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Lord *Bacon's* Eſſays

CONTINUED IN

Twenty Seven Chapters, Tranſlated from His Lordſhip's Treatiſe,

De Augmentis Scientiarum.

By WILLIAM WILLYMOTT, L. L. D. Fellow of *King's-College* in *Cambridge*, and Maſter of a Private School at *Iſleworth* in *Middleſex*.

With the Life of the Author.

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9. *Caſtalio.*
10. *Nouns* and *Verbs.*
11. *Corderius* with *Engliſh* Notes.

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THE

LIFE

Of the Honourable

AUTHOR:

Written in Latin *by his Lordſhip's Chaplain,* Dr. WILLIAM RAWLEY, *and thus Tranſlated.*

FRANCIS BACON, the Glory of his Age and Nation; the Adorner, and Ornament of Learning, was Born in *York-Place*, in the Street called the *Strand*, on the twenty-ſecond of *January*, in the Year of our Lord, 1560. His Father was that famous Counſellor to

Queen *Elizabeth*, the second Prop of the Kingdom, in his Time, Sir *Nicholas Bacon*, Knight, Lord-Keeper of the Great Seal of *England*; a Worthy, of known Prudence, Judgment, Moderation, and Integrity: His Mother was *Ann Cook*, a Daughter of Sir *Anthony Cook*, Knight; unto whom the Erudition of King *Edward*, the Sixth, had been committed; a choice Lady, and eminent for Piety, Virtue, and Learning; being exquisitely skill'd, for a Woman, in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongue. These being the Parents, any one might easily make an early Conjecture, what the Issue was like to be; having had all the Advantages that Nature and Education could give him.

His first and tender Years of Childhood, pass'd not without remarkable Proofs of superior Excellency; at which Age, he was endued with such a towardness and acuteness of Wit, as gave great Hopes of that profound and universal Apprehension, which he was afterwards famous for; and caused him to be taken notice of by several of the Nobles, and other Persons of Eminence for Worth and Place; and especially by the Queen her self, who (as I have been credibly inform'd) delighted to talk with him, and to try him with pretty hard Questions: Unto whom he acquitted himself with that Gravity and Maturity of Judgment, above his Years, that her Majesty used to call him,

The

The young Lord Keeper. When she ask'd him, *How old he was*, he ingeniously, tho' but a Child, answer'd, *That he was two Years younger than Her Majesty's happy Administration.*

At the ordinary Years of Ripeness for University-Learning, or rather something earlier, by Order of his Father, he was enter'd of *Trinity College*, under the Care of the most Reverend *John Whitgift*, Doctor of Divinity, then Master of the College, afterwards the Renowned Arch-Bishop of *Canterbury*, a Prelate of the First Magnitude, for Sanctity, Learning, Patience, and Humility; under whom he was observ'd to have made a wonderful Proficience, above any of his Co-temporaries, in the Liberal Arts and Sciences. Whilst he was yet a Student in the University, being about 16 Years of Age (as his Lordship hath been pleased to impart unto my self) he first fell into Dislike of the *Aristotelian* Philosophy, not from any Undervalue entertain'd of the Author, whom he ever used to extol most highly, but for the Unfruitfulness of the Way; being a Philosophy (as his Lordship was often pleas'd to say) made only for Disputations and Contentions, but for the production of Works for the Benefit of human Life, altogether barren. In which Mind he continu'd to his dying Day.

After he had run the Circle of the Liberal Arts, his Father thought fit to frame and mould him to the Arts of State; and

for that End sent him over into *France*, in the Retinue of Sir *Amyas Paulet*, then design'd Ambassador in ordinary to the *French* King: By whom he was, after a while, held fit to be sent back into *England* with a Message to the Queen. Which Affair having perform'd, not without Thanks from Her Majesty, he return'd a second Time into *France*, with Intention not to see *England* again for some Years. During his Travels in *France*, his Father, the Lord-Keeper, died; leaving (as I have heard of knowing Persons) a considerable Sum of Money, collected with Intention to have made a Purchase of Land for the use of this his youngest Son; (who was the only one unprovided for after his Father's Death; and tho' he had the least Part of his Father's Estate, he had a principal Share in his Affection) but this Purchase being design'd only whilst his Father was alive, and not accomplish'd, there came no greater Share to him than his single Part, and Portion of the Money dividable among five Brethren; which was the Cause of his living in some Straits and Necessities in his younger Years. For as for that noble and pleasant Manour of *Gorhambury*, he came not to it, till many Years after, namely, by the Death of his dearest Brother, Mr. *Anthony Bacon*, a celebrated Gentleman, and perfectly well vers'd in foreign Courts, equal to his Brother in height of Wit, but inferiour to him

him in the knowledge of the Liberal Arts; between whom there was a great Dearneſs of Affection, they Two being the ſole Male Iſſue of a ſecond *Venter*.

Being return'd from *France*, he was to reſolve upon a Courſe of Life; therefore he apply'd himſelf to the Study and Profeſſion of the *Common-Law*, in which he attain'd to great Excellency in a ſhort Time; tho' (to uſe his own Words) he made that Knowledge but as an Acceſſary, not as his principal Study. He publiſh'd, at the very beginning, ſeveral Tractates upon that Subject, wherein, tho' ſome great Maſters of the Law outwent him, perhaps, in Bulk and Number of Caſes, yet in Weight, and in the Knowledge of the Grounds and Myſteries of the Law, he was exceeded by none.

Before he was out of his *Freſhmanſhip* in the Law, he was ſworn of the *Queen's Council Learned Extraordinary*; a Grace (as I have been told) ſcarce ever indulg'd to any before. He ſeated himſelf for the Convenience of his Studies, and Practice, amongſt the Honourable Society of *Greyes-Inn*; of which *Houſe* he admitted himſelf a Member, where he erected that elegant Pile, or Structure, commonly known by the Name of, *The Lord Bacon's Lodgings*; which he inhabited by Turns the moſt Part of his Life, (ſome few Years only excepted) unto his dying Day: In which Society he carried himſelf with

ſuch Sweetneſs, Pleaſantry, and Generoſity of Spirit, that he was much revered and loved by the Seniors, and young Gentlemen of the Houſe.

But notwithſtanding that he ſtuck to the Profeſſion of the Law, for his Livelihood, and Subſiſtence, yet, in his Heart and Affection, he was carried more to Political Arts, and Places of State; for which, if Her Royal Majeſty had then pleas'd, he was ſingularly Qualified. In his younger Years, he join'd himſelf with thoſe that ſtudied the Service and Fortunes of that noble, but unfortunate Worthy, the Earl of *Eſſex*, whom he ſerv'd, to the utmoſt of his Power, as a private, and moſt faithful Counſellor; and indeavour'd to inſtil into him ſafe and honourable Advice, till, in the end, the Earl heark'ning to the Counſels of certain raſh and violent Perſons, hurried himſelf into Ruin.

His Birth, and ingenuous Qualifications, gave him, above others of his Profeſſion, an eaſy and free Acceſs to Court, and conſequently to the Queen's Preſence; who vouchſafed to diſcourſe him in private, and with great Familiarity, (whenever it was convenient) not only about Matters of his Profeſſion, and Law-Buſineſs, but alſo about the arduous Affairs of the State of the Kingdom; in whoſe Anſwers, from Time to Time, ſhe was hugely ſatisfy'd. Nevertheleſs, tho' ſhe cheared

cheared him much with the Bounty of her Countenance, yet she never cheared him with the Bounty of her Hand, having never confer'd upon him any Office, whether of Honour or Profit, save only one dry Reversion of the *Register's-Office* in the *Star-Chamber*, worth about 1600 *l. per Annum*; for which he waited, in expectation, either fully, or near twenty Years; of which Office his Lordship, in Queen *Elizabeth*'s Time, pleasantly said, *That it was like another Man's Ground lying upon his House, which might mend his Prospect, but did not fill his Barn.* Nevertheless, in the Reign of King *James*, he at last enjoy'd it, and manag'd it by a Deputy. But this could not be any ways imputed to a Disaffection, or Averseness in the Queen towards him, but to the Arts and Emulation of a certain Peer at that Time in great Favour with the Queen, who labour'd by all means to depress and keep him down, lest, if he had risen to any Pitch, his own Glory might have been obscured by him.

But tho' he stood long at a Stay, in the Days of his Mistress, Queen *Elizabeth*, yet after the change of Administration, and coming in of his new Master, King *James*, he made a hasty Progress; by whom he was remarkably advanc'd into Places of Trust, Honour, and Profit. I have seen a Letter in his Lordship's own Hand to King *James*, wherein he acknowledges, *That he was that*

Master to him, that had raised, and advanced him nine Times; thrice in Dignity, and six Times in Office. The *Offices* he means were, I conceive, *Council Learned extraordinary to His Majesty*; (as he had been before to Queen *Elizabeth*) *King's Sollicitor-General*; *King's Attorney-General*; *Privy-Counsellor*, being yet but *Attorney*; *Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of* England; lastly, *Lord Chancellor*: Which two last Places, tho' they be the same in Authority and Power, yet they differ in Patent, Heighth, and Favour of the Prince; since whose Time, none of his Successors was ever grac'd with the Title of *Lord Chancellor* to this Day. His *Dignities* were, first, *Knight*; then, *Baron of Verulam*; lastly, *Viscount St. Alban*: Besides other good Gifts, and Bounties of the Hand, which his Majesty was pleas'd to give him, both out of the *Broad Seal*, and *Alienation Office*.

Towards his rising Years, he had Thoughts of Marriage. Accordingly he took to Wife, *Alice*, one of the Daughters, and Co-Heirs of *Benedict Barnham*, Esquire, and Alderman of *London*; with whom he receiv'd a sufficiently ample, and liberal Portion, as well in Land, as Money. Children by her he had none; which though they be a Means to perpetuate our Name after our Death, yet he had the Fortune to be bless'd with another *Issue* to perpetuate his Memory, the *Issue* of his Brain, in which he was ever Happy, and Wonder-

ful;

ful; like *Jupiter*, when he brought forth *Pallas*. Neither did the Want of Children, in the leaſt, abate his Affection to his Conſort, whom he ever proſecuted with the higheſt conjugal Love, and Marks of Reſpect; with many rich Gifts, and Settlements, beſides a matrimonial Robe of Honour, which ſhe wore twenty Years after his Death. For ſo long ſhe ſurviv'd her honourable Husband.

The laſt Five Years of his Life, withdrawing from Civil Affairs, and an active Life, he employ'd wholly in Contemplation and Studies. A Thing which he ſeems to have had moſt at Heart; as if he had affected to dye in the Shade, rather than in the Light. Whereof plain Diſcoveries are to be met with, in peruſing his Works. In which Time he compoſed the greateſt Part of his Books, both in *Engliſh* and *Latin*; which I will endeavour to ennumerate in the juſt Order of Time (being preſent, and obſerving it) wherein they were Written. They ſtand thus. *The Hiſtory of the Reign of* Henry *the Seventh King of* England, in the *Engliſh* Tongue. *Abecedarium Naturæ*; a Metaphyſical Piece, which by ſome ill Fate is loſt. *Hiſtoria Ventorum. Hiſtoria Vitæ et Mortis. Hiſtoria Denſi, et Rari*, now firſt Printed. *Hiſtoria Gravis, & Levis*; which is alſo loſt. Theſe Books written in *Latin*. Afterwards certain Fragments in *Engliſh*; as, *A Diſcourſe of a War with* Spain. *A Dialogue touching an Ho-*

Holy War. *The Fable of the New* Atlantis. *A Preface to a Digeſt of the Laws of* England. *The beginning of the Hiſtory of the Reign of* Henry *the Eighth King of* England. There had paſs'd between, *A Work concerning the Advancement of Learning* ; in the Tranſlating of which, by his own proper Strength, and without Help, out of *Engliſh* into *Latin*, he labour'd exceedingly, and enrich'd it every where with many and various Additions and Enlargements. Afterwards, *Counſels Civil and Moral*, (call'd before, *Eſſays*) but then enlarg'd both in Number and Weight, in the *Engliſh* Tongue. *The Converſion of certain Pſalms of* David *into* Engliſh *Verſe*. Again ; *The Tranſlation of certain Writings of his out of* Engliſh *into* Latin ; as, *The Hiſtory of King* Henry *the Seventh*. *Counſels Civil and Moral* ; call'd after that, *Sermones Fideles* ; or, *Interiorꝫ Rerum*. *The Dialogue of the Holy War* : And, *The Fable of the New* Atlantis ; to gratify Foreigners, who, he was told, had a Deſire to ſee them. His Book of *The Wiſdom of the Antients*, reviſed. *Inquiſitio de Magnete*. *Topica Inquiſitionis de Luce & Lumine*. Laſtly, *Sylva Sylvarum* ; or, *The Natural Hiſtory*, an *Engliſh* Piece. And theſe were the Fruits and Productions of his laſt Years. Books wrote before that Time, I mention not. His Lordſhip alſo deſign'd (upon the Motion of His Majeſty K. *Charles*)

to

to have written the Reign of King *Henry* the Eighth : But that Book went no further than Design only, God not indulging our glorious Author longer Life. However there is a Specimen extant of that History, being the Product of a few Morning Hours of one Day, amongst his Lordship's Miscellany Works publish'd in *English*; by which you may see, *ex ungue Leonem.*

There is a Commemoration due, as well to the Virtues, and Abilities of this Great Man, as to the Course of his Life. Those Abilities, which commonly are parted, and go single in other Men, tho' of prime Parts, met together, and were married as it were in him. Those were, *Sharpness of Wit, Strength of Memory, a piercing Judgment,* and a *flowing Elocution.* For the former Three, his Books do abundantly speak them; of which (as *Hirtius* says of *Julius Cæsar*) *how well and correctly he wrote them, let the World judge; but with what ease and quickness he dictated them, I know my self.* But for the Fourth, that is, his *Elocution*, I shall mention what I my self heard Sir *Walter Rawleigh* (whose Judgment may well be trusted) once speak of him; *That the Earl of* SALISBURY *was a good Speaker, but no good Pen-Man*; on the other Hand, *That the Earl of* NORTHAMPTON *was a good Pen-Man, but no good Speaker*; but that *Sir* FRANCIS BACON *excell'd in both, Speaking and Writing.*

I have often thought, that, if there was any Man, whom God vouchſaf'd to illuminate with a Beam of Human Knowledge, in theſe modern Times, it was undoubtedly He. For though he was a great Reader of Books, yet that he drew his Knowledge from Books only, muſt never be granted; but from certain Principles and Notions, lighted up within himſelf; which notwithſtanding he vented not raſhly, but with great Caution, and Circumſpection. His *Novum Organum* (which in his own Account was the chiefeſt of his Works) was no ſlight Imagination, or Fancy of his Brain; but a fixt as it were, and radicated Notion; the Production of many Years inceſſant Labour. I my ſelf have found, among his Lordſhip's private Papers, about twelve Copies of the *Novum Organum*, labour'd, and reviſed from Year to Year, and every Year ſtill further poliſh'd and amended, till at laſt it came to that Frame, in which it was publiſh'd: As many living Creatures lick their Young, till they bring them to Strength of Limbs.

In the compoſing of his Books, he principally drove at Strength and Perſpicuity of Expreſſion; not Elegancy, or Spruceneſs of Language. And in Writing, or Dictating, would often ask, *If the Meaning were expreſs'd clearly and plainly enough:* As knowing it fit, that Words ſhould be ſubſervient to Matter, not Matter to Words. And if he happen'd

happen'd to hit upon a polite Stile, (as he was reckon'd a Master of the *English* Tongue) it was because he could do no otherwise. Neither was he taken with trifling and playing upon Words; but did ever purposely and industriously avoid it; well knowing that such Fooleries are but Deviations and Digressions from the Scope intended, and prejudice, and derogate, not a little, from the Gravity and Dignity of the Stile.

He was no Plodder upon Books: For though he read much, and that with great Judgment, and rejection of Impertinencies incident to many Authors, yet he would interlace a moderate Relaxation of Mind with his Studies; as gentle Walking, Coaching, slow Riding, playing at Bowls, and other such-like Exercises. And yet he would lose no Time; for, upon his first return, he would immediately fall to Reading, or Thinking again; and so suffer'd no Moment, or Slip of Time, to be lost, and pass by him unprofitably.

You might call his Table a Refection of the Ear, as well as the Stomach: Like the *Noctes Atticæ*, or Entertainments of the *Deipnosophists*; wherein a Man might be refresh'd in his Mind and Understanding, no less than in his Body. I have known some of no mean Parts, that have profess'd to make use of their Note-Books, when they have risen from his Table. He never took a Pride,

as

as is the Humour of ſome, in putting any of his Gueſts, or that otherwiſe diſcours'd with him, to the Bluſh; but was ever ready to countenance and encourage their Abilities, whatever they were. Neither was he one that would appropriate the Diſcourſe to himſelf alone, but left a Liberty to the reſt of the Company to take their Turns; wherein he took Pleaſure to hear a Man ſpeak in his own Faculty, and would draw him on, and allure him to diſcourſe upon ſuch a Subject. And for himſelf, he deſpiſed no Man's Obſervations; but would light his Torch at any Man's Candle.

His Opinions, and Aſſertions, were ſcarce ever controverted; and whilſt he diſcours'd, all hearken'd, and none contradicted; as if he had utter'd Oracles, rather than Diſcourſes. Which, I think, may be imputed either to the exact weighing of his Sentence, before he declar'd it, in the Scales of Truth and Reaſon; or to the Eſteem wherein he was univerſally held, that no Man would conteſt with him. So that there was no Argumentation, or *Pro* and *Con* known at his Table: Or, if there chanced to be any, it was carried with much Submiſſion and Moderation.

I have often obſerv'd, and ſo have other Men of great Account, that if he had occaſion, in Diſcourſe, to repeat another Man's Words after him, he had a Faculty to dreſs them

in

in new and better Apparel: So that the Author ſhould find his own Speech better'd in the Stile, but in Senſe and Subſtance the ſame; as if it had been natural to him to uſe good Forms: As *Ovid* ſpake of his Faculty of Verſifying;

Et quod tentabam dicere, Verſus erat.

Whenever his Office oblig'd him (as he was of the *King's Counſel Learned*) to charge any Offender, either in *Criminal*, or *Capital Matters*, he never ſhew'd any thing of Haughtineſs, or Inſult over the Delinquent; but behav'd himſelf with Mildneſs, and decent Temper: And though he knew it his Duty, as concern'd for the King, to charge the Party Home, yet he carried it ſo as to caſt a ſevere Eye upon the Example, and a merciful Eye upon the Perſon. And in Affairs of State, when he was made of the *Privy-Council*, he obſerv'd an excellent Method of *Adviſing*; not engaging his Maſter in any precipitate, or unpopular and oppreſſive Counſels; but in moderate, and equal Courſes: King *James* honouring him with this Teſtimony, *That he had the Knack of managing Buſineſs in a pleaſing agreeable Manner*; and declar'd, *That was the Way which was moſt according to his own Heart.*

Neither

Neither was he (when there was Occasion) less Gracious with the Subjects of the Kingdom, than with the King himself. He was ever very acceptable to the *House of Commons*, whilst he was a Member thereof. Being the King's *Attorney*, and chosen to a Place in Parliament, he was allow'd and dispens'd with, to sit in the House, which was not permitted to other *Attornies*. And as he had the Reputation of a good Servant to his Master, being never, in 19 Years Service, (as himself averr'd) rebuked by the King, for any Offence relating to His Majesty; so he had the Character of a good Master to his own Servants; and freely rewarded their long Attendance with good Places, when they fell into his Power; which was the Cause why he was almost tired with Importunities to admit so many young Gentlemen of Blood and Quality into the Number of his Retinue. And if any of them made an ill Use of his Grace and Favour, it must be imputed only to an Errour in the Goodness of his Nature, and be a perpetual Mark of Infamy and Indiscretion upon them.

This great Man was strictly Religious. For though the World be apt to brand great Politicians, and exalted Wits, with the Name of *Atheists*, yet He was conversant with God; as evidently appears by various Testimonies, scatter'd throughout the whole Thread of his Works. Otherwise he would have destroy'd

ſtroy'd, and overturn'd his own Principles, which were, *That a ſmattering in Philoſophy draws the Mind from God, as attributing too much to ſecond Cauſes; but a full Draught of Philoſophy, brings it about again to God.* Now that He was a deep *Philoſopher*, I believe there is no one that will deny. And not only ſo; but he was both able and ready *to render a Reaſon of the Hope, which was in him*; which that Writing of his, *The Confeſſion of Faith*, doth abundantly teſtify. He repaired frequently (when his Health would permit him) to the Service of the Church; to hear Sermons; to the adminiſtration of the Sacrament; and at laſt died in the true Faith, eſtabliſh'd in the Church of *England*.

This may be laid down for a certain Truth, That he was entirely void of all Malice; which (as he ſaid himſelf) *he neither bred, nor fed.* As for revenging of Injuries, he never ſo much as thought of it; for which, if he had been ſo diſpos'd, he was arm'd both with Opportunity and Power. He was no Heaver of Men out of their Places; as if the Ruin and Undoing of others were *Fatneſs to his Bones.* He was no Defamer of any Man to his Prince. One Day, when a great Stateſman, that had been no Friend of his, was newly dead, the King ask'd him, *What he thought of that Lord which was gone*; to whom he made anſwer, *That he was one*

that never would have advanc'd or improv'd His Majesty's Estate; but undoubtedly he would have done his best to keep it from being worse. Which I reckon not among his moral, but his christian Virtues.

His Fame is greater, and sounds louder abroad, and in foreign Parts, than at Home, in his own Nation; thereby verifying that divine Oracle, *A Prophet is not without Honour, save in his own Countrey, and in his own House.* Concerning which, I will give you a Taste only, out of a Letter, written from *Italy* (the Store-House of refined Wits) to the late Earl of *Devonshire*, then the Lord *Candish.* It was thus: *I will expect the NEW ESSAYS of my Lord Chancellor* Bacon; *as also his History, and whatever else he is composing, with great Impatience: But particularly, in his History I promise my self a perfect and finish'd Piece, especially in* Henry *the Seventh*; *where he will have Scope to exercise the Talent of his divine Understanding. This Lord is daily more and more known, and his Works here more and more delighted in*; *and those Men that have a more than ordinary Insight into human Affairs, esteem him one of the most capable, and most sublime Spirits of this Age*; *and he is truly such.*

Now his Fame does not decay by length of Time, but encreases rather. Divers of his Books have been taught to speak other Languages, as well Learned as Modern, both

some

ſome time ſince, and lately, by the Natives of thoſe Countries. Several Perſons of Quality, during his Lordſhip's Life, croſs'd the Seas into *England*, for no other Reaſon but to ſee him, and to gain an Opportunity of diſcourſing with him. One of whom he preſented with his Picture, at full length, to carry into *France* with him; which that Stranger acknowledg'd would be a Thing moſt acceptable to his Country-men, that ſo they might enjoy the Image of his Perſon, as well as the Images of his Brain, his Books. Amongſt the reſt, Marquis *Fiat*, a *French* Nobleman, who came Ambaſſador into *England* the firſt Year of Queen *Mary*, Wife to King *Charles*, was taken with an extraordinary Deſire to ſee him. And meeting with an Opportunity for it, when he was come into his Chamber, being then, through Weakneſs, confined to his Bed, he ſaluted him in a Stile a little of the grandeſt; *That his Lordſhip had ever been to him like the Angels, of whom he had heard much, and had alſo read much of them in Books, but was never indulg'd a Sight of them.* After which Interview, ſo intimate a Friendſhip was contracted between them, and the Marquis did ſo much revere him, that beſides frequent Viſits, Letters paſs'd between them under the Titles and Appellations of *Father* and *Son*. As for Salutations, without Number, by Letters from foreign Worthies, devoted to Wiſdom, or good Learn-

ing, I forbear to mention them; becauſe this is a Thing common to other Men of Note, together with him.

But when I ſpeak of his Fame, I would be underſtood not in the Excluſive, but in the Comparative only; for his Reputation is not decay'd, or weak, but ſtrong and vigorous, among thoſe of his Country alſo; eſpecially ſuch as are of a more acute and ſublime Underſtanding; which I will exemplify but with two Teſtimonies, and no more. The former is this: When his *Hiſtory of the Reign of* Henry *the Seventh* was ready for the Preſs, it was deliver'd by King *James* to the Lord *Brook* to peruſe; who, when he had diſpatch'd it, return'd it to the Author with this Elogy, *Commend me to his Lordſhip, and deſire him to get good Paper and Ink, for the Work is incomparable.* The other ſhall be that of Doctor *Samuel Collins*, late Profeſſor of Divinity, and Provoſt of *King's College* in *Cambridge*, a Man of no vulgar Wit, who affirm'd to me, (whether in Mirth or Earneſt) *That when he had read the Book of the Advancement of Learning, he found himſelf in a caſe to begin his Studies anew; and that he had loſt all the Time of his Studying before.*

It hath been deſired by ſome Perſons, that ſomething ſhould be inſerted touching his Diet, and the Regimen of his Health; for that, by reaſon of his univerſal Inſight into

to

to Nature, he may, perhaps, be to some an Example therein. For his Diet, it was rather plentiful and liberal, as his Stomach would bear, than low or restrained; which he elsewhere commended in his *History of Life and Death*. In his younger Years he fed chiefly upon the finer and lighter Meats (as Fowls, and the like) but, upon further Experience, he approv'd rather the stronger Meats, such as the *Shambles* afford; as those Meats which bred the stronger and more solid, and (to use his own Words) *the less dissipable* Juices of the Body; and would often eat nothing else, though there were other Dishes upon the Table. You may be sure he would by no means neglect that himself, which you find so much extol'd in his Writings; that is, the frequent use of *Nitre*, whereof he took the Quantity of about three Grains, in thin, warm Broth, every Morning, for thirty Years, more or less, next before his Death. As for Medicine, it is true, that he lived *Medicinally*, but not *Miserably*; for he constantly took half a Dram, and no more, of *Rhubarb*, infused in a Draught of White-Wine and Beer mingled together, for the space of half an Hour, once in six or seven Days: And that a little before Meat (whether Dinner, or Supper) that it might dry the Body the less; which (as himself asserted) carried away frequently the grosser Humours of the Body, without causing the

Spirits to exhale, which repeated Sweatings do. And for other Phyſick, (whatſoever hath been commonly ſaid) he uſed none. The Receipt for the *Gout*, which himſelf was the Author of, and which, upon frequent Experience, eaſed his Pain within two Hours, is extant in the End of the *Natural Hiſtory*.

It may ſeem that the *Moon* had ſome principal Place in the Figure of his Nativity. For as often as the Moon was eclipſed, he was ſeiz'd with a ſudden Fit of Fainting ; and that tho' he had no previous Knowledge of the Lunar Defect : And the Eclipſe no ſooner ceas'd, but he recover'd, and came to himſelf again.

He died on the 19th Day of *April*, in the Year 1626, early in the Morning of the Day celebrated for our Saviour's Reſurrection, in the 66th Year of his Age, at the Earl of *Arundel*'s Houſe, in *High-Gate*, near *London* ; to which Place he caſually repaired eight Days before, for Diverſion, and not with deſign to ſtay ; God ſo ordaining, that he ſhould dye there of a gentle Fever, accompanied with a violent Defluxion, whereby the Rheum fell ſo plentifully upon his Breaſt, that he dyed by Suffocation. He was buried in St. *Michael*'s Church, at St. *Albans* ; the Place appointed for his Burial by his laſt Will and Teſtament, both becauſe the Body of his Mother was inter'd there ;

and

and becauſe it was the only Church remaining from the Ruins of old *Verulam.* Where he hath a noble Monument of *White Marble* erected for him (by the Care and Gratitude of Sir *Thomas Meautys*, Kt. his Executor, and formerly his Lordſhip's Secretary, and afterwards Clark of the Privy-Council, under two Kings) repreſenting his Effigies ſitting in a Chair, and ſtudying; together with an Epitaph compoſed out of Love and Admiration, by that accompliſh'd Gentleman, and bright Wit, Sir *Henry Wotton.*

But howſoever his Body, which he depoſited, was mortal, yet his Works and Memory will undoubtedly live, and endure as long as the World endures. In order to which, I have thought good (according to my poor Ability) to make this Collection, ſuch as it is, by way of contributing (after a ſort) to the propagating of his Name to Poſterity.

The

December 23. 1710. Nº. 267.

The TATLER.

Qui genus humanum ingenio ſuperavit, et omnes
Reſtinxit ſtellas, exortus uti Æthereus Sol.
Lucr.

I Have heard, that it is a Rule among the Conventuals of ſeveral Orders in the *Romiſh* Church, to ſhut themſelves up at a certain Time of the Year, not only from the World in general, but from the Members of their own Fraternity, and to paſs away ſeveral Days by themſelves, in ſettling Accounts between their Maker and their own Souls, in cancelling unrepented Crimes, and renewing their Contracts of Obedience for the future. Such ſtated Times for particular Acts of Devotion, or the exerciſe of certain religious Duties, have been enjoin'd in all civil Government, whatever Deity they worſhipped, or whatever Religion they profeſſed. That which may be done at all Times, is often totally neglected and forgotten,

gotten, unleſs fixed and determined to ſome Time more than another; and therefore, tho' ſeveral Duties may be ſuitable to every Day of our Lives, they are moſt likely to be perform'd, if ſome Days are more particularly ſet apart for the Practice of them. Our Church has accordingly inſtituted ſeveral Seaſons of Devotion, when Time, Cuſtom, Preſcription, and (if I may ſo ſay) the Faſhion it ſelf, call upon a Man to be ſerious and attentive to the great End of his Being.

I have hinted in ſome former Papers, that the greateſt and wiſeſt of Men in all Ages and Countries, particularly in *Rome* and *Greece*, were renowned for their Piety and Virtue. It is now my Intention to ſhow how thoſe in our own Nation, that have been unqueſtionably the moſt eminent for Learning and Knowledge, were likewiſe the moſt eminent for their adherence to the Religion of their Country.

I might produce very ſhining Examples among the Clergy; but becauſe Prieſtcraft is the common Cry of every cavilling, empty Scribbler, I ſhall ſhew, that all the Laymen who have exerted a more than ordinary Genius in their Writings, and were the Glory of their Times, were Men whoſe Hopes were filled with Immortality, and the Proſpect of future Rewards, and Men who lived in a dutiful Submiſſion to all the Doctrines of Revealed Religion.

I shall in this Paper only instance Sir *Francis Bacon*, a Man who for the Greatness of Genius, and Compass of Knowledge, did Honour to his Age and Country; I could almost say, to human Nature it self. He possess'd at once all those extraordinary Talents which were divided amongst the greatest Authors of Antiquity. He had the sound, distinct, comprehensive Knowledge of *Aristotle*, with all the beautiful Lights, Graces, and Embellishments of *Cicero*. One does not know which to admire most in his Writings, the Strength of Reason, Force of Stile, or Brightness of Imagination.

This Author has remarked in several Parts of his Works, that a thorough Insight into Philosophy makes a good Believer, and that a Smattering in it naturally produces such a Race of despicable Infidels, as the little profligate Writers of this present Age, whom (I must confess) I have always accused to my self, not so much for their Want of Faith as their Want of Learning.

I was infinitely pleased to find among the Works of this extraordinary Man, a Prayer of his own composing, which for the Elevation of Thought, and Greatness of Expression, seems rather the Devotion of an Angel than a Man. His principal Fault seems to have been the Excess of that Virtue which covers a multitude of Faults. This betrayed him to so great an Indul-

gence

gence towards his Servants, who made a corrupt Use of it, that it ſtripp'd him of all thoſe Riches and Honours which a long Series of Merits had heaped upon him. But in this Prayer, at the ſame Time that we find him proſtrating himſelf before the great Mercy-Seat, and humbled under Afflictions, which at that Time lay heavy upon him, we ſee him ſupported by the Senſe of his Integrity, his Zeal, his Devotion, and his Love to Mankind, which give him a much higher Figure in the Minds of Thinking Men, than that Greatneſs had done from which he was fallen. I ſhall beg leave to write down the Prayer it ſelf, with the Title to it, as it was found among his Lordſhip's Papers, written by his own Hand; not being able to furniſh my Reader with an Entertainment more ſuitable to this ſolemn Time.

A Prayer, *or* Pſalm, *made by my Lord* Bacon, *Chancellor of* England.

'MOST gracious Lord God, my merciful Father; from my Youth-up, 'my Creator, my Redeemer, my Comforter. 'Thou, O Lord, ſoundeſt and ſearcheſt the 'Depths and Secrets of all Hearts; Thou 'acknowledgeſt the upright of Heart; Thou 'judgeſt

‘ judgeſt the Hypocrite ; Thou pondereſt
‘ Men's Thoughts and Doings, as in a Ba-
‘ lance ; Thou meaſureſt their Intentions
‘ as with a Line : Vanity and crooked Ways
‘ cannot be hid from Thee. Remember, O
‘ Lord ! how thy Servant hath walked be-
‘ fore Thee : Remember what I have firſt
‘ ſought, and what hath been principal in
‘ my Intentions. I have loved thy Aſſem-
‘ blies, I have mourned for the Diviſions of
‘ thy Church, I have delighted in the
‘ Brightneſs of thy Sanctuary. This Vine,
‘ which thy Right-Hand hath planted in
‘ this Nation, I have ever prayed unto
‘ Thee, that it might have the firſt and
‘ the latter Rain ; and that it might ſtretch
‘ her Branches to the Seas, and to the Floods.
‘ The State and Bread of the Poor and Op-
‘ preſſed have been precious in mine Eyes.
‘ I have hated all Cruelty, and hardneſs of
‘ Heart. I have (tho' in a deſpiſed Weed)
‘ procured the Good of all Men. If any
‘ have been my Enemies, I thought not of
‘ them ; neither hath the Sun almoſt ſet
‘ upon my Diſpleaſure ; but I have been as
‘ a Dove, free from Superfluity of Mali-
‘ ciouſneſs. Thy Creatures have been my
‘ Books, but thy Scriptures much more. I
‘ have ſought Thee in the Courts, Fields,
‘ Gardens, but I have found Thee in thy
‘ Temple.

‘ Thou-

' Thouſands have been my Sins, and ten ' Thouſands my Tranſgreſſions, but thy San- ' ctifications have remained with me, and ' my Heart (through thy Grace) hath been ' an unquenched Coal upon thine Altar.

' O Lord, my Strength! I have ſince my ' Youth met with Thee in all my Ways, by ' thy fatherly Compaſſions, by thy comfor- ' table Chaſtiſements, and by thy moſt viſi- ' ble Providence. As thy Favours have in- ' creaſed upon me, ſo have thy Correcti- ' ons; ſo as Thou haſt been always near ' me, O Lord! And ever as my worldly ' Bleſſings were exalted, ſo ſecret Darts from ' Thee have pierced me; and when I have ' aſcended before Men, I have deſcended in ' Humiliation before Thee. And now when ' I thought moſt of Peace and Honour, ' thy Hand is heavy upon me, and hath ' humbled me according to thy former lo- ' ving Kindneſs, keeping me ſtill in thy fa- ' therly School, not as a Baſtard, but as a ' Child. Juſt are thy Judgments upon me ' for my Sins, which are more in Num- ' ber than the Sands of the Sea, but have ' no proportion to thy Mercies: For what ' are the Sands of the Sea? Earth, Hea- ' vens, and all theſe, are nothing to thy ' Mercies.

' Beſides my innumerable Sins, I confeſs ' before Thee, that I am a Debtor to Thee ' for the gracious Talent of thy Gifts and

' Graces,

'Graces, which I have neither put into a 'Napkin, nor put it (as I ought) to Ex-'changers, where it might have made beſt 'Profit, but miſpent it in Things for which 'I was leaſt fit: So I may truly ſay, 'my Soul hath been a Stranger in the 'Courſe of my Pilgrimage. Be merciful 'unto me, O Lord, for my Saviour's ſake, 'and receive me unto thy Boſome, or guide 'me in thy Ways.

BACON's Essays

CONTINU'D.

CHAP. I.

Of the Discredits *of* LEARNING, *and the Answer.*

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Lib. Prim.

TO clear the Way, and as it were to command Silence, in order to have the Testimonies concerning the Dignity of Learning to be better heard, without the Interruption of tacit Objections, I have determin'd in the first Place, to deliver Learning from the

the Diſgraces and Diſcredits, which Ignorance has caſt upon it; but Ignorance, under ſeveral Forms, appearing and diſcovering it ſelf ſometimes in the Zeal of Divines, ſometimes in the Arrogance of Politicians, and ſometimes in the Errors of Learned Men themſelves.

I hear the firſt ſay, *That Knowledge is of the Number of thoſe Things, which are to be admitted with Limitation and Caution: That an over-great Appetite of Knowledge, was the firſt Sin, whereupon enſued the Fall of Man; and that even to this Day it hath ſomewhat of the Serpent in it; for when it enters, it makes a Man ſwell*; Scientia inflat. *That* Solomon *is of Opinion, that there is no end of making Books; and that much Reading is wearineſs of the Fleſh.* And in another place, *That in much Wiſdom there is much Grief: And that he that encreaſeth Knowledge, encreaſeth Anxiety.* That St. *Paul* puts in a Caveat, *That we be not ſpoiled through vain Philoſophy.* Further, *That Experience demonſtrates, that the learned'ſt Men have been Arch-Hereticks; and the learned'ſt Times inclined to Atheiſm.* Finally, *That the contemplation of Second Cauſes derogates from the Authority of the Firſt Cauſe.*

TO diſcover then the Falſity of this Opinion, and the Weakneſs of its Foundation, any

any Man may ſee plainly, that theſe Men do not obſerve and conſider, that the Knowledge which occaſion'd the Fall, was not that pure and primitive Knowledge of Nature, by the Light of which, Man gave Names to other Creatures in Paradiſe, as they were brought before him, according to their Proprieties; but that proud Knowledge of *Good* and *Evil*, by which he affected to ſhake off God, and give Law to himſelf. Neither is it any Quantity of Knowledge, how great ſoever, that can ſwell the Mind, ſince nothing can fill the Soul, much leſs extend it, but God, and the Contemplation of God: And therefore *Solomon* ſpeaking of the two principal Senſes of Inquiſition (*Seeing* and *Hearing*) ſaith, *That the Eye is never ſatisfied with Seeing, nor the Ear with Hearing.* Eccleſ. 1. 8. And if there be no Fulneſs, it follows, that the Continent is greater than the Content.

IN like manner, of Knowledge it ſelf, and the Mind of Man (to which the Senſes are but as Emiſſaries) he defines in theſe Words, which he ſubjoins to his Calendar, or Regiſter, that ſets down the Times and Seaſons of all Things, concluding thus: *God hath made all things beautiful, or decent, in the true return of their Seaſons.* Eccleſ. 3. 11. *Alſo he hath placed the World in Man's Heart, yet cannot Man find out the*

Work which God worketh from the Beginning to the End. By which Words he plainly intimates, that God has framed the Mind like a Mirrour, or Glaſs, capable of the Image of the Univerſal World, and as deſirous of receiving it, as the Eye is of Light, and delighted to behold not only the Varieties and Viciſſitudes of Times, but ambitious likewiſe to ſearch, and ſpy out the immoveable and inviolable Laws and Decrees of Nature. And altho' he ſeem to inſinuate, that the Whole of that Oeconomy of Nature (which he calls *the Work which God works from the Beginning to the End*) is not poſſible to be found out by Man; this does not derogate from the Capacity of Man, but ſhould be caſt upon the Impediments of Knowledge; ſuch as the ſhortneſs of Life, ſeparation in Men's Studies, a depraved and unfaithful Tradition of Knowledge, from hand to hand; and a World of other Inconveniencies, to which the Condition of Man is ſubject. For that no Part of the Univerſe is improper for the Diſquiſition of Man, he ſhews clearly enough in another Place, where he ſays, *The Spirit of Man is as the Lamp of God, wherewith he ſearcheth the Inwards of all Secrets.*

IF then ſuch be the Capacity of the Mind of Man, it is manifeſt that there is no Danger from the Quantity of Knowledge (how large

large ſoever) leſt it ſhould make it ſwell; but merely in the Quality of Knowledge, which tho' never ſo ſmall, if it be taken without its proper Antidote, hath a kind of Malignity and Venom in it, full of flatuous Symptoms. This Antidote, or Corrective-Spice (the mixture whereof tempers Knowledge, and renders it exceeding wholſome) is *Charity*, which alſo the Apoſtle ſubjoins to the former Clauſe, ſaying, *Knowledge puffeth up, but Charity buildeth up:* Not unlike that which he delivers in another Place, *Tho'* (ſays he) *I ſpake with the Tongues of Men, and of Angels, and have not Charity, I am become as ſounding Braſs, or a tinkling Cymbal*, 1 Cor. 13. Not but that it is an excellent Thing to ſpeak with the Tongues of Men and Angels, but becauſe if it be ſevered from *Charity*, and not referr'd to the publick Good of Mankind, it will rather exhibit an empty Glory, than any ſolid Fruit.

AS for *Solomon*'s Cenſure, touching the Exceſs of Writing and Reading Books; and the Anxiety of Spirit redounding from Knowledge; and that Admonition of St. *Paul*, *That we be not ſeduced by vain Philoſophy*; let thoſe Paſſages be rightly explain'd, and they do excellently point out the true Bounds and Limits, within which Human Knowledge is confined and circumſcribed, yet ſo as that She may be at liberty, without any

ſtraitning, to comprehend and take in the univerſal Nature of Things. The Limits are Three. *The Firſt*, That we do not ſo place our Felicity in Knowledge, as to forget our Mortality. *The Second*, That we do not ſo uſe our Knowledge, as that it may be the occaſion of Anxiety, not Tranquillity of Mind. *The Third*, That we do not think, by the Contemplation of Nature, to be able to reach the Divine Myſteries.

AS to the Firſt, *Solomon* doth excellently expound himſelf in another Place of the ſame Book, *Eccleſ.* 2. 13. *&c. I ſaw well*, ſaith he, *that Wiſdom recedeth as far from Folly, as Light from Darkneſs. The wiſe Man's Eyes keep watch in his Head, whereas the Fool roveth about in Darkneſs; but withal I learn'd, that the ſame Mortality involves them both.*

FOR the *Second*, Certain it is, that no Anxiety, or Perturbation of Mind, reſults from Knowledge, but merely by Accident. For all Knowledge, and Wonder, (which is the Seed of Knowledge) is in it ſelf Pleaſant; but when Concluſions are drawn from it, which being obliquely applied to our own Particular, beget either weak Fears, or vaſt Deſires, then, and not till then, ariſes that Vexation, and Trouble of Mind, of which we are ſpeaking: For then

then Knowledge is no longer *Dry Light*, (as *Heraclitus* the *Obſcure*, would have it, *Lumen ſiccum optima anima*; *Dry Light's the beſt Soul*) but becomes *Lumen madidum, atque Humoribus Affectuum maceratum*; *Light ſteeped and infuſed in the Humours of the Affections.*

THE *Third* Rule requires a more accurate Diſquiſition, and is not to be lightly paſſed over. For if any Man thinks, by a View and Enquiry into ſenſible and material Things, to attain ſo much Light, as will be ſufficient to diſcover the Nature, or Will of God, *that Man indeed is ſpoil'd through vain Philoſophy.* For the Contemplation of the Creatures, with regard to the Creatures themſelves, produces Knowledge; but with regard to God, Wonder only, which is a kind of broken Knowledge. And therefore it was moſt aptly ſaid by one of *Plato*'s School: *That Human Senſes reſemble the Sun, which reveals indeed the Terreſtrial Globe, but ſeals up the Celeſtial, and the Stars.* So the Senſe diſcovers natural Things, but darkens and ſhuts up Divine. And hence it hath come to paſs, that ſome of the learned Tribe have tumbled into Hereſy, whilſt they labour'd to fly up to the Secrets of the Deity, upon the waxen Wings of the Senſes.

AS to the Conceit of those, who are of Opinion that too much Knowledge inclines the Mind to Atheism, and that the Ignorance of Second Causes is, as it were, a Mid-wife to our Piety towards the First Cause, I would willingly ask these Persons *Job*'s Question, *Job* 13. 7. *Whether it be fit to Lie for God, and for his Sake to speak deceitfully, that we may gratify him?* For it is plain, that God worketh nothing in Nature, according to ordinary Course, but by Second Causes; and if they would have it otherwise believed, 'twould be mere Imposture, as it were, in favour to God; and nothing else, but to offer to the Author of Truth, the unclean Sacrifice of a Lye.

BUT further, it is an assured Truth, and warranted by Experience, that a small, or superficial Taste of Philosophy, may perchance incline a Man to Atheism, but that a deeper Draught brings him back again to Religion. For, in the entrance to Philosophy, when the Second Causes, which are, as it were, neareſt to the Senses, offer themselves to the Mind of Man, and the Mind it self cleaves unto them, and dwells upon them, an Oblivion of the First Cause may possibly creep in: But if a Man proceed further, and view the Dependence, Continuation, and Confederacy of Causes, and the

the Works of Providence, then according to the Allegory of the Poets, he will eaſily believe that the higheſt Link of *Nature's Chain*, is faſten'd to the Foot of *Jupiter's Chair*.

TO conclude in a Word, let no Man, in purſuit of the Name of an ill-apply'd Sobriety and Moderation, imagin, that we can go too far, or be too well-ſtudied in the Book of God's Word, or in the Book of God's Works, Divinity, or Philoſophy; but rather let Men awaken themſelves, and vigorouſly urge and purſue an endleſs Progreſs, or Proficiency in both; only let 'em beware, leſt they apply Knowledge to Swelling, not to Charity; to Oſtentation, not to Uſe: And again, That they do not unſkilfully mingle and confound thoſe diſtinct Learnings of Theology and Philoſophy, and their ſeveral Waters together.

CHAP. II.

Diſcredits of LEARNING *from the Objections of Politicians*, &c.

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Ibid.

NOW let us come to the Diſgraces wherewith the Politicians aſperſe Learning. They are of this Nature: *That the Arts ſoften Men's Minds, and render them unapt for Military Glory. Then, in matter of Politicks too, that they ſpoil Men's Diſpoſitions, making them either too Curious by Way of Reading, or too Peremptory and Poſitive by the Stiffneſs and Strictneſs of Rules; or too Swelling, by reaſon of the Greatneſs of Examples; or too Incompatible with the Times, by reaſon of the Diſſimilitude of Examples: But at leaſt, that they divert however, and alienate Men's Minds from Buſineſs and Action; inſtilling into them a love of Leiſure and Privacy: Next that they bring into States a Relaxation of Diſcipline, whilſt every Man is more ready to Argue, than to Obey.* Upon which Conceit, *Cato*, ſirnamed the *Cenſor*, one of the wiſeſt Men that ever lived, when the young Men of *Rome*, flock'd from all

Quar-

Quarters about *Carneades* the Philoſopher, who was come Embaſſador from *Rome*, taken with the Sweetneſs and Majeſty of his Eloquence, gave Counſel in full Senate, That they ſhould give him his Diſpatch with all ſpeed, leſt he ſhould infect and inchant the Minds of the Citizens, and at unawares bring in an Alteration of the Manners and Cuſtoms of the State. The ſame Conceit mov'd *Virgil* alſo, preferring the Honour of his Country, before his own Profeſſion, to make a Separation between the Arts of Policy, and the Arts of Literature, claiming thoſe to the *Romans*, and leaving theſe to the *Grecians*, in thoſe celebrated Verſes, *Æn.* 6. V. 847. *&c.*

Excudent alii, &c.

Let others better mould the running Maſs
Of Mettal, and inform the breathing Braſs,
And ſoften into Fleſh a Marble Face:
Plead better at the Bar; deſcribe the Skies,
And when the Stars deſcend, and when they riſe.
But Rome, *'tis Thine alone, with awful Sway,*
To rule Mankind, and make the World obey;
Diſpoſing Peace and War thy own majeſtick Way.
Dryden.

WE ſee likewiſe that *Anytas*, the Accuſer of *Socrates*, laid it as an Article of Charge and Accuſation againſt him, That he did by the Power and Variety of his Diſcourſes and Diſputations, embaſe in the Minds of young Men, the Authority and Reverence of the Laws and Cuſtoms of their Country; and that he did profeſs a dangerous and pernicious Art, with which, whoever was furniſh'd, might make the worſe Cauſe the better, and ſuppreſs Truth it ſelf by the Train and Bravery of Eloquence.

BUT theſe, and the like Imputations, carry rather a perſonated Gravity, than any Sincerity of Truth. For Experience witneſſes, as the ſelf-ſame Perſons, ſo the ſelf-ſame Times have flouriſh'd in the Glory of Arms and Good Letters at once. As for Men, we may inſtance in that noble Pair of Emperors, *Alexander* the Great, and *Julius Cæſar* the Dictator; the One, *Ariſtotle*'s Scholar in Philoſophy, the Other, *Cicero*'s Rival in Eloquence. Or if any Man ſhould rather call for Learned Men, that have proved great Generals, than Generals that were great Scholars, there is ready for him *Epaminondas* the *Theban*, or *Zenophon* the *Athenian*; the former of which was the firſt that paved the Way to the overthrow of the

the *Perſian* Monarchy. And this Marriage, as it were, of Arms and Letters, is yet more viſible in Times, than in Perſons, by how much an Age is a greater Object than a Man. For the very ſame Times with the *Egyptians*, *Aſſyrians*, *Perſians*, *Grecians*, and *Romans*, that are moſt renown'd for military Vertue, were likewiſe moſt admired for Learning too; ſo that the graveſt Authors and Philoſophers, and the moſt celebrated Captains and Governours, have lived in the ſame Age. Nor indeed can it otherwiſe be, for as in Man the Vigor of Body and Mind grow to maturity almoſt together (ſave that the former is a little more early than the other) ſo in States, the Glory of Arms and Learning (the one whereof correſponds to the Body, the other to the Soul) are either Coeval, or follow one another very cloſe.

NOW for matter of Policy and Government, that Learning ſhould rather be an Impediment, than a Help to it, is a Thing very improbable. We all confeſs it an unadviſed Act, to commit a natural Body, and the Cure of Health, to Empyrick Phyſicians, who are wont to make boaſt of a few Receipts, which ſeem to them univerſal Remedies; in confidence of which they venture to attempt any thing, when yet they neither know the Cauſes of Diſeaſes, nor the Conſti-

tutions

tutions of Patients, nor the Danger of Symptoms, nor the true Method of Cures. We ſee it a like Error in thoſe, who for the diſpatch of their Cauſes and Suits, make uſe of little Lawyers, vers'd in Practice rather, than in the Law-Books, who are eaſily impos'd upon, if there fall out any thing new, or out of the common Road of their Experience: So by like reaſon, it muſt needs be a Matter of great Danger, whenever the Sum of Affairs is intruſted chiefly to Empyrick Stateſmen. On the contrary, there can ſcarce one Inſtance be brought of a diſaſtrous Government, where Learned Men have ſate at the Helm. For tho' it hath been ordinary with Politicians to vilify Learned Men by the Name of *Pedants*; yet Hiſtory, the Miſtreſs of Truth, bears Record in abundance of Particulars, that the Government of Princes in Minority, (notwithſtanding the great Diſadvantage of that kind of State) have nevertheleſs excell'd the Government of Princes of mature Age, even for that Reaſon, which Politicians traduce, namely becauſe, at that Time the adminiſtration of Affairs has been in the Hands of *Pedants*. Who does not know, that during thoſe five Years of *Nero*, ſo much magnify'd, the Burden of Affairs lay upon *Seneca* a *Pedant*? So again, *Gordianus* the younger, owed the ten Years applauded Government to *Miſitheus*, a *Pedant*. Nor did *Alexander Severus* govern

leſs

leſs happily in his Miniſtry, in which Space Women took care of all Things, but with the Advice of *Preceptors*.

NAY, let us look into the Government of the Biſhops of *Rome*, and by Name, that of *Pius Quintus*, or *Sextus Quintus*, in our Times, who were eſteem'd at their entrance but as poor, ignorant, and unexperienc'd Friars; and we ſhall find that the Acts of ſuch Popes are uſually more memorable, than of thoſe who have aſcended to the Papacy from an Education and Breeding in Affairs of State, and in the Courts of Princes. For altho' Men, that have ſpent moſt of their Life in Letters, are leſs quick and nimble in apprehending Occaſions, and in Points of Convenience, and accommodating Things for the preſent, which the *Italians* call *Ragioni di ſtato*, (the very Name whereof *Pius Quintus* could not bear, being uſed to ſay, That they were the mere Devices of wicked Men, wherewith to oppreſs Religion and the moral Virtues) yet in this there is made ample Recompence, that they are perfect and ready in the ſafe and plain Way of Religion, Juſtice, Honeſty, and the moral Virtues; which Way they that conſtantly keep, will no more need thoſe other Remedies, than a ſound Body does Phyſick. Moreover, the ſpace of one Man's Life cannot furniſh Preſidents enough to direct the Events

Events of but one Man's Life. For as it ſometimes happens, that the Grandſon, or great Grandſon, reſembles the Grand-Father, or great Grand-Father more than the Father, ſo many times it comes to paſs, that the Occurrences of preſent Times ſort better with antient Examples, than with thoſe of later Times. Laſtly, The Wit of one Man yields as much to the Extent and Latitude of Learning, as the Income of a private Man to a publick Treaſury.

AND tho' 'twere granted, that thoſe Depravations, Indiſpoſitions, and Impediments, which are imputed to Learning by Politicks, were of any Force and Validity, and had any Truth in them, yet it muſt be remembred withal, that Learning in each of theſe is more medicinal than it is hurtful. For allow, that Learning by a ſecret Influence renders the Mind irreſolute and perplext; yet certainly it plainly teaches how to unwind the Thoughts, how far to deliberate, and when at laſt to reſolve; nay, it ſhews how Things in the mean time may be protracted, and ſuſpended without Prejudice.

BE it likewiſe granted, That Learning makes Men's Minds too poſitive and ſtiff; yet withal it teaches, what Things are in their nature Demonſtrative, and what Conjectural; and propounds as well the Uſe of Diſtin-

Diſtinctions and Exceptions, as the Stability of Rules and Principles.

BE it again, That it miſleads and wreſts Men's Minds, either by the diſproportion or diſſimilitude of Examples, that I can't tell; yet this I know well, that it unfolds, and lays open as well the Force of Circumſtances, as the Errors of Compariſons, and teaches all the Cautions of Application; ſo that in the whole, it rectifies Men's Minds more than it perverts them. And theſe Remedies Learning inſinuates every where by the great Force and Variety of Examples. Let a Man weigh well the Errors of *Clement* the VIIth, ſo lively deſcrib'd by *Guicciardine*, that was a kind of Domeſtick to him; or the Waverings of *Cicero*, painted to the Life by his own Pencil, in his Epiſtles to *Atticus*; and he will of all things ſhun Inconſtancy, and frequent ſhifting of Reſolutions. Let him look into the Errors of *Phocion*, and he will dread Obſtinacy, and Wilfulneſs. Let him read the Fable of *Ixion*, and it will diſpel exceſſive Hopes, and ſuch like Fumes and Miſts. Let him conſider *Cato* the Second, and he will never go to the *Antipodes*, and tread oppoſite to the preſent World.

NOW for the Conceit of thoſe that think Learning a Friend to Sloth, and that it overſpreads

verſpreads the Mind with a ſweet Slumber of Repoſe and Retirement, they will do a Miracle if they can prove, That *that* which accuſtoms the Mind to a perpetual Motion, and Agitation, is the Patroneſs of Sloth: Whereas, on the contrary, it may be truly affirm'd, That no kind of Men love Buſineſs for Buſineſs-ſake, but the Learned. For other Perſons love Affairs and Buſineſs, for the Profit, as Hirelings the Work for the Wages: Others for Honour; for while they are in Action, they live in the Eyes of Men, and refreſh their Reputation, which would otherwiſe decay. Others for the ſake of Power, and the Privileges of Fortune, that they may be able to reward their Friends, and be reveng'd of their Enemies. Others, that they may exerciſe ſome peculiar Faculty that they are fond of, and in that reſpect often congratulate and pleaſe themſelves. Others, laſtly, to obtain other Ends of theirs. So that as it is ſaid of Braggadocio's, that their Valour is in the Eyes of the Spectators; ſo ſuch Men's Diligence and Activity ſeems to aim at this, either that others may applaud them, or that they may be delighted inwardly in pleaſing Conceits of themſelves, and their own Deſigns: Only Learned Men love Buſineſs and Employment, as Actions agreeable to Nature, and no leſs healthful to the Mind, than Exerciſe is to the Body, having an Eye to the Thing only, not the Profit: So that

of

all Men, they are the moſt Indefatigable, provided it be any ſuch Buſineſs as can fill and entertain the Mind according to its Dignity.

AND if any be found ſometimes active in Reading, but idle in Action, they have not this from Learning, but from ſome Weakneſs and Softneſs of Body, or Spirit; ſuch as *Seneca* touches: *Some*, ſays he, *are ſo much for Shade and Obſcurity, that whatever is in the Light, they take to be in a Storm.* It may perchance happen, that Men from a Conſciouſneſs of ſuch a Temper, may give themſelves to Learning; but Learning it ſelf implants and breeds no ſuch Temper.

BUT if any Man, notwithſtanding, peremptorily maintains, That Learning ſwallows up too much Time, which might otherwiſe be better employ'd; I anſwer, That no Man is ſo ſtraitned and oppreſt with Buſineſs, but he has his Intermiſſions and Vacancies, till the Returns and Tides of Buſineſs flow in again, unleſs he be either very dull, and of no Diſpatch; or ambitious (little to his Credit and Reputation) in reaching after Buſineſs of all Kinds and Natures.

IT remains then to be enquir'd, with what, and in what manner it may be convenient

to fill up thoſe ſpare Hours; whether with Studies or Pleaſures, with Senſuality, or Contemplation; as was well anſwer'd by *Demoſthenes* to *Æſchines*, a Man given to Pleaſure, who when he told him by way of Reproach, *That his Orations ſmelt of the Lamp. In troth*, ſays he, *there is great difference between the Things that I and you do by Lamp-Light.* Wherefore there is no need of fearing, leſt Learning ſhould expel Buſineſs; nay, rather it reſcues and defends the Mind from Idleneſs and Pleaſure, which otherwiſe by degrees are wont to ſteal in, to the prejudice of both, Buſineſs as well as Learning.

AGAIN, Whereas they object, that Letters undermine the Reverence of Laws and Government, it is a mere Calumny, and has not the probable appearance of an Accuſation. For to ſay, that a blind Obedience ſhould be a ſtronger Obligation than an ocular Duty, is all one as to affirm, that a Blind Man with a Guide, treads ſurer than he that has the uſe of Light and Eyes. Nay, without all Controverſy, the Arts ſoften the Manners, make them tender, obſequious, pliable, and ductile to the Commands of Power; whereas Ignorance on the other hand, makes them Contumacious, Refractory, and Mutinous: And this appears clearly by Hiſtory, conſidering that the moſt unlearned

learned, rude, and barbarous Times, have been moſt ſubject to Tumults, Seditions, and Changes.

AS to the Judgment of *Cato* the *Cenſor*, ſo much I ſhall ſay, that he was well puniſh'd for his Blaſphemy againſt Learning; for when he was paſt Threeſcore Years of Age, he was taken with an extreme Deſire to go to School again, and to learn the *Greek* Tongue, in order to read the *Greek* Authors; which demonſtrates, that his former Cenſure of the *Grecian* Learning, was rather an affected Gravity, than the inward Senſe of his own Opinion.

AS to *Virgil*'s Verſes, tho' he took a fancy to inſult the World, in aſſerting to the *Romans* the Arts of Empire, and leaving all the reſt to others as popular and ſervile; yet ſo much is manifeſt, that the *Romans* never aſcended to the Pinnacle of Empire, till the Time they had aſcended to the Height of Arts. For in the Time of the two firſt *Cæſars*, Men of the greateſt Perfection in the Art of Government, there lived Contemporaries; the beſt Poet, *Virgilius Maro*; the beſt Hiſtorian, *Titus Livius*; the beſt Antiquary, *Marcus Varro*; and the beſt, or ſecond beſt Orator, *Marcus Cicero*; the greateſt Men no doubt, each in their Faculties, that to the Memory of Man are known.

LASTLY, for the Accuſation of *Socrates*, I ſhall only ſay, the Time muſt be remembred, when it was proſecuted, namely, under the Thirty Tyrants, of all Mortals the bloodieſt, the wickedeſt, and moſt unworthy of Government: Which Revolution of State and Time was no ſooner over, but the ſame *Socrates*, whom they had made a Perſon Criminal, was made a Perſon Heroical, and his Memory accumulated and crown'd with all Honours Divine and Human; and thoſe Diſcourſes of his, before eſteem'd corrupters of Manners, were celebrated by all Poſterity for moſt ſovereign Medicines of Mind and Manners. And let this ſerve for Anſwer to Politicks, who in their ſupercilious Severity, or in their counterfeit Gravity, have preſumed to throw their Reproaches and Affronts upon Learning.

CHAP. III.

Of the Diſcredits *of* LEARNING, *from Learned Men's Fortunes, Manners, and Nature of Studies.*

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Ibid.

NOW are we come to the Third ſort of Diſcredit, that redounds to Learning from Learned Men themſelves, and That commonly ſticks faſter than the reſt. That derives its Original either from their Fortune, or their Manners, or the Nature of their Studies. The Firſt of which is out of their Power, the Second Accidental, and not to the Purpoſe; ſo that the Third only ſeems properly to fall into Inquiry. Yet becauſe the Debate in hand is not ſo much concerning the true Weight of Things, as of Popular Opinion, it will not be amiſs to inſinuate ſomewhat alſo of the Two other.

THE Derogations therefore, and Diminutions, or Diſcredits, that are caſt upon Learning from the Fortune of Learned Men, are taken either from their Poverty and ſcarcity of Living, or from their obſcure and private Courſe of Life, or from the Meanneſs of the Employments wherein they are converſant.

AS to Poverty, and that it frequently happens, that Learned Men are Indigent, and commonly begin with little, and do not grow Rich ſo faſt as other Men, who mind nothing but Lucre; it were adviſeable to leave this Common-Place, in Praiſe of Poverty to the *Mendicant Friars* to adorn; (if by their leaves I may be ſo bold) to whom *Machiavell* attributed much, when he ſaid, 'That the Kingdom of the Prieſts had long 'ſince been at an end, if Reverence towards 'the Poverty of Friars and Monks, had 'not compenſated for the Luxury and Ex-'ceſs of Prelates.' So may a Man ſay, That the Felicity and Magnificence of Princes and Great Perſons had poſſibly long ago ſunk into Barbariſm and Rudeneſs, if they had not been obliged to thoſe poor Learned Men for the Civility, and Honour of Life. But without any ſuch hunting after Encomiums, it is worthy Obſervation, what a ſacred and venerable Thing Poverty it ſelf was

was esteemed, for some Ages, among the *Romans*, which nevertheless was a State without Paradoxes. For thus saith *Titus Livius* in his Introduction; 'Either my Affection 'to the Work I have undertaken, deceives 'me, or never was there Common-Wealth, 'either more Mighty than the *Roman*, or 'more Holy and Devout, or more richly furnish'd with good Presidents; or which Avarice and Excess so late invaded; or where'in Poverty and Parsimony were so greatly 'and so long honoured. In short, the more 'they wanted, the less they desired.

MOREOVER, after the *Roman* State had now degenerated, we read, that when *Cæsar* the Dictator profess'd a Restoration of the ruin'd State, one of his Confidents told him, That the most compendious Way to his Design, would be to take away, by whatever means, the Esteem of Riches. 'But, '(says he) these, and all other Evils will 'cease, together with the Reputation of Mo'ny, if neither Offices, nor any other Things, 'that commonly appear so desirable, be ex'posed to Sale.

TO conclude, as it was truly said, That Blushing was the Colour of Virtue, tho' sometimes it come from Vice; so you may truly say, That Poverty is the Fortune of Virtue, tho' sometimes it proceeds from Lux-

ury and Miſmanagement. Surely this is *Solomon*'s Judgment, *He that haſteth to be Rich, ſhall not be Innocent*; and his Precept, *Buy the Truth, and ſell it not*; *alſo Knowledge and Prudence.* Judging it right and good, that Riches ſhould be employ'd to get Learning, not Learning apply'd to hoard Riches.

TO what purpoſe ſhould we ſpeak of the Privateneſs and Obſcurity of Life, that they object to Learned Men? It is a Theme ſo trite, and banded about by all, to extol Leiſure and Retirement (not accompany'd with Sloth and Luxury) before a civil and active Life, for Security, Liberty, Sweetneſs, Dignity, or at leaſt Freedom from Indignities, that no Man handles this Subject, but handles it well. This only I ſhall add, that Learned Men lying cloſe in States, and not living in the Eyes of Men, are like the Images of *Caſſius* and *Brutus*, of which, not being carried, as many other were, at the Funeral of *Julia*, *Tacitus* ſaith, *Eo ipſo præfulgebant, quod non viſebantur*; They out-ſhone the reſt for this very reaſon, becauſe they did not appear.

As to the Meanneſs of Employment aſſigned to Learned Men, this is chiefly objected, that the Education of Children and Youth is allotted to them, the Diſeſteem of which Age, becauſe it is the Age of leaſt Autho-

Authority, is caſt upon the Maſters themſelves. But how unjuſt this Diſparagement is, if the Thing be weigh'd, not according to popular Opinion, but ſound Judgment, we may take an Eſtimate from hence, that Men are more careful what they put into a new Veſſel, than into a Veſſel ſeaſon'd, and are more curious what Mould they lay about a young Plant, than about a Plant corroborate; from whence it is evident, that the principal Care is about the Beginnings of Things and Bodies. Hearken, if you pleaſe, to the Rabbies, *Your young Men ſhall ſee Viſions, and your old Men ſhall dream Dreams.* From this Text they gather, That Youth is the worthier Age, by how much Revelation is more clear by Viſions, than by Dreams. And this is well worth the noting, that however Pedagogues, have run the Deriſion of Theatres, as the Apes of Tyranny, and that the modern Times have been negligent, and as it were aſleep as to the Choice of School-Maſters, and Tutors; yet it hath been an antient Complaint, deliver'd down even from the beſt and wiſeſt Ages, that States are too buſy as to their Laws, and too negligent in point of Education. Which moſt noted Part of antient Diſcipline, has in ſome ſort been brought back again, by way of Recovery, as it were, in the Colleges of the *Jeſuits*, whoſe Induſtry and Acuteneſs, when I conſider, as well in the Culture of Learning,

ing, as in the Formation of Manners; That of *Ageſilaus* touching *Pharnabazus*, comes into my mind, *Talis cum ſis, utinam noſter eſſes*; 'Since thou art ſo excellent, I wiſh 'thou wert one of us.' And thus much for the Diſcredits drawn from the Fortunes, and Condition of Learned Men.

AS to the *Manners* of Learned Men, that is a Thing rather Perſonal, than belonging to Studies and Learning. And no doubt there are found amongſt them, as in all Orders and Profeſſions of Life, bad as well as good; but yet it is never the leſs true, what is aſſerted, *Abire ſtudia in Mores*, That Studies have an influence upon the Manners, and that Letters, unleſs they meet with very deprav'd Indiſpoſitions, reform Nature intirely, and change it for the better.

BUT upon an attentive, and impartial View, I can't find any Diſgrace that adheres to Learning, from the Manners of Learned Men, as they are Learned, unleſs it be imputed to them as a Fault (which *Demoſthenes*, *Cicero*, *Cato* the Second, *Seneca*, and many more are accuſed of) that becauſe the Times, they read of, are commonly better than thoſe they live in, and the Duties taught, better than the Duties practiſed; they contend beyond what is convenient, to reduce the Corruption of Manners to the Hone-

Honeſty of Precepts, and receiv'd Opinions, and to impoſe the Laws of antient Severity, upon diſſolute Times; of which nevertheleſs they have Caveats enow in their own Walks. For *Solon*, when he was asked, *Whether he had given his Citizens the beſt Laws. The beſt*, ſays he, *of ſuch as they were diſpoſed to receive.* So *Plato*, finding that the Manners of his Country-Men were too corrupt for him to bear, abſtain'd from all publick Office, ſaying, *That a Man's Country is to be dealt with as his Parents; that is, by Perſuaſion, not Violence; by humbly entreating, not conteſting.* And *Cæſar's* Counſellor puts in the ſame Caveat, ſaying, *Non ad vetera Inſtituta revocans, quæ jam pridem corruptis Moribus ludibrio ſunt:* 'Not reducing Things to the antient Cuſtoms, which 'have been long ſince laught at upon the Degeneracy of our Manners.' *Cicero* alſo notes this Error in *Cato* the Second, writing to his Friend *Atticus: Cato* (ſays he) *has moſt excellent Notions, but he ſometimes hurts the State; for he ſpeaks as in the Common-Wealth of* Plato, *and not as in the Dregs of* Romulus. The ſame *Cicero*, by a ſoft Interpretation, excuſes the rigid Sayings, and Placits of the Philoſophers: 'Thoſe very 'Preceptors and Teachers (ſays he) ſeem 'to have ſtretcht out the Line and Limits 'of Duties ſomewhat beyond what Nature 'requir'd; that when we had ſtrain'd our

'Soul

'Soul to reach the higheſt Point of Pefec-
'tion, we might however reſt and make a
'ſtand, where it is meet.' And yet he himſelf might have ſaid, *Monitis ſum minor ipſe meis*; 'I am not able to take my own 'Advice:' For he ſtumbled at the ſame Stone, tho' not in ſo extreme a Degree.

ANOTHER Fault which is perhaps deſervedly objected to Learned Men, is this, That they have poſt-pon'd their own Fortunes, or Safeties, to the Honour or Advantage of their Countries, or Maſters. For ſo *Demoſthenes* to his *Athenians*, 'My Coun-
'ſels (ſays he) if ye note it well, are not
'ſuch whereby I may grow great amongſt
'you, and your ſelves become little amongſt
'the *Grecians*; but of that Nature as are
'ſometimes not ſafe for me to give, but al-
'ways good for you to follow.' So *Seneca*, after he had conſecrated that *Quinquennium Neronis* (Five Years of *Nero*) to the eternal Glory of learned Preceptors, held on his Courſe of free and bold Counſel to his Maſter, now grown extremely Corrupt by all manner of Vice, to his own great Peril, and at laſt Ruin. Neither can it otherwiſe be, for Learning ſeaſons Men's Minds with a true Senſe of their own Frailty, and Inſtability of Fortune, the Dignity of their Soul, and of their own Duty; which Things when they think of, they can

can by no means perſuade themſelves, that any Advancement of their own Fortunes can be ſet down as a true and worthy End of their Being. Wherefore they ſo live, as Perſons ready to give up their Account to God, and to their Maſters under God, whether Kings or States, in this Form of Words, *Ecce tibi lucrifeci: (Behold I have gained for thee)* and not in that, *Ecce mihi lucrifeci, (Behold I have gained for my ſelf.)* But the Herd of Politicians, that have not their Thoughts train'd up and eſtabliſh'd in the Doctrin of Duties, and the Contemplation of univerſal Good, refer all things to themſelves, carrying themſelves as if they were the Center of the World, and that the Concurrence of all Lines ought to touch in them, and their Fortunes; never troubling their Heads what becomes of the Ship of the Republick, tho' toſt by Tempeſts, provided they can but retreat and ſave themſelves in the Cock-Boat of their own Fortune.

ON the contrary, Men that feel the Weight of Duty, and underſtand the Limits of Self-Love, make good their Places and Stations, tho' with Peril. And if they chance to ſtand in Seditions, and Alterations of Government, it is to be attributed not to any Arts, or verſatil temporizing Diſpoſitions in them, but to that Reverence, which Probity

ty extorts even from Enemies. But as to conſtancy of Faith, and tender Senſe and religious Obſervation of Duty, which Erudition doth certainly plant in the Minds of Men, however Fortune may ſometimes tax and amerce them, or Politicians, from unſound corrupt Principles, may condemn them, yet they will certainly carry a publick Commendation from all Men; ſo that in this Point, there needs no long Defence.

ANOTHER Fault there is ordinary with Learned Men, (and which may ſooner be excuſed than denied) namely this; that they do not eaſily apply and accommodate themſelves to Perſons, with whom they Negotiate, or Live: Which Defect ariſeth from two Cauſes: The Firſt is the Largeneſs and Greatneſs of their Soul, upon the account of which they can hardly ſtoop to the Obſervance of any one Man. It is a Speech for a Lover, not for a Wiſe Man, *Satis magnum alter alteri Theatrum ſumus*, 'We are 'a Theatre of Pleaſure and Entertainment, 'large enough, the one to the other.' Nevertheleſs I ſhall yield, that he that cannot contract the Sight of the Mind, like that of the Eye, as well as dilate it, is deſtitute of a notable Faculty for the management of Buſineſs. But the Second Cauſe is the Probity and Simplicity of their Manners; which

which argues Choice and Judgment, not Defect and Inability in them. For the true and juſt Bounds of obſervance towards any Perſon, extend no further, than ſo to underſtand his Temper, as to be able to converſe with him without Offence, and to aſſiſt him, if occaſion be, with Counſel, and in the mean time to take care of ourſelves in all Points: But to ſpeculate into another Man's Affections; to the end to work him, wind him, and turn him about at Pleaſure, is not the part of an ingenuous Nature, but of a crafty, and cloven-hearted Man; which as in Friendſhip, it is want of Integrity, ſo towards Princes or Superiors, is want of Duty. For the Cuſtom of the *Levant*, where it is accounted a heinous Offence, to gaze and fix their Eyes upon their Princes, in the outward Ceremony indeed is barbarous, but in the Moral good: For it becomes not Subjects, by curious Obſervation, to pierce and penetrate into the Hearts of Kings, which the Scripture declares to be *Inſcrutable*.

THERE is yet another Fault (with which I will conclude this Part) often imputed to Learned Men; namely, that in ſmall and outward Matters (as Countenance, Geſture, Gate, ordinary Diſcourſe, and the like) they fail many times in obſerving Decency; from whence ignorant Men make a Judgment from thoſe minute and trivial Miſcarriages,

carriages, how great their Errors muſt be in the management of more important Matters. But this Conſequence does generally deceive them; therefore let them know, that *Themiſtocles* has given them their Anſwer, who being ask'd to touch a *Lute*, anſwer'd arrogantly enough as to his own Perſon, but very appoſitely to the Purpoſe in hand; *That he could not Fiddle indeed, but he knew well enough, by what Means a ſmall Town might become a great State.*

AND there are, no doubt, many ſingularly ſkilful in the Arts of Policy, who notwithſtanding are ſtrangely to ſeek in common Life, and ordinary Matters of no Weight. Such Scoffers alſo are to be referr'd to *Plato*'s Elogy of his Maſter *Socrates*, whom he compar'd to the Gally-Pots of Apothecaries, which on the out-ſides were drawn with Apes, Owls, and Anticks; but contained within pretious Liquors, and noble Medicaments; acknowledging, that to vulgar Capacity, and popular Report, he was not without ſome ſuperficial Levities, and even Deformities, but was inwardly repleniſh'd with moſt excellent Faculties and Virtues. And ſo much for the *Manners* of Learned Men.

IN the mean time, I think good to adverti ſe, That I intend nothing leſs than to Patro-

Patronize certain abject and baſe Practices of Profeſſors of Learning, whereby they have diſcredited both themſelves and Letters; ſuch as were, in the latter Age of the *Roman* State, certain Trencher-Philoſophers, in the Families of wealthy Perſons, whom you may not improperly call *ſolemn Paraſites*: One of which kind *Lucian* makes a merry Deſcription of, whom a noble Matron would needs have carry her Lap-Dog in the Coach with her; which he doing officiouſly, but aukwardly, the Page ſcoffing, *I am afraid* (ſays he) *our Philoſopher of a Stoick will turn Cynick.*

BUT above all the reſt, nothing has ſo much prejudic'd the Dignity of Letters, as the groſs and ſcandalous Flattery, whereunto many (and thoſe not Unlearned) have abaſed their Wits and Pens, transforming *Hecuba* into *Helena*, and *Fauſtina* into *Lucretia*, (as *Du-Bartas ſays.*)

NEITHER, indeed, do I over-much commend that receiv'd Cuſtom of Dedicating Books to Patrons; for that Books (ſuch as are worthy the Name of Books) ought to have no Patrons but Truth and Reaſon. The Cuſtom of the Antients was better, who were wont to Dedicate their Writings to none but Friends and Equals; or to entitle their Treatiſes with the Names of ſuch

Friends: Or if they Dedicated to Kings, or Great Persons, 'twas then only done, when the Argument of the Book was fit and proper for such a Person. But these, and the like Courses, may deserve rather Reprehension, than Defence.

NOR say I this, as if I condemn'd Learned Men, for applying themselves sometimes to Men of Fortune, and Power: For to one that ask'd in mockery, *How it came to pass that Philosophers were the Followers of rich Men, and not rich Men of Philosophers*; the Answer that *Diogenes* made was right and sharp; *That it was, because Philosophers knew well what they had need of, but rich Men did not.* A-kin to this, is *that* of *Aristippus*, when having a Petition to *Dionysius*, and no Ear given to him, he threw himself at his Feet in manner of an Adorer, upon which, at last, he gave him the hearing, and granted his Petition: But a little after, some Person tender of the Honour and Credit of Philosophy, reprov'd *Aristippus*, that he should offer the Profession of Philosophy such an Indignity, as for such an inconsiderable Matter to fall at a Tyrant's Feet; to whom he reply'd, *That it was not his Fault, but* Dionysius's, *that had his Ears in his Feet.* Neither was it accounted Weakness, but Discretion in him, that suffer'd himself to be worsted in a certain Disputation

tion with *Adrianus Cæsar*; excusing the Fact, *That it was but reason to yield to One that commanded Thirty Legions.* Learned Men, therefore, must not be condemned, when, upon occasion, they abate somewhat of their Gravity, whether in Point of Necessity, or Convenience; which tho' it may seem mean and servile, at first sight; yet in a Judgment truly made, they will be esteem'd to submit to the Occasion, and not to the Person.

CHAP. IV.

Discredits of LEARNING *from Learned Men's Studies*, &c.

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Ibid.

ET us now proceed to those Errors and Vanities, which intervene in the Studies themselves of the Learned, and mix with them; wherein my Design is not to justify the Errors, but by a Censure and Separation of them, to sift out that which is sound and solid, and to deliver the same from Calumny. For we see it is the Custom, especially of envious Men, upon the account of what is corrupt and depraved, to traduce also that which is untainted, and hath retain'd its State; as the Heathens in the Primitive Church used to blemish the Christians with the Faults and Cor-

Corruptions of the Hereticks. Nevertheleſs, I purpoſe not to make any exact Animadverſion upon the Errors and Impediments of Learning, which are more ſecret and remote from vulgar Capacity; but only to ſpeak to ſuch as fall under common and popular Obſervation, and Note, or at leaſt do not recede far from it.

I find therefore chiefly three Vanities and Emptineſſes in Learning, which have principally given a handle to the Traducing of it. For we eſteem thoſe Things Vain, which are either Falſe, or Frivolous; wherein, that is, there is either no Truth, or no Uſe: Thoſe Perſons alſo we eſteem Vain and Light, who are either Credulous in Things Falſe, or Curious in Things of little Uſe. And Curioſity is either in Matter, or Words; that is, when either Labour is ſpent in Vain Matters, or too much Pains taken about Delicacy of Words. Wherefore it ſeems agreeable as well to right Reaſon, as to approv'd Experience, to ſet down Three Diſtempers of Learning. The Firſt is, *Phantaſtical Learning*; the Second, *Contentious Learning*; the Third, *Painted* and *Delicate Learning*. Or thus; *Vain Imaginations*, *Vain Altercations*, *Vain Affectations*; and with the laſt I ſhall begin.

DELICATE LEARNING.

THE Diſtemper ſeated in ſuperfluity and profuſeneſs of Speech (tho' in Times paſt, by turns, it was held in ſome Eſteem) about *Luther*'s Time, prevailed wonderfully. The principal Reaſon was, the Heat and Efficacy of Preaching, to ſooth and entice the People, which about that Time flouriſh'd hugely; and this required a popular kind of Expreſſion. Another Reaſon was, The Hatred and Contempt that grew up in thoſe very Times, towards the School-Men, who uſed a very different Stile, and Form of Expreſſion, taking an exceſſive Liberty to Coyn new and rugged Terms, without regard to the Ornament and Elegancy of Speech, ſo they might avoid Circumlocution, and deliver their Senſe and Conceptions with acuteneſs; and ſo it came to paſs a little after, that greater Care generally began to be taken of Words than Matter; moſt affecting rather Comptneſs of Phraſe, Roundneſs of Period, the ſweet-falling of the Clauſes, and the ſparkling of Tropes and Figures, than the Weight of Matter, the Soundneſs of Argument, the Life of Invention, or Exactneſs of Judgment. Then firſt flouriſh'd the luxuriant and watry Vein of *Oſorius*, the *Portugal* Biſhop. Then did *Sturmius* ſpend ſuch infinite and anxious Pains upon *Cicero* the Orator,

Orator, and *Hermogenes* the Rhetorician. Then did our *Car* and *Aſcham*, in their Lectures and Writings, extol *Cicero* and *Demoſthenes* even to the Skies, and invite young Men to this polite and flouriſhing kind of Learning. Then did *Eraſmus* take occaſion to bring in that ſcoffing *Eccho*, *Decem Annos conſumpſi in legendo* Cicerone; *I have ſpent ten Years in reading* Cicero: To which the Eccho anſwer'd, *One*, *Aſs*. Then began the Learning of the School-Men to be utterly deſpiſed, as rough and barbarous. In ſhort, the chief Inclination and Bent of thoſe Times, was rather to Plenty than Weight.

HERE then we ſee the firſt Diſtemper of Learning, when, as we have ſaid, Men ſtudy Words, not Matter; of which tho' I have brought Examples of late Times only, yet ſuch Impertinencies have taken more or leſs, both in Times paſt, and will again hereafter. Now it is not poſſible, but that this very Thing ſhould tend much to the Diſcredit and Diſparagement of Learning, even with the ignorant Vulgar, when they ſee Learned Men's Writings like the firſt Letter of a Patent, which tho' it be limned and drawn out with various Turns and Flouriſhes of the Pen, yet is it but one ſingle Letter. And to me indeed *Pigmalion*'s Frenzy ſeems a very appoſite Repreſentation, and Emblem, as it were, of this

Vanity; for what elſe are Words but the Images of Things, ſo that unleſs they be animated with the Spirit of Reaſon, to fall in love with them, is all one as to fall in love with a Picture.

BUT yet notwithſtanding it is a Thing not haſtily to be condemn'd, for a Man to illuſtrate and ſmooth the Obſcurities and Roughneſſes of Philoſophy with the Splendor of Words. For we have great Examples of this, in *Zenophon*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, *Plutarch*, and even *Plato* himſelf; and the Uſefulneſs of it is as great. For although this Thing may be ſome hindrance to a ſevere Inquiſition of Truth, and a deep Study of Philoſophy, becauſe it is too early ſatisfactory to the Mind, and quenches the Thirſt and Ardor of farther Search; yet if a Man applies his Learning to Civil Uſes, (as Conference, Counſel, Perſuaſion, Arguing, and the like) he will find all that he deſires, prepared and ſet out to his hand, in ſuch Authors. However the Exceſs of this is ſo juſtly contemptible, that as *Hercules*, when he ſaw in a Temple the Image of *Adonis*, *Venus* Minion, ſaid in Indignation, *Nil ſacri es*; (*Thou art nothing ſacred*) ſo all *Herculean* Champions in Learning, that is, the more laborious and ſteady Enquirers into Truth, will naturally deſpiſe ſuch Delicacies and Fopperies, as having nothing Divine in them. SOME-

SOMEWHAT more ſound is another kind of Stile (yet neither is That altogether exempt from Vanity) which near about the ſame Time ſucceeded this Copy, and Superfluity of Speech. That conſiſts altogether in this, that the Words be aculeate, the Sentences conciſe, the Contexture of the Speech, in fine, rather returning into it ſelf, than ſpread and dilated; ſo that it comes to paſs by this Artifice, that every Paſſage ſeems more ingenious, than indeed it is. Such a Stile as this we find more exceſſively in *Seneca*, more moderately in *Tacitus* and *Plinius Secundus*; and not long ſince it began to be pleaſing to the Ears of our own Time. But this very Stile is wont to find acceptance with ordinary Capacities (ſo as to be a kind of Dignity and Ornament to Learning) nevertheleſs, by the more exact Judgments, it is deſervedly nauſeated, and may be ſet down as a *Diſtemper of Learning*, ſince it is nothing elſe but a hunting after Words, and the Finery and Quaintneſs of the ſame. And thus much of the Firſt Diſtemper of Learning.

CONTENTIOUS LEARNING.

NOW follows the Diſtemper in the Matter it ſelf, which we placed Second, and deſign'd by the Name of *Contentious Subtilty*. And

And this is ſomewhat worſe than that, of which we ſpake but now. For as Subſtantialneſs of Matter excels Ornament of Words, ſo on the contrary, Vanity of Matter is more odious than Vanity of Words. Wherein, that Reprehenſion of St. *Paul* may refer as well to the following Times, as to his own Age; and ſeems to reſpect not only Divinity, but all Sciences alſo: *Avoid profane Novelties of Words, and Oppoſitions of Science falſly ſo called.* Tim. 1. v. 20. For in theſe Words he alledges two Marks and Badges of ſuſpected and falſified Science. The firſt is the *Novelty* and *Strangeneſs* of *Terms*; the other, the *Rigor* and *Strictneſs* of *Poſitions*, which muſt needs occaſion Oppoſition, and then Altercations and Queſtions.

CERTAINLY as many Natural Subſtances, which are ſolid and entire, ſo long as they are in a State of Perfection, do many times corrupt and paſs into Worms; after the ſame manner, ſound and ſolid Knowledge, often-times putrifies, and diſſolves into ſubtle, vain, unwholſome, and (if I may ſo ſpeak) *Vermiculate* Queſtions; which ſeem indeed to have a kind of Motion and Quickneſs in them, but are unſavory, and of no Uſe.

THIS

THIS kind of unſound and ſelf-corrupting Learning, prevail'd chiefly amongſt the School-Men, who having abundance of Leiſure, ſharp and ſtrong Wits, but ſmall Variety of Reading (their Underſtandings being ſhut up within the Writings of a few Authors, eſpecially *Ariſtotle*, their Dictator, as their Perſons were in the Cells of Monaſteries) and for the moſt part ignorant of the Hiſtory, as well of Nature as Time; did out of no great Quantity of Matter, but infinite Agitation of Wit and Spirit, ſpin out unto us thoſe moſt laborious Webs of Learning, which are extant in their Books. For the Mind of Man, (if it work upon Matter, by contemplating the Nature of Things, and the Works of God) works according to the Stuff, and is limited by the ſame; but if it turns inward, and works upon it ſelf (like the Spider weaving his Web) then is it endleſs, and brings forth indeed Cobwebs of Learning, admirable for fineneſs of Thread and Work, but as to Uſe, frivolous, and of no Subſtance.

THIS ſame unprofitable Subtilty, or Curioſity, is Two-fold: And is ſeen either in the Subject it ſelf, ſuch as is a fruitleſs Speculation, or Controverſy (of which Kind there are no ſmall Number both in *Divinity* and *Philoſophy*) or in the Manner and

and Method of Handling; which amongſt the School-Men was generally this. Upon every Poſition or Aſſertion they formed Objections, then Solutions of thoſe Objections; which Solutions, for the moſt part, were only Diſtinctions: Whereas, indeed, the Strength of all Sciences, like the old Man's Fagot, conſiſteth not in every Stick aſunder, but in all together united in the Band. For the Harmony of a Science, that is, when each Part mutually ſupports the other, is, and ought to be, the true and expedite Way of confuting all the ſmaller ſort of Objections: But on the other ſide, if you take out every Axiom, as the Sticks of a Fagot, one by one ſeverally, you may eaſily diſprove them, and bend and break them at pleaſure. So that what was ſaid of *Seneca*, *He breaks the Weight of Matter by the little Niceties of Words*, may truly be ſaid of the School-Men, *They break the Solidity of Sciences by the little Niceties of Queſtions.* Were it not better in a ſpacious Hall to ſet up one great Light, or to hang up a Branch furniſh'd with divers Lights, whereby all may be ſeen at once, than to go up and down with a ſmall Watch-Candle into every Corner? And ſuch is their Method, who do not ſo much endeavour to illuſtrate Truth by clear Arguments, Authorities, Compariſons, and Examples; as they labour to take out every minute Scruple, and to anſwer captious

captious Cavils, and to ſolve Doubts; by this means breeding Queſtion out of Queſtion, even as in the Compariſon above, of the Light, when you carry it into one Place, you forſake, and darken all the reſt. So that the Fable of *Scylla* expreſſes to the Life this kind of Philoſophy, whoſe Face and Breaſt reſembled a beautiful Virgin, but below they ſay ſhe was,

Candida ſuccinctam latrantibus inguina monſtris.

A beauteous Maid above, but Magick Arts,
With barking Dogs deform'd her nether Parts.
Dryden.

SO you ſhall find certain Generals, amongſt the School-Men, that are handſomly ſaid, and not invented amiſs; but when you deſcend to their Diſtinctions and Deciſions, inſtead of a fruitful Womb, for the benefit of human Life, they end in monſtrous and barking Queſtions.

THEREFORE it is no marvel, if this kind of Learning fall under, even the Contempt of the Vulgar, who are generally wont to deſpiſe Truth upon the account of Controverſies raiſed about it, and think they are all out of the Way who never meet: And when they ſee the Scuffles of Learned Men one with another, about Matters of no Moment,

Moment, they easily catch up that Saying of *Dionysius* of *Syracuse*, *Verba ista sunt senum otiosorum*; *This is nothing but the Tattle of old Men and Women, that have nothing else to do.* Notwithstanding most certain it is, That if the School-Men, to their unquenchable Thirst of Truth, and continual working of their Wit, had joyn'd Variety and Multiplicity of Reading, and Contemplation, they had doubtless prov'd distinguishing Lights, to the wonderful Advancement of all Arts and Sciences. And so much for the *Second Disease of Learning.*

PHANTASTICAL LEARNING.

FOR the *Third Disease*, which relates to Falsity and Untruth; this is of all other the Foulest, as being that which destroys the very Nature and Soul of Knowledge, which is nothing else but the Image of Truth. For the *Truth of Being*, and the *Truth of Knowing*, are all one; nor do they differ more from one another, than the Direct Beam, and the Beam Reflected. This Vice, therefore, brancheth it self into two sorts, *Imposture*, and *Credulity*: This is Deceiv'd, That Deceives; which altho' they appear to be of a different Nature, the one seeming to proceed from Craft, the other from Simplicity, yet for the most part they concur. For as the Verse has it,

Per-

Percontatorem fugito, nam Garrulus idem eſt.

Intimating, that an *Inquiſitive* Perſon is a *Prattler* alſo; ſo upon the like reaſon, he that is apt to *Believe*, is apt to *Deceive*. As we ſee it alſo in Fame, and Rumors, that he that eaſily believes them, will as eaſily augment and add to them. Which *Tacitus* wiſely hints in theſe Words, *They Invent, and Believe at once:* So great an Affinity is there between a Propenſity to *Deceive*, and a Facility to *Believe*.

THIS Facility of Believing, and admitting all things, tho' weakly authorized, or warranted, is of two Kinds, according to the Nature of the Subject-Matter: For we either Believe Story, or Matter of Fact, (as the Lawyers ſpeak) or elſe Matter of Opinion and Poſition. As to the former Kind, we ſee how much this Error has diſcredited, and derogated from ſome Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtories; which have been too eaſy in Regiſtring and Tranſcribing Miracles wrought by Martyrs, Hermits, Anchorites, and other Holy Men, and by their Reliques, Sepulchres, Chappels, and Images.

SO in Natural Hiſtory, we may ſee many Things raſhly, and with little Choice, or Judgment, receiv'd and regiſtred; as appears

pears by the Writings of *Pliny*, *Cardanus*, *Albertus*, and divers of the *Arabians*, which are every where fraught with forged and fabulous Stories; and thoſe not only uncertain and untried, but notoriouſly untrue, and manifeſtly convicted; to the huge Diſcredit of Natural Philoſophy, with grave and ſober Men. Wherein, in truth, the Wiſdom and Integrity of *Ariſtotle* ſhines forth, who having wrote a diligent and exquiſite Hiſtory of *Living Creatures*, hath mingled it ſo ſparingly with feign'd or fabulous Matter; but rather than do that, he has caſt all the *Prodigious Reports*, which he thought worthy Recording, into one Commentary: Excellently diſcerning that Matter of manifeſt Truth (which like a ſolid experimental Baſis, might ſerve as a Foundation for Philoſophy and Sciences to be built upon) was not unadviſedly to be mingled with Matter of doubtful Credit; and yet again, that things rare and ſtrange, which to moſt People ſeem incredible, are not wholly to be ſuppreſſed, or to be denyed to the Records of Poſterity.

BUT that other Credulity, which is yielded, not to Hiſtory, or Reports, but to Arts and Opinions, is likewiſe of two Sorts: Either when we give too much Credit to the Arts themſelves, or to the Authors in any Art.

THE

THE Arts themſelves, which have had more Intelligence and Confederacy with Imagination and Belief, than with Reaſon and Demonſtration, are chiefly Three, *Aſtrology*, *Natural Magick*, and *Alchymy*; the Ends of which Sciences however are Noble. For *Aſtrology* profeſſes to diſcover that Correſpondence or Concatenation, which is between the Superior Globe and the Inferior. *Natural Magick* pretendeth to call and reduce Natural Philoſophy from Variety of Speculations, to the Magnitude of Works. *Alchymy* undertakes to ſeparate and extract the Heterogeneous and unlike Parts of Things, which are hid and incorporate in Natural Bodies, and to refine and depurate Bodies themſelves, that are ſtained and ſoiled; to ſet at liberty ſuch as are bound and impriſoned; and to bring to perfection ſuch as are unripe. But the Ways and Methods which are preſumed to lead to theſe Ends, both in the Theory and in the Practiſe of thoſe Arts, are full of Error and Trifling. Yet ſurely to *Alchymy* this Right is due, that it may truly be compared to the Husbandman in *Æſop*, who being about to depart this Life, told his Sons, *That he had left them a great Quantity of Gold, buried in his Vineyard, but did not remember the particular Place:* Who when they had with Spades diligently turn'd up all the Vineyard, Gold indeed they found

none, however, by reaſon of their ſtirring and digging the Mold about the Roots of their Vines, they had a very great Vintage the Year following. So the ſtrenuous Pains, and mighty Stir of Chymiſts, about making Gold, have open'd the Way to a great Number of noble Inventions, and Experiments, ſingularly adapted, as well to the diſcloſing of Nature, as to the Uſes of Human Life.

NOW as for that Credulity, which has inveſted certain Authors of Sciences with a kind of *Dictatorian* Power to give Law; not *Senatorian*, to give Advice: This has been of infinite Damage to Sciences, as the principal Cauſe that has depreſs'd and kept them ſo low, that they have been heartleſs without any notable Growth or Advancement. For hence it hath come to paſs, that in Arts Mechanical, the firſt Projectors have been ſhort in their Inventions, and Time has ſupplied and perfected the reſt; but in Sciences, the firſt Authors have gone furtheſt, and Time has impair'd and corrupted much. So we ſee Artillery, Sailing, Printing, were in their Beginnings imperfect, and in a manner formleſs, and groſsly managed; but in progreſs of Time, accommodated and refined. But contrariwiſe, the Philoſophies and Sciences of *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, *Democritus*, *Hippocrates*, *Euclid*, *Archimedes*, were of moſt vigor under thoſe very Authors, and in proceſs

ceſs of Time degenerated rather, and loſt much of their Luſtre: Whereof the reaſon is no other, but that in Arts Mechanical the Wits of many have contributed and met in one; but in Liberal Arts and Sciences, the Wits of many have yielded and ſubmitted to ſome one, whom yet his Followers many times have rather depraved than illuſtrated: For as Water will not aſcend higher than the Spring-Head, from whence it flows; ſo Knowledge derived from *Ariſtotle*, and exempted from Liberty of Examination, will never riſe higher than the Knowledge of *Ariſtotle*. And therefore although I do not diſlike the Rule, *oportet diſcentem credere*, (*a Learner ought to believe*;) yet it muſt be coupled with this, *oportet jam doctum judicio ſuo uti*, (*he that is well inform'd, ought to make Uſe of his own Judgment.*) For Diſciples owe their Maſters only a Temporary Belief, and a Suſpenſion of their Judgment, till they have throughly learn'd the Arts; and not an abſolute Reſignation of their Liberty, and a perpetual Bondage of their Underſtanding. Wherefore to conclude this Point, I will ſay no more than this: Let great Authors ſo have their due Honour, as that we do not derogate from Time, which is the Author of Authors, and Parent of Truth.

CHAP. V.

Peccant Humours in LEARNING.

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Ibid.



THUS have we at length laid open three Distempers or Diseases of Learning; besides which there are some other, rather *peccant Humours*, than *confirm'd Diseases*; which, nevertheless, are not so occult, or secret, but that they fall under a popular Observation and Censure, and therefore are by no means to be passed over.

THE First of these is an Affectation of two Extremes, *Antiquity* and *Novelty:* Wherein the Daughters of *Time* take after the Nature and Malice of the Father: For as Time devours his Children, so do these one another,

ther, whilſt *Antiquity* envies new Improvements and Additions, aud *Novelty* cannot be content to add Things recent, unleſs it utterly turn out and reject the old: Surely the Advice of the Prophet is the true Direction in this Caſe: *Stand ye upon the old Paths, and ſee where is the good and the right Way, and walk therein*; Jerem. vi. 16. Antiquity deſerves ſo much Reverence, that Men ſhould make a Stop a-while, and ſtand thereupon, and look about them on every Side, to diſcover which is the beſt Way: But when the Diſcovery is well taken, then not to reſt there, but to advance chearfully. Indeed, to ſpeak Truth, *Antiquity of Time is the World's Youth.* Certainly our Times are the Antient Times, the World being now grown Old, and not thoſe, which are computed, *ordine retrogrado*, reckoning backward from our own Age.

ANOTHER Error, ſpringing from the Former, is a Suſpicion and Diffidence, which thinks, that it is not poſſible to find out any thing now, which the World could have been ſo long without; as if the ſame Objection might be made to Time, wherewith *Lucian* attacks *Jupiter*, and the reſt of the Heathen Gods: For he wonders they ſhould beget ſo many Children in old Time, and none in his: And asks merrily, Whether they were ſuperannuated, or reſtrain'd by the *Papian*

Law made against Old Men's Marriages. So Men seem to be apprehensive, that Time is become *Effete*, and past Children. Whereas on the other hand, we may easily discover here the Levity and Inconstancy of Men, who, 'till a Thing is done, think it impossible; and assoon as it is done, wonder it had not been done long before. Thus *Alexander*'s Expedition into *Asia*, was judg'd at first, as a vast, and exceeding difficult Enterprize; which, nevertheless, afterwards it pleas'd *Livy* to make so slight of, as to say of *Alexander*, *He did but bravely venture to despise idle Opinions.* And the same happened to *Columbus* in the Western Navigation. But in intellectual Matters, this is much more common, as may be seen in most of the Propositions in *Euclid*, which, before they are demonstrated, seem strange, and not easily to be assented to; but after Demonstration, the Mind embraces them by a kind of Recognizance, (as the Lawyers speak) as if it had understood and known them before.

ANOTHER Error, of Affinity with the Former, is a Conceit of those who think, that of all Sects, and antient Opinions, after they had been examined and sifted, the best still prevail'd, and suppress'd the rest. Wherefore they conceive, if a Man should begin his Search and Examination a-new, he must needs light upon some Opinions that had

had been rejected, and after Rejection, loſt, and obliterated; as if the Multitude, or even wiſe Men, to gratify the Multitude, did not oftner approve that which is popular, and light, than that which is ſolid, and profound. For Time is of the Nature of a River, which carries down to us Things light and ſwoln, but ſinks and drowns that which is ſolid and weighty.

ANOTHER Error different from the reſt, is an over-early and peremptory Reduction of Knowledge into Arts and Methods; which when it happens, Sciences receive ſmall or no Augmentation. Even as Young Men, when they are knit and perfectly ſhaped, ſcarce grow any more: So Knowledge, as long as it is diſpers'd into Aphoriſms and Obſervations, may grow and ſhoot up; but when once it is circumſcribed and ſhut up in Methods, it may, perchance, be poliſh'd and illuſtrated, or plain'd out and accommodated for human Uſe, but it encreaſes no more in Bulk and Subſtance.

ANOTHER Error ſucceeding That, which we laſt mentioned, is, that after the Diſtribution of particular Arts and Sciences into their ſeveral Claſſes, moſt Men have preſently abandoned Univerſality of Knowledge, *Philoſophia prima*; which is a deadly Enemy to the Progreſſion of Sciences. For Proſpects

are made from Turrets, or very high Places, and it is impossible for a Man to explore the more remote, and deeper Parts of any Science, if he stand but upon the Flat and Level of the same Science, and ascend not the Watch-Tower as it were of a higher Science.

ANOTHER Error flows from too great a Reverence, and a kind of Adoration of the Mind and Understanding of Man; by means whereof, Men have withdrawn themselves from the Contemplation of Nature, and the Observations of Experience, tumbling up and down in their own Speculations, and Conceits. But these noble Opinators, and (if I may so speak) Intellectualists, who are, notwithstanding, commonly taken for the most sublime and divine Philosophers; *Heraclitus* has rightly touch'd, *Men*, says he, *seek Truth in their own little Worlds, but not in the great World.* For they disdain the Alphabet as it were of Nature, and the *Primer* of the Divine Works; which if they did not do, they might, perhaps, by Steps and Degrees, after the Knowledge of simple Letters, and then Syllables, come at last, to read perfectly the Text and Volume of the Creatures it self. But they, contrariwise, by continual Meditation and Agitation of their Wit, urge, and as it were invocate their own Spirits, to divine,

vine, and give out Oracles unto them, by which they are deſervedly and pleaſingly deluded.

ANOTHER Error that hath ſome Connexion with this Latter, is, That Men many Times ſeaſon and infect their Meditations, and Doctrines, with certain Opinions, and Conceits of their own, which they hold moſt in Admiration; or with ſome Sciences, to which they are moſt addicted and devoted; dying and tincturing as it were all other things with thoſe Darlings of theirs, tho' a Paint very fallacious and deceivable. So hath *Plato* intermingled Theology in his Philoſophy; *Ariſtotle* Logick; the ſecond School of *Plato* (to wit, *Proclus* and the reſt) Mathematicks. So have the Chymiſts forged a new Philoſophy out of a few Experiments, the Fire, and Furnace. And *Gilbertus*, our Country-man, hath drawn a new Philoſophy out of the Loadſtone. So *Cicero*, when reciting the ſeveral Opinions concerning the Nature of the Soul, he had at laſt met with a Muſician, who held the Soul to be Harmony, ſaid pleaſantly, *This Man was not for going out of his own Profeſſion.* But of theſe ſort of Errors, *Ariſtotle* ſays aptly, and wiſely, *They that conſider but few Things, are apt to pronounce, and to be dogmatical.*

ANO-

ANOTHER Error is an Impatience of Doubting, and a blind Haſte to aſſert, without due and mature Suſpenſion of Judgment. For the two Ways of Contemplation are not unlike the two Ways of Action, often mentioned by the Antients: The One, plain and ſmooth in the Beginning, but in the End impaſſible; the Other, rough and craggy in the Entrance, but when you have gone on a little, fair and even: So in Contemplation, if a Man begins with Certainties, he ſhall end in Doubts; but if he begin with Doubts, and has the Patience to bear them a-while, he ſhall end in Certainties.

A like Error diſcovers it ſelf in the manner of delivering Knowledge, which, for the moſt part, is Imperious and Magiſterial, not Ingenuous and Liberal; ſo contrived, as to command Aſſent rather, than to ſubmit to Examination. I'll not deny, but that in compendious Treatiſes, deſign'd for Practice, that Form of Writing is to be retained: But in juſt and compleat Tractates of Sciences, both Extremes, in my Judgment, are to be avoided, as well that of *Velleius* the *Epicurean*, *Nil tam metuentis, quam ne dubitare de re aliqua videretur, (who fears nothing ſo much, as leaſt he ſhould ſeem to doubt about any Thing;)* as that of *Socrates*, and the Academy, that leave all Things in Doubt and

and Uncertainty. Men ſhould rather affect Candour and Sincerity, and propound Things with more or leſs Aſſeveration, according as they are more weakly, or more fully proved by the Weight of Argument and Reaſon.

OTHER Errors there are in the Scope that Men propound to themſelves, and to which they divert their Endeavours and Labours. For whereas the more diligent Leaders, and more noted Profeſſors of Learning, ought chiefly to make this their Aim, *viz.* The making ſome conſiderable Addition to the Art they profeſs; theſe Men on the other Side content themſelves to be Seconds only; courting the Name either of a ſubtle Interpreter, or of a ſmart tough Antagoniſt, or of a methodical Abridger. From whence the Revenues and Tributes of Sciences come to be augmented, but not the Patrimony and Ground of Knowledge it ſelf.

BUT the greateſt Error of all the reſt conſiſts in deviating from the ultimate End of Knowledge. For Men deſire and reach after Knowledge, ſome from an inbred and reſtleſs Curioſity; others for Entertainment and Delight; others for Reputation; others for the ſake of Contention, and Victory in Diſpute; moſt for Lucre, and Livelihood; very few to employ the Gift of Reaſon given by God, to the Benefit and Uſe of Mankind.

Juſt

Juſt for all the World as if there were ſought in Learning a Couch, whereupon to reſt a troubled and reſtleſs Spirit; or a Terraſs for a wandering and variable Mind to walk up and down upon at Liberty, and with a fair Proſpect; or ſome high and eminent Tower, for a proud ambitious Mind to raiſe it ſelf upon; or a Citadel, and Fort for Contention, and Battel; or a Ship for Trade and Merchandiſe; and not rather a rich Armory, and Store-houſe for the Glory of the Creator of all Things, and the Relief of Human Life. For this is that which would indeed dignify and exalt Learning and the Arts, if Contemplation and Action were more nearly and ſtraitly conjoyned and united, than they have hitherto been. Which Combination would be like the Conjunction of the two higheſt Planets, when *Saturn*, the Planet of Quiet and Contemplation, conſpires with *Jupiter*, the Planet of Society and Action. However, when I ſpeak of Practice and Action, I do not in the leaſt mean Profeſſory and Lucrative Learning: For I am not ignorant, how much that diverts and interrupts the Progreſſion and Advancement of Knowledge; like indeed the *Golden Apple* thrown before *Atalanta*, which while ſhe ſtoops to take up, the Race in the mean time is hinder'd.

Declinat

Declinat curſus aurumq; volubile tollit.

Nor again is it my Meaning (as was ſaid of *Socrates*) to call down Philoſophy from Heaven to converſe upon Earth only; that is, that Natural Philoſophy ſhould be laid aſide, to the end that Moral and Political Philoſophy only might be in Vogue: But as Heaven and Earth conſpire and conſent together for the Support and Delight of the Life of Man; ſo indeed ſhould this be the End of both Philoſophies, that vain Speculations, and whatever is empty and barren, being rejected, all that is ſolid and fruitful may be preſerved; that ſo, Knowledge may not be a Courteſan for Pleaſure, or a Hand-maid to Profit; but as a Spouſe, for Generation, Fruit, and honeſt Comfort.

AND now, methinks, I have explain'd and laid open, as by a kind of Diſſection, thoſe peccant Humours (the principal of them at leaſt) which have not only been an Impediment to the Proficience of Learning, but have alſo given Occaſion to the traducing of it. Which if I have done too much to the quick, it muſt be remember'd; *Faithful are the Wounds of a Friend*; *but the Kiſſes of an Enemy are deceitful*; Prov. xxvii. 6. However, this at leaſt I ſeem to have gained, to deſerve Belief in the following Encomium, ſince

since I have proceeded so freely in the preceding Censure. And yet I have no Purpose to write a Panegyrick of Learning, or to sing a Hymn to the *Muses*, (tho', perhaps, it is long since their Rites were duly celebrated:) But my Intent is, without Varnish or Amplification, to take the just Weight of Knowledge, and to ballance it with other Things, and to search out the true Value and Price thereof from Testimonies Divine and Human:

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Dignity of LEARNING.

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Ibid.

IRST therefore let us ſeek the Dignity of Knowledge in the Archetype, or firſt Platform; that is, in the Attributes, and Acts of God, as far as they are revealed to Man, and may be ſearch'd into with Sobriety. In which Matter, the Name of Learning is improper, ſince all Learning is Knowledge acquired; and no Knowledge in God is acquired, but Original. Therefore we muſt look out for ſome other Name; to wit, *Wiſdom*, or *Sapience*, as the Holy Scriptures call it.

THE Matter then ſtands thus: In the Works of Creation, we ſee a double Emanation

tion of Divine Virtue, the one referring to Power, the other to Wiſdom: The Former is chiefly ſeen in creating the Maſs of Matter; the Latter, in diſpoſing the Beauty of the Form. This being laid down, it is to be obſerv'd, that for any Thing which appears in the Hiſtory of the Creation to the contrary, the confuſed Maſs and Matter of Heaven and Earth was made in a Moment; yet the Diſpoſition and Digeſting of the ſame was the Work of ſix Days: So remarkable a Difference did it pleaſe God to put between the Works of Power, and the Works of Wiſdom. Furthermore, as to the Creation of the Matter, it is not recorded, that God ſaid, *Let there be Heaven and Earth*, as was ſaid of the Works following; but ſimply and actually, *God made Heaven and Earth*: So that the Matter ſeems to be as a Manufacture, but the Introduction of Form carries the Style of a Law, or Decree.

LET us proceed from God to Angels, whoſe Nature, in Order of Dignity is next to God. We ſee in the Orders of Angels, (ſo far as Credit is to be given to that Celeſtial Hierarchy, ſet forth under the Name of *Dionyſius* the *Arcopagite*) that the *Seraphim*, that is, the Angels of Love, have the Firſt Place; the Second, the *Cherubim*, Angels of Illumination; and that the Third, and following Places, are given to Thrones, Prin-

Principalities, and the reſt of the Angels of Power, and Miniſtry: So that from this very Order and Diſtribution, it appears, that the Angels of Knowledge, and Illumination, are placed before the Angels of Office and Domination.

TO deſcend from Spirits, and intellectual Natures, to ſenſible and material Forms, we read, that the firſt of created Forms was Light; which in Natural and Corporeal Things, has a Relation and Correſpondence to Things Spiritual and Incorporeal.

SO in the Diſtribution of Days, we ſee the Day, wherein God reſted, and contemplated his own Works, was bleſſed above all the Days, wherein the Fabrick of the Univerſe was created and diſpoſed.

AFTER the Creation was finiſh'd, we read that Man was placed in Paradiſe, to Work there: Which Work could be no other, than what relates to Contemplation; that is, the End whereof could not refer to Neceſſity, but to Delight, and Exerciſe, without Vexation or Trouble: For there being then no poſſible Reluctance of the Creature, no *Sweat of the Brow*, Man's Employment muſt of conſequence have been Matter of Pleaſure and Contemplation, not of Labour or Work. Again, the firſt Acts which Man perform'd

in Paradiſe, conſiſted of the two ſummary Parts of Knowledge, the View of Creatures, and the Impoſition of Names. As for the Knowledge which introduced the Fall, it was (as was touched before) not the Natural Knowledge of Creatures, but the Moral Knowledge of Good and Evil, wherein the Suppoſition was, that God's Commandments or Prohibitions were not the Originals of Good and Evil, but that they had other Beginnings which Man aſpired to know, to the end, to make a total Defection from God, and to depend wholly upon himſelf.

LET us paſs to the Things that happen'd immediately after the Fall. We ſee (as the ſacred Scriptures have infinite Myſteries, without ever violating the Hiſtorical and Literal Truth) an Image of the two Eſtates, the Contemplative and Active, delineated in the Perſons of *Abel* and *Cain*, and in their Profeſſions, and primitive Ways of Life: Whereof the one was a Shepherd, who, by Reaſon of his Leiſure, his Quiet, and free View of Heaven, is a Type of the Contemplative Life: The other, a Husbandman, that is, a Man fatigu'd with Labour, and his Countenance fix'd down upon the Earth: Where we may ſee that the Favour and Election of God went to the Shepherd, and not to the Tiller of the Ground.

SO

SO before the Flood, the holy Records (among the very few Occurrences regiſter'd of that Age) have vouchſafed to deliver down to Poſterity the Inventors of Muſick, and Works in Mettal.

IN the next Age after the Flood, the great Judgment of God upon the Pride of Man, was the Confuſion of Tongues, whereby the free Trade of Learning, and Intercourſe of Letters, was chiefly cut off.

LET us deſcend to *Moſes*, the Law-Giver, and God's firſt Notary, whom the Scriptures adorn with this Elogy, *That he was ſeen in all the Learning of the* Egyptians. Which Nation was reckon'd one of the moſt antient Schools of the World: For ſo *Plato* brings in the *Egyptian* Prieſt ſaying to *Solon*; *You* Grecians *are ever Children, having no Knowledge of Antiquity, nor Antiquity of Knowledge.* Take a View of the Ceremonial Law of *Moſes*, and you ſhall find, beſides the Prefiguration of Chriſt, the Diſtinction of the People of God from the *Gentiles*, the Exerciſe and Impreſſion of Obedience, and other holy Uſes of the ſame Law; that ſome of the moſt learned *Rabbins* have travailed profitably and profoundly to obſerve, ſome of them a Natural, ſome of them a Moral Senſe and Reduction of many of the Ceremonies

and Ordinances: As in the Law of the Leproſy, where it is ſaid; *If the Whiteneſs have overſpread the Fleſh, the Patient may paſs abroad for clean; but if there be any whole Fleſh remaining, he is to be ſhut up for unclean.* From this Law one of them collects a Principle of Nature; *That Putrefaction is more contagious before Maturity, than after.* Another noteth a Poſition of Moral Philoſophy; *That Men abandoned to Vice, do not ſo much corrupt Manners, as thoſe that are half good, and half evil:* So that in this, and very many other Places in that Law, there is to be found beſides the Theological Senſe, much Aſperſion of Philoſophy.

SO likewiſe if a Man turn over with Diligence that excellent Book of *Job*, he will find it full, and big as it were with the Myſteries of Natural Philoſophy. As for Example; Coſmography, and the Roundneſs of the World: *He ſtretcheth out the North over the empty Place and hangeth the Earth upon nothing*; Job xxvi. 7. wherein the Penſileneſs of the Earth, the Pole of the North, and the Finiteneſs or Convexity of Heaven are manifeſtly touched. So again Matter of Aſtronomy; *By his Spirit he hath garniſhed the Heavens; his Hand hath formed the crooked Serpent*; ibid. 13. And in another Place, *Canſt thou bind the ſweet Influences of* Pleiades? *Or looſe the Bands of* Orion?

xxxviii. 31. where the immoveable Configuration of the fix'd Stars, ever ſtanding at equal Diſtance one from the other, is with great Elegancy deſcribed. So in another Place, *Which maketh* Arcturus, Orion, *and* Pleiades, *and the Secrets of the South*; ix. 9. where again he points at the Depreſſion of the Southern Pole, calling it the *Secrets* of the South, becauſe the Southern Stars are not ſeen upon our Hemiſphere; Matter of Generation; *Haſt thou not poured me out like Milk, and condens'd me like Curds?* x. 10. Matter of Minerals; *Surely there is a Vein for Silver, and a Place wherein Gold is fined; Iron is digged up out of compacted Duſt, and Braſs extracted from Stone diſſolved in the Furnace*, and ſo forward in the ſame Chapter; 28. 1, *&c.*

IN like Manner alſo in the Perſon of King *Solomon*, we ſee the Gift of Wiſdom, both in his own Petition, and in the Divine Grant, preferr'd before all earthly and temporal Felicity. By Virtue of which Donative and Grant, *Solomon* being ſingularly furniſh'd, wrote not only thoſe excellent Parables, or Aphoriſms concerning Divine and Moral Philoſophy; but alſo compiled a Natural Hiſtory of all Vegetables, *from the Cedar upon the Mountain, to the Moſs upon the Wall*, (which is but the Rudiment of a Plant, between Putrefaction and an Herb;) and of

all Things that breath or move. Nay, the same King *Solomon*, though he excell'd in Wealth, in Magnificence of Buildings, in Shipping, in Service and Attendance, in Fame and Renown, and other Things relating to Glory; yet he reaps, or assumes to himself, nothing at all, out of that Train of Glories, besides the Glory of inquiring into, and finding out the Truth. For so he says expressly; *It is the Glory of God to conceal a Thing; but the Honour of Kings is to search out a Matter*; Prov. xxv. 2. As if, according to the innocent and sweet Play of Children, the Divine Majesty took Delight to hide his Works, to the end to have them found out; and as if Kings could not obtain a greater Honour, than to be God's Play-fellows in that Game; especially considering the great Command they have of Wits and Means, whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them.

NOR was the Dispensation of God otherwise, after our Saviour was come into the World. For he shew'd his Power, in putting Ignorance to flight, by his Conference with the Doctors, and Priests in the Temple, before he shew'd it, in subduing Nature, by his great and numerous Miracles. And the coming of the holy Spirit was chiefly figured and express'd, in the Similitude and Gift of Tongues,

Tongues, which are but the Vehicles of Knowledge.

SO in the Choice of thoſe Inſtruments, which God made uſe of for the Plantation of the Faith, at firſt he call'd forth Perſons wholly unlearn'd and ignorant, otherwiſe than by Inſpiration of the Holy Ghoſt; to the end he might more evidently declare his own immediate Working and Divine Power, and above Human Wiſdom. Nevertheleſs, his Counſel in this Reſpect was no ſooner fulfill'd, but in the next Succeſſion of Time, he ſent his Divine Truth into the World, waited upon by other Learnings as Servants or Handmaids. Accordingly the Pen of St. *Paul* (the only learned Man of the Apoſtles) was chiefly employ'd by God, in the Scriptures of the New Teſtament.

SO again we know that ſeveral of the ancient Biſhops and Fathers, were excellently read in all the Learning of the Heathen. Inſomuch, that the Edict of *Julian*, which forbad Chriſtians to be admitted into Schools, and Academies, was eſteemed a more pernicious Engine for the demoliſhing of the Chriſtian Faith, than the Sanguinary Perſecutions of the preceding Emperors. Neither was the Emulation and Invidiouſneſs of *Gregory* the Firſt, Biſhop of *Rome*, (otherwiſe an excellent Man) who zealouſly endeavour'd to ob-

literate the Memory of Heathen Authors and Antiquities, taken in good part, even among pious Men. Nay it was the Chriſtian Church alone, which, amidſt the Inundations of the *Scythians* from the North, and of the *Saracens* from the Eaſt, preſerv'd in her ſacred Boſom, the precious Relicks of Heathen Learning, which was now upon the Point of being utterly extinguiſh'd.

WHEREFORE to conclude this Part, there are two principal Offices and Services, beſides Ornament and Illuſtration, which Philoſophy, and Human Learning perform to Faith and Religion. The one, that they are effectual Incitements to the Exaltation and Celebration of the Glory of God; (for as the Pſalms, and other Scriptures, often invite us to contemplate, and magnify the great and wonderful Works of God; ſo, if we ſhould reſt only in the exterior part of them, as they firſt offer themſelves to our Senſes; we ſhould do the like Injury to the Majeſty of God, as if we ſhould judge of the Wealth and Store of a moſt noted Jeweller, by what is expoſed to View in the out-part of the Shop towards the Street.) The other, that they miniſter a ſingular Help and Preſervative againſt Unbelief and Error. For our Saviour ſaith, *Ye err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the Power of God.* Where he lays before us two Books to ſtudy, to prevent our falling into

into Error: Firſt the Volume of the Scriptures, which reveal the Will of God; then, the Volume of the Creatures, that expreſs his Power: The Latter of which, is as a Key to the Former, opening not only our Intellect, to conceive the genuine Senſe of the Scriptures, which is to be drawn out by the general Rules of Reaſon, and Laws of Speech; But beſides that, unlocking our Faith alſo, to enter into a ſerious Meditation of the Omnipotence of God, the Characters whereof are chiefly ſigned and engraven upon his Works. Thus much for Divine Teſtimonies, and Judgments, concerning the true Dignity and Value of Learning.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of Human Proofs and Arguments.

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Ibid.

S for Human Proofs and Arguments, ſo large a Field opens, that it is convenient to uſe Choice rather than Abundance.

FIRST therefore the higheſt Degree of Honour among the Heathen, was to obtain Divine Veneration and Worſhip; (which as to Chriſtians indeed is as the forbidden Fruit:) But we ſpeak now ſeparately concerning Human Judgments. Therefore (as we were ſaying) among the Heathens, that which the *Greeks* call *Apotheoſis*, and the *Latins*, *Relatio inter Deos*, (*Canonizing*,) was the ſupreme Honour that Man could poſſibly attribute to Man; eſpecially, when it was given

ven, not by any Decree, or Act of State (as to the *Roman* Emperors) but freely and frankly, from the Judgment, and inward Belief of Men. Of which exalted Honour there was a certain Degree, and middle Term. For there were reckoned above *Human Honours*, *Honours Heroical*, and *Divine*; in the Distribution of which, Antiquity observ'd this Order.

FOUNDERS of States, Legislators, Tyrannicides, Fathers of their Country, and other Persons of great Merit in Civil Affairs, were distinguish'd by the Title of Heroes only, or Demy-Gods; such as *Theseus*, *Minos*, *Romulus*, and the rest: On the other side, the Inventors and Authors of new Arts, and such as endow'd Human Life with new Conveniences, and Accessions, were ever consecrated among the *Greater Gods* themselves, which happen'd to *Ceres*, *Bacchus*, *Mercury*, *Apollo*, and others. Which, doubtless, was done justly, and upon sound Judgment. For *the Merits of the former*, are commonly confined within the Circle of one Age, or Nation; and are not unlike seasonable and favourable Showers, which though they be profitable and desirable, yet serve but for that Season, wherein they fall, and for that Latitude of Ground, which they water: But the Benefits of the latter, like the Blessings of the Sun, and of the heavenly Bodies, are for Time, perpetual; for Place, universal. Again, Those

are

are uſually accompanied with Strife, and Perturbation; but Theſe have the true Character of the Divine Preſence, and come *in a gentle Gale*, without Tumult, or Noiſe.

NOR indeed is the Merit of Learning in Civil Affairs, and in repreſſing the Inconveniencies which One Man brings upon Another, much inferior to that Other, in relieving Human Neceſſities, which ariſe from Nature herſelf. And this kind of Merit was excellently ſhadow'd under that Feign'd Relation, concerning *Orpheus*'s Theater; where all Beaſts and Birds aſſembled, and forgetful of their Natural Appetites, of Prey, of Game, of Fight, ſtood ſociably and lovingly together, taken with the melodious Sweetneſs of his Harp; the Sound whereof no ſooner ceaſed, or was drowned by ſome louder Noiſe, but every Beaſt returned to his own Nature. In which Fable, the Natures, and Manners of Men are elegantly deſcribed, who are toſſed with ſundry untamed Deſires of Gain, of Luſt, of Revenge; yet as long as they give ear to the Precepts, and Perſuaſions of Religion, of Laws, of Inſtructors, eloquently and ſweetly warbling, in Books, in Sermons, and Harangues; ſo long is Peace and Society maintain'd: But if thoſe are ſilent, or that Seditions, and Tumults diſturb them with their Clamour, all Things diſſolve, and relapſe into Anarchy and Confuſion.

BUT

BUT this appears more manifeſtly, when Kings themſelves, or Perſons of great Authority under them, or other Governours of States, are indued with Learning. For however partial to his own Profeſſion he may be thought, who ſaid, *Then would States be Happy, when either Philoſophers were Kings, or Kings Philoſophers*; yet ſo much is verified by Experience, that, under Learned Princes, and Governours of State, there have been ever the Happieſt Times. For howſoever Kings themſelves may have their Errors and Imperfections, being liable to Paſſions, and depraved Cuſtoms, like other Men; yet if they have the Illumination of Learning, certain anticipated Notions of Religion, Policy, and Morality, hold them back, and refrain them from all ruinous and incurable Exceſs, and Error; evermore twitching their Ear, even when Counſellors and Servants are ſilent. Moreover, Senators, and Counſellors themſelves, that are accompliſh'd with Learning, proceed upon more ſolid Principles, than thoſe that are only Men of Experience; the former ſeeing Dangers afar off, and warding them in Time; whereas theſe are wiſe only near at hand, ſeeing nothing but what is imminent, and then at laſt truſting to the Agility of their Wit to diſintangle and reſcue themſelves, in the very Inſtant of Perils.

WHICH

WHICH Felicity of Times under *Learned Princes* (to keep ſtill the Law of Brevity, by uſing only the moſt ſelect, and moſt eminent Examples) doth beſt appear in that Age, which paſſed from the Death of *Domitian* the Emperor, until the Reign of *Commodus*, comprehending a Succeſſion of ſix Princes, Learned themſelves, or at leaſt ſingular Favourers of Learning; and of all Ages (if we regard Temporal Happineſs) the moſt flouriſhing, that *Rome*, then the *Epitome* of the World, ever ſaw: A Matter revealed and prefigured to *Domitian* in a Dream, the Night before he was ſlain: For he thought he ſaw *a Golden Head grown out of the Nape of his Neck:* Which Divination was indeed fulfill'd in thoſe Golden Times which ſucceeded: Of which Princes we will make ſome Commemoration; wherein although the Matter will be vulgar, and may be thought fitter for a Declamation, than agreeable to a Treatiſe infolded as this; yet becauſe it is pertinent to the point in hand, (*neque ſemper arcum tendit Apollo*; and to name them only, were too naked and curſory) I will not omit it altogether.

THE firſt was *Nerva*, the excellent Temper of whoſe Government is, by a Glance in *Cornelius Tacitus*, touched to the Life (*after* Nerva *had united two before incompatible Things, Empire and Liberty:*) And in token

token of his Learning, he was a Familiar, and a Disciple as it were, of *Apollonius*, the famous *Pythagorean:* And the last Act of his short Reign left to Memory, was a Missive to his adopted Son *Trajan*, proceeding from some inward Discontent at the Ingratitude of the Times, comprehended in a Verse of *Homer*'s,

Revenge my Tears, O Phœbus, *with thy Shafts.*

TRAJAN, who succeeded, was not learned indeed as to his own Person: But if we will hearken to the Speech of our Saviour, that saith, *He that receiveth a Prophet in the Name of a Prophet, shall have a Prophet's Reward*; he deserves to be placed amongst the most learned Princes: For he was an Admirer of Learning, a Benefactor to learned Men, a Founder of Libraries, and in whose Court (tho' a warlike Prince) Preceptors and Professors are recorded to have been in the highest Request. On the other side, how much *Trajan*'s Virtue and Government was admired and renowned, surely no Testimony of grave and faithful History doth more lively set forth, than that Legend Tale of *Gregorius Magnus*, Bishop of *Rome*, who was noted for the extreme Envy he bare towards all Heathen Excellency; and yet he is reported out of the Love and Esteem of *Trajan*'s Moral Virtues, to have made unto God pas-

sionate

ſionate and fervent Prayers, for the Delivery of his Soul out of Hell; and to have obtained it with a *Caveat* that he ſhould make no more Petitions. In this Prince's Time alſo, the Perſecutions againſt the Chriſtians received Intermiſſion, upon the Certificate of *Plinius Secundus*, a Man of excellent Learning, and by *Trajan* advanced.

ADRIAN, his Succeſſor, was the moſt curious Man that lived, and the moſt univerſal Enquirer; inſomuch as it was noted for an Error in his Mind, that he deſired to comprehend all Things, and not to reſerve himſelf for the worthieſt Things, falling into the like Humour that was long before noted in *Philip* of *Macedon*, who when he would needs over-rule and convince an excellent Muſician, in an Argument touching Muſick, was well anſwer'd by him again, *God forbid, Sir*, (ſaith he) *that your Fortune ſhould be ſo bad, as to know thoſe things better than I.* It pleaſed God likewiſe to uſe the Curioſity of this Emperor, as an Inducement to the Peace of his Church in thoſe Days; for having Chriſt in Veneration, not as a God or Saviour, but as a Wonder or Novelty, and having his Picture in his Gallery, matched with *Apollonius*, (with whom, in his vain Imagination, he thought he had ſome Conformity) yet it ſerved the turn to allay the bitter Hatred of thoſe Times againſt the

the Christian Name; so as the Church had Peace during his Time. And for his Government Civil, although he did not attain to that of *Trajan*'s, in Glory of Arms, or Perfection of Justice; yet in deserving of the Weal of the Subject, he did exceed him. For *Trajan* erected many famous Monuments and Buildings, insomuch as *Constantine* the *Great*, in Emulation was wont to call him *Parietaria*, *Wall-Flower*, because his Name was upon so many Walls: But his Buildings and Works were more of Glory and Triumph, than Use and Necessity. But *Adrian* spent his whole Reign (which was peaceable) in a Perambulation, or Survey of the *Roman* Empire, giving Order, wherever he went, for re-edifying of Cities, Towns, and Forts decayed; and for cutting of Rivers and Streams; and for making Bridges and Passages, and for Policing of Cities and Commonalties, with new Ordinances and Constitutions; and granting new Franchises and Incorporations: So that his whole Time was a perfect Restoration of all the Lapses and Decays of former Times.

ANTONINUS Pius, who succeeded him, was a Prince excellently learned; and had the patient and subtile Wit of a School-man; insomuch as in common Speech, (which leaves no Virtue untaxed) he was called *Cumini-Sector*, a Carver, or a Divider of Cumin-

Seed, which is one of the leaſt Seeds: Such a Patience he had, and ſettled Spirit, to enter into the leaſt and moſt exact Differences of Cauſes; a Fruit, no doubt, of the exceeding Tranquillity and Serenity of his Mind; which being no Ways charged or incumbred either with Fears, Remorſes, or Scruples, but having been noted for a Man of the pureſt Goodneſs without all Fiction or Affectation, that hath reigned or lived, made his Mind continually preſent and entire: He likewiſe approached a Degree nearer unto Chriſtianity, and became, as *Agrippa* ſaid unto St. *Paul, half a Chriſtian*; holding their Religion and Law in good Opinion, and not only ceaſing Perſecution, but giving Way to the Advancement of Chriſtians.

THERE ſucceeded him the firſt *Divi Fratres*, the two adoptive Brethren, *Lucius Commodus Verus*, Son to *Elius Verus*, (who delighted much in the ſofter kind of Learning, and was wont to call the Poet *Martial* his *Virgil*) and *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*, whereof the Latter, who obſcured his Collegue, and ſurvived him long, was named the *Philoſopher*; who as he excell'd all the reſt in Learning, ſo he excell'd them likewiſe in Perfection of all Royal Virtues; inſomuch as *Julian* the Emperor, in his Book intitled, *Cæſares*, which was a kind of Satyr, to deride all his Predeceſſors, feigned that they were

were all invited to a Banquet of the Gods, and *Silenus* the Jester sate at the nether End of the Table, and bestowed a Scoff upon every one as they came in; but when *Marcus Philosophus* came in, *Silenus* was gravelled, and out of Countenance, having nothing to object, or carp at, except his Patience towards the Humours of his Wife. And the Virtue of this Prince continued with that of his Predecessor, made the Name of *Antoninus* so sacred in the World, that though it were extremely dishonoured in *Commodus*, *Caracalla*, and *Heliogabalus*, (who all bore the Name) yet when *Alexander Severus* refused the Name, because he was a Stranger to the Family, the Senate, with one Acclamation said, *Quomodo Augustus sic & Antoninus.* In such Renown and Veneration, was the Name of these two Princes in those Days, that they would have had it as a perpetual Addition in all the Emperors Style. In this Emperor's Time also, the Church for the most part was in Peace: So as in this *Series* of six Princes, we see the blessed Effects of Learning in Sovereignty, painted forth in the Great Table of the World.

BUT for a Tablet or Picture of smaller Volume, in my Judgment the most excellent, is that of Queen *Elizabeth*, a Prince that, if *Plutarch* was now alive to write Lives by Parallels, would trouble him, I think, to

find for her a Parallel among Women. This Lady was endued with Learning, in her Sex ſingular, and Grace even among Maſculine Princes; whether we ſpeak of Learning of Languages, or of Science, Modern or Antient, Divinity or Humanity. And to the very laſt Year of her Life, ſhe was accuſtomed to appoint ſet Hours for Reading, ſcarcely any young Student in an Univerſity, more daily, or more duly. As for her Government, I aſſure my ſelf, I ſhall not exceed, if I affirm, that this part of the Iſland never had 45 Years of better Times; and yet not through the Calmneſs of the Seaſon, but through the Wiſdom of her Regiment. For if there be conſidered on the one ſide, the Truth of Religion eſtabliſhed; the conſtant Peace and Security; the good Adminiſtration of Juſtice; the temperate Uſe of the Prerogative not ſlackened, nor much ſtrained; the flouriſhing State of Learning, ſuiting with ſo excellent a Patroneſs; the convenient Eſtate of Wealth and Means, both of Crown and Subject; the Habit of Obedience, and the Moderation of Diſcontents: And there be conſidered on the other ſide, the Differences of Religion, the Troubles of Neighbour Countries, the Ambition of *Spain*, and Oppoſition of *Rome*, and then that ſhe was ſolitary, and of her ſelf: Theſe Things, I ſay, conſider'd, as I could

could not have chosen an Instance so recent and so proper; so, I suppose, I could not have chosen one more remarkable, or eminent, to the purpose now in hand; which is concerning the Conjunction of Learning in the Prince, with Felicity in the People.

CHAP. VIII.

The Influence of LEARNING *in Military Affairs.*

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Ibid.

URTHERMORE, Learning has not only an Influence upon Civil Affairs, and the Arts of Peace, but it exercises its Power and Efficacy also in Martial Virtue; as appears manifestly in the Examples of *Alexander* the Great, and *Cæsar* the Dictator: Whose Military Virtues, and Atchievements in War, 'twould be needless to note or recite, since they were the Wonders of the World in that kind: But of their Affection and Zeal to Learning, as also their peculiar Perfection in the same, 'twill not be impertinent to subjoin somewhat.

ALEXANDER was bred and taught under *Aristotle*, (a great Philosopher, doubtless)

leſs) who dedicated divers of his Philoſophical Books to him: He was never without *Calliſthenes*, and ſeveral other great Scholars, who followed his Camp, and were his perpetual Aſſociates in all his Marches and Expeditions: And in what Eſteem he held Learning, is plainly demonſtrated by many Particulars: As the Envy, which he thought *Achilles*'s Fortune worthy of, in having ſo good a Trumpet of his Acts and Praiſes as *Homer*. His Judgment touching the precious Cabinet of *Darius*, found amongſt the reſt of the Spoils; of which, when a Queſtion was moved, What Thing was moſt worthy to be kept in it? and One ſaid one Thing; and Another, another; He gave Sentence for *Homer*'s Works. His chiding Letter to *Ariſtotle*, after he had publiſh'd his Books of Nature, wherein he expoſtulates with him, for publiſhing the Myſteries of Philoſophy; and withal ſends him Word, That he had rather excell all Men in Learning and Knowledge, than in Power and Empire. There are other Particulars alſo to this purpoſe. But as to Himſelf, how excellently he had improv'd his Mind with Learning, appears, or rather ſhines, in all his Sayings and Anſwers, full of Learning; wherein, though the Remains be few, you may find deeply impreſs'd the Footſteps of all Sciences.

AND herein again, it may ſeem a thing Scholaſtical, and ſomewhat idle, to recite Things that every Man knoweth; but yet, ſince the Argument I handle, leadeth me thereunto, I am glad that Men ſhall perceive I am as willing to flatter (if they will ſo call it) an *Alexander*, or a *Cæſar*, or an *Antoninus*, that are dead many hundred Years ſince, as any that now liveth: For it is the Diſplaying of the Glory of Learning in Sovereignty, that I propound to my ſelf, and not an Humour of Declaiming in any Man's Praiſes.

AS to Morals then, let the Apothegm of *Alexander*, touching *Diogenes*, be obſerv'd firſt; and ſee (if ye pleaſe) if it tend not to the ſettling of one of the greateſt Queſtions in Moral Philoſophy; *Whether he that enjoys outward Things, or deſpiſes them, is the happier Man.* For when he ſaw *Diogenes* contented with ſo little, turning to thoſe that ſtood about him, and mock'd at his Condition, *Were I not* (ſays he) Alexander, *I could wiſh to be* Diogenes. But *Seneca*, in this Compariſon, preferr'd *Diogenes*, when he ſaid, *There was more that* Diogenes *would have refuſed, than* Alexander *could have given.*

IN Natural Knowledge, let that Speech be obſerv'd which was uſual with him, *That he*

he felt his Mortality chiefly in two things, Sleep and Luſt, Which Speech, in truth, is drawn from the Depth of Natural Philoſophy, and likelier to have come out of the Mouth of an *Ariſtotle*, or a *Democritus*, than an *Alexander*; ſeeing as well the Indigence, as Redundance of Nature, repreſented by thoſe two Acts, are as it were Pledges and Earneſts of Death.

AS to Poetry, let that Speech be obſerv'd, when upon the bleeding of his Wounds, he called to him one of his Flatterers, that was wont to aſcribe to him Divine Honour; *Look*, ſays he, *this is the Blood of a Man, not ſuch Liquor as* Homer *ſaid ran from* Venus *Hand, when it was wounded by* Diomed: With this Saying making merry both with the Poets, and his Flatterers, and Himſelf.

IN Logick; Take his Reprehenſion of Dialectick Subtleties, as to the Repelling and Retorting of Arguments, in the Touch he gave *Caſſander*, who was confuting the Informers againſt his Father *Antipater*. For when *Alexander* happen'd to ſay, *Do you think theſe Men would have taken ſo long a Journey, if they had not juſt Cauſe of Complaint? Caſſander* anſwer'd, *Nay, this was the very Thing that gave them Encouragement, being in hopes that their Calumny at ſuch*

such a Distance could not be disprov'd. See (says the King) *the Quirks of* Aristotle *to turn a Thing both ways*, Pro *and* Con. Nevertheless, this very Art, which he reprehended in another, he knew well how to use himself, when Occasion required, to serve his own turn. For it so fell out, that *Callisthenes* (whom *Alexander* inwardly hated, for being against his new Canonization) was desired at a Banquet, by the Company at Table, to chuse some Subject, for Entertainment sake, (being a very eloquent Man) to discourse upon *extempore*; and he consenting, and pitching upon the Praises of the *Macedonian* Nation, harangued with the great Applause of all the Company: Whereupon *Alexander*, nothing pleas'd, said, *Upon a good Subject, it is easy for any body to be eloquent: But turn*, says he, *your Style, and let us hear what you can say against us. Callisthenes* undertook it, and perform'd it with that Sting and Bitterness, that *Alexander* interrupted him, and said; *Spight also, as well as a good Cause, infuses Eloquence.*

FOR Rhetorick, to which Tropes and Ornaments belong, behold a most elegant Use of a Metaphor, wherewith he girded *Antipater*, an imperious tyrannical Governour. For when one of *Antipater*'s Friends was praising him to *Alexander* for his great Moderation, in not degenerating, as other Lieu-

Lieutenants did, into the *Perſian* Luxury, and the Uſe of Purple, and throwing off the antient *Macedonian* Habit; *True*, ſays *Alexander*, *but* Antipater *is all over Purple within.* That other Metaphor alſo was fine; When *Parmenio* came to him in the Plains of *Arbela*, and ſhew'd him the vaſt Army of his Enemies, which lying under their View by Night, repreſented, by the infinite Number of Fires, another as it were ſtarry Firmament, and thereupon adviſed him to attack them by Night, *I will not*, ſays *Alexander*, *ſteal a Victory.*

FOR Matter of Policy, mark that moſt ſignificant and wiſe Diſtinction (which all Poſterity has embrac'd) that he made between two of his ſingular Friends, *Epheſtion* and *Craterus*, when he ſaid, *That the One loved* Alexander, *and the Other loved the King*; ſettling a Difference of great Import, between even the moſt faithful Servants of Princes, *That ſome bear a true Affection to the Perſons of their Maſters*; *others to their Crown, and Government.*

LET it be conſidered likewiſe, how notably he tax'd an Error, ordinary with the Counſellors of Princes, who generally ſuggeſt Counſel, according to the Model of their own Mind and Fortune, not that of their Maſters. For when *Darius* made great Offers

fers to *Alexander*; *I*, ſays *Parmenio*, *would accept them, if I was* Alexander. Replies *Alexander*; *And ſo would I, if I were* Parmenio.

Laſtly; Examine that quick and acute Reply to his Friends, when they ask'd him, *What he reſerv'd for himſelf, upon his giving ſo many and ſuch large Gifts to others?* *Hope*; ſays he. As one who well knew, that when all Accounts are caſt up aright, *Hope* is the true Portion, and as it were Inheritance, of thoſe that aſpire to Great Things. This was *Julius Cæſar*'s Portion, when upon going into *Gaul*, he had exhauſted all his Eſtate by profuſe Largeſſes. This was likewiſe the Portion of *Henry* Duke of *Guiſe*, that moſt Noble Prince, tho' too Ambitious, of whom it was uſually ſaid, *That he was the greateſt Uſurer in all* France, *becauſe all his Wealth was in Notes, and he had turn'd his whole Patrimony into Obligations.*

TO conclude therefore, as certain Criticks are uſed to ſay hyperbolically; That if all Sciences were loſt, they might be found in *Virgil*: So certainly this may be ſaid truly; there are the Prints and Footſteps of Learning in thoſe few Speeches which are reported of this Prince. The Admiration of whom, when I conſider him, not as *Alexander*

the

the Great, but as *Ariſtotle*'s Scholar, hath perhaps carried me too far.

AS for *Julius Cæſar*, the Excellency of his Learning need not be conjectur'd, either from his Education, or his Acquaintance, or his Anſwers. For this appears eminently in his Writings, and Books, ſome of which are extant, others are unfortunately loſt. We have to this Day that famous Hiſtory of his own Wars, which he nam'd and entitled, *Commentaries* only; wherein all ſucceeding Ages have admired the ſolid Weight of Matter, and lively Images, as well of Actions as Perſons, joined with the greateſt Purity of Language, and Perſpicuity of Narration that ever was: Which that it was not the Effect of a natural Gift, but of Learning and Precept, is well witneſſed by that Work of his intituled, *De Analogia*; being a Grammatical Philoſophy, wherein he did labour to make this ſame *Vox ad placitum*, to become *Vox ad licitum*; and to reduce Cuſtom of Speech to Congruity of Speech, and took as it were the Pictures of Words from the Life of Reaſon.

BY the Book which he entitled, *Anti-Cato*, it eaſily appears, that he aſpired as much to Victory of Wit, as Victory of War and Arms, undertaking therein a Conflict with the Pen

againſt

againſt the greateſt Champion of that Age, *Cicero* the Orator.

AGAIN, as a Monument of his Learning, no leſs than of his Power, we have the Computation of the Year reform'd by an Edict of his; a plain Evidence, that he took it to be as great a Glory to himſelf to underſtand well the Laws of the Stars in Heaven, as to give Laws to Men upon Earth.

AGAIN in his Book of Apophthegms, which he collected, we ſee he eſteem'd it more Honour, to make himſelf a kind of Regiſter-Book, for the entering the wiſe and pithy Sayings of others, than to have his own Sayings hallowed as Oracles, as ſome vain Princes, corrupted by Flattery, delight to do. And yet if I was minded to enumerate many of his Sayings, (as I did in *Alexander*) they are truly ſuch as *Solomon* notes; *The Words of the Wiſe are as Stings, and like Nails driven deep*; whereof I will recite three only, not ſo wonderful for their Elegancy, as for their Force and Efficacy.

FIRST then, he muſt needs be thought a Maſter of Speech, that could with one Word appeaſe a Mutiny in his Army. The Occaſion was this; 'Twas a Cuſtom with the *Romans*, when their Generals ſpoke to their Army, to uſe the Word *Milites*, but when the

the Magistrates spake to the People, to use the Word *Quirites*. *Cæsar*'s Soldiers tumulted, and seditiously demanded a Dismission; not that they really desired this, but by such Demand, to force *Cæsar* to other Conditions: He nothing mov'd, and unshaken, when Silence was made, began thus: *I Quirites*. By which Word he intimated, That they were already dismiss'd. The Soldiers struck, and utterly confounded at this, never left interrupting him as he went on with his Speech, and relinquishing their former Demand of Dismission, made it their earnest Suit on the other side, that the Name of *Milites* might be again restored them.

THE Second was thus; *Cæsar* extremely affected the Name of *King*: Therefore some were suborn'd, as he passed by, in popular Acclamation to salute him *King*. He finding the Cry weak and thin, put off the Matter with a Jest, as if they had mistaken his Surname; *I am*, says he, *not King, but* Cæsar; a Speech certainly, that if it be exactly search'd, the Life and Weight of it can scarce be express'd. For first it pretended a Refusal of the Name, but not serious. Next it shew'd an infinite Confidence and Magnanimity; as if the Appellation of *Cæsar* were a greater Title, than that of *King*; which came to pass accordingly, and hath obtain'd even to this Day: But what made most for his

his purpoſe, this Speech, by an admirable Artifice, purſued cloſely its own End; for this inſinuated, that the Senate and People of *Rome* contended with him about a Trifle, a Name only, (for he had long ſince the Power of a King) and ſuch a Name, as many even of mean Families bore: For *Rex* was a Surname of the *Romans*, as *King* is with us.

THE laſt Speech I think fit to mention here, was thus; When *Cæſar*, after the War began, had poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Rome*, and had broke open the inner Treaſury, to take the Money there ſtored, for the Service of the War, *Metellus*, as being then Tribune, withſtood him; to whom *Cæſar*, *If thou doſt perſiſt*, (ſays he) *Thou art a dead Man.* Then checking himſelf a little, he added, *Young Man, 'tis harder for me to ſay this, than to do it.* A Speech compouuded of ſuch wonderful Terror and Clemency, that nothing poſſibly could be more.

BUT to diſmiſs *Cæſar*, it is evident that he was fully ſenſible of his own Perfection in Learning; as appears by this, that when ſome were wondering at *Sylla*'s Reſolution in reſigning the Dictatorſhip, he ſcoffingly ſaid, Scylla *knew not Letters, and could not dictate.*

AND

AND it seems to be time now to put an End to this Discourse concerning the near Alliance of Military Virtue and Learning, (for what in this Kind can come after *Alexander* and *Cæsar?*) were it not that I am transported with the Worthiness and Rareness of one other Example, because it did so suddenly pass from *Scorn* to *Wonder*. And it is of *Zenophon*, the Philosopher, who went from *Socrates*'s School into *Asia*, with *Cyrus* the Younger, in his Expedition against King *Artaxerxes*. This *Zenophon*, at that Time, was a very Youth, and never had seen Army or Camp; nor had he then any Command in the Army, but went only as a Volunteer, for the Conversation of his Friend *Proxenus*. He was by chance present, when *Falinus* came with an Embassage from the Great King to the *Grecians*, after that *Cyrus* was slain in the Field, and the *Grecians* (but an Handful of Men) having lost their General, in the Heart of the Provinces of *Persia*, were cut off from their own Country, by the Interposition of abundance of Miles, and by very great and deep Rivers. The Embassage imported, That they should deliver up their Arms, and submit themselves to the King's Mercy: To which Embassy before Answer was publickly made, several of the Army conferr'd fa-

miliarly with *Falinus*; and amongſt the reſt *Zenophon* happened to ſay: *Why*, (ſays he) Falinus, *we have now but theſe two Things left us, our Arms, and our Courage: And if we yield up our Arms, what Uſe, pray, will our Courage be to us?* Here *Falinus*, ſmiling, ſaid, *If I be not deceiv'd, Young Gentleman, you are an* Athenian, *and ſtudy Philoſophy, and theſe are pretty ſpruce Things that you ſay, but you are very much miſtaken, if you think your Courage a Match for the King's Forces.* Here was the Scorn; the Wonder follows. This School-Novice, and Philoſopher, after all the Captains and Commanders were murder'd by Treachery, conducted back ten Thouſand Foot, from *Babylon* into *Greece*, through the midſt of the King's Provinces, in deſpight of all his Forces, to the Aſtoniſhment of the World, and the no ſmall Encouragement of the *Grecians* from that Time, to an Invaſion and Subverſion of the *Perſian* Monarchy. Which indeed ſoon after *Jaſon* the *Theſſalian* deſign'd; *Ageſilaus* the *Spartan* attempted; and at laſt *Alexander* the *Macedonian* atchieved, all ſtirred up by this Brave Leading Act of that Young Scholar.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

The Influence of LEARNING *in Moral Virtue.*

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Ibid.

ET us proceed from Imperial and Military Virtue, to Moral, and that which is the Virtue of Private Men: And firſt, that of the Poet is a moſt certain Truth,

Scilicet ingenuas didiciſſe fideliter Artes
Emollit mores, nec ſinit eſſe feros.

FOR Learning frees Men's Minds from Brutality and Barbariſm. But yet the Emphaſis had need be upon the Word *fideliter*, (*throughly*) for a ſuperficial confuſed Knowledge turns rather to the contrary. Learning, I ſay, takes away Levity, Raſhneſs, and

Inſolence, whilſt it ſuggeſts all Dangers and Doubts together with the Thing it ſelf; ballances the Weight of Reaſons and Arguments on both ſides; turns back the firſt Offers and pleaſing Conceits of the Mind as ſuſpected, and teaches us not to tread a Step without ſearching, as it were, and examining our Way.

THE ſame extirpates vain and exceſſive Admiration, which is the very Root of all Weakneſs. For we admire Things, either becauſe they are *New*, or becauſe they are *Great*. As for *Novelty*, there is no Man that is throughly Learned and Contemplative, but hath This printed upon his Heart, *Nil novi ſuper terram*, (*there is nothing new under the Sun:*) Neither will any Man much marvel at the Play of Puppets, that puts his Head behind the Curtain, and ſees the Inſtruments and Wires that cauſe the Motion. For *Greatneſs*; as *Alexander* the *Great*, after he had been uſed to mighty Battels, and Conqueſts in *Aſia*, receiving ſometimes Letters out of *Greece*, of ſome Expeditions and Scuffles there, which were commonly for a Bridge, or Caſtle, or for the taking of ſome Town at the moſt, was wont to ſay; *It ſeemed to him, that News was brought him of the Battels of the Frogs, and the Mice, that* Homer *talks of*: So certainly to a Man that con-

contemplates the univerſal Frame of Nature, the Globe of the Earth with the Men upon it (ſetting aſide the Divinity of their Souls) will ſeem nothing greater than a Hillock of Ants, ſome of which creep and run up and down with Grains of Corn, others with their Eggs, ſome empty, all here and there about a little Heap of Duſt.

AGAIN, Learning takes away, or at leaſt mitigates the Fear of Death, and of adverſe Fortune, which is one of the greateſt Impediments to Virtue and Manners. For if a Man's Mind be ſeaſoned, and deeply dyed with the Contemplation of Mortality, and the corruptible Nature of Things, he will be of *Epictetus*'s Sentiment; who going out one Day, and ſeeing a Woman weeping for her Pitcher, that was broke; and going out the next Day, and ſeeing another Woman lamenting the Death of her Son, ſaid; *Heri, vidi fragilem frangi; Hodie, vidi mortalem mori: Yeſterday I ſaw a brittle Thing broke; to Day I ſaw a mortal Thing die.* Wherefore *Virgil* did excellently, and very wiſely, in coupling the Knowledge of Cauſes and the Conqueſt of all Fear, together, as Concomitants;

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoſcere cauſas,
Quiq; metus omnes & inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, ſtrepitumq; Acherontis avari.

Happy the Man, who, ſtudying Nature's Laws,
Thro' known Effects can trace the ſecret Cauſe:
His Mind poſſeſſing in a quiet State,
Fearleſs of Fortune, and reſign'd to Fate.

Dryden.

'TWOULD be too tedious to run over the particular Remedies, which Learning miniſters to all the Diſeaſes of the Mind, ſometimes purging out the ill Humours, ſometimes opening Obſtructions, ſometimes helping Digeſtion, ſometimes exciting Appetite, often healing its Wounds and Ulcers, and the like. Wherefore I will conclude with that which ſeems to be the Sum of all, which is, that Learning diſpoſes and inclines the Mind, never to acquieſce wholly, and to continue fix'd and benumb'd as it were in its own Defects, but to be ſtill rouzing it ſelf, and breathing after Growth and Advancement. The illiterate Man knows not what it is to deſcend into himſelf, or to call himſelf to Account, or the Pleaſure of that Life, which is ſenſible of its growing every Day better: If he chance to have any Virtue, he'll be boaſting of it to be ſure, and will expoſe it every where to full View, and perhaps make a dexterous Uſe of it, to his own Advantage, but neglects to improve and increaſe it. Again if he labour under any Imperfection,

he

he will uſe Art and Induſtry to conceal and colour it, but very little to amend it; like an ill Mower that mows on ſtill, and never whets his Scythe. On the other ſide a Learned Man does not only employ his Mind, and exerciſe his Virtues, but is continually reforming himſelf, and making Progreſs in Virtue. Nay, to ſay all in a Word, certain it is, that *Truth* and *Goodneſs* differ but as the Seal and the Impreſſion; for Goodneſs is Truth's Impreſſion: And on the contrary, the Storms of Vice and Paſſions break from the Clouds of Error and Falſhood.

CHAP. X.

Of the Power and Sovereignty wherewith LEARNING *inveſts Men, and of the Pleaſures of it.*

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Ibid.

ROM Virtue let us paſs to Matter of Power and Empire, and conſider whether there be any where found ſo much Power and Sovereignty, as that wherewith Learning inveſts and crowns Man's Nature. We ſee the Dignity of Commanding, is according to the Dignity of the Commanded. Command over Beaſts, and Cattle, as Herdſmen and Shepherds have, is a Thing contemptible: Command over Children, as School-Maſters have, is a Matter of ſmall Honour: Command over Galley-Slaves, is a Diſparagement rather than an Honour: Neither is the Command of Tyrants much better over a ſervile People, ſtript of all Spirit, and

and Generosity of Mind: Therefore it has ever held, that Honours in free Monarchies, or Common-Wealths, have more Sweetness than under Tyrants; because a Command over the Willing is more honourable than over the Forced, and Compelled. And therefore *Virgil*, when he would exert himself to draw forth, from the Depth of Art, the very best of Human Honours, to assign to *Augustus Cæsar*, does it in these very Words:

Victorq; volentes
Per populos dat jura, viamq; *affectat Olympo.*
Georg. 4.

Thus have I sung of Fields, and Flocks, and Trees,
And of the waxen Work of lab'ring Bees;
While mighty Cæsar, *thund'ring from afar,*
Seeks on Euphrates *Banks the Spoils of War:*
With conqu'ring Arts asserts his Country's Cause,
With Arts of Peace the Willing *People draws:*
On the glad Earth the Golden Age renews,
And his great Father's Path to Heav'n pursues.
Dryden.

BUT the Empire of Knowledge is far higher than the Empire over the Will, tho' free and unmanacled. For That has a Dominion over Reason, Belief, and even the Understanding, which is the highest Part of the Soul, and gives Law to the Will it self. For without Question, there

there is no Power on Earth which ſets up its Throne and Chair of State, as it were, in the Spirits and Souls of Men, and in their Thoughts, and Imaginations, their Aſſent alſo and Belief, but Learning and Knowledge. And therefore we ſee the deteſtable and extreme Pleaſure that Arch-Hereticks, Falſe Prophets, and great Impoſtors, are raviſh'd, and tranſported with, when once they find that they have begun to reign in the Faith and Conſciences of Men; indeed ſo great, that he that has once taſted it, can hardly be brought by any Perſecution or Torment, to relinquiſh and abandon his Sovereignty. And as this is that which is called in the *Revelations*, *The Depth or Profoundneſs of* Satan; ſo on the contrary, a juſt and lawful Sovereignty over Men's Minds, eſtabliſhed by the mere Evidence, and moſt delightful Recommendation of Truth, approaches certainly as near as poſſible to the Similitude of the Divine Power.

AS to Fortunes and Honours, the Munificence of Learning is not ſo confined to the Inriching and Adorning of whole Kingdoms and Commonwealths, as not likewiſe to amplify and advance the Fortunes and Eſtates of private Perſons. For it is an ancient Obſervation, *That* Homer *has given more Men their Living, than* Sylla, Cæſar, *or* Auguſtus; notwithſtanding their numerous Largeſſes, Do-

Donatives, and Diſtributions of Lands. Certainly, it is hard to ſay, whether Arms or Letters have advanced greater Numbers. And in caſe of Sovereignty, we ſee, that if Arms, or Right of Inheritance, have carried away the Kingdom, yet Learning has generally carried the Prieſthood, which has ever ſtood in Competition with Empire.

AGAIN, if you conſider the Delight and Pleaſure of Knowledge, aſſuredly it far ſurpaſſes all other Pleaſures. For what? Shall, it may be, the Pleaſures of the Affections as far exceed the Delights of the Senſes, as the happy obtaining of a Deſire, does a Song, or a Supper: And ſhall not, by the ſame Gradation, the Pleaſures of the Intellect tranſcend thoſe of the Affections? To all other Pleaſures Satiety is Neighbour; and after they have been uſed, and are grown a little ſtale, their Verdure and Beauty fades; whereby we are inſtructed, that they were not truly pure and ſincere Pleaſures, but Shadows only, and Fallacies of Pleaſures, and that it was the Novelty which pleas'd, rather than the Quality: Whence voluptuous Men often turn *Monks*; and the declining Age of ambitious Princes is commonly ſad, and beſieg'd with Melancholy. But in Knowledge there is no Satiety, but Enjoyment and Appetite are perpetually interchangeable; ſo that this Delight muſt needs be good in it

it self simply, without Accident, or Fallacy.

NEITHER does that Pleasure which *Lucretius* describes, hold the lowest Place in the Mind of Man,

SVAVE mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis, &c.

IT is a delightful View (says he) *to stand or walk upon the Shore, and to see a Ship tost upon the Sea in a Tempest. A Pleasure likewise to behold from a lofty Turret two Armies joyning Battel upon a Plain: But nothing is pleasanter to a Man, than a Mind planted, by Learning, in the Cittadel of Truth, from whence it may descry the Errors and Wanderings, the Perturbations, and Labours of other Men.*

LASTLY; Omitting those vulgar Arguments, *viz.* That by Learning, Man excells Man in that, wherein Man excells the Brutes; That by the Help of Learning, Man ascends in his Understanding, even to the Heavens, to which in Body he cannot, and the like; let us conclude this Dissertation concerning the Excellency of Learning, with that Good whereunto Man's Nature doth most aspire, which is, Immortality and Eternity. For to this tends Generation, the Ennobling of Families, Buildings, Foundations, Monu-

Monuments, Fame, and, in ſhort, the Sum of Human Deſires. But we ſee how much more durable the Monuments of Wit and Learning are, than thoſe of Works and Manufactures. Have not the Verſes of *Homer* continued 25 Centuries of Years, and above, without the Loſs of a Syllable, or Letter? During which Time, an infinite Number of Palaces, Temples, Caſtles, and Cities have decayed and fallen, or been demoliſh'd. The true Pictures, or Statues of *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, *Cæſar*, nay of Kings and Princes of much later Years, can't poſſibly now be had; for the Originals, worn away long ſince with Age, are periſh'd; and the Copies daily loſe of their Primitive Reſemblance. But the Images of Men's Wits remain entire in Books for ever, exempt from the Injuries of Time, becauſe capable of perpetual Renovation: Tho' they can't properly be called Images neither, becauſe they are perpetually generating as it were, and ſcattering their Seed in the Minds of Men, and raiſing and procreating infinite Actions, and Opinions, in ſucceeding Ages. Now if the Invention of the Ship was thought ſo noble and wonderful a Thing, which tranſports Riches and Merchandiſe from Place to Place, and conſociates the moſt remote Regions, by a Participation of their Productions, and Commodities; how much more are Letters to be magnified, which, as Ships furrowing the Ocean of Time, connect the moſt

diſtant

diſtant Ages by a Commerce and Correſpondence in Wits and Inventions?

NAY further we ſee, ſome of the Philoſophers, that were moſt ſunk in Fleſh and Senſe, and leaſt Divine, and that peremptorily denied the Immortality of the Soul, yet driven to it by the Force of Truth, granted thus much, that whatſoever Motions and Actions the Soul of Man could perform without the Organs of the Body, thoſe might probably remain after Death; that is, ſuch as were the Motions of the Underſtanding, but not of the Affections. So immortal and incorruptible a Thing did Knowledge ſeem to them to be. But we, upon whom Divine Revelation has ſhone, deſpiſing theſe Rudiments, theſe Cheats and Deluſions of the Senſes, know that not only the Underſtanding, but alſo the Affections purified, not only the Soul, but the Body too, ſhall be advanc'd in due Time to Immortality. But it muſt be remembred, that in the Proofs of the Dignity of Knowledge, I did from the very Beginning ſeparate Divine Teſtimony from Human; which Method, I have conſtantly purſued, and ſo handled them both apart.

BUT altho' all this be true, nevertheleſs I by no Means take upon me, nor do I think it poſſible for me, by any Pleading of mine, in the Cauſe of Learning, to reverſe the

the Judgment, either of *Æsop*'s Cock, who preferr'd the Barley-Corn before the Gem; or of *Midas*, that being chosen Judge, between *Apollo*, President of the Muses, and *Pan*, God of the Flocks, judg'd for Plenty; or of *Paris*, that judg'd for Beauty, and Pleasure, despising Wisdom, and Power; or of *Agrippina*'s Choice, *Occidat matrem, modo imperet*; *Let him kill his Mother, provided he Rule*; preferring Empire with Conditions never so detestable; or of *Ulysses*, *Qui vetulam suam prætulit immortalitati*; *Who preferr'd his Old Woman to Immortality*; being indeed a Type of those who prefer Custom before all Excellency; and a Number of the like popular Judgments: For these Things will continue as they have been: But so will that also continue, upon which Learning hath ever relied, as upon a most firm Foundation, and that can never be shaken: *Justificata est Sapientia a filiis suis*; *Wisdom is justified by her Children.* Matt. xi.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Acts of Merit towards LEARNING.

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Lib. 2. Procem.

THE Acts and Works pertaining to the Advancement of Learning, are conversant about three Objects: About the Seats of Learning; About the Books of Learning; And about the Persons of Learned Men. For as Water, whether falling from the Dew of Heaven, or rising from the Springs of the Earth, easily scatters and loses it self in the Ground, except it be collected into some Receptacle, where it may by Union comfort and sustain it self; (for which purpose the Ingenuity of Man hath invented Spring-Heads, Conduits, Cisterns, and Pools; and beautified them also with divers Ornaments, serving for Magnificence and State, as well as for Use and Necessity:) So this most precious Liquor of

of Knowledge, whether it diſtill from Divine Inſpiration, or ſpring from Human Senſe, would ſoon periſh all and vaniſh, if it were not preſerv'd in Books, Traditions, Conferences; and eſpecially in particular Places deſigned to that end, as *Univerſities*, *Colleges*, *Schools*; where it may both have fix'd Stations, and Power and Ability to unite and collect it ſelf into a Body.

AND Firſt, the Works which concern the *Seats of the Muſes* are Four: Foundations of Houſes; Endowments of Revenues; Grant of Privileges; Inſtitutions and Statutes for Government; All tending to Privateneſs and Quietneſs of Life, and a Diſcharge from Cares and Troubles; much like *Virgil*'s Requiſites for the Building of Hives, in Order to make Honey.

Principio ſedes apibus, ſtatioq; petenda
Quo neque ſit ventis aditus, &c.
Virg. Georg. 4.

Firſt; for thy Bees a quiet Station find,
And lodge them under Covert of the Wind.
Dryden.

BUT the Works touching *Books* are principally two: *Firſt*, Libraries, wherein, as in ſtately Monuments, the Reliques of the Antient Saints, full of true Virtue, and that without Deluſion or Impoſture, are preſerved, and repoſed. *Secondly*, new Editions of Authors, furniſh'd with more correct Impreſſions, more faithful Tranſlations, more uſeful Comments, more diligent Annotations, and the like Train.

AGAIN, the Works which regard the *Perſons of Learned Men*, (beſides the advancing and countenancing of them in general) are likewiſe two: The Reward and Deſignation of Readers, in Sciences already invented and known; and the Deſignation of Writers and Enquirers, concerning any Parts of Learning, not hitherto ſufficiently laboured and improved.

THESE are briefly the Works and Acts, wherein the Merits of Renowned Princes, and other illuſtrious Perſonages, towards the State of Learning have ſhone.

AS for any particular Commemoration of Perſons that have deſerv'd well of Learning, when I think thereupon, I call to

to Mind that of *Cicero*, which, after his Return, put him upon giving general Thanks; *'Tis difficult not to pass by some one, and ungrateful to pass by any one.* Let us rather (according to the Advice of Scripture) *look unto that Part of the Race which is before us, than look back unto those Things which are behind us.*

CHAP. XII.

Of Defects in theſe Acts.

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Ibid.

IRST therefore, amongſt ſo many moſt Noble Foundations of Colleges throughout *Europe*, I wonder they ſhould be all deſtin'd to particular Profeſſions, and none dedicated to the free and univerſal Studies of Arts and Sciences. For if Men judge that all Learning ſhould be referred to Uſe and Action, they judge right; But yet it is eaſy this Way to fall into the Error taxt in the antient Fable; in which, the other Parts of the Body enter'd an Action againſt the Stomach, becauſe it neither perform'd the Office of Motion, as the Limbs do; nor of Senſe, as the Head doth; though all this while

while it was the Stomach that concocted, digested, and distributed Nourishment to the rest of the Body: Just so, the Man that thinks Philosophy and universal Contemplations a vain and idle Study, does not consider that all Professions and Arts are supplyed with Sap and Strength from thence. And I am verily persuaded, that this very Thing has been a great Cause that hath hinder'd a more happy Progression of Learning hitherto, because these Fundamental Sciences have been studied but only in Passage, and deeper Draughts have not been taken of them. For if you will have a Tree bear more Fruit than it hath used to do, it is in vain to think of tampering with the Boughs; you must stir the Earth about the Root, and apply richer Mould, or you do nothing. Nor again is it to be passed over in Silence, that this Dedicating of Colleges and Societies, only to the Use of Professory Learning, hath not only been an Enemy to the Growth of Sciences, but hath redounded likewise to the Prejudice of Kingdoms and States. For hence it proceedeth, that Princes when they would make Choice of Ministers fit for the Affairs of State, find about them a marvellous Solitude of such Men; for this Reason, because there is no Collegiate Education design'd to this end, where such as are framed and fitted by Nature thereto, may (besides other Arts) intend chiefly History, Modern Languages,

Books and Treatiſes of Policy; that ſo they may thence come more able, and better furniſh'd, to Service of State.

AND becauſe Founders of Colleges do *Plant*, but Founders of Lectures *Water*; it follows now in Order, to ſpeak of the Defect which is in publick Lectures. I diſapprove then exceedingly of the Smallneſs and Meanneſs of Salaries (eſpecially with us) aſſign'd to Readers, whether of Arts, or Profeſſions. For it is of mighty Importance to Advancement in Sciences, that Readers in every Kind be choſen out of the ableſt and moſt ſufficient Men; as thoſe whoſe Labour is not for tranſitory Uſe, but to propagate and ſupply Offspring to Science for future Ages. This cannot be, unleſs the Reward and Conditions be appointed ſuch, as may fully content the moſt eminent Man in that Art; ſo as he may not think much to ſpend his whole Life in that Function, and never deſire to Practiſe. Wherefore that Sciences may flouriſh, *David*'s Military Law ſhould be obſerv'd; *That he that ſtaid with the Carriage, ſhould have an equal Part with him that went down to the Battel*; 1 Sam. xxx. Elſe will the Carriages be ill attended. So Readers in Sciences are as it were the Preſervers and Guardians of the Stores and Proviſions of Learning, from whence Men in Action may be furniſh'd. Wherefore it is

but

but Reason, that their Salaries be equal to the Gain of Practitioners. Otherwise if the Allowances appointed to the Fathers of Sciences be not competently ample, and handsome, it will come to pass,

Ut patrum invalidi referant jejunia nati.
Virg. Georg. 3.

—— *If the Sire be faint, or out of Case,*
He will be copied in his famish'd Race.
Dryden.

I will note another Defect, wherein I shall have need to call in some Alchymist to my Aid; since this Sect of Men advise Students to sell their Books, and build Furnaces, quitting and forsaking *Minerva*, and the *Muses*, as barren Virgins, and applying themselves to *Vulcan*. Yet certainly it must be confess'd, that unto the Depths of Contemplative, as well as to the Fruits of Operative Study, in some Sciences, (especially Natural Philosophy and Physick) Books are not the only Instrumentals; wherein also the Munificence of Men hath not been altogether wanting; for we see Spheres, Globes, Astrolabes, Maps, and the like, have been provided as Appurtenances, to Astronomy and Cosmography, as well as Books. We see likewise that some Places dedicated to the Study of Physick, have Gardens for the Inspection and Knowledge of

Simples of all ſorts; and do likewiſe command the Uſe of dead Bodies for Anatomy Obſervations. But theſe reſpect but few Things. In general, Be it ſet down for a Truth, That there can hardly be made any great Proficiency in the diſcloſing and unlocking the Secrets of Nature, unleſs there be a plentiful Allowance for Experiments, whether of *Vulcan*, or *Dædalus*, (Furnace, or Engine) or any other Kind whatſoever. And therefore as Secretaries, and Emiſſaries of Princes, are allowed to bring in Bills of Charges for their Diligence in the Enquiry and Diſcovery of new Occurrences and State Secrets; ſo the Spyals and Intelligencers of Nature muſt be paid their Expences; or elſe we ſhall never be advertiſed of many Things moſt worthy to be known. For if *Alexander* ſupplied *Ariſtotle* with a vaſt Sum of Money, to hire Hunters, Fowlers, Fiſhers, and others, that he might come the better appointed to compile a Hiſtory of living Creatures; greater certainly is their Merit, who wander not in the Foreſts of Nature, but open themſelves a Way in the Labyrinths of the Arts.

ANOTHER Thing which I find fault with, is this: It is an uſual Practice (tho' in my Opinion an abſurd one) for Scholars in the Univerſities to be enter'd too ſoon in Logick and Rhetorick; Arts ſurely fitter for Gra-

Graduates, than Children and Novices. For these two (if the Matter be rightly taken) are in the Number of the gravest Sciences; being the Arts of Arts, the one for Judgment, the other for Ornament. Furthermore they contain Rules and Directions, either for the disposing, or illustrating of Matter: And therefore for Minds raw, and empty of Matter (and which have not yet gathered that which *Cicero* calls *Sylva* and *Supellex*, *Stuff* and *Variety*) to begin with those Arts; (as if a Man should have a Mind to weigh, or measure, or paint the Wind,) doth work but this Effect; that the Virtue and Strength of these Arts (which are very great and extensive) are almost made contemptible, and have degenerated either into Childish Sophistry, and ridiculous Affectation; or at least have suffer'd much in their Reputation. And further, the too early, and untimely Accession to these Arts, hath of necessity drawn along with it a watery and jejune Delivery and Handling of the same, such as is fitted indeed to the Capacity of Children. Another Instance (that I shall bring) of an Error grown long since inveterate in the Universities, is This; That in the Exercises of the Schools, there uses to be a Divorce, very prejudicial, between Invention and Memory: For *there* most of their Speeches are either altogether premeditate, so that they are uttered in the very precise Form of Words they were conceived

ceived in, and nothing left to Invention; or merely *Extempore*, ſo that very little is left to Memory: (Whereas in Life and Practice, there is rarely any Uſe of either of theſe apart, but rather of their Intermixture, that is, of Notes or Memorials, and of *Extempore* Speech together.) So that by this Conrſe, the Exerciſes do not fit the Practice, nor does the Image anſwer the Life. And it is a Rule ever to be obſerv'd in Exerciſes, that all, as near as may be, repreſent thoſe Things which in common Courſe of Life uſe to be practis'd; otherwiſe they will pervert the Motions and Faculties of the Mind, and not prepare them. The Truth whereof is not obſcurely ſeen, when Univerſity-Men ſet to the Practice of their Profeſſions, or other Actions of Civil Life; which when they do, this Want, whereof we ſpeak, is ſoon found out by themſelves, but ſooner by others. But this Part touching the Amendment of the Inſtitutions and Orders of the Univerſities, I will conclude with the Clauſe of *Cæſar*'s Letter to *Oppius* and *Balbus*; *Hoc quemadmodum fieri poſſit, nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt, & multa reperiri poſſunt; de iis rebus rogo vos, ut cogitationem ſuſcipiatis.*

ANOTHER Defect which I note, aſcends a little higher than the former. For

For as the Proficience of Learning consists much in the wise Government and Institution of Universities in particular; so it would be yet more advanc'd, if the Universities in general, dispers'd throughout all *Europe*, were united in a nearer Conjunction and Correspondence by mutual Intelligence. For there are, we see, many Orders, and Communalties, which tho' they be divided under distinct Sovereignties, and Territories widely distant, yet do they contract and maintain a Society, and Kind of Brotherhood one with the other; insomuch as they have their Prefects, (some Provincial, others General) to whom they all yield Obedience. And surely, as Nature creates a Brotherhood in Families; and Arts Mechanical contract a Brotherhood in Companies; the Anointment of God superinduces a Brotherhood in Kings, and Bishops; Vows and Rules unite a Brotherhood in Orders: So in like manner, there cannot but intervene a noble and generous Fraternity, amongst Men, by Learning and Illumination; relating to that Paternity which is attributed to God, who is called the *Father of Illuminations*, or *Lights*.

LASTLY; This I complain of (which I touch'd before) that there hath not been, or very rarely been, any publick Designation of able Men, who might either write, or

or make Enquiry, concerning ſuch Parts of Learning, as have not been hitherto ſufficiently labour'd. In which Point, it would be of main Uſe, if there were erected a kind of Viſitation of Learning; and a Cenſe or Eſtimate taken, what Parts of Learning are rich, and well improv'd; what poor, and deſtitute. For the Opinion of Plenty is amongſt the Cauſes of Want: And the great quantity of Books maketh a Shew rather of Luxury than Lack. Which Superfluity, nevertheleſs, is not to be remedied by making no more Books, but by making more good Books; which may be of ſuch a Kind, that like *Moſes* his Serpent, they may devour the Serpents of the Inchanters.

THE removing of all theſe Defects, now enumerated, except the laſt, and of the active Part of the laſt too, (which is the Deſignation of Writers) are Works truly *Baſilical*; towards which, the Endeavours and Induſtry of a private Man, may be but as an Image in a Croſs-way, that can point the Way, but cannot go it. But the ſpeculative Part, which appertains to the Survey and Examination of Learning, (namely, what is deficient in every particular Science) is open to the Induſtry even of a private Man.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Hiſtory of LEARNING.

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Lib. 2. Cap. 4.

URELY the Hiſtory of the World, without this Part, may be thought not unlike the Statue of *Polyphemus* with his Eye out; that Part of the Image being wanting, which doth moſt repreſent the Nature and Spirit of the Perſon. And though we ſet down this as deficient, yet we are not ignorant, that in divers particular Sciences, as of the Juriſconſults, the Mathematicians, the Rhetoricians, the Philoſophers, there are ſet down ſome ſlight Memorials, or certain jejune Relations of the Sects, Schools, Books, Authors, and Succeſſions of ſuch like Sciences: That there are likewiſe extant ſome thin bar-

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ren Treatiſes touching the Inventors of Things and Arts: But for a Juſt and Univerſal Hiſtory of Learning, we aſſert that none hitherto hath been publiſh'd. Wherefore we will propound both the Argument, and the Manner of Contriving, and the Uſe thereof.

THE Argument is no other than a Recital from all Times, of what Knowledges and Arts have flouriſh'd in any Ages and Climates of the World. Let there be made a Rehearſal of their Antiquities, their Advances, alſo of their Progreſſes through divers Parts of the World; (for Sciences ſhift and remove no leſs than People.) Again, of their Declenſions, Oblivions, Inſtaurations. Let there likewiſe be Obſervations made through every particular Art, of the Occaſion and Original of their Invention; of their Manner of Delivery; of their divers Adminiſtrations and Managings. Let there alſo be added the Sects, and Controverſies moſt famous, which have taken up and exerciſed Learned Men; the Scandals and Reproaches to which they lay open; the Praiſes and Honours wherewith they were graced. Let there be noted the chiefeſt Authors, the beſt Books, Schools, Succeſſions, Academies, Societies, Colleges, Orders, and, in fine, whatſoever belongs to the State of Learning. But above all, we would have this obſerv'd, (which is the Ornament and Soul, as it were, of Civil Hiſtory)

ry) that the Cauſes be coupled with the Events: that is, that the Natures of Countries and People be recorded; and the Diſpoſitions apt and able, or unapt and unable for divers Diſciplines; the Accidents of Times adverſe, or propitious to Sciences; the Zeals and Mixtures of Religions; the Diſcountenances, and Favours of Laws; and laſtly, the eminent Virtues, and Sway of certain Perſons, for the Promoting of Learning; and the like. But our Advice is, That all theſe Points be ſo handled, that Time be not waſted in Praiſe and Cenſure, after the Manner of the Criticks; but that the Things be barely related in a Manner perfectly Hiſtorical, and our own Judgment ſparingly interpoſed.

AS to the *Manner* of Compiling ſuch a Hiſtory, we do eſpecially admoniſh thus much; That the Matter and Proviſion thereof be drawn, not only from Hiſtories, and Criticks; but alſo that through every Century of Years, or even leſſer Intervals, by a continued Sequence of Time, (beginning from the higheſt Antiquity) the beſt Books written within thoſe Spaces of Time, be conſulted with; to the end that, not from a through Peruſal of them, (for that were an endleſs Work) but from a Taſte and Obſervation of the Argument, Stile, and Method, the learned *Genius* of that Time, as by a Kind of Charm, may be call'd up from the Dead.

AS

AS to the *Uſe* of this Work, it is deſign'd to this End; Not that the Honour, and Pomp of Learning, may be celebrated by ſo many Images every Way ſurrounding her; nor that, for the ardent Affection we bear to Learning, we deſire, even to Curioſity, to enquire, and know, and preſerve whatſoever to the State of Learning may any way appertain; but chiefly for a more ſerious and grave Purpoſe. It is in few Words this: For that, by means of ſuch a Relation as we have deſcribed, we conceive a very great Addition may be made to the Wiſdom and Skill of Learned Men, in the Uſe and Managing of Learning; and that the Motions, and Perturbations, and the Vices and Virtues, of Intellectual Matters, as well as Civil, may be noted; and the beſt Regimen from thence drawn and practis'd. For we do not ſuppoſe that St. *Auſtin*'s, or St. *Ambroſe* his Works will make ſo wiſe a Biſhop or a Divine, as Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory throughly read and obſerv'd. Which we make no Queſtion would be the Caſe of Learned Men alſo from the Hiſtory of Learning. For what is not ſuſtained and propt up with Examples and Records, is very apt to fall, and is expoſed to Raſhneſs. Thus much of the *Hiſtory of Learning*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Dignity and Difficulty of Civil History.

De Augmentis Scientiarum. Lib. 2. Cap. 5.

HE Dignity and Authority of Civil History is eminent among Human Writings. For upon the Credit of this, the Examples of our Ancestors, the Vicissitudes of Affairs, the Grounds of Civil Prudence; and lastly, the Name and Fame of Men depend. But the Difficulty is as great as the Dignity. For to draw back the Mind in Writing to Things past, and to make it as it were aged; to search out with Diligence; to relate with Fidelity and Freedom; finally, to represent to the Eye with Beauty and Clearness of Expression, the Changes of Times, the Characters of Persons, the Waverings of Counsels, the Turns and Windings of Actions, (as of Waters,) the inner Subtleties and Depths

of Pretences, and the Secrets of Government, is a Task of great Pains and Judgment; especially since Antient Matters are subject to Uncertainty; Modern, liable to Danger. Wherefore the Errors also are many which attend this same Civil History; whilst the greatest Part write poor and vulgar Narrations, the very Reproach of History; others patch up, in a rash Haste, and unequal Contexture, particular Relations, and brief Memorials; others run over the Heads only of Actions done; others, on the contrary, pursue every trivial Circumstance, nothing belonging to the Sum and Issue of Things; some out of too much Indulgence to their own Wit, take the Confidence to feign many Things; whilst others add and imprint upon Affairs the Image, not so much of their own Wit, as of their Affections, mindful of their own Sides and Parties, but unfaithful Deponents of Fact; some every where interlace such politick Observations, as they most fancy, and seeking Occasion of Digression for Ostentation, too slightly break off the Narration; others are injudiciously excessive in the Prolixity of their Speeches, and Harangues, or even of the very Facts; so that it is sufficiently manifest, that in the Writings of Men, there is nothing found more rare than a just History, and in all Parts compleat and perfect.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Partition of Civil Hiſtory.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 2. Cap. 6, &c.

CIVIL Hiſtory is of three Kinds, not unlike the three ſorts of Pictures, or Images. For of Pictures, and Images, we ſee ſome imperfect and unfiniſhed, as wanting the laſt Hand; others perfect and finiſh'd; others again decayed and defaced with Age. In like Manner we will divide *Civil Hiſtory* (which is a ſort of Image of Actions and Times) into three Kinds, agreeable to thoſe of Pictures; namely, *Memorials*; *Perfect Hiſtory*; and *Antiquities*. *Memorials* are *Hiſtories unfiniſh'd*, or the firſt and rude Draughts of Hiſtory; and *Antiquities* are *Hiſtory defaced*, or ſome

Remnants of Hiſtory, which have caſually eſcaped the Shipwreck of Time.

MEMORIALS, or *Preparatory Hiſtory*, are of two ſorts; one whereof I think good to term *Commentaries*, the other *Regiſters*. *Commentaries* ſet down a naked *Series*, and Connexion of Actions and Events, omitting the Cauſes and Pretexts of Things, their Beginnings alſo and Occaſions, the Counſels likewiſe and Speeches, and other Paſſages of Action. For this is the true Nature of *Commentaries*, tho' *Cæſar*, in Modeſty mix'd with Greatneſs, was pleas'd to give the Name of *Commentary* to the beſt Hiſtory in the World. But *Regiſters* are of a twofold Nature; for they comprehend either the Titles of Matter and Perſons, in a Continuation of Time; ſuch as we call *Calendars* and *Chronologies*; or the *Solemnities* of *Acts*, as the Edicts of Princes, the Decrees of Councils, Judicial Proceedings, Publick Orations, Letters of State, and the like, without a Contexture, or continued Thread of Narration.

ANTIQUITIES, or *Remnants* of *Hiſtory*, are (as was ſaid) *tanquam tabulæ naufragii*; like the ſcatter'd Planks of a Shipwreck; when the Memory of Things failing, and being almoſt drowned, nevertheleſs induſtrious and ſagacious Men, by an obſtinate and ſcrupulous Diligence, and Obſervation, out of Genealogies,

gies, Calendars, Inscriptions, Monuments, Coins, Proper Names and Styles, Etymologies of Words, Proverbs, Traditions, Archives, and Records as well publick as private, Fragments of Stories, scattered Passages of Books nothing Historical; out of all these, I say, or some of them, do rescue and save somewhat from the Deluge of Time.

JUST or *Perfect History* is of three Kinds, according to the Nature of the *Object*, which it propounds to it self to represent. For it either represents *some Portion of Time*; or *some memorable Person*; or *some more illustrious Action*. The first we call *Chronicles*, or *Annals*; the second, *Lives*; the third, *Relations*. Of these, *Chronicles* seem to excell in Glory and Name; *Lives* in Profit and Use; *Relations* in Sincerity and Truth. For *Chronicles* propound the Amplitude of Actions, and the publick Faces and Deportments of Persons, and pass over in Silence the smaller Passages and Motions of Men and Matters. And it being the peculiar Workmanship of God, *to hang the greatest Weight upon the smallest Wyers*; it comes many Times to pass, that this sort of History, pursuing only the greater Occurrences, does rather set forth the Pomp, and Solemnities of Affairs, than their true Springs, and more subtile Contextures. Further, tho' it add and intermix the Counsels themselves, yet delighting in Grandness,

it beſprinkles Men's Actions with more Gravity and Prudence, than indeed is in them: So that a Satyr may be a truer Picture of Human Life, than ſome ſuch Hiſtories.

LIVES, on the other Hand, if they are written with Diligence and Judgment, (for I ſpeak not of Elogies, and ſuch like jejune Rehearſals) propounding to themſelves a ſingle Perſon for their Subject, in whom, Actions both ſlight and weighty, ſmall and great, publick and private, are neceſſarily compounded and mix'd together; do certainly exhibit more lively, and faithful Narrations of Things, and which a Man may more ſafely and happily transfer into Example.

SO again, ſpecial *Relations* of Actions (as *the War of* Peloponneſus, *the Expedition of* Cyrus, *the Conſpiracy of* Catiline; and the like) cannot but be more purely and exactly true, than *Juſt Hiſtories* of Times; becauſe in them may be choſen an Argument that is manageable, and limited; and of ſuch a Quality, that exact Knowledge, and Certainty, and full Information may be had thereof; whereas on the other ſide, the *Hiſtory of a Time* (ſuch eſpecially as is much antienter than the Age of the Writer) muſt needs in the Memory of Matters fail many Times, and contain blank Spaces; which he muſt be forced to fill up out of his own Wit and Con-

Conjecture. Yet even this which we ſay touching the Sincerity of *Relations*, is to be underſtood with a Reſerve; for it muſt indeed be confeſs'd, (ſince all Human Things Labour of Imperfection, and Conveniences are almoſt always accompanied with Inconveniences) that ſuch Kind of Relations, eſpecially if they be publiſhed about the Times of the Acts done (ſince they are many Times written either with Favour or Hatred) of all other Narrations, are deſervedly moſt ſuſpected. But then again, together with this Inconvenience, this Remedy alſo groweth up; That theſe ſame *Relations* (being they are not ſet out by one ſide only, but through Faction, and Partiality, are ever almoſt publiſhed on both ſides) do by this Means open and prepare a Way, as between Extremes, to Truth: And after the Heat of Paſſion is over, to a good and wiſe Hiſtorian they become none of the worſt Matter, and Seed-Plot of a more perfect Hiſtory.

AS for *Lives*, when I think thereupon, I am ſeiz'd with a Kind of Admiration, that theſe our Times ſhould not know their own Virtue; ſince there is ſo ſeldom any Memorial, or Records of the Lives of thoſe who have been eminent in our Times. For although Kings, and ſuch as have Abſolute Sovereignty, may be few; and Princes in free Common-Wealths (ſo many States being con-

verted into Monarchies) are not many; yet however there have not been wanting excellent Men (though living under Kings) that deserve better, than an uncertain and wandring Fame of their Memories, or dry and jejune Elogies. For to this Point, the Invention of one of the Modern Poets, whereby he hath inrich'd the antient Fiction, is not inelegant. He feigns, that at the end of the Thread of every Man's Life, there hangs a Medal, or Tablet, whereon the Name of the Deceased is stampt; and that Time waits upon the Sheers of the Fatal Sister, and as soon as the Thread is cut, immediately catches up the Medals, carries them away, and a little after throws them out of his Bosom into the River *Lethe*: And that about the River there are a World of Birds flying up and down, that snatch the Medals; and after they have carried them about in their Beaks a little while, soon after, thro' Negligence suffer them to fall into the River: Amongst these Birds, that there are a few Swans found, which if they get a Medal, are wont immediately to carry it to a certain Temple, consecrated to Immortality. Now such Swans have almost fail'd in our Age. And although most Men, abundantly more mortal in their Pursuits and Studies, than in their Bodies, despise the Memory of their Name, as Smoke or Air, *Animi nil magnæ laudis egentes*; *Degenerate Souls, and nothing Ambitious of Fame and Glory*; such

such whose Philosophy and Severity springs from that Root, *Non prius laudes contempsimus, quam laudanda facere desivimus*; *We did not begin to despise Praise, till we had left off doing Praise-worthy Things:* Yet that with us, shall not prejudice *Solomon*'s Judgment, *The Memory of the Just is blessed, but the Name of the Wicked shall rot.* The One perpetually flourishes; the Other either instantly passes into Oblivion, or putrifies into an ill Odour. And therefore in that very Style, or Form of Speech, which by receiv'd Custom, and with great Reason, is attributed to the Deceas'd, (*Of Happy Memory*; *Of Pious Memory*; *Of Blessed Memory*;) we seem to acknowledge that which *Cicero* (borrowing it of *Demosthenes*) alledg'd; *That a good Fame is the proper Possession of the Dead:* Which Possession I cannot but observe in our Age lies generally waste and neglected.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 2. Cap. 11.

HISTORY Eccleſiaſtical in general, falls under the ſame Diviſion in a manner with *Hiſtory Civil.* For there are *Eccleſiaſtical Chronicles*; there are *Lives of Fathers*; there are *Relations of Synods*; and of the like Things appertaining to the Church. But in Propriety of Speech, it is rightly divided into *the Hiſtory of the Church*; (keeping the general Name;) *the Hiſtory of Prophecy*; and *the Hiſtory of Providence.* The Firſt deſcribes the Times, and different State of the *Church Militant*; whether ſhe be fluctuant, as the *Ark* in the *Deluge*; or moveable, as the *Ark* in

in the *Wilderneſs*; or at Reſt, as the *Ark* in the *Temple*: That is, the State of the Church in *Perſecution*, in *Remove*, and in *Peace*. In this Part I find no Deficience; rather there is Superfluity here than Want: Only this I could wiſh, that the Virtue and Sincerity of the Narrations anſwer'd to the Maſs and Quantity.

THE Second Part, which is the *Hiſtory of Prophecy*, conſiſts of two Relatives, the *Prophecy* it ſelf, and the *Accompliſhment* thereof: And therefore the Nature of ſuch a Work ought to be, that every Prophecy of Scripture be ſorted with the Event fulfilling the ſame; and this throughout all the Ages of the World, both for the better Confirmation of Faith, and for the eſtabliſhing a kind of Art, and Skill, in the Interpretation of thoſe Prophecies, which are yet unfulfilled: Allowing, nevertheleſs, that Latitude which is proper and familiar unto Divine Prophecies; that their Accompliſhments may be both perpetual, and punctual: For they are of the Nature of their Author, *with whom one Day is as a thouſand Years, and a thouſand Years as but one Day*: And though the Fullneſs and Height of their Complement may be aſſign'd to ſome one Age, or even Moment; yet they have in the mean Time many Degrees, and Scales of Accompliſhment, throughout divers

Ages

Ages of the World. This Work I ſet down as deficient; but it is of that Nature as muſt be handled with great Wiſdom, Sobriety, and Reverence, or not at all.

THE Third Part, which is the *Hiſtory of Providence*, hath fallen indeed under the Pens of many pious Men, but not without ſiding of Parties: It is employed in obſerving that Divine Correſpondence which is between God's revealed Will, and his ſecret Will. For although the Counſels and Judgments of God are ſo obſcure, that they are for the moſt part inſcrutable to the Natural Man; yea, many Times withdraw themſelves from *Their* Eyes, that look out of the Tabernacle; yet at ſome Times it pleaſeth the Divine Wiſdom, for the Confirmation of his Own, and the Confutation of thoſe, who are *as without God in the World*; to write them in Capital Letters as it were, and to offer them to Sight ſo viſibly, that (as the Prophet ſaith) *he that runs may read them*; that is, that meer Senſual and Carnal Men, that haſten by God's Judgments, and never fix down their Thoughts upon them; yet tho' they are upon the Speed, and intend nothing leſs, are urg'd to acknowledge them. Such are late and unlooked for Vengeances; ſudden and unexpected Deliverances; the Divine Counſels, paſſing through crooked Mazes, and ſtupendous

dous Windings, and at length manifeſtly diſintangling and clearing themſelves; and the like: Which ſerve not only for the Conſolation of the Minds of the Faithful, but for the Aſtoniſhment and Conviction of the Conſciences of the Wicked.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Appendages of Hiſtory.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 2. Cap. 12.

UT there ought to be Records kept not only of the *Deeds* of Mankind, but of their *Words* alſo. Yet is it true, that ſometimes Words are inſerted in the Hiſtory it ſelf, ſo far as they conduce to a perſpicuous and grave Delivery of *Deeds*. But *Books* of *Orations*, *Epiſtles*, and *Apothegms*, are appropriated to the Cuſtody of the *Sayings* or *Words* of Men. And certainly the *Orations* of wiſe Men, touching Buſineſs, and Matters of grave and high Importance, conduce much both to the Knowledge of the Things themſelves, and to Eloquence.

BUT

BUT yet greater Helps for the furniſhing Civil Prudence, are from the *Letters* of great Perſonages, touching Affairs of State. For of all the *Words* of Men, there is nothing, in my Judgment, more ſound and excellent than theſe ſame *Letters*. For they are more natural than *Orations*; and more adviſed, than *Extempore* Conference. The ſame, when they are continued according to the *Series* of Time, (as in thoſe from Embaſſadors, Governors of Provinces, and other Miniſters of State, to Kings or Senates; or again from them to their Miniſters) are without queſtion, of all others, the beſt Proviſion for Hiſtory, and to a diligent Reader, the beſt Hiſtories themſelves.

NEITHER are even Apothegms only for Delight, and Ornament, but for Buſineſs alſo, and Civil Uſe. For they are (as † He ſaid) as it were *Secures* or *Mucrones verborum*, which by their ſharp Edge cut and penetrate the Knots of Affairs and Buſineſs: And for Occaſions, they run round in a Ring, and what was formerly proper, may be applicable, and of Uſe again; whether a Man produce them as his own, or as antient. 'Tis great Pity *Cæſar*'s Book of *Apothegms* is loſt; for

† *Cic. Epiſt. Fam. Lib. 9.*

for as his Hiſtory, and thoſe few Letters of his which we have, and thoſe *Apothegms* which were of his own, excell all Men's elſe; ſo I ſuppoſe would his Collection of *Apothegms* have done: For as for thoſe which are collected by others, either I have no taſte in ſuch Matters, or elſe their Choice hath not been happy.

AND ſo much for Hiſtory, that part of Learning which anſwers to one of the Cells, or Domicils of the *Underſtanding*, that is to ſay, Memory.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of POETRY.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 2. Cap. 13.

OETRY is a Part of Learning, in Measure of Words for the most part restrained, in Matter loose and licens'd: And doth truly refer to the *Imagination*; which being not tied to the Laws of Matter, may at Pleasure join that which Nature hath severed, and sever that which Nature hath joined, and so make unlawful Matches and Divorces of Things; *Pictoribus atq; Poetis, &c.* It is taken in two Senses, in respect of *Words*, or *Matter*. In the first Sense, it is but a *Character* of Style, and belongs to the Arts of Speech: In the latter, it is a principal Por-

tion of Learning, and is nothing elſe but *Feigned Hiſtory.*

THE trueſt and propereſt Partition of Poetry, is into Poetry *Narrative*, *Repreſentative*, and *Alluſive*. The *Narrative* is a meer Imitation of Hiſtory with the Exceſſes beforementioned; chuſing for Subject commonly Wars, and Love; rarely State, and ſometimes Pleaſure, or Mirth. *Repreſentative*, is as it were a viſible Hiſtory; for it gives an Image of Actions as if they were preſent, as Hiſtory does of Actions, in Nature as they are, that is, paſt. *Alluſive*, or *Parabolical*, is Typical Hiſtory, which brings down the Intellectuals to Senſe.

AS for *Narrative* Poetry, or if you pleaſe to call it *Heroical*, That (ſo you underſtand it of the *Matter*, not of the *Verſe*) ſeems to be raiſed from a moſt noble Foundation, and which makes much for the Dignity of Man's Nature. For the Senſible World being inferior in Dignity to the Rational Soul; This *Poetry* ſeems to give to Human Nature what Hiſtory denies it; and to ſatisfy the Mind with the Shadows at leaſt of Things, where the Subſtance cannot be had. For if the Matter be throughly conſidered, a ſtrong Argument may be drawn from *Poetry*, that a more illuſtrious Magnitude of Things, a more perfect

perfect Goodneſs, and a more beautiful Variety pleaſes the Soul of Man, than what it can any way find in meer Nature, ſince the Fall. Wherefore ſeeing the Acts and Events, which are the Subject of true Hiſtory, are not of that Amplitude as to content the Soul of Man; *Poetry* is ready at hand to feign Acts Greater and more Heroical. Seeing true Hiſtory propounds the Succeſſes of Actions, in no wiſe proportionable to the Merit of Virtue and Vice; *Poetry* corrects it, and exhibits Iſſues and Fortunes more agreeable to Deſert, and more according to the Law of Providence. Seeing true Hiſtory, by repreſenting Actions and Events more ordinary and leſs interchanged, ſatiates the Mind of Man; *Poetry* chears and refreſhes the ſame, chanting Things rare, and unexpected, and full of alternative Variations. So that *Poetry* ſerves and contributes not only to Delight, but alſo to Magnanimity and Morality. Wherefore it may ſeem, and with Reaſon too, to partake of a Kind of Divinity, becauſe it erects and exalts the Spirit with high Raptures, by proportioning the Images of Things to the Deſires of the Mind, not by buckling and bowing the Mind to the Nature of Things, as Reaſon and Hiſtory do. And by theſe Allurements, and Congruities, whereby it ſooths the Soul of Man, joined alſo with Confort of Muſick, whereby it may more ſweetly inſinuate it ſelf, it hath made it ſelf a Way to Eſteem,

even in very rude Times, and with barbarous Nations, where other Learning has ſtood wholly excluded.

DRAMATICAL Poetry, whoſe Theater is the World, is of excellent Uſe, if it were not abuſed. For both the Inſtruction and Corruption of the Theater may be great: But the Corruptions in this Kind abound; the Diſcipline is altogether neglected in our Times; nevertheleſs, although in Modern Common-Wealths, the Action of the Theater be eſteemed but as a Matter wholly ludicrous, unleſs perchance it draw too much from the Satyr, and Bite; yet the Care of the Antients was, that it ſhould inſtruct the Minds of Men to Virtue. Nay, wiſe Men, and great Philoſophers have look'd upon it as a Kind of Muſical Quill of the Mind. And certainly it is moſt true, and as it were a Secret of Nature, that the Minds of Men are more open to Affections, and Impreſſion, Congregate, than Solitary.

BUT *Poetry Parabolical*, excells the reſt, and ſeems to be a ſacred and venerable Thing; eſpecially ſeeing Religion it ſelf makes uſe often of its Service, and by its Miniſtry holds a Divine Commerce with Men. Yet even This alſo is found to have been adulterated by the Levity and Indulgence of Men's Wits about Allegories. And it is of ambiguous

ous Uſe, and applied to contrary Ends. For it ſerves to *Obſcure*; and it ſerves alſo to *Illuſtrate*. In *This* there ſeems to be ſought a *Way* to *Teach*: In *That*, an *Art* to *Conceal*. And this *Way* of *Teaching*, which tends to *Illuſtration*, was very much in Uſe in ancient Times: For when the Inventions and Concluſions of Human Reaſon, (even thoſe which are now trite and common) were then ſtrange and unuſual; the Underſtandings of Men were not capable of ſuch Subtilty, unleſs thoſe Points were, by ſuch Reſemblances and Examples, brought down nearer to Senſe. Wherefore all Things in thoſe Ages, were full of Fables, and Parables, and Ænigma's, and Similitudes of all ſorts. Hence the Symbols of *Pythagoras*; the Ænigma's of *Sphinx*; the Fables of *Æſop*; and the like. Furthermore, the Apothegms of the ancient Sages expreſſed a Thing generally by Similitudes. Hence *Menenius Agrippa* amongſt the *Romans* (a Nation in that Age by no means Learned) repreſſed a Sedition by a Fable. In fine, as Hieroglyphicks were before Letters, ſo Parables were before Arguments. And even at this Day and ever, there is, and hath been much Life and Vigour in Parables; becauſe Arguments cannot be ſo clear, nor even Examples ſo pat.

BUT there remains yet another Uſe of *Poetry Parabolical*, oppoſite in a manner to

the former; tending, (as we said) to *Obscure*; such Things namely, the Dignity whereof deserves to be retired, and separated as it were by a Curtain: That is, when the Secrets and Mysteries of Religion, Policy, and Philosophy, are involv'd in Fables and Parables.

BUT whether there be any mystical Sense couched under the ancient Fables of the Poets, may admit some Doubt: And indeed I confess, for my part, that I incline to this Opinion, that many of the Fables of the Ancient Poets had a Mystery infused into them. Nor is it any Argument with me, to pass Judgment upon them contemptuously, because they are left commonly to School-Boys, and Grammarians, and are therefore little accounted of: But contrariwise, since it is manifestly clear, that the Writings, which recite these Fables, of all the Writings of Men, next to sacred Writ, are the most ancient; and that the Fables themselves are far more ancient than They; (for they are recited by those Writers, as credited and received before, not as invented by them) they seem to be like a fine rarified Air, which from the Traditions of more ancient Nations, fell into the Flutes of the *Grecians*. And because whatsoever hath been hitherto attempted for the Interpretation of these Parables, namely by unskilful Men, not learned beyond common Places, gives us no Satisfaction at all; we have thought good

to

to enter *Philoſophy according to ancient Parables*, in the Number of *Deficients*.

AND we will annex an Example or two of this Work: Not that it is a Matter perhaps of ſuch Moment, but to keep up my Deſign: Which is this, if any Part of thoſe Works which we place among the *Deficients*, be more obſcure than ordinary, always to lay down either *Precepts* for Information in that Work, or *Examples*; leaſt any one ſhould think that we have only ſome light Notion of them in our Head; and like Augurs, can only meaſure Countries in our Mind, without knowing the Ways to them. As for any other Part defective in *Poetry*, we find none; nay rather *Poetry*, being a Plant ſpringing as it were from a luxuriant Soil, without any certain Seed, hath grown up and ſpread above all other Kinds of Learning. But now we will propound *Examples*, in Number only Three; One from Things *Natural*; Another from *Political*; and a Third from *Moral*.

The firſt Example of Philoſophy, according to the Antient Parables, in Things Natural.

Of the Univerſe, *according to the Fable of* Pan.

THE Antients have moſt exquiſitely deſcribed Univerſal Nature under the Perſon of *Pan.* His Original they leave doubtful. For ſome ſay he was the Son of *Mercury:* Others give him a far different Kind of Birth; for they ſay, That all *Penelope*'s Suitors had to do with her, from which promiſcuous Act, *Pan*, the common Offspring, deſcended. And from this latter Account, no doubt, ſome of the Moderns entitled this ancient Fable by the Name of *Penelope*; a Thing frequent among them, when they transfer old Fictions to younger Perſons and Names; and that many Times abſurdly and fooliſhly; as here: *Pan* being one of the moſt Ancient Gods, and long before the Time of *Ulyſſes*, and *Penelope* held venerable for her Matron-like Chaſtity. There is a third Account of his Birth, not to be paſſed over neither: For ſome have reported him the Son of *Jupiter* and *Hybris*, that is, *Contumely.* But howſoever begotten, the *Parcæ* (they ſay) were his Siſters, who dwelt in a Cave under-ground; but *Pan*'s Abode was in the open Air. *Pan*, as to his Figure, is thus deſcribed by Antiquity:

With

With Horns, and thoſe riſing in a ſharp Pyramidical Point even to Heaven; all his Body rough and ſhagged; his Beard very long; his Shape biform'd, above like a Man, but half Beaſt, and ending with the Feet of a Goat. The Enſigns of Juriſdiction that he bore, were, a Pipe of ſeven Reeds in his Left Hand; in his Right, a Sheep-Hook, or a Staff, at the upper End crooked, and bent inwards: He was clad in a Mantle made of a Leopard's Skin.

THE Dignities and Offices attributed to him are theſe; That he is the God of Hunters, of Shepherds alſo, and of all Rural Inhabitants; Preſident alſo of Mountains; and next to *Mercury*, the Meſſenger of the Gods. Moreover, he was accounted the Leader and Commander of the Nymphs, which were always wont to dance the Rounds, and frisk about him: The *Satyrs* alſo, and elder than they, the *Sileni* were of his Train. He had Power alſo to ſtrike Men with Terrors, and thoſe eſpecially vain and ſuperſtitious, which were termed *Panick Fears*. His Acts recorded are not many: The chiefeſt was, His Challenging *Cupid* to wreſtle, by whom he was foiled in the Conflict. He caught alſo the Giant *Typhon* in a Net, and held him faſt. They tell alſo, That when *Ceres* being ſad, and in Reſentment of the Rape of *Proſerpine*, had hid her ſelf; and that all the Gods, diſ-

disperſing themſelves ſeveral Ways, were earneſtly in queſt of her; it was only *Pan*'s good Fortune, as he was Hunting, to light upon her, and diſcover where ſhe was. He preſumed alſo to put it to the Trial who was the better Muſician, he or *Apollo*, and by the Judgment of *Midas* was indeed preferr'd; for which Judgment he receiv'd a Pair of Aſſes Ears, but privily and ſecretly. Amours of *Pan* there was none mentioned, or at leaſt very few; a Thing to be wondered at, eſpecially being among a Troop of Gods ſo profuſely amorous. This only was ſaid of them, That he was in Love with *Eccho*, who alſo was reputed his Wife; and one Nymph more, call'd *Syrinx*; towards whom, *Cupid*, in Anger and Revenge that he had offer'd to challenge him to wreſtle, inflamed his Deſire. He is reported alſo to have once taken the Moon aſide into the high Woods. Neither had he any Iſſue, (which is a marvel alſo, ſeeing the Gods, eſpecially thoſe of the Male-Kind, were hugely prolifick) excepting only that he was the reputed Father of a certain Wench, call'd *Iambe*, that with merry Tales was wont to entertain Strangers, and who was thought by ſome to be his Daughter by his Wife *Eccho*. This (if any) is a noble Tale, and big, and ſtrutting as it were with the Secrets and Myſteries of Nature. The Parable ſeems to be this:

PAN

PAN (as the very Name alſo imports) repreſents and holds forth *the All of Things*, or *Univerſal Nature*. Concerning his Original, there are but two Opinions, nor can there be more. For either he comes of *Mercury*, that is, the *Word* of God, (which both the Holy Scriptures put out of doubt, and the Philoſophers themſelves, ſuch as were held any Thing Divine, ſaw;) or from *the confuſed Seeds of Things*. For they that held one ſimple Beginning of Things, either referr'd the ſame to God; or if they are for a material Beginning, they aſſerted it however to be various in Power; ſo that this whole Controverſy may be reduced to that Diſtribution of the World's taking Beginning either from *Mercury*, or from *Penelope*, and all her Suitors.

Virg. Eclog. 6. 31.

Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta
Semina terrarumq; animæq; mariſq; fuiſſent,
Et liquidi ſimul ignis: ut his Exordia primis
Omnia, & ipſe tener Mundi concreverit orbis.

He ſung the ſecret Seeds of Nature's Frame;
How Seas, and Earth, and Air, and active Flame,
Fell through the mighty Void, and in their Fall
Were blindly gather'd in this goodly Ball.

Dryden.

THE

THE third Generation of *Pan* is ſuch, that the *Grecians* ſeem to have heard ſomething of the *Hebrew* Myſteries, either by Intercourſe with the *Egyptians*, or one Way or other; for it relates to the State of the World, not in its meer Production, but as expoſed, and made ſubject to Death and Corruption, after the Fall of *Adam*. For that State was, and remains to this Day, the Offspring of God, and Sin. For the Sin of *Adam* was a Kind of *Contumely*, ſince *he deſired to be like God*. And therefore this three-fold Account concerning the Production of *Pan*, may even ſeem true, if it be rightly diſtinguiſh'd both as to Things and Time. For this *Pan* (as we now behold and comprehend him) took Beginning from the Word of God, by the intermediate means of *confuſed Matter*, (which yet was created by God) and the ſtealing in of Prevarication, and thereby Corruption.

THE *Deſtinies*, or *Fates of Things* may well be reported and thought the Siſters of *the Nature of Things*; for the Chains of Natural Cauſes draw along with them the Beginnings of Things, the Durations, the Diſſolutions, the Depreſſions, the Eminences, the Labours, the Felicities, and, in fine, whatſoever Fates can happen unto Things; ſo that the Chain of Nature, and the Thread of the

the Deſtinies, is in a manner the ſame Thing.

AGAIN; the Ancients feign'd, that *Pan*'s Abode was always in the open Air, but the *Parcæ* lived in a mighty ſubterraneous Cave, and from thence flew of a ſudden with prodigious Swiftneſs to Men: Becauſe Nature, and the Face of the Univerſe is viſible and open; but the Fates of Individuals are ſecret, and ſwift.

HORNS are attributed to the World, becauſe Horns are broad at the Root, and ſharp at the Ends; the Nature of all Things being acute in the Faſhion of a Pyramid. For Individuals, in which the Baſis of Nature is ſpread forth, are infinite; theſe are collected into *Species*, and thoſe many and various: Again, *Species* riſe into Generals, and theſe alſo aſcending are contracted into more univerſal Generalities; ſo that at length *Nature* may ſeem to be contracted into an Unity as it were; which is ſignify'd by the *Pyramidical Figure* of *Pan*'s *Horns*. Neither is it to be wonder'd at, that *Pan* touches even Heaven with his Horns; ſeeing the Heights of Nature, or Univerſal Idea's do, in ſome ſort, reach to Things Divine. Hence *Homer*'s famous Chain (*viz.* of Cauſes Natural) is ſaid to be tied to the Foot of *Jupiter*'s Chair; and it is plain, that no Man converſant in Metaphyſicks,

physicks, and Things in Nature Eternal, and Immoveable, that has never so little withdrawn his Mind from the Flux of Things, but he instantly falls upon Natural Theology; so ready and short is the Passage from the Top of the Pyramid to Matters Divine.

THE Body of *Pan* is most elegantly and truly drawn *Hairy*, because of the Rays or Beams of Things. For Rays are as it were the Hairs or Shag of Nature; and all Things in a manner are more or less Beamy: Which is most apparent in the Faculty of Sight; and no less in every magnetick Virtue, and Operation at a Distance. For whatsoever operates at a Distance, may rightly be said to dart forth Rays.

MOREOVER, *Pan*'s Beard is said to be exceeding long, because the Rays of Heavenly Bodies, and especially the Sun, operate and pierce farthest of all; so that they have perfectly turn'd, and subdued, and fill'd with their Spirit, not only the Surface of the Earth, but the inner Parts also, to some Distance. And this of the Beard is the more elegant, because the Sun himself, when his higher half is shadowed with a Cloud, and his Beams break out in the lower, looks as if he were *Bearded*.

NATURE

NATURE alſo is excellently deſcrib'd *Piform*, becauſe of the Difference of Superior and Inferior Bodies. For *Thoſe*, becauſe of their Beauty, and Equality and Conſtancy of Motion, and their Dominion alſo over the Earth, and earthly Things; are deſervedly repreſented under a Human Figure; Human Nature participating of Order and Dominion: But *Theſe*, becauſe of their Diſorder, and irregular Motions; as alſo becauſe they are moſtly governed by the Heavenly Bodies; may well be contented with the Figure of a Brute Creature. Again, this ſame Deſcription of the Biform Body relates to the Participation of Species: For no Species of Nature ſeems to be ſimple, but participating as it were, and compounded of Two. For a Man hath ſomething of a Brute, a Brute ſomething of a Plant, a Plant ſomething of an inanimate Body, and all Things indeed are Biform, and compounded of a Superior and Inferior Species.

IT is a witty Allegory, that of the *Goat's Feet*, by Reaſon of the aſcending of earthly Bodies towards the Regions of the Air and the Heaven, where they become penſile, and from thence are rather caſt down, than deſcend. For the Goat is a mounting Animal, and loves to be hanging upon Rocks and Precipices: And this is done alſo, and in a wonderful

derful manner, even by thoſe Things which are deſtin'd to this Inferior Globe; as manifeſtly appears in Clouds and Meteors.

THE two Enſigns, which *Pan* bears in his Hands, point, the one at *Harmony*, the other at *Empire*. For the *Pipe* conſiſting of *ſeven Reeds*, evidently ſhews the Concert and Harmony, and diſcordant Concord of Things, which is cauſed by the Motion of the ſeven Planets. The *Staff of Empire* is a noble Alluſion, by Reaſon of the Ways of Nature, which are partly ſtrait, and partly oblique. It is eſpecially crooked at the upper End, becauſe all the Works of Divine Providence in the World are commonly fetcht about by Circuits and Windings; ſo that one Thing may ſeem to be aimed at, and the contrary done; as *the Selling of* Joſeph *into* Egypt. Beſides, in all wiſe Human Governments, thoſe that ſit at the Helm, do more happily bring their Purpoſes about, and inſinuate more eaſily Things fit for the People, by Pretexts, and oblique Courſes, than by direct Methods.

PAN's Cloak or *Mantle* is ingeniouſly feign'd to be made of the Skin of a Leopard, becauſe of the Spots every where interſpers'd. For the Heavens are powder'd with Stars, the Sea ſprinkled with Iſlands, the Land with Flowers, and all particular Things are commonly diverſify'd with various Colours

Colours about the Superficies, which is as it were *the Mantle of a Thing.*

THE Office of *Pan* can be by nothing ſo livelily ſet forth and repreſented, as by his being *the God of Hunters.* For every Natural Action, nay even Motion and Progreſſion, is nothing elſe but *Hunting.* For Arts and Sciences have their Works, and Human Counſels their Ends, which they *hunt after*; and all Natural Things hunt either their Food, in order to preſerve; or their Delight and Pleaſure, in order to perfect their Nature; and this in a moſt diſcerning and ſagacious manner.

Virg. Ecl. 2. 63.

Torva leæna lupum ſequitur, lupus ipſe capellam,
Florentem Cytiſum ſequitur laſciva capella.

The greedy Lyoneſs the Wolf purſues,
The Wolf the Kid, the wanton Kid the Browze.
Dryden.

PAN is alſo ſaid to be the God of *all Country Inhabitants* in general, becauſe Men of this Condition live more agreeably to Nature; whereas in Cities and Courts, Nature is corrupted by too much Art and Dreſs, inſomuch as that of the Poet about Love matters,

is verified, upon the Account of thoſe Delicacies, as to Nature alſo.

Pars minima eſt ipſa puella ſui.

The Maid ſo tricks her ſelf with Art,
That of her ſelf ſhe is leaſt part.

HE is held to be the *Preſident* of *Mountains*; becauſe in Mountains and high Places, Nature lays her ſelf moſt open to the Eye of Contemplation. In that *Pan* is *Meſſenger of the Gods*, *next to* Mercury; that is a moſt Divine Allegory; ſince next to the Word of God, the very Image of the World, proclaims the Divine Power and Wiſdom. As ſings the ſacred Poet, *Pſ.* xix. 1. *The Heavens declare the Glory of God, and the Firmament ſhews his Handy-Work.*

PAN is delighted with the Nymphs, that is, Souls: For the Darlings of the Univerſe, are the Souls of Living Creatures. He is well called their *Leader* or *Commander*, ſince they all follow Nature as their Guide; and with infinite Variety, every one of them, after the Faſhion of his Country, doth leap and dance with inceſſant Motion about her.

THE *Satyrs* and *Sileni* are perpetually of his Train; that is Youth, and Old Age; for of all natural Things, there is a merry, and

as

as it were a dancing Age; and again, a dull, flegmatick tippling Age. And the Purſuits and Humours of both theſe Ages, to a true Contemplative, (ſuch as *Democritus*) may perchance ſeem as ridiculous and deform'd, as a *Satyr*, or a *Silenus*.

AS to the *Panick Terrors*, they hold forth a very wiſe Inſtruction. For Nature hath implanted in all living Creatures a Fear and Dread, tending to the Preſervation of their Life and Being, and to the ſhunning and repelling of the Invaſion of evil Things. Nevertheleſs, the ſame Nature knows not how to keep a Mean, but always intermixes vain and empty Fears with good and wholeſome ones; ſo that all Things (if their Inſides might be ſeen) are very full of *Panick Frights*; eſpecially Things Human; and above all other, the Common People, who are infinitely troubled and toſſed with Superſtition, (which in truth is nothing but a *Panick Fright*) eſpecially in hard, and dangerous, and adverſe Times. Nor does this Superſtition reign only in the Vulgar, but from the Opinions of the Vulgar ſometimes breaks out upon wiſe Men too, inſomuch as *Epicurus* (if his other Diſcourſes about the Gods had been anſwerable) ſpake divinely; *To deny the Gods of the Vulgar is not profane; but to apply the Opinions of the Vulgar to the Gods, is profane indeed.*

AS to *the Audacioufneſs of* Pan, *and his Combat, upon Challenge, with* Cupid; the Meaning is, That Matter wants not Inclination and Deſire to diſſolve and throw back the World again into its ancient *Chaos*, did not the powerful Agreement of Things (ſignified by *Love* or *Cupid*) reſtrain and keep in Order his Malice and Violence. Therefore it was a happy Turn for Men, and the World, that *Pan* was worſted and conquer'd in that Conflict.

TO the ſame purpoſe is *his Hampering* Typhon *in a Net*; becauſe howſoever vaſt and unwonted Tumors in Nature (this *Typhon* imports) may ſometimes happen, whether the Seas ſwell, or the Clouds ſwell, or the Earth ſwells, or any Thing elſe; yet Nature intangles and reſtrains in an inextricable Toil the Exuberances and Inſolencies of ſuch-like Bodies, and ties them down as it were with an Adamantine Chain.

IN that the *finding of* Ceres, is attributed to this God, and that, as he was Hunting; but is denied to the reſt of the Gods, though they ſought her earneſtly, and did nothing elſe: It carries with it a very true and wiſe Admonition; that is, that we expect not the Invention of Things uſeful for Life and Convenience, from abſtracted Philoſophies, as from

from the Gods of the First Rank, tho' they apply themselves thereto with all their Strength; but only from *Pan*, that is, from Sagacious Experience, and an Universal Knowledge of the World; which is wont to light upon such Inventions, even by chance, and as it were a Hunting. For the most profitable Inventions are owing to Experience, and have been as certain Donatives accidentally scatter'd among Men.

THE Musical Contest, and the Event thereof, gives us a wholesome Lesson, and such as may serve to restrain within the Bounds of Sobriety the Exulting and Insolence of Human Reason and Judgment. For there seems to be a twofold Harmony, and *Musick* as it were, the one of the Divine Wisdom, the other of Human Reason. For to Human Judgment, and to the Ear as it were of Mortals, the Administration of the World and Nature, and the more secret Judgments of God, sound somewhat harsh, and as it were discordant: Which Folly, tho' it be deservedly mark'd with Asses Ears, yet those very Ears are secret, and do not openly appear. For the Deformity of this Thing is not seen or noted by the Vulgar.

LASTLY; It is no Wonder at all, that no Amours are attributed to *Pan*, except his Marriage with *Ecchо:* For the World or Na-

ture enjoys it self, and in it self all Things else: Now he that Loves, would Enjoy; but where there is enough, there is no Place left for Desire. Therefore there can be no Amours of *Pan*, nor Desire of Enjoyment, (being contented with himself) unless perchance the Amours of *Speech*. And these are the Nymph *Eccho*, a Thing not solid, but vocal; or if they are more accurate, *Syrinx*, that is to say, when Words and Voices are regulated by certain Measures, whether Poetical, or Oratorical, and are as it were Modulated. And above all other Speeches or Voices, *Eccho* alone is excellently chosen for *Pan*'s Wife: For that, when all is done, is true Philosophy, which faithfully returns the Voices of the World it self, and was taken from the Mouth as it were of the World dictating; and is nothing but the Image and Reflexion of the same; and adds nothing of its own, but only iterates and resounds. For as to *Pan*'s calling aside the *Moon* into the high Woods, it seems to relate to the Congress of Sense with Things Heavenly or Divine. For the Case of *Endymion* and *Pan* are different: The Moon of her own Accord comes down to *Endymion* sleeping; for that Divine Illuminations sometimes slide into the Understanding, cast asleep, and retired from the Senses: But if they are sent for, and invited by Sense, as by *Pan*, then they yield no other Light, than that,

Quale

Quale ſub incertam Lunam ſub luce maligna
Eſt iter in Sylvis Virg. Æn.

Thus wander Travellers in Woods by Night,
By the Moon's doubtful, and malignant Light.
Dryden.

IT makes alſo for the Sufficiency and Perfection of the World, that he has no Iſſue. For the World doth generate in reſpect of its Parts; but in reſpect of the whole, how can it generate, ſince there is no Body without, or beſide it ſelf? For as to the young Girl *Iambe*, the Reputed Daughter of *Pan*, that certainly is a very wiſe Addition to the Fable. For by her are repreſented thoſe vain and idle Paradoxes concerning the Nature of Things, which in all Ages run about every where, and fill all Places, for the Matter fruitleſs, for the Kind ſuppoſititious as it were, but in reſpect of their Garrulity ſometimes pleaſant, ſometimes troubleſome and impertinent.

The Second Example of Philoſophy, *according to Ancient Parables, in* Politicks.

Of War, *according to the Fable of* Perſeus.

PERSEUS, tho' bred and born in the Eaſt, is reported to have been ſent by *Pallas* to cut off *Meduſa*'s Head, who was a mighty Peſt to abundance of Countries in the Weſt, about the utmoſt Coaſts of *Iberia*. For this Monſter was ſo dire and horrible, that with her bare Aſpect ſhe turn'd Men into Stone.

THIS *Meduſa* was one of the *Gorgons*, and the only one of them that was Mortal; the other not being Paſſive. *Perſeus* therefore preparing himſelf for ſo noble an Enterprize, had Arms and Gifts beſtowed on him by three of the Gods; Of *Mercury* he received Wings to his Feet; Of *Pluto*, a Helmet; Of *Pallas*, a Shield and Looking-Glaſs. Nevertheleſs, though he was ſo well furniſh'd, he march'd not directly againſt *Meduſa*, but turn'd off firſt to the *Græ*; theſe, by the Mother's Side, were Siſters to the *Gorgons*; and from their Birth Hoary-headed, and reſembling Old Women. They had but one Eye

Eye and one Tooth among them all; which as any had Occaſion to go abroad, they wore in their Turns, and when they came Home uſed to lay down again. Now this Eye and this Tooth they lent to *Perſeus*. And thus judging himſelf compleatly appointed for effecting his Deſign, he haſtens to *Meduſa* with winged Speed. Her he found ſleeping, yet durſt not venture himſelf with his Face towards her, (leaſt ſhe ſhould chance to awake) but turning his Head aſide, and looking in *Pallas* her Glaſs, and ſo directing his Blow, cut off her Head: From whoſe Blood, ſhed upon the Ground, inſtantly ſtarted up Winged *Pegaſus*. Her Head thus ſmote off, *Perſeus* transfers and inſerts into *Pallas* her Shield, which ſtill retained its Virtue; ſo that all that looked upon it, became ſenſeleſs and motionleſs, as tho' they were Thunder-ſtruck, or Planet-ſtruck.

THIS Fable ſeems to be deviſed for a Direction as *to the Method and Wiſdom of making War*. And Firſt; *The Undertaking* of every *War* ought to be as a *Commiſſion from* Pallas; certainly not from *Venus*, (as the *Trojan* War was) or upon any other ſlight Motive; becauſe Reſolutions concerning Wars ought to be founded upon ſolid Counſels. Then as to the Choice of the *Kind* or *Sort of War*, the Fable lays down three very ſound and important Precepts.

FIRST;

FIRST; That a Prince trouble not his Head much concerning *the Conqueſt of Neighbour Nations:* For the Ways of enlarging an Eſtate, and an Empire, are different; for in the Caſe of private Poſſeſſions, the Vicinity of Farms is conſidered; but in the Propagation of Empire, Occaſion, and the Facility of making War, and the Advantage thereof, ought to be inſtead of Propinquity. Therefore *Perſeus*, tho' an Eaſtern Prince, refuſed not ſo remote an Expedition, even to the extreme Parts of the Weſt. There is a notable Preſident of this in the different manner of Warring, of two Kings, a Father and a Son, *viz. Philip* and *Alexander*. For the Former being taken up in Wars with neighbouring People, added a few Cities to his Empire, and this not without the utmoſt Contention and Peril; being brought into the utmoſt Hazard, as at other Times, ſo eſpecially in the *Theban* War: But *Alexander* nobly and proſperouſly attempting a remote Expedition againſt the *Perſian*, ſubdued infinite Nations, tired more with Marching than Fighting. The ſame Thing is more evident, in the Propagation of the Empire of the *Romans*, who, at what Time they had ſcarce carried their Weſtern Conqueſt beyond *Liguria*, did yet in the Eaſt bring all the Provinces as far as Mount *Taurus*, within the Compaſs of their Arms and Command. So *Charles* the *Eighth*, King

King of *France* finding the *Britannick* War (which was at last ended by Marriage) not so feasible, accomplish'd his remote *Neapolitan* Expedition with wonderful Ease and Felicity. Certainly remote Wars have this Advantage, that the Fight is with those who are not practised in the Discipline and Arms of the Aggressor; but in Wars upon Borderers, the Case is different. Besides, the Preparation in such Expeditions is usually more diligent and greater; and the Terror in the Enemy encreas'd from the Boldness of the very Attempt. Nor can there be made, in those remote Expeditions, by Enemies attack'd so far off, any Diversion, or reciprocal Invasion, which, in the Course of War with Borderers, is frequent. But the chief Point of all is, that in subduing Borderers, there is but small Choice of Occasions; but if a Man be for remote Expeditions, he may at Pleasure transfer the War, where either Military Discipline is most relax'd, or the Strength of the Nation most wasted and worn, or Civil Discords seasonably set on foot, or such like Opportunities present themselves.

THE Second Precept is, That there be always a Just, and Religious, and Honourable, and Plausible Ground of War: For that begets Alacrity, as well in the Soldiers that fight, as in the People that pay; it opens and procures Alliances, and is attended with many

ny other Advantages. But amongst the Causes of War, That is most plausible, which leads to the suppressing of Tyrants, under whom the People sink, and are cast down flat without Spirit and Vigor, as *at the Sight of* Medusa; and this procured Divinity to *Hercules*. Certainly it was a great Point of Conscience amongst the *Romans*, with Vigour and Activity to haste to the Succour and Defence of their Allies, that were any way oppress'd. Wars also for a just Revenge have ever been prosperous, as the War against *Brutus* and *Cassius*, to revenge the Death of *Cæsar*; that of *Severus* to revenge the Death of *Pertinax*; of *Junius Brutus*, for the Death of *Lucretia*. In a Word, whosoever by War either lighten or revenge the Calamities and Injuries of Men, bear Arms under *Perseus*.

THE Third is, That in the Undertaking of any War, a true Estimate be made of one's Strength: And that it be rightly weigh'd, whether it be such a War, as may be effected and brought to a Period, least vast and boundless Hopes be pursued. For of the *Gorgons*, (by which Wars are represented) *Perseus* wisely made Choice of her, that in her Nature was Mortal, and did not set his Mind upon Impossibilities.

AND thus far the Fable instructs us as to the Things that fall under Deliberation in the

the Undertaking of War; the reſt pertain to the War it ſelf. In War theſe three *Gifts of the Gods* are of all Things the moſt prevalent, ſo as in a Manner they govern and lead Fortune it ſelf after them. For *Perſeus* receiv'd *Speed* from *Mercury*; *Concealing of Counſels* from *Orcus*; and *Forecaſt* from *Pallas*. Neither is it without an Allegory, and that a moſt wiſe one too, that thoſe Wings of *Speed* are faſten'd to his Heels, and not to his Shoulders; becauſe *Celerity* is required, not ſo much in the firſt Attacks of War, as in thoſe Things that follow, and that ſecond and back the firſt. For there has been no Error in War more frequent, than that Proſecution, and ſubſidiary Attacks fail to anſwer the Alacrity of the firſt Onſets. As for the Helmet of *Pluto*, (which was wont to render Men Inviſible) that is a plain Parable. For *Concealing of Counſels*, next to *Celerity*, is of greateſt Moment in War: Whereof *Celerity* it ſelf is a great Part. For Speed prevents the divulging of Counſels. It pertains to *Pluto*'s *Helmet*, that there be but one General of the War, with free Commiſſion; for Conſultations with many partake more of the *Plumes of* Mars, than of *the Helmet of* Pluto. To the ſame alſo pertain various Pretexts, and doubtful Deſignations, and emiſſary Reports, which either dazzle, or turn aſide Men's Eyes, and place the true Aims of Counſels in the dark. Again, diligent and ſuſpicious Cautions touching

ing Letters, Embaſſadors, Deſerters, and many the like Proviſo's, adorn and begirt *the Helmet of* Pluto.

BUT it is of as great Importance, to explore *the Counſels of the Enemy*, as to conceal one's own. Therefore to the *Helmet of Pluto* we muſt join *the Looking-Glaſs of Pallas*, whereby the Strength, the Weakneſs, the ſecret Abettors, the Diviſions and Factions, the Proceedings and Counſels of the Enemy may be diſcern'd. And becauſe War is liable to ſuch Caſualties, there is not much depending either upon concealing our own Deſigns, or diſcovering thoſe of the Enemy, no nor upon Celerity it ſelf; therefore above all Things we muſt take *the Shield of Pallas*, that is of *Providence*, that as little as poſſible may be left to Fortune. Hitherto belong, the ſending out of Scouts to examine the Ways, the Fortifying of Camps with Care and Diligence, (which in the Modern Diſcipline is almoſt grown out of Uſe; but the *Roman* Camps were fortified like Cities againſt all adverſe Events of War) a ſettled well-order'd Field of Battel, not truſting too much to the light Bands, or even to the Troops of Horſe; in a Word, all Things pertaining to a ſubſtantial and careful Defenſive; ſeeing in Wars the *Shield of Pallas* does more, than even *the Sword of Man.*

BUT

BUT *Perſeus*, howſoever furniſh'd with Forces and Courage, is to do yet another Thing of ſpecial Importance throughout the whole Action, before he enter the Liſts: That is, *to turn aſide to the* Greæ. Now theſe *Greæ* are *Treaſons* and *Treacheries*. Siſters of War you muſt know, but half Siſters only, and inferior in Nobleneſs of Birth. For Wars are generous, Treaſons baſe and ignoble. Their Deſcription is elegant, hoary from their Nativity, and like Old Women, by Reaſon of their continual Cares and Fears of Traytors. Their Strength (before they break out into open Rebellion) conſiſts either in an *Eye*, or in a *Tooth*. For every Faction, alienated from a State, and propenſe to Treaſon, both *Spies* and *Bites*. And this *Eye* and *Tooth* is common as it were; for whatſoever they have learn'd and know, is handed in a manner, and runs from one to another. And for the *Tooth*, they bite alike, and with one Mouth as it were, and caſt the ſame Scandals; ſo that, Hear one, and you Hear all. A *Perſeus* therefore muſt engage theſe *Greæ* to him, and win them to his Aid, that they may lend him their *Eye* and *Tooth*; The *Eye* for Diſcoveries; The *Tooth* for the ſowing and ſpreading of Rumours, for the raiſing of Envy, and troubling the Minds of Men.

AND

AND when all Things are well prepared and diſpoſed for War, That in the firſt Place muſt be taken Care, which *Perſeus* did, to find *Meduſa ſleeping*. For a wiſe Undertaker of War always almoſt attacks the Enemy unprepared, and when he is moſt ſecure. Laſtly, in the very Action and Heat of War, *the looking into* Pallas *her Glaſs* is particularly uſeful. For moſt Men, before the Danger, can look acutely into, and conſider attentively the State of the Enemy; but in the very Point of Danger, they are either amaz'd and confounded with Fear, or in a raſh manner fronting Dangers too directly precipitate themſelves into them, mindful of Victory, but forgetful of Eſcape, or Retreat. Yet neither of theſe ſhould be done; but they ſhould look in the *Glaſs* of *Pallas* with a *reflex'd Countenance*, that ſo the Stroke may be rightly directed, without either Terror or Rage.

AFTER the War finiſh'd, and the Victory won, there follow two Effects; The *Generating* and *Starting up* of *Pegaſus*; which plainly enough denotes *Fame*, that flies over the World, and proclaims Victory, and renders the Remains of the War eaſy, and the Iſſue proſperous. Secondly, the *bearing* of *Meduſa*'s *Head* in his *Shield*; to which there is no Kind of Defence for Excellency comparable. For *one only* famous and memorable

Action,

Action, prosperously carried on and atchieved, deadens all Motion in the Enemy, and stupifies Envy her self.

The Third Example in Philosophy, *according to Ancient Parables, in* Morality.

Of Desire, *according to the Fable of* Dionysus.

THEY tell, That *Semele*, a Mistress of *Jupiter*, having oblig'd him by an Inviolable Oath, to grant her an indefinite Request, desir'd that he would come to her Bed, in the same manner as he came to *Juno*'s. So she perish'd with Lightning. But the Infant, which she bare in her Womb, was taken out by the Father, and put into his Thigh, till the Months were accomplish'd that it should be born. The Burden, however, made *Jupiter* somewhat to limp. Whereupon the Child, because it incumber'd and prick'd *Jupiter*, whilst he bore it in his Flank, was called *Dionysus*. Being born, it was nurs'd for several Years by *Proserpine*; and when it was grown up, it had such a Maiden Face, that a Man could hardly tell whether it were

Boy or Girl. He died alſo, and was buried for ſome Time, and not long after revived again. In his tender Youth, he firſt invented and taught the Dreſſing of the Vine, the Making alſo, and Uſe of Wine; for which becoming famous and renowned, he ſubjugated the World, even to the utmoſt Bounds of *India*. He rode in a Chariot drawn by Tygers. There danced about him certain deformed Hobgoblins, called *Cobali*, *Acratus*, and others. Nay, and the *Muſes* joined themſelves to his Retinue. He took to Wife *Ariadne*, deſerted and left by *Theſeus*. The Tree ſacred unto him was the Ivy. He was held the Inventor alſo and Inſtitutor of ſacred Rites and Ceremonies, but of ſuch ſort, as were Frantick, and full of Debauchery, and Cruelty alſo. He had Power likewiſe to ſtrike Men with Madneſs. At leaſt in his Orgies, two celebrated Men *Pentheus* and *Orpheus* are ſaid to have been torn in pieces by certain diſtracted Women: The One, for getting up a Tree, out of Curioſity, to behold their Ceremonies; the Other, for playing ſweetly and ſkilfully upon his Harp. And for the Atchievements of this God, they are commonly confounded with the Acts of *Jupiter*.

THIS Fable ſeems to pertain to *Morality*, inſomuch as Moral Philoſophy affords nothing better. Under the *Perſon of Bacchus* there is deſcribed the *Nature of Deſire*, or of the Paſſions

sions and Perturbations of the Mind. First therefore, as to the *Birth and Parentage of Desire*, the *Origin* of all *Desire*, tho' never so pernicious or wicked, is no other than *Good Apparent*. For as the Mother of Virtue is *Good Existing*, so the Mother of Desire is *Good Appearing*. The One, the lawful Wife of *Jupiter*, (under whose Person the Soul of Man is represented;) the Other, his Concubine; who yet emulates the Honour of *Juno*, as *Semele* did. *Desire* is conceiv'd in an unlawful Wish rashly granted, before rightly understood and judg'd of. And after it has begun to kindle up, its Mother (that is, the Nature and Appearance of Good) by *too much Fire* is destroyed and perishes. The Proceeding of *Desire* from its first Conception is after this manner: It is nurs'd, and concealed by *the Mind of Man*, (which is its Father) especially in the inferior Part thereof, the *Thigh* as it were, and pricks, and girds, and depresses the Mind, so as to hinder and *lame* its Actions and Resolutions. Furthermore, after it is confirm'd by Consent and Time, and breaks out into Act, so that it has now in a manner *fulfill'd its Months*, and is fairly brought forth and born, at first for some Time however it is educated with *Proserpine*, that is, *it seeks Holes and Corners*, and is clandestine, and under-ground as it were; until *the Reins of Shame and Fear* being laid aside, and improv'd in Boldness, it either assumes

the Cloak of some Virtue, or despises Infamy it self. And this is most true, that every vehement Passion is as it were *of the Doubtful Gender*. For it has the Fierceness of a *Man*, but the Weakness and Impotence of a *Woman*.

THAT likewise is an excellent Fiction, *That* Bacchus *died, and came to Life again.* For Passions sometimes seem fast asleep, and even dead, but there is no trusting of them, no though they were buried; for let there be but Matter and Opportunity offered, and they'll rise again.

THE Invention of the Vine is a wise Parable; for every Affection is very ingenious and quick in finding out that which nourishes and cherishes it. And of all Things known to Men, Wine is most powerful, and efficacious, to excite and kindle Passions of what Kind soever; being in a manner the *common Incentive* to Desires in general.

AGAIN; *Passion* or *Desire* is elegantly represented *a Subduer of Provinces*, and an Undertaker of infinite Expeditions. For it never rests content with what it has purchased, but with an infinite and insatiable Appetite still covets and gapes after more.

TIGERS

TIGERS, alſo *ſtable by Affections*, and *are* ſometimes *put* to their *Chariot*. For when once a Paſſion is from *going a-foot* advanced to ride in a *Chariot*, and has captivated Reaſon, and leads her as it were in Triumph, it grows cruel, unmanageable, and fierce againſt all that withſtand or oppoſe it.

AND it is a pretty Fiction, *The Dancing* of thoſe deform'd ridiculous *Demons* about *Bacchus his Chariot*. For every vehement Paſſion cauſes in the Eyes, and in the very Face, and Geſture, certain indecent, diſorderly, capering, and deform'd Motions; ſo that they who in any Paſſion, (as Anger, Arrogance, Love,) may perhaps ſeem glorious and brave in their own Eyes, do yet appear to others ugly and ridiculous.

THE Muſes alſo are ſeen *in the Train of Deſire*. For there is hardly any Paſſion to be found ſo deprav'd and vile, which is not ſoothed by ſome Kind of Learning. For in this Particular, the Indulgence, and Immodeſty of Wits hath hugely derogated from the Majeſty of the *Muſes*; that whereas they ought to be the Guides and Standard-Bearers of Life, they many Times become the Handmaids and Procurers to Luſt.

BUT that is a most noble Allegory, *Bacchus*'s *letting loose his Affections* upon her that had been *abandon'd* and nauseated by another. For it is a most certain Truth, that Passions covet and court that which Experience hath long since rejected. And let all those know, who being Slaves to, and indulging their Passions, set an immense Value upon gaining their Point, (whether they court Honours, or Mistresses, or Glory, or Science, or whatever else) that they seek after *Things abandon'd*, and by divers Men, in all Ages almost, after Experience, dismiss'd and cast off.

NEITHER is it without Mystery, that the Ivy was sacred to *Bacchus*, for this holds two Ways; First; In that *the Ivy is green in Winter*; Secondly; In that it creeps about, and overspreads, aand mounts upon so many Things, Trees, Walls, Edifices. Touching the first, every *Desire* by *Resistance*, and Forbiddance, and by a Kind of Antiperistasis, (like the *Ivy* by the Winters Colds) grows fresh and lively, and gathers Vigor: Secondly, every predominant *Affection* in the Soul of Man, incloses and hedges in, like the *Ivy*, all his Actions and Resolves; neither can you find any Thing almost untainted, and which That does not clinch as it were with its Tendrels.

NEI-

NEITHER is it any Wonder, that *Superſtitious Rites ſhould be attributed to Bacchus*, ſince every mad *Affection* in falſe Religions, *keeps* in a manner *Revel rout*; ſo that the vile Rabble of Hereticks hath out-done the Bacchanals of the Heathen; and their Superſtitions alſo have been no leſs bloody than filthy. Nor is it a Wonder again, that *Bacchus* ſhould be thought to ſend *Madneſs*, ſeeing every *Affection in the Exceſs thereof*, is a Kind of *ſhort-liv'd Diſtraction*, and if it continue long, and with any Thing of Violence, concludes many Times in Madneſs.

AS to the rending and diſmembring of *Pentheus* and *Orpheus*, in the Celebration of the *Orgies of Bacchus*, the Parable is plain; ſince every prevalent Affection is very outrageous againſt, and a moſt deadly Enemy to two Things; one whereof is, *a curious Enquiry into it*; the other, *free and wholeſome Admonition*. Nor will it avail, that the Enquiry is made, only to contemplate and behold, like climbing a Tree, without any Malignity of Mind: Nor again, that the Admonition be given with a great deal of Sweetneſs and Dexterity; but be that as it will, the *Orgies* cannot bear either a *Pentheus*, or an *Orpheus*.

LASTLY; That *Confusion of the Persons of Jupiter and Bacchus* may be well transferr'd to a Parable; seeing noble and famous *Atchievements*, and remarkable and glorious Merits, proceed sometimes from Virtue, and right Reason and Magnanimity; and sometimes again from a *latent Affection*, and a hidden Desire, (both equally affecting Glory and Renown;) so that it is not easy to distinguish the Acts of *Dionysius* from those of *Jupiter*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Triumphs of Man.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 4. Cap. 1.

THE *Knowledge concerning the Perſon of Man* comprehends two Things eſpecially; namely, The Contemplation of the *Miſeries of Mankind*; and of the *Prerogatives*, or *Excellencies of the ſame*. But the Bewailing of Man's *Miſeries* hath been elegantly and copiouſly ſet forth by ſeveral, in the Writings, as well of Philoſophers, as Divines. And it is both a pleaſant and a wholeſome Contemplation.

BUT that other touching *Man's Prerogatives*, hath ſeem'd to me a Point that may well be ſet down among the Deficients of Learning.

Learning. *Pindar*, in extolling *Hiero*, ſays (as uſually he does) moſt elegantly, *That he cropt off the Tops* or *Summities of all Virtues.* And truly I ſhould think it would much conduce to the Magnanimity and Honour of Man; if a Collection were made of the *Ultima*'s (as the Schools ſpeak) or *Summities* (as *Pindar*) of Human Nature, principally out of the faithful Reports of Hiſtory; That is, *What is the laſt and higheſt Pitch, to which Human Nature in it ſelf ever aſcended, in all the Perfections both of Body and Mind.* What a ſtrange Ability was that which is reported of *Cæſar*, That he could dictate at once to five *Amanuenſes?* So alſo the Exercitations of the Antient Rhetoricians, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*; likewiſe of Philoſophers, *Calliſthenes*, *Poſſidonius*, *Carneades*; who were able to diſcourſe *ex tempore* upon any Subject, *Pro* and *Con*, with Elegancy and Fluency, do much ennoble the Powers of Man's Wit and Natural Endowments. And that which *Cicero* reports of his Maſter *Archias* is little for Uſe, but great perhaps for Oſtentation and Faculties; that he was able to recite *ex tempore* a a great Number of Verſes pertinent to the Diſcourſe in hand whatever it was. That *Cyrus* or *Scipio* could call ſo many Thouſands of Men by their particular Names, is a ſingular Commendation to that Faculty of the Mind, Memory.

BUT

BUT the Trophies of Moral Virtues are no leſs famous than thoſe of Intellectual. What a mighty Example of Patience does that common Story of *Anaxarchus* preſent unto our Thoughts, who being put to the Rack and Torture, bit out his own Tongue (the hoped Inſtrument of Diſcovery) and ſpit it in the Tyrant's Face? Nor is that inferior for Tolerance (tho' much for Merit and Dignity) which fell out in our Time of a certain *Burgundian*, who had committed a Murder upon the Perſon of the Prince of *Orange:* This Fellow being ſcourged with Iron Rods, and his Fleſh torn with burning Pincers, gave not ſo much as a Groan: Further, when a broken Piece of the Scaffold fell by chance upon the Head of one that ſtood by, the ſinged ſtigmatiz'd Varlet, in the midſt of his Torments, laugh'd; who but a little before had wept at the cutting off his curled Head of Hair.

IN like manner a wonderful Serenity and Security of Mind hath ſhone in many, at the very Inſtant of Death; as was That of a Centurion in *Tacitus:* He being ordered by the Soldier that had Commands to execute him, to ſtretch forth his Neck valiantly; *I wiſh* (ſays he) *thou wouldſt ſtrike as valiantly.* But *John*, Duke of *Saxony*, when the Commiſſion was

was brought him, as he was playing at Cheſs, wherein his Death was commanded the next Day, call'd to one that ſtood by him, and ſmiling, *Look*, (ſays he) *if I have not the better Hand of the Game. For he* (pointing to him with whom he play'd) *will boaſt, when I am dead, that himſelf was the fairer of the Set.*

AND our *More*, Chancellour of *England*, when the Day before he was to die, a Barber came to him (ſent, it ſeems, for this End, leaſt the Sight of his long Hair might move more than ordinary Compaſſion in the People at his Execution) and asked him if he would not pleaſe to have his Hair cut; he refuſed, and turning to the Barber; *The King* (ſays he) *is at Suit with me for my Head*; *And 'till that Controverſy be ended, I mean to beſtow no Coſt upon it.* And the ſame Perſon, at the very Point of Death, after he had laid his Head upon the fatal Block, raiſed himſelf up again a little, and having a fair large Beard, gently removed it, ſaying, *Yet, I hope, this hath not offended the King.* But not to inſiſt too long upon this Point, it is plain enough what we mean; Namely, That the *Wonders of Human Nature*, and its ultimate Powers and Virtues, as well of Mind as Body, ſhould be collected into a Volume; which

which might ſerve as a Kalendar of Human Triumphs. In which Affair, we approve the Deſign of *Valerius Maximus*, and *C. Plinius*, but wiſh they had uſed more Diligence and Judgment.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Knowledge of Man's Body.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 4. Cap. 2.

THE *Knowledge* that reſpects *Man's Body* admits of the ſame Diviſion, as the *Good of Man's Body* does, unto which it is ſubſervient. The *Good* of *Man's Body* is of four Kinds: *Health*; *Beauty*; *Strength*; *Pleaſure*. As many therefore are the *Knowledges*: *Medicine*, or the *Art* of *Cure*; *Coſmetick*, or the *Art* of *Decoration*: *Athletick*, or the *Art* of *Activity*; And the Art *Voluptuary*, which *Tacitus* calls *Eruditus Luxus*.

MEDICINE is a moſt noble Art, and deſcended of a very great Family according to

to the Poets. For they have brought in *Apollo*, as the chief God of Medicine; to whom they have aſſigned *Æſculapius* for a Son, a God too, and Profeſſor of Phyſick: Becauſe in Things Natural the Sun is the Author and Fountain of Life; the Phyſician the Preſerver, and as it were the ſecond Stream of it. But an Honour infinitely greater accrues to Medicine from the Works of our Saviour, who was a Phyſician both of Soul and Body; and made the Body of Man the Object of his Miracles, as the Soul was the Object of his Heavenly Doctrine. For we read not that he ever vouchſafed to do any Miracle about Honour, or Money (except that one for giving Tribute to *Cæſar*) but only about the preſerving, ſuſtaining, and healing the Body of Man.

THIS Subject of *Medicine* (*Man's Body*) is of all other Things in Nature, moſt ſuſceptible of Remedy; but then that Remedy is moſt ſuſceptible of Error. For the ſame Subtilty and Variety of the Subject, as it doth afford large Poſſibility of Cure, ſo does it give great Facility to Error. Wherefore as that Art (eſpecially as it is now managed) may well be placed among the Arts that are moſt of all Conjectural; ſo the Inquiry into the ſame may be reckon'd one of the moſt difficult, and therefore ought to be the more exact. Neither yet are we ſo ſenſeleſs, as to imagine

imagine with *Paracelſus*, and the Alchymiſts, That there are to be found in Man's Body certain Correſpondences and Parallels, anſwering to all Varieties of Things (as Stars, Planets, Minerals, and the reſt) that are extant in the Univerſe; as they Fable, fantaſtically ſtraining the ancient Opinion (that Man was a *Microcoſm*, an Abſtract or Epitome of the whole World) to countenance that Figment of Theirs. Yet notwithſtanding thus much is true, (which we were about to ſay) that of all Natural Subſtances there is none ſo manifoldly compounded as the *Human Body*. For we ſee Herbs and Plants are nouriſhed by Earth and Water; Beaſts, for the moſt part, by Herbs and Fruits: But Man by the Fleſh of Beaſts, Birds, Fiſhes; alſo by Herbs, Grains, Fruits, divers Juices and Liquors; not without a manifold Commixtion, Seaſoning, and Preparation of thoſe Bodies, before they come to be Man's Meat and Aliment. Add hereunto, that Beaſts have a more ſimple Order of Life, and fewer Affections to work upon their Bodies, and they commonly operating one Way; whereas Man in his Manſions, Exerciſes, Paſſions, Sleep and Watchings, undergoes almoſt an infinite Viciſſitude of Variations. So true is it, that the *Body* of *Man*, of all other Things, is the moſt fermented, and moſt variouſly compounded Maſs. The *Soul*, on the other ſide, is the ſimpleſt of Subſtances, as is well expreſſed;

Concretam

Concretam exemit labem, purumq; reliquit
Æthereum ſenſum, atq; Aurai ſimplicis ignem.
Virg. Æn. 6. v. 746.

No Speck is left of their habitual Stains;
But the pure Æther of the Soul remains.
Dryden.

WHEREFORE it is no Wonder, that the *Soul*, ſo placed, ſhould enjoy no Reſt, according to that Principle, *Motus rerum eſt rapidus extra locum, placidus in loco; Things move ſwiftly out of their Place, and quietly in it.* But to the Purpoſe: This various and ſubtile Compoſition and Fabrick of *Man's Body* hath made it like a curious and exquiſite Inſtrument, which is eaſily put out of Tune. Wherefore the Poets have very well conjoyned Muſick and Medicine in *Apollo*; becauſe the Genius of both the Arts is pretty much alike; and the Office of a Phyſician conſiſts merely in this, To know how to tune and finger this Harp of Man's Body, ſo as that the Harmony may not be diſcordant and harſh. This Inconſtancy therefore, and Variety of the Subject, hath made the Art more Conjectural: And the Art being ſo Conjectural, hath given the larger Scope not only to Error, but alſo to Impoſture. For almoſt all other Arts and Sciences are judg'd of by Acts, or Maſterpieces, (as I may term them) and not by the

Succeſſes and Events. The Lawyer is judg'd by the Virtue of his Pleading, and not by the Iſſue of the Cauſe. The Maſter of the Ship is judg'd by the directing his Courſe aright, and not by the Fortune of the Voyage. But the Phyſician, and perhaps the Politique, have no particular Arts demonſtrative of their Skill and Ability; but carry away Honour or Diſgrace from the Event principally, a way of Judging very unequal. For where's the Man that can tell, if the Patient die or recover, or if a State be preſerv'd or ruin'd, whether it be Art or Accident? And therefore many times it falls out, that the Impoſtor is prized, and the Man of Skill cenſured. Nay, the Weakneſs and Credulity of Man is ſuch, that they will often prefer a Mountebank, or Witch, before a learned Phyſician. And therefore the Poets ſeem to have been very clear and quick-ſighted, when they made *Circe* Siſter to *Æſculapius*, both Children of the Sun; as we find it in the Verſes, concerning *Æſculapius* Son of *Phœbus*;

Tum Pater omnipotens, aliquem indignatus ab umbris
Mortalem infernis ad lumina ſurgere vitæ,
Ipſe repertorem medicinæ talis & artis
Fulmine Phœbigenam ſtygias detruſit ad undas.
Virg. Æn. 7. 769.

Then

Then *Jove*, who ſaw from High, with juſt
Diſdain,
The Dead inſpir'd with vital Breath again,
Struck to the Center with his flaming Dart
Th' unhappy Founder of the Godlike Art.
Dryden.

AND again of *Circe*, the Sun's Daughter;

Dives inacceſſos ubi Solis filia lucos
Aſſiduo reſonat cantu, tectiſq; ſuperbis
Urit odoratam nocturna in lumina cedrum,
Arguto tenues percurrens pectine telas.
Æn. 7. 11.

Now near the Shelves of *Circe*'s Shores they
run
(*Circe* the Rich, the Daughter of the Sun)
A dangerous Coaſt: The Goddeſs waſtes her
Days
In joyous Songs, the Rocks reſound her Lays:
In Spinning, or the Loom, ſhe ſpends the
Night,
And Cedar Bands ſupply her Father's Light.
Dryden.

FOR in all Times, in the Opinion of the Multitude, Witches, and Old Women, and Impoſtors, have been Rivals as it were of Phyſicians; and have in a manner contended

with them for the Fame of Cures. And what, I pray, followeth? Even this, that Phyſicians ſay to themſelves, as *Solomon* expreſſes it upon a higher Occaſion: *If it happen to me, as it happeneth to the Fool, to what Purpoſe is it, that I have taken more Pains to be Wiſe? Eccleſ.* 2. And indeed I do not much blame Phyſicians, that they uſe commonly to intend ſome other Study, which they fancy, more than their Profeſſion. For you ſhall have of them, Poets, Antiquaries, Humaniſts, Stateſmen, Divines, and in theſe Arts better ſeen, than in their own Profeſſion. Nor does this come to paſs, as I conceive, becauſe (as a certain Declaimer againſt Sciences objects to Phyſicians) they have ſuch foul and ſad Spectacles ever before their Eyes, that it is altogether neceſſary for them to draw off their Minds to other Objects; (for as they are *Men, Nihil humani a ſe alienum putent*; *They can think no Office of Humanity unbecoming them*;) But upon this very ground, that we are now upon; Namely, That they find there is little matter of Difference, either as to Reputation, or Profit, whether they are Moderately or Eminently ſkill'd in their Profeſſion. For the Vexations of Sickneſs, the Sweetneſs of Life, the Flattery of Hope, and the Recommendation of Friends, make Men depend upon Phyſicians, whatever they be. But nevertheleſs, if a Man ſeriouſly weigh the Matter, theſe Things tend rather to the Blame

Blame of Phyſicians, than to their Excuſe. For they ought not to caſt away Hope, but to put to more Strength. For if a Man would awake his Obſervation, and look about a little, he will eaſily ſee in obvious and familiar Inſtances, what a Command and Sovereignty the Subtilty and Sharpneſs of the Underſtanding hath over the Variety either of *Matter* or *Form*. Nothing more variable than the Faces and Countenances of Men; yet the Memory can retain the infinite Diſtinctions of them. Nay, a Painter with a few Shells of Colours, by the Benefit of his Eye, the Force of his Imagination, and the Steadineſs of his Hand, could imitate and deſcribe with his Pencil the Faces of all, that are, have been, and may be, if they were brought before him. Nothing more variable than Man's Voice; yet we eaſily diſcern the Differences of it in every particular Perſon: Nay, you ſhall have a Buffoon or Pantomime imitate and expreſs to the Life as many as he pleaſes. Nothing more variable, than the differing Sounds of Words; yet Men have found the Way to reduce them to a few Letters of the Alphabet. So that it is not Want of Subtilty or Capacity in the Mind of Man, that breeds theſe Mazes and Incomprehenſions in Sciences, but rather the too remote placing of the Object. For as the Senſe, afar off, is full of miſtaking, but within due Diſtance, errs not much; ſo is it of the Underſtanding. For Men are wont to take

a Proſpect of Nature, as from a high Turret, and to view her afar off, and to be too much taken up about Generals; whereas if they would vouchſafe to deſcend, and approach Particulars, and more attently and diligently look into Things themſelves, there might be made a more true and profitable Comprehenſion. Now the Remedy of this Inconvenience does not lie in this alone, to quicken or ſtrengthen the Organ, but withal to go nearer to the Object. And therefore there is no doubt, but if Phyſicians, laying aſide Generalities for a while, would go up boldly to Nature; they might aſſume to themſelves what the Poet ſays,

Et quoniam variant Morbi, variabimus Artes;
Mille mali ſpecies, mille ſalutis erunt.
Ov. R. A. L. 2.

WHICH they ought the rather to do, becauſe the Philoſophies themſelves, upon which Phyſicians, whether they be Methodiſts, or Chymiſts, do rely (and Medicine not grounded upon Philoſophy is a weak Thing,) are indeed of little Worth. Wherefore if too wide Generalities (tho' they were true) have this Defect, that they do not well bring Men Home to Action; certainly there is greater Danger in thoſe Generals, which are in themſelves falſe, and inſtead of Directing, Miſlead.

ME-

MEDICINE therefore (as we have ſeen) is a Science which hath hitherto been more profeſſed than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced; ſince the Pains beſtowed thereon, have been rather in Circle than in Progreſſion. For I find much Iteration by Writers in it, but ſmall Addition.

WE will divide it into three Parts, which we will call the three Duties thereof. The Firſt is *Preſervation* of *Health*; the Second, the *Cure of Diſeaſes*; the Third, *Prolongation* of *Life*.

And for this laſt Duty, Phyſicians ſeem not to have acknowledged it as a principal Part of their Profeſſion, but to have mingled and confounded it (ignorantly enough) with the other Two. For they ſuppoſe, if Diſeaſes be repelled before they invade, and be cured after they have ſeized the Body, that Prolongation of Life follows of Courſe. Which tho' it be ſo without all queſtion, yet they are ſhort in not diſcerning, that both of theſe belong only to Diſeaſes, and to that *Prolongation* of *Life* alone, which is ſhorten'd and intercepted by Diſeaſes: But the Extending the very Thread of Life, and the Proroguing of Death (which inſenſibly creeps upon us, by Natural Reſolution, and the Conſumption of Age) for any Time, is an Argument which none of the Phyſicians has worthily handled.

Neither let this Scruple trouble Men's Minds, That a Thing which is under Providence wholly, ſhould be reduced to Rule and Art: For without doubt, Providence equally diſpoſes and determines all Deaths whatſoever, whether they come of Violence, or from Diſeaſes, or from the Courſe of Age; and yet it does not therefore exclude Preventions and Remedies. For Art and Induſtry do not command, but are ſubſervient to Nature and Providence. But of this Part we ſhall ſpeak by and by; thus much in the mean time by way of Preface; leaſt any one ſhould unskilfully confound this Third Office of Medicine (as hath hitherto uſually been done) with the Two former.

AS for the Duty of *Preſerving Health*, (the Firſt of the Three aforeſaid) many have written of it, as in other Points unskilfully enough, ſo (in my Judgment) in attributing too much to the Quality of Meats, and too little to the Quantity thereof. And in the Quantity it ſelf, like Moral Philoſophers, they have too much extoll'd Moderation; whereas both Faſting, and full Eating, interchangeably uſed, and made cuſtomary, are better Preſervatives of Health than thoſe ſame moderate Uſages, which weaken Nature, and render her impatient of Exceſs and Hardſhip, if Occaſion ſhould be. And for the Kinds of Exerciſe, contributing moſt to the Preſervation

tion of Health, thoſe no one of the Profeſſion hath well diſtinguiſh'd, or obſerv'd; there being hardly any Diſpoſition to a Diſeaſe, which may not be corrected by ſome proper Exerciſe. Bowling is good for the Diſeaſes of the Reins, Shooting for thoſe of the Lungs, Walking and Riding for the Stomach, and the like. But this Part, touching the Preſervation of Health, having been handled throughout, to purſue leſſer Deficiences, is not to my preſent Purpoſe.

AS for the *Cure* of *Diſeaſes*, That indeed is a Part of *Medicine*, whereon much Labour has been beſtowed, but with ſmall Profit. It contains the *Knowledge* of *Diſeaſes*, to which Man's Body is ſubject, together with their *Cauſes*, *Symptoms*, and *Cures*. In this ſecond Office of *Medicine*, there are many Things deficient; Of theſe we ſhall propound a few of the moſt remarkable, which we ſhall think fit to enumerate without any preciſe Order or Method.

Narrationales Medicinales.

THE firſt is the Diſcontinuance of that exceeding uſeful and exact Diligence of *Hippocrates*, whoſe Cuſtom was to compoſe a Narrative of the ſpecial Caſes of his Patients; ſetting down the Nature of the Diſeaſe, the Method of Proceeding, and the Event. And having

having ſo proper and illuſtrious a Precedent of this Thing, in a Perſon that was in a manner held the Father of the Art, we ſhall not need to go to Foreign Arts for an Example; or to the Wiſdom of the Lawyers, who are very careful to take down more notable Caſes, and new Deciſions; that they may be the better prepared and furniſhed againſt future Caſes. Wherefore I find wanting a *Continuation* of *Medicinal Reports*; eſpecially digeſted into one Body with Diligence and Judgment; which, notwithſtanding, I do not mean ſhould be made ſo ample, as to take in Vulgar, and Every-day Caſes, (for that were an infinite Work, and not to the Purpoſe;) nor again ſo ſtrait, as to admit Prodigies and Wonders only; a Thing which has been done by ſome. For many Things are new in the *Manner*, and *Circumſtances*, which are not new in the *Kind:* And he that gives his Mind to obſerve, will meet with many Things, even in vulgar Matters, worthy Obſervation.

Anatomia Comparata.

SO in *Diſquiſitions Anatomical*, the manner is, That the Parts generally incident to Man's Body, are moſt diligently enquired into, even to Curioſity, and in every the leaſt Point: But as to the *Variety*, which is found in *divers Bodies*, there the Diligence of Phyſicians fails. And therefore I grant that

ſimple

ſimple Anatomy has been excellently well handled; But *Comparative Anatomy* I aver to be deficient. For they enquire well of the particular Parts, and of their *Subſtances*, *Figures*, and *Collocations*; but the *different Figure* and *Condition* of thoſe *Parts* in *different Men*, they do not ſo well obſerve. The Reaſon of which Omiſſion, I ſuppoſe to be no other than this, That the firſt Enquiry may be ſatisfied by the View of one or two Anatomies; but the latter, being Comparative and Caſual, muſt ariſe from the attentive and exact Conſideration of many. Beſides, the firſt is a Matter wherein learned Men, in their Prelections, and in the Companies of thoſe they read to, can ſet out themſelves to Advantage: But the ſecond is, That which can be acquired only by a thoughtful and long Experience. This, in the mean Time, there is no queſtion of, that the Figure and Structure of the Inward Parts is as full of Variety, as that of the Outward; and that Hearts, and Livers, and Ventricles, are as different in Men, as either Foreheads, or Noſes, or Ears.

AND in theſe very Differences of the Inward Parts, are many Times the *Cauſes Continent* of many Diſeaſes; which not being obſerv'd, Phyſicians quarrel often with the Humours which are no way in fault; the Fault being in the very Frame and Mechaniſm of

of ſome Part. In the Cure of which Diſeaſes, 'tis in vain to apply *Alterative Medicines* (becauſe the Caſe admits not of *Alteration*,) but the Matter muſt be corrected, and accommodated, or palliated, by Diets, and Medicines familiar.

LIKEWISE, to *Comparative Anatomy* appertain accurate Obſervations, as well of all Kind of *Humours*, as of the *Footſteps* and *Impreſſions* of *Diſeaſes*, in Variety of Bodies diſſected: For the *Humours* are commonly paſſed over in *Anatomies*, as ſuperfluous Excrements, though it be moſt neceſſary to obſerve, *of what Nature*, and *what various Kinds* there be of differing *Humours* (not relying herein too much upon the received Diviſions of them) which may ſometimes be found in the Body of Man; and in what Cavities, and Receptacles, each Humour uſes for the moſt part to lodge and neſtle; and with what Advantage, or Prejudice, and the like. In like Manner, the *Footſteps* and *Impreſſions* of *Diſeaſes*, and the *Leſions* and *Devaſtations* of the *Inward Parts* by them, are to be obſerved with Diligence in *divers Anatomies*; as, Impoſthumations, Exulcerations, Diſcontinuations, Putrefactions, Exeſions, Comſumptions; Again, Contractions, Extenſions, Convulſions, Luxations, Diſlocations, Obſtructions, Repletions, Tumors; together with all preternatural Subſtances found in Man's Body,

(as

(as Stones, Carnosities, Excrescencies, Worms, and the like:) All these Things, (I say) and such other, ought to have been exactly observed by Multitude of Anatomies, and the Contribution of Men's several Experiments; and carefully set down both historically according to the Appearances, and artificially with a Reference to the Diseases and Symptoms which resulted from them, in Case where the Anatomy is of a defunct Patient; whereas now upon opening of Bodies, they are passed over slightly, and in Silence.

TOUCHING that other Defect in *Anatomy*, (to wit, that it hath not used to be practised upon *Living Bodies*) to what purpose should we speak of it? For this is an odious and barbarous Thing, and by *Celsus* justly condemn'd. And yet for the Passages and Pores, it is true which was anciently noted, That the more subtile of them appear not in Anatomical Dissections; because they are shut and latent in *Dead Bodies*, though they be open and manifest in *Live*. Wherefore that Use and Humanity may at once be consulted, this *Anatomia Vivorum* is not to be relinquished altogether, nor referr'd (as did *Celsus*) to the casual Practices of Surgery; since this very Thing may well be perform'd, by the Dissection of Beasts alive, which, notwithstanding the Dissimilitude of their Parts, may, being

being done with Judgment, ſufficiently ſatisfy this Inquiry.

De curatione Morborum habitorum pro inſanabilibus.

LIKEWISE in their Inquiry of Diſeaſes, they find many which they pronounce *Incurable*; ſome from the firſt Acceſs of the Diſeaſe; and others, after ſuch a certain Period. So that the Proſcriptions of *L. Sylla*, and the *Triumvirs* were nothing to the *Proſcriptions* of *Phyſicians*, whereby they deliver over ſo many Men, by their moſt ſevere Edicts, to Death, whereof Numbers however do eſcape with leſs Difficulty than they formerly did in the *Roman* Proſcriptions. Therefore I ſhall make no Scruple to ſet down among the *Deficients*, *A Work of the Cures of Diſeaſes held incurable*; to the End that ſome extraordinary and brave-ſpirited Phyſicians may be awak'd and ſtirred up to ſet to this Work, (ſo far as the Nature of Things permits;) ſince this *Pronouncing* of *Diſeaſes Incurable*, enacts a Law as it were for Neglect, and exempts Ignorance from Diſcredit.

De Euthanaſia Exteriore.

NAY to go a little further, I am clearly of Opinion, That it is part of a Phyſician's Office, not only to reſtore Health, but alſo to mitigate

mitigate the Pains and Torments of Diſeaſes: And not only when ſuch Mitigation of Pain, as of a dangerous Symptom, may conduce to *Recovery*; but even when all Hope of Recovery being gone, it may ſerve only to make a *fair and eaſy Paſſage out of Life.* For it was no ſmall Felicity which *Auguſtus Cæſar* was wont to wiſh ſo much to himſelf, that ſame *Euthanaſia*; and which was ſpecially noted in the Death of *Antoninus Pius*, who did not ſeem ſo much to dye, as to fall into a pleaſant and deep Sleep. So it is written of *Epicurus*, that he procured this ſame eaſy Departure unto himſelf; for after his Diſeaſe was judged deſperate, he drowned his Stomach and Senſes with a large Draught and Ingurgitation of Wine; whence That in the Epigram, ——— *Hinc Stygias ebrius hauſit aquas*; *He was not ſober enough to taſte any Bitterneſs in the* Stygian *Water.* But the Phyſicians contrariwiſe in our Times make a Kind of Scruple and Religion to ſtay with the Patient after he is given over; whereas in my Judgment, if they would not be wanting to their Profeſſion, and to Humanity it ſelf, they ought both to learn the Art, and to give the Attendance, for the facilitating and aſſwaging the Pains and Agonies of Death. And this Part we call an Inquiry concerning an *Outward Euthanaſia*, (to diſtinguiſh it from that *Euthanaſia*, which regards

gards a due Preparation of the Soul) and refer it among the *Deficients*.

Medicinæ Experimentales.

LIKEWISE in the *Cures* of *Diseases*, I find this general *Deficiency*; that the Physicians of the present Age, though they pursue the General Intentions of Cures well enough, yet for particular Receipts, respecting the proper Cures of peculiar Diseases, either they do not well know them, or do not religiously observe them. For Physicians have frustrated the Fruit of Tradition and approv'd Experience by their Magistralities; in adding, and taking out, and changing, *Quid pro quo*, in their Receipts, at their Pleasures, in such manner commanding the Medicine, that the Medicine can no longer command the Disease. For except it be *Treacle*, and *Mithridate*, and of late *Diascordium*, and a few more, they tye themselves to no Receipts severely and religiously. For the Confections which stand in the Shops for Sale are in Readiness for General Intentions, and not accommodate and appropriate to particular Diseases; for they do not much refer to any special Distemper, but in the general to Purging, Opening, Comforting, Altering; And this is the chief Cause why Empiricks, and Old Women are more happy many Times in their Cures, than learned Physicians; because they

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are more faithful and religious in holding to approv'd Medicines. Therefore here is the Deficience which I find, That Phyſicians have not partly out of their Practice, partly out of the conſtant Probations reported in Books; and partly out of the Traditions of Empiricks; ſet down and delivered over, certain *Experimental Medicines*, for the Cure of particular Diſeaſes; beſides their own *Conjectural* and *Magiſterial Deſcriptions*. For as they were the Men of the beſt Compoſition in the State of *Rome*, who either being Conſuls inclined to the People; or being Tribunes inclined to the Senate: So in the matter we now handle, they are the beſt Phyſicians, who being Learned, incline to the Traditions of Experience; or being Empiricks, incline to the Methods of Learning.

Imitatio Naturæ in Balneis, & aquis medicinalibus.

ALSO in Preparation of Medicines, I find it ſtrange (eſpecially conſidering how *Mineral Medicines* have been extoll'd; and that they are ſafer for the Outward, than Inward Parts) that no Man hath ſought to make an Imitation by Art of *Natural Baths*; and *Medicinal Fountains*; which nevertheleſs are confeſſed to receive their Virtues from Minerals, and not ſo only, but diſcerned and diſtinguiſhed from what particular Mineral they

receive Tincture, as Sulphur, Vitriol, Steel, or the like: Which Nature if it may be reduced to Compositions of Art, both the Variety of them will be encreased, and the Temper of them will be more commanded.

Filum Medicinale, sive de vicibus Medicinarum.

BUT least I should be more particular, than is agreeable either to my Intention, or to the Proportion of this Treatise; I will conclude this Part with the Note of one Deficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest Consequence; which is, that the *Prescriptions in Use* are *too compendious* to effect any notable and difficult Cure. For to my Understanding, it is a vain and flattering Opinion, to think any Medicine can be so Sovereign, or so Happy, as that the simple Use of it should be of Force sufficient to work any great Effect upon the Body of Man. It were a strange Speech indeed, which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a Man from a Vice, to which he were by Nature subject. It is Order, Pursuit, Sequence, and Interchange of Application, which are mighty in Nature: Which altho' they require more exact Knowledge in Prescribing, and more precise Obedience in Observing, yet are amply recompenced in the Greatness of Effects. And altho' a Man would think by the daily Attendance of

of Phyſicians upon the Sick, in Viſiting, Sitting by them, and Preſcribing, that there were a ſteady Purſuance in the Cure; yet let a Man carefully look into what they preſcribe, and adminiſter, and he ſhall find them but Inconſtancies, and every Day's Deviſes, without any ſettled Providence or Project: Now they ſhould even from the Beginning, after they have made a full and perfect Diſcovery of the Diſeaſe, meditate and reſolve upon an orderly Sequence of Cure; and not without important Reaſons depart therefrom. And let Phyſicians know for certain, That (for Example) three perchance, or four Receipts, are rightly preſcribed for the Cure of ſome great Diſeaſe; which taken in due Order, and in due Spaces of Time, perform the Cure: Each and every of which, if they were taken by themſelves alone, or if the Order were inverted, or the Intervals of Time not obſerv'd, would be very hurtful. Yet it is not our Meaning, that every ſcrupulous and ſuperſtitious Method of Cure ſhould be in Eſteem as the beſt in the World, (no more than every *ſtreight Way* is the Way to *Heaven:*) But that the Way ſhould be right, as well as ſtreight and difficult. And this Part, which we call *Filum Medicinale*, (*an orderly Courſe and Sequel in Phyſick,*) we ſet down as deficient. So theſe are the Things, which in the *Knowledge* of *Medicine*, touching the *Cure* of *Diſeaſes*, we judge to be *wanting*; ſave that

there remains yet one Thing, which is of more Uſe than all the other. There *is wanting a True and Active Natural Philoſophy*, whereupon to build the *Science* of *Medicine*. But that belongs not to this Treatiſe.

De Prolongatione Vitæ.

THE Third Part of *Medicine* laid down was, That of *Prolongation* of *Life*; which is a Part new, and *deficient*; and is the moſt Noble of all. For if any ſuch Thing may be found out, Medicine ſhall not be converſant only in the *Filthineſs* of *Cures*, nor ſhall Phyſicians be honoured merely for *Neceſſity* ſake; but for a Gift to Mortals, the greateſt certainly of Earthly ones, which it is poſſible for them, next under God, to be the Diſpenſers and Adminiſtrators of. For altho' the *World* to a Chriſtian Man, travelling to the *Land* of *Promiſe*, be as it were a *Wilderneſs*; yet whilſt we are Journeying in this *Wilderneſs*, that our Shooes and Veſtments (which is as a Covering to the Soul) be the leſs worn out, is to be eſteemed a Gift of the Divine Goodneſs. Concerning this Point, becauſe it is one of the choiceſt, and that we have ſet it down amongſt *Deficients*, we will, after our accuſtomed Manner, lay down ſome Advertiſements, Diſcoveries, and Precepts.

FIRST,

FIRST, We *advertise*; That of the Writers upon this Subject, there is no one that hath found out any Thing *Great*, not to say *Sound*. Indeed *Aristotle* has put out a very small Commentary concerning this, wherein there is some Acuteness; because he himself would be All Things, as his Manner is. But the Moderns have wrote so dreamingly, and superstitiously upon this Matter, that the Argument it self, through their Vanity, begins to be reputed vain and senseless.

SECONDLY, We *advertise*, That the very Intentions of Physicians regarding this Matter, are nothing worth; and that they rather lead Men's Thoughts away from the Point, than direct them unto it. For they discourse, That Death consists in a Destitution of Heat and Moisture: And therefore that Natural Heat should be Comforted and Strengthened, and Radical Moisture cherish'd; as if this was a Matter to be effected by Broths, or Lettices and Mallows, or Furmety, or Juburbs, or again with Spices, or generous Wine, or the Spirit of Wine, and Chymical Oyls: All which Things hurt rather, than do good.

THIRDLY, We *advertise*; That Men would leave off trifling, and not be so easy as to believe, that so great a Work as that of *Re-*

taraing and *turning* back the *Courſe* of *Nature*, can be effected by a Morning Draught, or the Uſe of ſome precious Receipt; no not with *Aurum potabile*, nor the Subſtances of Pearls, and ſuch like Trifles; but that they would hold it for a certain Truth, That the *Prolongation* of *Life* is a mighty Work, and that conſiſts of divers Remedies, and of a due Connexion of them one with another: For a Man muſt not be ſo ſtupid, as to believe, that what never yet was done, can now be effected, but by Means never yet attempted.

FOURTHLY, We *adverti ſe*, That Men rightly obſerve and diſtinguiſh concerning thoſe Things which may conduce to a *Healthful Life*, and ſuch as may contribute to a *Long Life*. For there are many Things which ſerve to exhilerate the Spirits, to ſtrengthen the active Powers of Nature, and to repel Diſeaſes; which yet ſubduct from the Sum of Life, and without Sickneſs accelerate an aged *Atrophie*. There are other Things alſo, which help to the *Prorogation* of *Life*, and to the Suſpending the Atrophie of Old Age, but yet are not uſed without Hazard of Health. So that they who ſhall uſe Things for the *Prolongation* of *Life*, muſt likewiſe provide againſt ſuch Inconveniencies, as otherwiſe upon their Uſe they may be ſurpriz'd with. And ſo much by way of *Advertiſement*, or *Admonition*.

AS touching *Discoveries*; The Image or Idea, which we have conceiv'd of this Matter in our Mind, is This. Things are conserv'd and continue two Ways: Either in *their proper Identity*; or, by *Reparation*.

IN *their proper Identity*; as a Fly, or an Ant in *Amber*; A Flower, or an Apple, or Wood in *Conservatories* of *Snow*; A dead Corps amidst *Balsams*. By *Reparation*; as in *Flame*; and in *Mechanicks*. He that goes about the Work of *Prolongation* of *Life*, must put in Practice both these Kinds, (separate they can do little) and Man's Body must be conserv'd, as Inanimate Bodies are conserv'd: And again as Flame is conserv'd: And lastly in some Degree as Mechanicks are conserv'd. There are therefore three Intentions for the *Prolongation* of *Life*: The *Retardation* of *Consumption*: The *Goodness* of the *Reparation*: And the *Renovation* of that which *began to decay and grow old*.

CONSUMPTION is caus'd by two *Depredations*; By the *Depredation* of the *Innate Spirit*; and the *Depredation* of the *Ambient Air*. The Hindering of both is twofold; Either when those *Agents* become less *Predatory*; or when the *Patients* (that is, the Juices of the Body) are render'd less *depredable*. The *Spirit* becomes less *predatory*, if either *it be*

condens'd in *Subſtance*, as in the Uſe of *Opiates*, and *Nitrous Remedies*, and in *Contriſtations*; or *be diminiſh'd* in *Quantity*, as in *Pythagorical* and *Monaſtical Diets*; or *be gentle and moderate in its Motion*, as in Eaſe and Tranquillity.

THE *Ambient Air* becomes leſs *predatory*, either if it be leſs heated by the Beams of the Sun, as in colder Countries; in Caves; in Mountains; and in the Pillars and Stations of *Anchorites*: Or if it be kept off from the Body, as in a denſe cloſe Skin, and in the Plumes of Birds, and in the Uſe of Oyl and Unguents without Aromaticks.

THE *Juices* of the *Body* are render'd leſs *depredable*, if they are either render'd *Hard*; or *Dewy* and *Oyly*. *Hard*; as by *courſe Diet*: By a *Life accuſtom'd to Cold*: By *robuſt Exerciſes*: By certain *Mineral Baths*. *Dewy*; as in the *Uſe* of *ſweet Things*, and by an *Abſtinence* from *Meats Salt* and *Acid*; and above all, in ſuch a Mixture of Drink, as is of Parts very *tenuious* and ſubtile, and yet without all *Acrimony* and *Tartneſs*.

REPARATION is perform'd by *Aliments*; And *Alimentation* is promoted four Ways: By the *Concoction* of the *Bowels* for the *Extruſion* of the *Aliment*, as in *Confortation*

tion of the *principal Bowels*; By the *Excitation* of the *Exterior Parts* for the *Attraction* of the *Aliment*, as in due *Exercises* and *Frications*, and certain *Unctions* and *appropriate Baths*; By the *Preparation* of the *Aliment* it self, that it may more easily insinuate it self, and in a manner anticipate the Digestions themselves, as in the divers and artificial Ways of *Seasoning Meat*, *Mingling Drink*, *Leavening Bread*, and *reducing* the *Virtues* of these *Three* into *One*; By *Comforting* the very *last Act* of *Assimilation*, as in *seasonable Sleep*, and certain *exterior Applications*.

THE *Renovation* of that which begins to *grow to Decay*, is perform'd two Ways; either by *Intenerating* the *Habit* of the *Body* it self, as in the Use of *suppling* or *softening Applications* by *Baths*, *Plaisters*, and *Unctions*, of such a Quality, as to *impress*, not to *draw out*: Or by the *Expurgation* of the *old Juice*, and *Substitution* of *new Juice*, as in seasonable and repeated *Purging*, *Blood-letting*, and *attenuating Diets*, which restore the Flower of the Body. And so much for *Discoveries*.

AS for *Precepts*, tho' most of them may be deduc'd from the *Discoveries* themselves, yet we think good to subjoin Three of the most principal. Our First *Precept* is, That Prolongation of Life be expected rather from stated set Diets, than from any familiar Regimen

gimen of Food; or even from the Excellency of particular Medicines. For whatſoever Things are of ſuch mighty Virtue, as to be able to turn back the Courſe of Nature; are commonly too ſtrong, and powerful *Alteratives*, to be compounded together in any Medicine, much leſs to be intermingled in familiar Food. It remains therefore that they be adminiſtred ſucceſſively, and regularly, and at ſet appointed Times returning in certain Courſes.

OUR ſecond *Precept* is, That *Prolongation* of *Life* be expected rather from an Operating upon the Spirits, and from a Suppling, or Inteneration of the Parts, than from the Methods of Alimentation. For ſeeing the Body of Man, and the Frame thereof (ſetting aſide outward Accidents) ſuffers from three Things; namely, the Spirits; the Parts; and Aliments; the Way of Prolongation of Life by the Means of Alimentation is long and tedious, and through many Windings and Circuits; but the Ways by Operating upon the Spirits, and upon the Parts, are much more compendious, and ſooner bring us to the deſired End; for this Reaſon that the Spirits are ſuddenly affected, both from Vapours and Paſſions, which have a ſtrange Power over them; and the Parts no leſs, by Baths, or Unguents, or Plaiſters, which in like manner make ſudden Impreſſions.

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OUR Third *Precept* is, That *Suppling* or *Intenerating* of the Parts outwardly, ſhould be perform'd by Applications *Conſubſtantial*, *Penetrating*, and *Shutting up*. For *Conſubſtantials* are welcomely receiv'd, and kindly embrac'd by the Parts, and do properly *Intenerate* and *Supple*. Applications *Penetrating*, both as Vehicles, convey with more Eaſe, and ſink deeper the Virtue of the *Supplers*, and do themſelves alſo ſomewhat expand the Parts. Things *that ſhut up*, keep in the Virtue of both, and for a Time fix it, and check Perſpiration, which is a Thing oppoſite to *Intenération* or *Suppling*, becauſe it ſends forth Moiſture. Therefore by theſe Three (but rather diſpoſed in Order, and ſucceeding, than mix'd together) the Matter is effected. In the mean Time we note here, That the Intention of outward *Suppling* is not to nouriſh the Parts, but only to render them more capable of Nouriſhment. For whatever is more dry, is leſs active to aſſimilate. And thus much of the *Prolongation* of *Life*, which is a Third Part newly aſſigned to *Medicine*.

COME we now to *Coſmetick*, which hath Parts Civil, and Parts Effeminate. For Cleanlineſs, and an honeſt Ornament of Body was ever eſteemed to proceed from a certain Modeſty of Behaviour, and from a Reverence, in the firſt Place, to God, whoſe Creatures

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we are; next to Society, wherein we live; and laſtly to our ſelves, whom we ought to reverence as much, nay more than others. But that adulterate Decoration by Painting and Colouring, is well worthy of the Deficiences which always attend it; being neither ingenious enough to deceive, nor handſome to pleaſe, nor ſafe and wholeſome to uſe. And I wonder that this corrupt Cuſtom of Painting hath ſo long eſcaped Penal Laws, both of the Church and of the State; which yet have been very ſevere againſt Exceſs of Apparel, and the effeminate Trimming of Hair. We read indeed of *Jezabel*, that ſhe painted her Face, 2 *Kings* ix. But of *Eſther* and *Judith*, no ſuch Matter is reported.

LET us proceed to *Athletick*; This we underſtand in a Senſe ſomewhat larger than it is uſually taken in. For to this we refer any Point of *Ability*, whereunto the Body of Man may be brought; whether it be of *Activity*, or of *Patience*. Whereof *Activity* hath two Parts, *Strength* and *Swiftneſs*: And *Patience* likewiſe hath two Parts, either *Sufferance* of *Natural Wants*; or *Indurance* of *Pain*, or *Torment*. Of all which Things we ſee many Times notable Inſtances in the Practice of Tumblers and Rope-Dancers; in the hard Fare

Fare of ſome Savages; in the amazing Strength of Maniacks; and in the Conſtancy of many in the midſt of exquiſite Torments. Nay, if there be any other Faculty to be found, which falls not within the former Partition, (ſuch as is many Times ſeen in *Divers*, who are able to contain Reſpiration to a Wonder) we would have it referr'd to this Art. And that ſuch Things may ſometimes be done, is moſt manifeſt; But the Philoſophy, and an Inquiry into the Cauſes of them, is commonly neglected; for this Reaſon we conceive, becauſe Men are perſuaded that ſuch Maſteries and Commands over Nature, are obtain'd only, either by a peculiar Aptneſs of ſome Men, (which falls not under Rule) or from a long Cuſtom, continued even from Childhood, which uſes to be commanded rather than taught. Which tho' it be not altogether true; yet to what purpoſe ſhould we note any Deficiences in theſe Matters? For the *Olympick* Games are down long ſince: And a Mediocrity in theſe Things is enough for Uſe: As for Excellency in them, it ſerves for the moſt part but for mercenary Oſtentation.

FOR Arts *Voluptuary*, the chief Deficiency in them is of Laws to repreſs them. For as it hath been well obſerv'd, that while

while States are riſing and in their Growth, Arts Military flouriſh; when they are in the Height, Arts Liberal; and when they are in their Declenſion, Arts Voluptuary: So I doubt this Age of the World is ſomewhat upon the Deſcent of the Wheel, and inclines to Arts Voluptuary: Wherefore let us paſs them over. And thus much of *the Knowledge which concerns Man's Body*, which is but the Tabernacle of the Mind.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of MEMORY.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 5. Cap. 5.

E will divide the *Art* of *Retaining*, or of the *Custody* of *Knowledge*, into two Doctrines: That is, the Doctrine touching the *Helps* of *Memory*; and the Doctrine touching the *Memory it self*. A *Help* to *Memory* is *Writing* no doubt: And it must by all Means be noted, That *Memory*, without this Support, would be too weak for more prolix and accurate Matters. Therefore there can hardly be a Thing more useful to Memory, than a substantial and learned *Digest* of *Common Places*. Yet I am not ignorant, that the referring those Things we read or learn, into

to *Common Places*, is reckon'd by ſome as a Prejudice to Learning, as retarding the Courſe of Learning, and incouraging the *Memory* in Idleneſs. Nevertheleſs, becauſe it is but a counterfeit Buſineſs, to be pregnant and forward in Learning, unleſs you are withal ſolid, and every way furniſh'd; I hold the Diligence and Pains in collecting *Common Places*, to be a Matter of very great Uſe and Certainty in Studying; as that which furniſhes Plenty to *Invention*; and contracts the Eye of the *Judgment* to a Point. Nevertheleſs it is true, that of the Methods and Syntagms of *Common Places*, that I have chanc'd to ſee hitherto, there is none of any Worth; for that in their Titles, they carry the Face of a School rather, than of a World; making Vulgar and Pedantical Diviſions, and not ſuch as any way penetrate the Marrow and Pith of Things.

AS for *Memory it ſelf*, That ſeems to have been inquired into looſely and weakly enough hitherto. An Art indeed there is extant of it: But we are certain, that there may be had both better Precepts for the confirming and encreaſing *Memory*, than that Art comprehends; and that a better Practice of that very Art may be contriv'd, than that which is receiv'd. Yet I make no doubt, but that (if a Man has a Mind to abuſe this Art to Oſtentation) ſome Wonderful and Prodigious Matters

ters may be perform'd by it: Nevertheleſs, for Uſe (as it is managed) it is a barren Thing. However, in the mean Time, I do not tax it with deſtroying, and over-charging the *Natural Memory*, (which is commonly objected;) but that it is not dextrouſly applied, to lend Aſſiſtance to *Memory*, in Buſineſs, and ſerious Affairs. And this we have learn'd (it may be from our Civil Courſe of Life) not to value Things that make Oſtentation of Art, and are of no Uſe. For to repeat inſtantly a vaſt Number of Names, or Words, upon once hearing, in the ſame Order they were delivered; or to pour forth abundance of Verſes upon any Argument *extempore*; or to touch every Thing that occurs, with ſome Satyrical *Simile*; or to turn all Things ſerious into a Jeſt; or to elude any Thing by a Contradiction or Cavil; and the like; (whereof in the Faculties of the Mind there is a great Store; and which by Wit and Practice may be carried even to a Miracle;) All theſe Things, and ſuch-like, we make no more Account of, than of the Agilities and Tricks of Rope-Dancers, Tumblers, and Jugglers: For they are in a manner the ſame Thing; ſeeing Theſe abuſe the Powers of the Body, and Thoſe the Powers of the Mind; and perchance they may have ſomewhat of Strangeneſs in them, but little or no Worth.

AS for the *Art* of *Memory*, That is built but upon two Intentions; *Prenotion*, and *Emblem:* We call *Prenotion* a certain Abscission of indefinite Investigation. For when a Man endeavours to recall any Thing to Memory; if he has no Prenotion, or Preception of that he seeks; he seeks indeed, and takes Abundance of Pains, and runs up and down this way and that way, as in a Maze of Infinity. But if he has any certain Prenotion; immediately the Infinity is cut off, and the Memory beats nearer Home; like the Hunting of a Fallow-Deer within a Park. Therefore 'tis evident that Method helps *Memory*. For there is a secret *Prenotion*, that the Thing sought must have a Congruity with Method. So Verses are easilier got by Heart than Prose. For if a Man sticks at a Word, *Prenotion* suggests, that it must be such a Word as will stand in the Verse. And this *Prenotion* is the first Part of *Artificial Memory*. For in *Memory Artificial* we have Places digested and provided before-hand: *Images* we make *extempore*, according to the present Occasion: But there is a secret *Prenotion*, that the *Image* must be such, as hath some Resemblance with the Place; this being the Thing that twitches the Memory, and in some sort makes way for it to the Thing we are in Chace of.

EMBLEM reduces Conceits Intellectual to Images Senſible: Theſe ſtrike the Memory more forcibly, and are more eaſily imprinted there, than Things Intellectual. So we ſee that even the Memory of Brutes is ſtirr'd up by a Senſible Object, but not by an Intellectual. Therefore you will more eaſily retain the Image of a Huntſman purſuing a Hare; or of an Apothecary ſetting in Order his Boxes; or of a Pedant making a Speech; or of a Boy reciting Verſes by Heart; or of a Droll Acting upon a Stage; than the naked Notions of Invention, Diſpoſition, Elocution, Memory, Action. There are other Things alſo pertaining to the Help of *Memory*, (as we ſaid juſt now;) but the Art now in Uſe conſiſts of the two Things now premiſed. And to purſue the particular Defects of Arts, would be to depart from our propoſed Method. Wherefore let thus much ſuffice for the Art of *Retaining*, or of *Cuſtody*.

CHAP. XXII.

Of RHETORICK.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 6. Cap. 3.

HETORICK, or *Oratory*, is a *Science* both excellent in it self, and by Writers excellently well improv'd. Yet Eloquence, if a Man consider the Thing truly, is, without doubt, inferior to Wisdom. For we see how much This distances That, in those Words of God to *Moses*, when he refused the Charge assigned him, for Want of Elocution; There is *Aaron*, *He shall be to thee instead of a Mouth*; *and Thou shalt be to him instead of God.* Yet in Profit, and popular Esteem, Wisdom gives Place to Eloquence. For so *Solomon*; *The Wise in Heart shall be called prudent: but the Sweetness of the Lips shall*

ſhall find greater Things. Prov. xvi. 21. Signifying not obſcurely, that Profoundneſs of Wiſdom will help a Man to a Name, or Admiration; but that it is Eloquence, that prevails moſt in Buſineſs, and in common Life. And as to the labouring of this Art; the Emulation of *Ariſtotle* with the Rhetoricians of his Time; and the earneſt and vehement Diligence of *Cicero*, endeavouring with all Might to ennoble it, joyned with long Experience, hath made them in their Books about this Art, exceed themſelves. Again, thoſe moſt excellent Examples of Eloquence, in the Orations of *Demoſthenes* and *Cicero*, added to the Acuteneſs of the Precepts, have doubled the Progreſſion in this Art. And therefore the *Deficiences* which we find in this *Art*, will rather be in ſome Collections, which may as Hand-Maids attend the Art, than in the Rules, or Uſe of the Art it ſelf.

NOTWITHSTANDING, to ſtir the Earth a little about the Roots of this Science, as our Faſhion is; ſurely *Rhetorick* is ſubſervient to the *Imagination*, as *Logick* is to the *Underſtanding*. And the *Office* and *Duty* of *Rhetorick* (if a Man enter any Thing deep into the Matter) is no other, than *to apply and commend the Dictates of Reaſon to the Imagination, for the better moving of the Appetite and Will.* For we ſee *Reaſon* is attack'd and diſturb'd in her Adminiſtration by three

Means; Either by the *Illaqueation* of *Sophisms*, which pertains to *Logick*; or by the *Bewitchery* of *Words*, which pertains to *Rhetorick*; or by the *Violence* of *Passions*, which pertains to *Morality*. For as in Negotiation with others, a Man uses to be overcome and prevailed upon, either by *Cunning*, or by *Importunity*, or by *Vehemency*; so also in that Inward Negotiation, which we exercise with our selves, we are either undermined by the *Fallacies* of *Arguments*; or sollicited and disquieted by the *Assiduity* of *Impressions* and *Observations*; or shaken and transported by the *Assault* of *Passions*. Neither is the Nature of Man so unfortunate, as that those Powers and Arts should have Force to dethrone Reason, and not to strengthen and establish it: Nay, much more do they conduce to this Effect, than to the contrary. For the End of *Logick* is, to teach a Form of Arguments, to secure Reason, and not to entrap it. Likewise the End of *Morality* is to compose the Affections in such manner, that they may fight for Reason, and not invade it. Lastly, the End of *Rhetorick* is to fill the Imagination with Objects and Idea's, to second Reason, not to oppress it. For the Abuses of an Art come in but *ex obliquo*, for Caution, not for Use.

AND therefore it was great Injustice in *Plato* (tho' springing out of a just Hatred to the *Rhetoricians* of his Time) to place *Rhetorick*

torick amongſt the Arts *Voluptuary:* Reſembling it to Cookery, which did ſpoil wholſome Meats, and render unwholſome pleaſant by Variety of Sauces. For we ſee that Speech is much more converſant in adorning that which is Good, than in colouring that which is Evil: For there is no Man but Speaks more honeſtly, than he either Thinks or Acts: And it was excellently noted by *Thucydides* in *Cleon*, That becauſe he uſed to hold on the bad Side in Cauſes of State; therefore he was ever inveighing againſt Eloquence, and good Speech; as knowing full well that no Man can ſpeak fair of Courſes ſordid and baſe; but can of honeſt ones, with the greateſt Eaſe. And therefore as *Plato* ſaid elegantly: *That Virtue, if ſhe could be ſeen, would move great Love and Affection:* So ſeeing ſhe cannot be ſhewed to the *Senſe*, by corporal Shape, the next Degree is, to ſhew Her to *Imagination* in lively Repreſentation: For to ſhew her to *Reaſon*, only in Subtilty of Argument, was a Thing ever derided in *Chryſippus*, and many of the *Stoicks*, who thought to obtrude Virtue upon Men by ſharp Diſputations and Concluſions, which have no Sympathy with the Imagination and Will of Man.

AGAIN; if the Affections in themſelves were pliant and obedient to Reaſon; it were true, there would be no great Uſe of Perſua-

ſions and Inſinuations, to procure Acceſs to the Mind; but 'twould be ſufficient if Things were nakedly and ſimply propoſed and proved: But on the contrary, the Affections make ſuch Mutinies and Seditions (according to that,

Video meliora proboq;
Deteriora ſequor.) ——

THAT Reaſon would be entirely led away into Servitude and Captivity, if the Perſuaſions of Eloquence did not win the Imagination from taking Part with the Affections, and contract a Confederacy between Reaſon and Imagination, againſt the Affections. For it muſt be noted, That the Affections of themſelves are ever carried to Good Apparent, and in this Reſpect, have ſomewhat in common with Reaſon: But herein they differ; *That the Affections behold chiefly Good Preſent; But Reaſon looking forward, beholds alſo that which is Future, and Good in the main.* And therefore, as Things *preſent* more forcibly fill the Imagination, Reaſon commonly yields, and is vanquiſh'd. But when once Eloquence and Perſuaſion hath made Things *Future*, and *Remote*, appear as actually *preſent*, then upon the Revolt of the Imagination to the ſide of Reaſon, Reaſon prevails.

WE conclude therefore, That *Rhetorick* can be no more charged, with the Colouring of the worſe Part, than *Logick* with Sophiſtry, or *Morality* with Vice. For who doos not know that the Doctrines of Contraries are the ſame, tho' the Uſe be oppoſite? Again, *Logick* differs from *Rhetorick*, not only in this, that the One (as is commonly ſaid) is like the *Fiſt*; the Other like the *Palm*;) the One, that is, handles Things cloſely; the Other at large;) but much more in this, That *Logick* conſiders Reaſon in its Natural Truth; *Rhetorick*, as it is planted in popular Opinions and Manners. And therefore *Ariſtotle* doth wiſely place *Rhetorick* between *Logick* on the one Side, and *Moral* or *Civil Knowledge* on the other, as participating of both. For the Proofs and Demonſtrations of *Logick*, are toward all Men indifferent and the ſame: But the Proofs and Perſuaſions of *Rhetorick*, ought to vary according to the Auditors; that a Man like a Muſician, accommodating himſelf to different Ears, may become

Orpheus in Silvis, inter Delphinas Arion.

WHICH Kind of Application, and Variance of Speech, (if a Man deſire the Perfection and Height of it) ought to be ſo far extended, that if a Man were to ſpeak the

the

ſame Thing to ſeveral Perſons, he ſhould ſpeak to them all reſpectively and ſeveral Ways. Though this *Politique Part of Eloquence in private Speech*, it is eaſy for the greateſt Orators to want; whilſt by obſerving their well graced Forms of Speech, they loſe that Volubility of Application, and Characters of Diſcourſe, which in Diſcretion they ſhould uſe towards particular Perſons. Certainly it would not be amiſs to recommend this, of which we are ſpeaking, to better Inquiry, and to call it, *The Wiſdom of private Speech*; and to refer it to *Deficients*: A Thing ſurely, which the more ſeriouſly a Man ſhall think on, the more highly he ſhall value. And whether this ſhould be placed Here, or in that Part which concerneth Policy, is a Matter of no great Conſequence.

AND now let us deſcend to the *Deficiences* of this Art, which (as I ſaid) are of ſuch a Nature, that they may be eſteemed rather as Appendages, than Portions of the Art it ſelf; and pertain all to the *Promptuary* Part, for the Furniture of Speech, and Readineſs of Invention.

Colores

Colores boni & mali, ſimplicis & comparati.

FIRST then, I do not find any one that has well purſued, or ſupplied the Wiſdom and Diligence too of *Ariſtotle*. He began to make a Collection of *the popular Signs*, or *Colours of Good and Evil, both Simple and Comparative*, which are as the *Sophiſms* of *Rhetorick*, (as I touched before.) They are of excellent Uſe, eſpecially as to Buſineſs, and the *Wiſdom* of *private Speech*. But the Labour of *Ariſtotle* concerning theſe Colours is three Ways deficient; Firſt, That he recites but few of many: Secondly, That their *Elenches* are not annexed: Thirdly, That he ſeems to have conceiv'd but a Part of the Uſe of them: For their Uſe is not more in Probation, than in Affecting and Moving. For many Forms of Speech, which are equal in *Signification*, are yet different in *Impreſſion*. For that which is ſharp, pierces far more effectually, than that which is blunt, though the Strength of the Percuſſion be the ſame. For there is no Man, but will be more raiſed, by hearing it ſaid, *Your Enemies will triumph ſtrangely at this*;

Hoc Ithacus velit, & magno mercentur Atridæ;

Than

Than by hearing it barely said, *This will prejudice your Affairs.* Wherefore these *sharp-edged*, and *quick-pointed Speeches*, are by no means to be neglected. And since we report this Part as *deficient*, we will, after our Custom, support it with *Examples*; for Precepts will not sufficiently illustrate the Matter.

Examples of the Colours *of Good and Evil, both Simple and Comparative.*

The COLOUR.

1. "WHAT Men Praise and Celebrate, "is Good; what they Dispraise and Repre- "hend, is Evil.

The ELENCH, *or* REPREHENSION.

THIS Colour deceives four Ways; *viz.* Either through *Ignorance*; or through *Want of Integrity*; or through *partial Respects*, and *Factions*; or through the *natural Dispositions*

ſitions of thoſe that *Praiſe* and *Diſpraiſe*. Firſt, Through *Ignorance*; For what ſignifies the Judgment of the Rabble in diſtinguiſhing and determining Good and Evil? *Phocion* diſcern'd better, who, when the People applauded him more than ordinary, aſked, *Whether he had done any Thing amiſs?* Secondly, Through *Want of Integrity*; For thoſe that *Praiſe* and *Diſpraiſe*, commonly carry on their own Deſigns, and don't ſpeak what they think.

Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.
Hor. Lib. 2. Epiſt. 2.

SO again; *It is naught, it is naught, (ſays the Buyer;) but when he is gone, he vaunteth. Prov.* xx. Thirdly, Out of *Partiality* and *Faction*; For every one knows, that Men uſe to extoll with immoderate Praiſe, thoſe that are on their own Side; and to depreſs thoſe of the adverſe Party below their Deſert: Laſtly, Through *natural Temper and Inclination*; For ſome Men are by Nature framed and moulded for ſervile Fawning and Flattery; whilſt others, on the contrary, are ſtiff, captious and moroſe; and when theſe Commend or Inveigh, they do but comply with their own Humours, not troubling their Heads over-much about the Truth of the Buſineſs.

The

The COLOUR.

2. " That which draws Commendation " even from Enemies, is a great Good; But " that which is reprehended even by Friends, " is a great Evil.

THIS *Colour* ſeems to ſtand upon this Foundation, That it may well be believed, that the Force of Truth extorts from us whatſoever we ſpeak againſt our Wills, and contrary to the Bent and Inclination of our Minds.

The REPREHENSION.

THIS *Colour* deceives through the Subtilty, as well of *Enemies* as *Friends*. For the Praiſes of *Enemies* are not always againſt their Wills, nor as forc'd by Truth, but they chuſe to beſtow them in ſuch Caſes where they may create Envy or Danger to their *Adverſaries*. Therefore the *Grecians* had a ſuperſtitious Fancy, That if a Man were commended by another out of Spight, and with a miſchievous Deſign, *He would have a Puſh riſe upon his Noſe*. Again it deceives, becauſe Enemies ſometimes beſtow Praiſes, like Preambles as it were, that they may the more freely and maliciouſly calumniate afterwards. On the other ſide, this *Colour* deceives alſo, from the Craft

Craft of *Friends*. For even they ſometimes will take Notice of the Faults of *Friends*, and ſpeak freely of them; but they chuſe ſuch as may do them little hurt, as if for all the reſt they were the beſt Men in the World. Again it deceives, becauſe *Friends* alſo uſe their Reprehenſions (as we ſaid *Enemies* do their Commendations) as certain little Prefaces, that they may expatiate more largely in their Praiſes ſoon after.

The COLOUR.

3. " THAT whoſe Privation is Good, " is an Evil; That whoſe Privation is Evil, " is a Good.

The REPREHENSION.

THIS *Colour* deceives two Ways; Either by Reaſon of the *Compariſon* of *Good* and *Evil*; Or by Reaſon of the *Succeſſion* of *Good* to *Evil*, or of *Evil* to *Good*. By Reaſon of *Compariſon*; If it were *Good* for Mankind to be *deprived* of the Eating of Acorns, it follows not that ſuch Food was *Evil*, but that Maſt was *Good*, Corn *Better*. Neither if it were *Evil*, for the People of *Sicily* to be deprived of *Dionyſius* the Elder; doth it follow that the ſame *Dionyſius* was a *Good* Prince, but that he was leſs *Evil* than *Dionyſius* the Younger. So in the Tale of *Æſop*, when the Old fainting Man

Man in the Heat of the Day caſt down his *Burthen*, and called for *Death*; and when *Death* came to know his Will with him, ſaid, *It was for nothing, but to help him up with his Burthen:* It doth not follow, that becauſe *Death*, which was the Privation of the *Burthen*, was *ill*, therefore the Burthen was *Good*. By *Succeſſion*; For the Privation of a *Good* does not always give Place to an *Evil*, but ſometimes to a *greater Good*; as when the Flower or Bloſſom falls, the Fruit ſucceeds. Nor does the Privation of an *Evil* always give Place to a *Good*, but ſometimes to a *greater Evil*. For *Clodius*, tho' an Enemy, being ſlain, *Milo* at the ſame Time loſt a fair Harveſt of Glory.

The COLOUR.

4. " THAT which is near to Good, is Good; " That which is at a Diſtance from Good, is " Evil.

SUCH is the Nature of Things, that Things contrary and diſtant in Nature and Quality, are alſo ſevered and disjoined in Place; and Things like and conſenting in Quality, are placed, and as it were, quartered together: For partly, in Regard of the Nature, to ſpread, multiply, and infect in Similitude; and partly, in Regard of the Nature, to break, expel, and alter that which is diſ-

agreeable

agreeable and contrary; moſt Things do either aſſociate, and draw near to themſelves the like, or at leaſt aſſimilate to themſelves that which approacheth near them, and do alſo drive away, chace, and exterminate their Contraries. And that is the Reaſon commonly yielded, why the middle Region of the Air ſhould be coldeſt; becauſe the Sun and Stars are either hot by direct Beams, or by Reflexion. The direct Beams heat the upper Region; the reflected Beams from the Earth and Seas, heat the lower Region. That which is in the *Midſt*, being furtheſt diſtant in Place from theſe two Regions of Heat, are moſt diſtant in Nature, that is, *Coldeſt*; which is that they term *Cold*, or *Hot*, *per* * *Antiperiſtaſin*, *Environing by Contraries*: Which was pleaſantly taken hold of by him, who ſaid, That *an honeſt Man* in theſe Days muſt needs be more honeſt than in Ages heretofore, *propter Antiperiſtaſin*, becauſe the ſhutting of him in the midſt of Contraries, muſt needs make the *Honeſty* ſtronger, and more compact in it ſelf.

* Antiperiſtaſis *is a Philoſophical* Term, *ſignifying* a Repulſion on every Part, *whereby either Heat or Cold is made more ſtrong in it ſelf, by the reſtraining of the contrary.*

The REPREHENSION.

THIS *Colour* deceives three Ways: Firſt, in Reſpect of *Deſtitution*; Secondly, in Reſpect of *Obſcuration*; Thirdly, in Reſpect of *Protection*. In Regard of *Deſtitution*; It happens, that Things of greateſt Amplitude and Excellence in their Kind, do (as much as may be) ingroſs all to themſelves, and *leave* that which is next them *moſt deſtitute*; as the Shoots or Underwood that grow near a great and ſpread Tree is the moſt pined and ſhrubby Wood of the Field, becauſe the great Tree doth deprive and beguile them of the Sap and Nouriſhment. Likewiſe he ſaith well, *Divitis ſervi maximè ſervi.* And the Compariſon was pleaſant of him, that compared the inferior Attendants in the Courts of Princes to the Eves of Feſtivals, which are next the Holy-Day, but are themſelves devoted to Faſting. In Regard of *Obſcuration*; For this alſo is the Nature of Things moſt excellent and predominant in their Kind, that though they do not extenuate Things adjoyning to them, in Subſtance, yet they drown and obſcure them in Shew and Appearance. And therefore the Aſtronomers ſay, That whereas in all other Planets, Conjunction is the perfecteſt Amity; the Sun contrariwiſe is good by Aſpect, but evil by Conjunction. In Regard of *Protection*; For Things come together and

and congregate not only for Confort and Similitude of Nature; but even that which is *Evil* flies to that which is *Good*, for Concealment and Protection: And *Good* to *Evil* for Converſion and Reformation. So *Hypocriſy* draws near to Religion for Covert and Hiding it ſelf.

Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni.

Oft under neighb'ring Good, Vice ſhrowded lies.

THUS impious Men and Malefactors betake themſelves to Sanctuaries, and to Prieſts, and Prelates, and Holy Men: For the Majeſty of good Things is ſuch, that the Confines of them are Reverend. So on the other ſide, *Good* draws near to *Evil*, not for Society, but for Converſion and Reformation. Therefore our Saviour, when it was objected to him, that he convers'd with Publicans and Sinners, ſaid, *They that be whole need not a Phyſician, but they that are ſick. Matt.* ix. 12.

The COLOUR.

5. " SINCE all Parties or Sects challenge " the Preheminence of the FIRST Place " to themſelves; That to which all the reſt " give the SECOND Place, ſeems to be " better than the others. For every one

" ſeems to take the FIRST Place out of " Zeal to it ſelf; but to give the SECOND " where it is really due.

SO *Cicero* goes about to prove the Sect of the *Academicks*, which ſuſpended all *Aſſeveration*, to have been the beſt of Philoſophies. ' For (ſays he) ask a *Stoick*, what Sect is beſt, ' and he will prefer his own: Then ask him ' which is the next beſt, and he will confeſs ' the *Academick*. Deal thus with an *Epicure*, (who can ſcarce bear the Sight of a *Stoick*) and after he has ſeated his own Sect in the uppermoſt Place, he will place the *Academicks* next to him.

IN like manner, when a Place is vacant, if a Prince ſhould take the Competitors, and examine them ſeverally, whom next themſelves they would chiefly recommend; it were likely, the ableſt and moſt worthy Man would have the moſt *Second* Voices.

The REPREHENSION.

THIS *Colour* deceives, in Reſpect of *Envy*. For Men are accuſtomed, next to Themſelves, and their own Faction, to incline unto them who are the ſofteſt and weakeſt, and ſtand leaſt in their Way; in Deſpight and Derogation of them that hold them hardeſt to it. So that this *Colour* of *Meliority* and *Prehemi-*

nence

nence is a Sign of Enervation and Weakneſs.

The COLOUR.

6. " THAT Kind is ALTOGETHER " BEST, whoſe Excellence, or Prehemi- " nence is BEST.

APPERTAINING to this are thoſe uſual Forms: ' Let us not wander in Gene- ' ralities. Let us compare Particular with ' Particular.

The REPREHENSION.

THIS *Appearance* ſeems to be of ſome Strength, and to be rather *Logical*, than *Rhetorical*. Yet it ſometimes deceives. For many Things are caſual, and liable to Danger, which nevertheleſs, if they eſcape, prove more excellent than others. So that they are inferior in *Kind*, becauſe they are ſubject to *Peril*, and often miſcarry; but in the *Individual* are more noble. Of this Sort is the *Bloſſom* of *March*, whereof the *French* Proverb goes:

Bourgeon de Mars, Enfans de Paris,
Si un eſchape, bien vant dix.

So that in general, the Bloſſom of *May* is better than the Bloſſom of *March*; yet in particular,

cular, the best Blossom of *March* is better than the best Blossom of *May*.

SECONDLY; It deceives, because of the Nature of Things, which in some *Kinds*, or *Species*, is more equal, in others more unequal: Thus it has been an Observation, That warmer Climates produce generally more acute Wits; yet in colder Countries, Wits that are extraordinary, surpass the acutest of those in warm Climates. So in many Armies, if the Matter should be tried by *Duel* between particular Champions, the Victory would go on one side; and if by the *Gross*, on the other. For Excellencies go as it were by chance; but Kinds go by a more certain Nature, as by Discipline in War.

LASTLY, Many *Kinds* have much *Refuse*, which contervail that, which they have *Excellent*; and therefore in general *Metal* is more precious than *Stone*; and yet a *Diamond* is more precious than *Gold*.

The COLOUR.

7. "THAT which keeps a Matter safe "and entire in our own Hands, is GOOD: "But what is destitute, and unprovided of a "Retreat, is BAD. For whereas all Ability "of Acting is Good: Not to be able to "come off, is a Kind of Impotency.

HENCE

HENCE *Æsop* framed the Fable of the two Frogs; that in a great Drought, when the Plashes were dry every where, consulted together what was to be done: The First propounded, *Going down into a deep Well, because it was like the Water would not fail there:* To whom the other replied; *Yea, but if it do fail, how shall we get up again?* The Ground and Foundation of this *Colour* is; That Human Actions are so uncertain and subject to Perils, that That seemeth the best Course, which hath most Passages out of it. Appertaining to this Persuasion, the usual Forms are: *You will wholly tye up, and engage your self. You will not be able to be your own Carver. The Matter will be no longer in your own Power*; &c.

The REPREHENSION.

THIS *Colour* deceives first, Because *Proceeding and Resolving in all Actions is necessary.* For as one said well, *Not to Resolve, is to Resolve.* For many Times the Suspending of Resolution breeds as many Necessities, and engages as far some other Way, as to Resolve. And this Disease of the Mind seems to be like that of covetous Men: But translated from the Desire of retaining Wealth, to the Desire of retaining Free-Will, and Power. For the covetous Man will enjoy nothing, that he

may have his full Store, and Possibility to enjoy the more; and this Kind of Sceptick will execute nothing, because he would be still indifferent, and at Liberty to execute any Thing. Again it deceives, because Necessity, and this same *jacta est alea*, hath many Times an Advantage, in that it awakens the Powers of the Mind, and strengthens Endeavour; as he saith, *Cæteris pares, necessitate certe superiores estis.*

The COLOUR.

8. " That which a Man hath procured by " his own Default, is a Greater Evil: That " which is laid on by others, or from with- " out, is a lesser Evil.

THE Reason is, because the Sting and Remorse of the Mind, accusing it self, doubles all Adversity: Contrariwise, the considering, and reflecting inwardly, that a Man is clear and free from Fault, and just Imputation, qualifies outward Calamities. For if the Evil be in the Sense, and the Conscience both, there is a Gemination of it; but if Evil be in the one, and Comfort in the other, it is a kind of Compensation. And therefore the Poets in their Tragedies exaggerate those Sufferings most, and as Fore-runners of Despair, wherein a Man accuses and tortures himself.

Seq; unam clamat cauſamq; caputq; malorum.

She railing, doth confeſs herſelf to be
The Cauſe and Source of her own Miſery.

CONTRARIWISE, the Conſcience of Innocence and Merit leſſens, and even annihilates the Calamities of extraordinary Men. Beſides when the Evil comes from without, a Man is at Liberty to complain, whereby his Grief evaporates, without ſuffocating the Heart: For in Evil proceeding from Human Injury, we uſe to expreſs Indignation, or meditate Revenge, or laſtly to implore, or expect Divine Vengeance and Retribution: Furthermore, if the Infliction be from Fortune it ſelf, there is left however a kind of Expoſtulation with the Fates themſelves;

Atq; Deos atq; aſtra vocat crudelia mater.

On the other hand, where the Evil is derived from a Man's own Fault, there the Grief ſtrikes inward, and does more deeply wound and pierce the Heart.

The REPREHENSION.

THIS *Colour* deceives, firſt in Reſpect of *Hope*; which is a great Antidote againſt Evils. For Reformation of our Fault is often in

in our Power; but the Amendment of Fortune is not ſo. Therefore *Demoſthenes* more than once beſpeaks his *Athenians* thus; *That which, with Regard to the Time paſt, is the worſt Point and Circumſtance of all the reſt, the ſame, as to the Time to come, is the beſt. What is that? Even this, that by your Sloth, Irreſolution, and Miſgovernment, your Affairs are grown to this Declenſion and Decay. For had you uſed and ordered your Means and Forces to the beſt, and done your Parts every way to the full, and notwithſtanding your Matters ſhould have gone backward in this manner as they do, there had been no Hope of your State becoming better*, &c. So *Epictetus* ſpeaking of the Degrees of Tranquillity of Mind, aſſigns the Loweſt Place to thoſe *who blame others*; an Higher to thoſe *who blame themſelves*; and the Higheſt of all to ſuch *as blame neither themſelves, nor others.*

ANOTHER *Reprehenſion* of this *Colour*, is in Reſpect of the well-bearing of Evils, wherewith a Man can charge no Body but himſelf, which makes them the leſs.

Leve fit, quod bene fertur onus.

AND therefore many Natures, that are either extremely proud, and will take no Fault to themſelves; or elſe very true, and cleaving to themſelves (when they ſee the Blame of

of any Thing that falls out ill, muſt light upon themſelves) have no other ſhift, but to bear it out well, and to make the leaſt of it. For as we ſee when a Fault is committed, and it is not yet known who is the Delinquent, Men make much ado, grow hot and impatient about the Matter; but after, if it appear to be done by a Son, or by a Wife, or by a near Friend, then it is light made of, and preſently all is Quiet: So much more, when any thing falls out, the Blame whereof muſt needs light upon our ſelves. And this commonly happens in Women, who if they have made an unfortunate Choice againſt their Parents or Friends Conſent, if they be never ſo ill uſed, yet you ſhall ſeldom ſee them complain, but ſet a good Face on it.

The COLOUR.

9. "THE Degree of Privation ſeems "greater than the Degree of Diminution: "And again, the Degree of Inception ſeems "greater than the Degree of Increaſe.

IT is a Poſition in Mathematicks, *That there is no Proportion between Somewhat and Nothing.* Therefore the Degrees of Nullity and Quiddity ſeem larger than the Degrees of Increaſe and Decreaſe. As to a *Monoculus*, it is more to loſe one Eye, than to a Man that hath two Eyes. So if a Man has divers Children,

dren, it is more Grief to him to lose the last, than all the rest. Because he is *Spes gregis.* And therefore *Sibylla* when she brought her Three Books, and had burnt Two, doubled the Price of the Third; because the Loss of that had been a Degree of Privation, and not of Diminution.

The REPREHENSION.

THIS *Colour* deceives, first in Respect of those Things, the Use and Service whereof consists in a certain Sufficiency, or Competency, that is, in a determinate Quantity. For if a Man were obliged to pay upon Penalty a certain Sum of Money upon a certain Day, it would be more to him to want one Twelve Pence, than if (supposing he could not tell where to be furnish'd with this one Twelve Pence) he wanted Ten Shillings at another Time. So in the Decay of a Man's Estate, the Degree of Debt which first lessens the principal Stock, and casts him behind, seems worse than the last Degree, that reduces him to Want. And to this Purpose are the common Forms; *It is too late to pinch, when the Purse is at Bottom*; And, *As good never a whit, as never the better*, &c.

SECONDLY, It deceives, in Respect of that Principle in Nature, that the *Corruption of one Thing is the Generation of another.* So that

that even the Degree of ultimate Privation is ſometimes no great Matter, becauſe it gives a Handle and a Spur to ſome new Courſe. As when *Demoſthenes* reprehended the People for hearkening to the Conditions offered by King *Philip*, being not honourable, nor equal, he ſaith, *They were but Aliments of their Cowardice and Sloth; which if they were taken away, Neceſſity would teach them ſtronger Reſolutions.* So Doctor *Hector* was wont to ſay to the Dames of *London*, when they complained they were *they could not tell how*; but yet they could not endure to take any Medicine, he would tell them, *Their Way was only to be ſick; for then they would be glad to take any Medicine.*

THIRDLY, This *Colour* may be reprehended in Regard the Degree of *Decreaſe* is more ſenſible than the Degree of *Privation*; for in the Mind of Man, the Degree of *Decreaſe* may work a Wavering between Hope and Fear, and keep the Mind in Suſpenſe, from Settling and Accomodating in Patience, and Reſolution. Hence the common Forms; *Better Eye out, than always ake: Make or Mar.*

AS for the ſecond Branch of this *Colour*, it depends upon the ſame General Reaſon: Hence grew the common Place of extolling the *Beginning* of every Thing;

Dimidium

Dimidium facti, qui bene cœpit, habet.

He hath his Work half done,
Whoe'er hath well begun.

THIS made the *Aſtrologer* ſo idle, as to judge of Man's Nature, and Deſtiny, by the Conſtellation of the Moment of his Nativity, or Conception.

The REPREHENSION.

THIS *Colour* deceives, Firſt, Becauſe in many Things the firſt Inceptions are but (as *Epicurus* terms them) *Tentamenta*, that is, *Imperfect Offers*, and *Eſſays*, which vaniſh and come to nothing, without Iteration and Improvement. Wherefore, in ſuch Caſes, the ſecond Degree ſeems worthier, and more potent, than the firſt; as the Body-Horſe in the Cart, draws more than the Fore-Horſe. Hence the common Forms; *The ſecond Blow makes the Fray. The ſecond Word makes the Bargain. Alter principium dedit, alter modum abſtulit, &c. The one began, the other kept no Mean.*

ANOTHER *Reprehenſion* of this *Colour*, is in Reſpect of *Defatigation*, which makes *Perſeverance* of greater Dignity than *Inception:* For Chance or Inſtinct of Nature may

may cauſe *Inception*; but ſettled Affection, or Judgment, maketh the *Continuance*.

THIRDLY, This *Colour* is reprehended in ſuch Things, which have a natural Courſe and Inclination, contrary to an *Inception*; ſo that the firſt *Inception* is perpetually evacuated, and gets no Start, unleſs the Force be continued; as in the common Forms; *Non progredi, eſt regredi*; And *Qui non proficit, deficit*; *Not to go forward, is to go backward*, &c. As in Running againſt a Hill; In Rowing againſt the Stream. But on the other ſide, if it be with the Hill, or with the Stream; then the Degree of *Inception* is more than all the reſt.

FOURTHLY, This *Colour* is to be underſtood, Of the Degree of *Inception*, in Compariſon of the *Power* with the *Act*: Not of the Degree from the *Act* to the *Increaſe*. For otherwiſe, The Degree from *Impotency* to *Potency*, ſeems greater, than from the *Power* to the *Act*.

The COLOUR.

10. " THAT which hath Relation to " *Truth*, is greater, than that which refers to " *Opinion*. But the Meaſure and Trial of that " which belongs to Opinion, is this: *It is* " *that which a Man would not do, if he thought* " *it would not be known.* SO

SO the *Epicureans* ſay of the *Stoicks* Felicity placed in Virtue; That it is like the Felicity of a Player, who if he were left of his Auditors, and their Applauſe, would ſtrait be out of Heart and Countenance; And therefore they call Virtue a *Stage-Good.* It is otherwiſe in Riches; of which one ſaith;

Populus me ſibilat; at mihi plaudo.

LIKEWISE in Pleaſure;

——*Grata ſub imo*
Gaudia corde premens, vultu ſimulante dolorem.

The REPREHENSION.

THE Fallacy of this *Colour* is ſomewhat ſubtil; though the Anſwer to the Example alledged, be ready. For Virtue is not choſen, for the ſake of popular Applauſe; It being a Rule given, *That a Man ſhould reverence himſelf moſt of all.* So that a Good Man will be the ſame in a Deſart, that he is in the Theater; though perhaps Virtue may be more ſtrong by Glory and Fame, as Heat is doubled by Reflexion. But this denies the Suppoſition, without reprehending the Fallacy. The Reprehenſion then is this: Though it be granted, that Virtue (ſuch eſpecially as is joined with Labour and Conflict) would not be

be choſen, but for her Concomitants Praiſe and Fame; yet it follows not, that the chief Motive of the Election ſhould not be real, and for it ſelf; For Fame may be only the *Impelling* or *Urging Cauſe*, and not the *Conſtituting* or *Efficient* Cauſe. For Example; If there were two Horſes, and the one would perform better without the Spur than the other: But again, the other with the Spur would far exceed the Performance of the former, giving him the Spur alſo; the latter will be judged to be the better Horſe: And the Form of Saying, *Poh! the Life of this Horſe is but in the Spur*, will not ſerve as to a wiſe Judgment: For, ſince the ordinary Inſtrument of Horſemanſhip is the Spur, and and that it is no Matter of Impediment or Burthen, the Horſe is not to be accounted the leſs of, which will not do well without the Spur; but the other is to be reckoned rather a Delicacy, than a Virtue. So Glory and Honour are the Spurs to Virtue: And although Virtue would languiſh without them, yet ſince they are always at hand to attend Virtue, Virtue is not ſaid to be the leſs choſen for it ſelf, becauſe it needed the Spur of Fame and Reputation. And therefore that Poſition *(viz. That the Mark of a Thing choſen for Opinion, and not for Truth, is this; That one would not do it, if he thought it would not be known;)* is reprehended.

The COLOUR.

11. " THAT which is got by our own " Pains and Ability, is a greater Good; " That which comes by another Man's Cour- " teſy, or the Indulgence of Fortune, is a " leſſer Good.

THE Reaſons are theſe: Firſt, in Reſpect of *Future Hope:* Becauſe in the Favour of others, or even the good Winds of Fortune, we have no Hold or Certainty; but our own Endeavours or Abilities are always ready at hand. So that, when any Good has been procured to us this way, the ſame Inſtruments ſtill remain ready for a new Purchaſe; nay, by Cuſtom and Succeſs, render'd ſtronger and better edged. The Forms are: *You have won this by Play. You have not only the Water, but you have the Receipt. You can make it again, if it be loſt,* &c.

SECONDLY, Becauſe what we enjoy by the Benefit of others, we are alſo Debtors to others for; Whereas the other which we derive from our ſelves, carries no Load with it, being like the *Freeſt Patents, Abſq; aliquo inde reddendo.* Again, if the Divine Providence confer a Favour upon us, it demands a Kind of Retribution towards the Goodneſs of God, which ſtings ungracious and wicked Men;

Men; Whereas, in the other Kind, that of the Prophet comes to paſs: *They rejoyce and are glad, they ſacrifice unto their Net, and burn Incenſe unto their Drag.* Habac. i. 15.

THIRDLY, Becauſe that which cometh unto us, without our own Virtue, yieldeth not that Commendation and Reputation. For Actions of great Felicity, draw Wonder, but not Praiſe. As *Cicero* ſays to *Cæſar*; * *We have what we may wonder at, but expect what to praiſe.*

FOURTHLY, Becauſe the Purchaſes of our own Induſtry, are joyned commonly with Labour and Striving, which gives an Edge and Appetite; as *Solomon* ſays, *Suavis cibus a venatu*; *Veniſon is ſweet of one's own Killing.*

The Counter-Colours.

ON the other ſide, there are four *Counter-Colours* to this *Colour*, rather than *Reprehenſions*; becauſe they are as large as the *Colour* it ſelf.

FIRST, Becauſe Felicity ſeems to be a Sign and Character of the Divine Favour;

* *Pro M. Mar.*

and accordingly works both Confidence and Alacrity in our ſelves, and Reſpect and Authority from others. And this Felicity extends to Fortuitous Things, whereunto the Care and Virtue of Man cannot reach; and therefore ſeemeth to be at large *Good.* As when *Cæſar* ſaid to the Sailer, by way of Encouragement; *Thou carrieſt* Cæſar, *and his Fortune:* Had he ſaid, *Thou carrieſt* Cæſar, *and his Valour*; it had been ſmall Comfort againſt a Tempeſt; otherwiſe than if it might ſeem upon Merit, to induce Fortune.

SECONDLY, Becauſe thoſe Things, which proceed from Virtue, or Induſtry, ſeem to be done by a Kind of Habit, and Art, and are *imitable*, and open to others; whereas Felicity is a Thing *inimitable*, and the Prerogative of ſome ſingular Perſon. So we generally ſee, that Things Natural are preferr'd before Things Artificial, becauſe they are inimitable; for the Power of Imitating makes a Thing common.

THIRDLY, Thoſe Things that come from Felicity have this Recommendation, that they ſeem *Free Gifts*, whereas Things purchaſed by our own Virtue, ſeem *Pennyworths.* Whereupon *Plutarch* ſaith elegantly of the Acts of *Timoleon*, the moſt Fortunate of all Men, compared with the Acts of *Ageſilaus* and *Epaminondas*, who lived in the ſame Age: *That*

That the former were like Homer's *Verſes, they ran ſo eaſily, and ſo well.*

FOURTHLY, This ſame *Præter ſpem, vel expectatum, (when Things happen beſides Hope or Expectation)* increaſes the Price and Pleaſure of many Things. But this is not incident to thoſe Things, that proceed from our own Care and Compaſſing.

The COLOUR.

12. "THAT which conſiſts of more "Parts, and thoſe Diviſible, is Greater, and "more One, than what is made up of Fewer: For all Things when they are look'd "upon piece-meal, ſeem Greater; whence "alſo a Plurality of Parts make Shew of a "Bulk conſiderable. And a Plurality of "Parts works more ſtrongly, if they be in no "certain Order; for it then reſembles an "Infinity, and hinders the Comprehending "of them.

THIS *Colour* ſeems a palpable Fallacy, even at firſt Sight; for it is not Plurality of Parts, without Majority of Parts, that maketh the Total greater; yet nevertheleſs it often carries the Imagination away; yea, it deceiveth the Senſe. For it ſeemeth to the Eye a ſhorter Diſtance of Way, if it be all dead and continued, than if it have Trees, or Build-

ings, or any other Marks, whereby the Eye may divide it. So when a great Money'd Man hath divided his Cheſts, and Coins, and Bags, he ſeemeth to himſelf Richer than he was. And therefore the way to amplify any Thing is to break it, and to make Anatomy of it in ſeveral Parts, and to examin it according to ſeveral Circumſtances. And this maketh the greater Shew, if it be done without Order: For Confuſion begets an Opinion of Multitude. And beſides, what is ſet down by Order and Diviſion, doth demonſtrate, that nothing is left out or omitted; but all is there: Whereas if it be without Order, both the Mind comprehendeth leſs that which is ſet down; and beſides it leaveth a Suſpicion, as if more might be ſaid than is expreſs'd.

The REPREHENSION.

THIS *Colour* deceives; Firſt, When the Mind of him that is to be perſuaded, overconceives or prejudges of the Greatneſs of any Thing; for then the Breaking of it will make it ſeem leſs, and rectify that falſe Opinion, and preſent the Object in its natural Truth, and without Amplification. Wherefore if a Man be in Sickneſs or in Pain, the Time will ſeem longer to him without a Clock, or an Hour-Glaſs, than if it were meaſured with them: For if the Tediouſneſs and Vexation of a Diſeaſe, make the Time ſeem longer

longer than in Truth it is; yet the Computation of Time reforms that Miſtake, and makes it ſhorter than that erroneous Opinion conceiv'd it to be. So in a dead Plain (contrary to what was ſaid juſt now) it ſometimes falls out; for though at firſt the Eye preconceiv'd the Way ſhorter, becauſe it was undivided; yet if upon this Suppoſition, an Opinion poſſeſs the Imagination of a far ſhorter Space of Ground than it proves to be, the Fruſtrating of that falſe Conceit, will make it ſeem longer than the Truth. Therefore if any Man deſire to humour and ſecond the falſe Opinion of another, touching the Greatneſs of any Thing, let him beware of Diſtributions, and breaking it into ſeveral Conſiderations, but let him out of Hand extol the Matter entire, and in the groſs.

SECONDLY, This *Colour* deceives, when the Matter broken, or divided, is diſtracted or ſcattered, and not preſented entire and at one View to the Eye. Therefore an Hundred Pounds in Heaps of Five Pounds will ſhew more than in one groſs Heap; ſo the Heaps be all upon one Table to be ſeen at once; otherwiſe not. Thus Flowers, growing ſcattered in divers Beds, will ſhew more than if they were all growing in one Bed; ſo the Beds be within a Plot, that they may be the Object of View at once; otherwiſe Union is of more Force than ſcattered Diſtribution.

Therefore Their Revenues seem greater, whose Lands lie together in one Shire; for if they were dispersed, they would not fall so easily within Notice and Comprehension.

THIRDLY, This *Colour* deceives in Respect of the Dignity of Unity above Multitude. For all Composition is a certain Mark of Indigence and Deficiency in the Particulars; because if one Thing would serve the Turn, it were ever best; but it is the Defect and Imperfection of Things that hath brought in that Help to piece one Thing with the Addition of another.

THEREFORE *Mary* had chosen the better Part. *Martha, Martha, thou art troubled about many Things; but One Thing is sufficient. Luke* x. 41. Hereupon *Æsop* framed the Fable of the Fox and the Cat: Wherein the Fox bragged, what a Number of Shifts and Devices he had, to get from the Hounds; and the Cat said, He had but one, which was to climb a Tree; which in Proof was better worth than all the rest; whence the Proverb;

Multa novit Vulpes, sed Felis unum magnum.

Reynard the Hounds to 'scape, had Shifts not small,
Grimalkin only one as good as all.

AND

AND in the Moral of this Fable, it comes likewiſe to paſs, That *a good ſure Friend is a better Help at a Pinch, than all the Stratagems and Policies of a Man's own Wit.* So it falleth out to be a common Error in Negotiating; when Men have many Reaſons to induce or perſuade, they ſtrive commonly to utter, and uſe them all at once, which weakens them. For it argueth, as was ſaid, a Needineſs in every of the Reaſons by it ſelf, as if one did not truſt to any of them, but fled from one to another, helping himſelf with That,

Et quæ non proſunt ſingula, multa juvant.

And what help'd not *Alone* before,
Doth help full well, when joyn'd with *More.*

Indeed in a ſet Speech in an Aſſembly, it is expected, a Man ſhould uſe all his Reaſons in the Caſe he handleth: But in private Perſuaſions, it is always a great Error.

A Fourth Caſe, wherein this *Colour* may be reprehended, is, in Reſpect of that ſame *Vis unita fortior*; *The acknowledg'd Strength of an united Power*; according to the Tale of the *French King*, who, when the *Emperor's Embaſſador* had recited his Maſter's Style at large, which conſiſteth of many Countries

and

and Dominions; the *French King* willed his *Chancellor*, or other *Miniſter*, to repeat *France* as many Times as the other had recited the ſeveral *Dominions*; meaning it was equivalent to them all, and more *compacted* and *united.*

THERE is alſo appertaining to this *Colour* another Point, Why Breaking of a Thing doth help it; not by way of adding a Shew of Magnitude unto it, but a Note of Excellency and Rarity: Whereof the Forms are; *Where ſhall you find ſuch a Concurrence? Great, but not Compleat:* For it ſeems a leſs Work of Nature or Fortune, to make any Thing in his Kind *greater than ordinary*, than to make a *ſtrange* Compoſition. Yet, if it be narrowly conſidered, this *Colour* will be reprehended, or encounter'd, by imputing to all Excellencies in Compoſitions a Kind of Poverty, or at leaſt a Caſualty, or Jeopardy: For from that, which is excellent in *Greatneſs*, ſomewhat may be taken, or there may be a Decay, and yet ſufficiently left; but from that which hath his Price in *Compoſition*, if you take away any Thing, or any Part do fail, all is Diſgrace. Thus much of *Popular Marks*, or of the *Colours* of *Good* and *Evil* in *Appearance*, as well *Simple* as *Comparative.*

A Second Collection, which appertains to the Promptuary Part, is that, which *Cicero* hints; when he gives it in Precept, That we ſhould have in Readineſs *Common Places*, argued *Pro* and *Con*; ſuch as, *For the Words of the Law*, and *For the Senſe of the Law*, &c. But we extend this Precept to other Things alſo, applying it not only to the *Judicial* Kind, but to the *Deliberative* and *Demonſtrative* alſo. And in our Opinion, the Manner of this Collection as well for Uſe as Brevity, would be the beſt, if ſuch *Places* were caſt up into ſome brief and acute Sentences, as into Skains or Bottoms of Thread to be drawn out, and unwinded into larger Diſcourſes, as Occaſion ſerves. Of this ſort (having a great many ready prepared) we have thought good to lay down ſome for a Pattern. Theſe we call *Antitheta Rerum.*

Examples

Examples of the *Antitheta.*

Nobility. I.

Pro.

THEY whoſe Virtue is deeply implanted in them from the Stock; theſe have not only no Will, but not ſo much as a Power to be wicked.

NOBILITY is a Garland of Bays, wherewith TIME crowns Men.

WE reverence Antiquity even in dead Monuments; How much more in Living?

IF you deſpiſe the Nobility of Families;

Contra.

NOBILITY ſeldom ſprings from Virtue; Virtue more ſeldom from Nobility.

NOBLEMEN oftner uſe the Interceſſion of their Anceſtors for Pardon, than their Suffrage for Honours.

THE Induſtry of new Riſing Men uſes to be ſo great, that Noblemen, in Compariſon of them, ſeem as Statues.

NOBLEMEN look too often back in the Courſe;

Pro.	*Con.*
lies; What Difference will there be between the Race of Men, and that of Beasts?	Course; which is the Quality of an ill Racer.
NOBILITY withdraws Virtue from Envy, and recommends it to Grace and Favour.	

Beauty. II.

Pro.	*Con.*
DEFORMED Persons are usually reveng'd of Nature.	VIRTUE, like a rich Jewel, is best set without much Gold and Ornament.
AS Virtue is nothing else but an Inward Beauty; so is Beauty nothing else but an Outward Virtue.	WHAT a fair Vestment is to a deform'd Person, the same is Beauty to an ill Man.
DEFORMED Persons seek to rescue them-	THEY are for the most part equally light,

Pro.

themſelves from Scorn by a natural Malice.

BEAUTY makes Virtues ſhine, Vices bluſh.

Con.

light, both thoſe whom Beauty adorns, and whom it moves.

Youth. III.

Pro.

OUR firſt Thoughts, and the Counſels of Youth, are more Divine.

OLD Men are more wiſe for themſelves, than they are for others, and the Republick.

IF it could be made viſible, Old Age doth more deform the Mind than the Body.

OLD Men fear all Things, but the Gods.

Con.

YOUTH is the Field of Repentance.

THERE is in Youth an inbred Contempt of the Authority of Age; that every one may grow wiſe at his own Peril.

Health.

Health. IV.

Pro.

A ſound Body is the Soul's Hoſt; a ſickly Body, her Gaoler.

NOTHING ſo promotes the Sum of Buſineſs, as a proſperous State of Body; on the contrary, a ſickly Conſtitution, makes too many Holy-days.

Con.

THE Excuſe of Indiſpoſition is of much and frequent Uſe; to which we fly even when we are well.

HEALTH unites the Soul and the Body in too ſtrict a League.

BOTH the Couch hath govern'd mighty Empires; and the Litter mighty Armies.

Wife and Children. V.

Pro.

CHARITY to the Common-wealth begins

Con.

HE that hath Wife and Children, hath

Pro.	*Con.*
gins at a private Family.	hath given Hostages to Fortune.
WIFE and Children are a Kind of Discipline of Humanity; but unmarried Men are froward and cruel.	GENERATION and Issue are Human Acts; Creation, and Works, are Acts Divine.
SINGLE Life and a Childless State are good for nothing but for Flight.	ISSUE is the Eternity of Beasts; Fame, Merits, Rules, and Ordinances, the Eternity of Men.
HE sacrifices to Death, that procreates no Children.	ŒCONOMICAL Respects many Times supplant Publick ones.
THEY that are happy in other Respects, are commonly unfortunate in their Children; lest being Men they should approach too near to a Condition Divine.	SOME Persons have liked the Fortune of *Priam*, who surviv'd his whole Posterity.

Riches

Riches. VI.

Pro.

THEY deſpiſe Riches, that deſpair of them.

AN Envy conceiv'd againſt Riches hath made Virtue a Goddeſs.

WHILST the Philoſophers are diſputing, whether all Things ought to be referr'd to Virtue or Pleaſure; Gather you the Inſtruments of both.

OTHER Goods have a Provincial Command; Riches only, a General one.

Con.

OF great Riches there is either a Cuſtody, or a Diſtribution, or a Fame from them, but no ſolid Uſe to the Owner.

DO you not ſee what feigned Prices are ſet upon little Stones, and other Curioſities, that there may ſeem to be ſome Uſe of great Riches?

I cannot call Riches better than the Baggage of Virtue; for they are both neceſſary, and cumberſome to Virtue.

RICHES are a good Handmaid, but the worſt Miſtreſs.

Honours. VII.

Pro.

HONOURS make both Virtues and Vices conſpicuous; therefore Thoſe they Provoke, Theſe they Check.

NO Man can tell what Proficience he hath made in the Race of Virtue; unleſs Honours afford him an open Field.

THE Motion of Virtue, as of other Things, is violent to its Place, calm in its Place: And the proper Place of Virtue is Honour.

Con.

WHILST we ſeek Honours, we loſe Liberty.

HONOURS commonly give Men a Power to do thoſe Things, wherein the beſt Condition is, not to Will; the next, not to be Able.

THE Aſcent to Honours is ſteep, the Standing ſlippery, the Regreſs a Downfall.

MEN in great Place had need borrow the Opinion of the Common People, to think themſelves Happy.

Empire.

Empire. VIII.

Pro.

TO enjoy Happineſs, is a great Bleſſing; but to be able to impart it to others, is ſtill a greater.

KINGS are more like Stars than Men: For they have a great Influence, both upon particular Perſons, and upon Times themſelves.

TO reſiſt God's Vicegerents, is not only the Crime of Treaſon, but a Kind of Theomachy.

Con.

WHAT a miſerable State is it, to have few Things to deſire, and infinite Things to fear?

PRINCES are like Heavenly Bodies, which have much Veneration, but no Reſt.

Praiſe, Reputation. IX.

Pro.

PRAISES are the reflexed Beams of Virtue.

PRAISE is that Honour which we arrive at by Free Voices.

THE Voice of the People hath ſomething of Divinity in it; elſe how ſhould ſo many Men agree to be of one Mind?

Con.

FAME is a worſe Judge, than a Meſſenger.

WHAT has a good Man to do with the *Saliva* of the Mob?

FAME, like a River, bears up Things light and ſwoln; but drowns Things weighty and ſolid.

THE Common People praiſe the Loweſt Virtues, admire the Middle, but have no Notion of the Higheſt.

PRAISE is the Effect of Oſtentation more than Merit; and is the Portion of the

Con.

the Windy more than of the Solid and Subſtantial.

Nature. X.

Pro.

CUSTOM againſt Nature, is a Kind of Tyranny; and quickly, and upon light Occaſion, falls to the Ground.

Con.

WE Think according to Nature; We Talk according to Rule; but We Act according to Cuſtom.

Fortune. XI.

Pro.

FORTUNE is to be honoured and reſpected, if it be but for her Daughters, Confidence, and Authority.

Con.

THE Folly of one Man is the Fortune of another.

Life. XII.

Pro.

IT is abſurd to love the Accidents of Life, more than Life it ſelf.

A full Courſe of Life is better than a ſhort one, in Order to all Things, yea even Virtue.

WITHOUT a good Compaſs of Life, we can neither Accompliſh, nor Learn throughly, nor Repent.

Con.

THE Philoſophers, by making ſuch mighty Preparations againſt Death, have made it more terrible.

MEN fear Death, becauſe they do not know it, as Children fear to go in the Dark.

YOU can find no Paſſion in the Mind of Man ſo weak, but, if it be a little preſt, it maſters the Fear of Death.

A Man would die, though he were neither Valiant nor Miſerable, only upon a Wearineſs of doing the ſame Things over and over again.

Superſtition.

Superſtition. XIII.

Pro.

THOSE that Err out of Zeal, are not to be approved, but may be loved.

MEDIOCRITIES are due to Moral Matters; Extremes to Divine.

I had rather believe all the Fables in the *Legend*, and the *Talmud*, and the *Alcoran*, than that this Univerſal Frame is without a Supreme Being.

Con.

AS it adds Deformity to an Ape, to be ſo like a Man; ſo the Similitude of Superſtition to Religion, makes it the more deform'd.

LOOK how odious Affectation is in Matters Civil; ſo hateful is Superſtition, in Matters Divine.

IT were better to have no Belief of a Deity at all, than ſuch an one as is reproachful to Him.

Pride. XIV.

Pro.

PRIDE is incompatible even with Vi-

Con.

PRIDE is the Ivy of Virtues, and

Pro.

Vices: And as Poyſon is expelled by Poyſon, ſo are many Vices by Pride.

AN Eaſy Nature is liable even to the Vices of others; but a Proud Spirit, to his own only.

PRIDE, if it riſe from Contempt of others, to a Contempt of it ſelf, will at laſt be chang'd into Philoſophy.

Con.

of all good Qualities.

PRIDE wants the beſt Condition of Vices, that is, Concealment.

Ingratitude. XV.

Pro.

THE Crime of Ingratitude is nothing elſe but a piercing Diſcernment of the Cauſe of the Benefit conferr'd.

Con.

THE Obligations of Benefits are more ſtrict than of Duties; Wherefore he that is ungrateful, is unjuſt, and all Things.

WHILST

Pro.

WHILST we endeavour to be grateful to ſome, we neither do Juſtice to others, nor reſerve Liberty to our ſelves.

THE Requital of a Kindneſs is the leſs to be made; becauſe the Value of it is uncertain.

Envy. XVI.

Pro.

IT is natural for a Man to hate what upbraids him with his own Fortune.

ENVY in States is a Kind of wholeſome Oſtraciſm.

Con.

ENVY makes no Holy-Days.

NOTHING but Death can reconcile Envy to Virtue.

ENVY exerciſes Virtue with Labours, as *Juno* did *Hercules.*

Incon-

Incontinence. XVII.

Pro.

CHASTITY may thank Jealouſy that She is become a Virtue.

OF Loves, as of Wild Fowl, there is Property; but the Right is made over with the Poſſeſſion.

Con.

UNCHASTITY is *Circe*'s worſt Tranſformation.

AN unchaſte Liver has utterly loſt the Reverence of himſelf; which is the Bridle of all Vices.

ALL with *Paris*, that make Beauty their Choice, forfeit Wiſdom and Power.

ALEXANDER happen'd upon no Vulgar Truth, when he ſaid, That Sleep and Luſt were the Earneſts of Death.

Cruelty.

Cruelty. XVIII.

Pro.

NO Virtue is ſo often guilty as Clemency.

CRUELTY, if it proceed from Revenge, is Juſtice; if from Danger, Wiſdom.

HE that ſhews Mercy to his Enemy, denies it to himſelf.

PHLEBOTOMY is not more neceſſary in the Natural Body, than in the Politick.

Con.

TO delight in Blood is the part either of a Beaſt, or of a Fury.

CRUELTY to a good Man ſeems Fabulous, and a Tragical Fiction.

Vain-Glory. XIX.

Pro.

HE that is ſo ſtaunch, as to regard nothing that is Foreign, it may be feared

Con.

VAIN-glorious Perſons are always Factious, Liars, Inconſtant, Over-doing.

THRASO

Pro.

ed that he will account Publick Matters Foreign.

DISPOSITIONS that have something vain in them, more easily undertake the Charge of the Publick.

Con.

THRASO is *Gnatho's* Prey.

IT is a Shame for a Lover to make Suit to the Hand-maid: And Praise is Virtue's Hand-maid.

Justice. XX.

Pro.

WE are beholden to Justice, That Man is to Man a God, and not a Wolf.

JUSTICE, though it cannot extirpate Vice, yet it keepeth it from doing Hurt.

Con.

IF we must give every one his Due, then surely Pardon to Humanity.

Fortitude. XXI.

Pro.

NOTHING is terrible but Fear it ſelf.

THERE is nothing either ſolid in Pleaſure, or ſecured in Virtue, where Fear infeſts.

HE that confronts Dangers with open Eyes, that he may receive them, marks alſo how to avoid them.

OTHER Virtues free us from the Dominion of Vice; Fortitude alone from the Dominion of Fortune.

Con.

THAT's a goodly Virtue to be ſure, to be willing to die, that you may deſtroy.

THAT's a noble Virtue ſure, which even Drunkenneſs gives.

HE that is prodigal of his own Life, is a dangerous Man to that of another's.

FORTITUDE is a Virtue of the Iron Age.

Temperance. XXII.

Pro.

TO *Abſtain* and to *Suſtain*, are in effect the ſame Ability.

UNIFORMITIES, Concords, and Meaſures of Motions, are Things Celeſtial, and the Characters of Eternity.

TEMPERANCE, like wholeſome Colds, concentrates and ſtrengthens the Force of the Mind.

Con.

THAT Mind languiſhes, that is not ſpirited by Exceſs.

I love thoſe Virtues which induce Vivacity of Action, not Dullneſs of Paſſion.

Conſtancy. XXIII.

Pro.

CONSTANCY is the Baſis of all Virtues.

HE

Con.

CONSTANCY, like a ſurly moroſe Portreſs, turns away many uſeful Informations.

THERE

Pro.

HE is a miſerable Man, that does not know, what he ſhall or may be.

CONSTANCY gives a Gracefulneſs even to Vice.

IF to the Inconſtancy of Fortune, Inconſtancy of Mind alſo be added, in what a Darkneſs do we live?

FORTUNE, like *Proteus*, if you perſevere, returns to her true Shape.

Pro.

THERE is good Reaſon, that Conſtancy ſhould patiently endure Croſſes, for ſhe commonly brings them.

THE ſhorteſt Folly is the beſt.

Magnanimity. XXIV.

Pro.

WHEN once the Mind has made Choice of Noble Ends, it is immediately ſurrounded and guarded not

Con.

MAGNANIMITY is a Poetical Virtue.

Pro.

not only by the Virtues, but by the Deities.

Knowledge, Contemplation. XXV.

Pro.

THAT Pleaſure, when all is done, is according to Nature, whereof there is no Satiety.

THE ſweeteſt Proſpect is that which looks upon the Errors of others, in the Vale below.

Con.

CONTEMPLATION is a ſpecious Sloth.

GOOD Thoughts are not much better than good Dreams.

GOD takes Care of the World; Take thou Care of thy Country.

Learning. XXVI.

Pro.

IF there were Books written about Minute Matters, there would

Con.

IN Univerſities they learn to believe.

WHAT

Pro.	*Con.*
would ſcarce be any Uſe of Experience.	WHAT Art ever taught the ſeaſonable Uſe of Art?
READING is a Converſe with the Wiſe; Action for the moſt part, with Fools.	TO be wiſe by Rule, and by Experience, are perfectly oppoſite Methods; ſo that he that is accuſtomed to the One, is unfit for the Other.
SCIENCES are not to be accounted uſeleſs, that are of no Uſe in themſelves, if they ſharpen and marſhal the Wit.	THERE is many Times an impertinent Uſe of Art, leſt there ſhould be no Uſe at all of it.
	THIS is the way generally of all Academicks, to Acknowledge what they Know of any thing, and not to Learn what they do not Know.

Readineſs. XXVII.

Pro.

THAT is no opportune Wiſdom, that is not quick and nimble.

HE that is wiſe upon Deliberation, and not upon preſent Occaſion, performs nothing Great.

Con.

THAT Wiſdom is not far fetcht, nor deep, which is ready at hand.

WHAT is invented in a ſhort time, pleaſes but for a ſhort time.

Silence in Matters of Secrecy. XXVIII.

Pro.

FROM a ſilent Man nothing is concealed; becauſe all Things are ſafely communicated.

HE that eaſily Talks what he Knows, Talks alſo what he Knows not.

EVEN

Con.

SECRECY is the Virtue of a Confeſſor.

FROM a ſecret Man all things are conceal'd; becauſe Silence is repaid.

A cloſe Man is next a-kin to an unknown Man.

Pro.

EVEN Myſteries are due to the Secret.

Facility. XXIX.

Pro.

I like a Man that is pliant to another's Inclination, but yet keeps his Judgment from Obſequiouſneſs.

HE that is flexible comes neareſt to the Nature of Gold.

Con.

FACILITY is an inept Privation of Judgment.

HE owes the Thanks to himſelf, that obtains any thing of an eaſy Man.

AN eaſy Man is preſs'd with all Difficulties; for he engages in all.

AN eaſy Man commonly comes off with Diſcredit.

Popularity. XXX.

Pro.

THE ſame things commonly pleaſe wiſe Men, but to humour the Changeableneſs of Fools, is a Point of Wiſdom.

TO Honour the People, is to be Honoured.

THEY who themſelves are great Men, have no one Perſon generally to fear, but the People.

Con.

HE that ſorts well with Fools, may himſelf be ſuſpected.

HE that pleaſes the Mob, is commonly a Raiſer of the Mob.

NOTHING moderate pleaſes the Common People.

FLATTERY of the People, is the loweſt Degree of Flattery.

Loquacity. XXXI.

Pro.

HE that is ſilent, is either jealous of others, or of himſelf.

ALL

Con.

SILENCE adds both Grace and Authority to a Man's Words.

SI-

Pro.

ALL Reſtraints are miſerable, but that of the Tongue moſt ſo.

SILENCE is the Virtue of Fools: Therefore He ſaid well to a ſilent Man: *If you are wiſe, you are a Fool; if you are a Fool, you are wiſe.*

Con.

SILENCE, like a kind of Sleep, refreſhes and nouriſhes Wiſdom.

SILENCE is the Fermentation of our Thoughts.

SILENCE is the Candidate of Truth.

Diſſimulation. XXXII.

Pro.

DISSIMULATION is a Compendious Wiſdom.

NAKEDNESS even in the Mind is uncomely.

DISSIMULATION is both a Grace and a Guard.

DIS-

Con.

THOUGH we are not able to Think according to the Truth of things; yet at leaſt let us ſpeak according to our Thoughts.

THOSE that have not a Capacity for the Arts of State, make Uſe of Diſſimulation inſtead of Wiſdom.

Pro.

DISSIMULATION is the Fence of Counſels.

HE that carries all things with an undiſſembled Openneſs, equally deceives: For many either do not take him, or do not believe him.

OPEN Dealing is nothing but a Weakneſs of Mind.

Con.

THE Diſſembler deprives himſelf of the principal Inſtrument for Action; which is Belief.

DISSIMULATION invites Diſſimulation.

THE Diſſembler is a Slave.

Boldneſs. XXXIII.

Pro.

WHAT Action is to an Orator, the ſame is Boldneſs to a Politician; the Firſt, the Second, the Third.

Con.

IMPUDENCE is good for nothing, but Impoſture.

CONFIDENCE is the Fool's Empreſs, and the Wiſe Man's Buffoon.

Cere-

Ceremonies, Puntoes, Affectation. XXXIV.

Pro.

A decent Management of Countenance and Geſture, is the true Seaſoning of Virtue.

HE that does not keep a Decorum in ſmall Matters, and in his daily Cuſtoms, though he be a great Man, yet be aſſured, that ſuch a Perſon is wiſe only at certain Hours.

VIRTUE and Wiſdom without Puntoes, are like Foreign Languages; for they are commonly not underſtood.

Con.

WHAT can be a more deform'd Spectacle, than to transfer the Stage into Life?

BETTER a Painted Face, and Curled Hair, than a Painted and Curled Behaviour.

HE that breaks his Mind to ſuch ſmall Obſervances, can never be capable of great Thoughts.

AFFECTATION is the ſhining Putrefaction of Gentility.

Jeſts. XXXV.

Pro.

A Jeſt is the Altar of Orators.

HE that mingles a modeſt Facetiouſneſs in all his Diſcourſe, retains Liberty of Mind.

IT is a thing more Politick than a Man would imagine; eaſily to paſs from Jeſt to Earneſt, and from Earneſt to Jeſt.

A Jeſt is many times a Vehicle of Truth, which otherwiſe would not arrive.

Con.

THOSE Hunters of Deformities and Concinnities, what Man would not deſpiſe?

TO ſlur off Buſineſs of Importance with a Jeſt, is a wicked Artifice.

THEN judge of a Jeſt, when you have done laughing.

YOUR merry facetious Men ſeldom penetrate farther than the Superficies of Things; which is the very Seat of a Jeſt.

Love.

Love. XXXVI.

Pro.

DO you not ſee that all Men ſeek themſelves? But the Lover only finds himſelf.

THERE is no better Ordering of the Mind, than from the Power of ſome predominant Affection.

HE that is wiſe, let him look out for ſome Deſire; for he that does not affect ſome one thing more than ordinary, to him all things are diſtaſteful and tedious.

Con.

THE Stage is much beholden to Love, Life not at all.

I hate thoſe Monophrontiſts.

LOVE is a very narrow Contemplation.

Friend-

Friendſhip. XXXVII.

Pro.

FRIENDSHIP does the ſame things that Fortitude doth, but more ſweetly.

FRIENDSHIP is a pleaſant Sauce to all good things.

IT is the worſt ſort of Solitude, to be deſtitute of true Friends.

IT is a juſt Puniſhment of Falſe-heartedneſs, to be deprived of Friends.

Con.

HE that contracts ſtrict Leagues of Friendſhip, impoſes upon himſelf new Bonds and Engagements.

Flattery.

Flattery. XXXVIII.

Pro.

FLATTERY proceeds more from Cuſtom, than Malice.

BY Praiſing to Inſtruct, was ever a Form due to great Perſons.

Con.

FLATTERY is the Cement of Vices.

FLATTERY is that Kind of Fowling, which deceives Birds by Reſemblance of Voice.

THE Deformity of Flattery is Comical, the Damage Tragical.

Revenge. XXXIX.

Pro.

PRIVATE Revenge is a Kind of wild Juſtice.

HE that returns Wrong for Wrong, offends againſt the Law

Con.

HE that does a Wrong, is the Beginner of a Quarrel; but he that Retaliates, takes away all Means of ending it.

RE-

Pro.

Law only, not the Perſon.

THE Fear of private Revenge is uſeful; for Laws too often ſleep.

Con.

REVENGE, by how much the more natural, by ſo much the more is it to be repreſs'd.

HE that is apt to return an Injury, is behind-hand perhaps in Time, not in Will.

Innovation. XL.

Pro.

EVERY Medicine is an Innovation.

HE that flies new Remedies, muſt expect new Diſeaſes.

TIME is the greateſt Innovator: Why then may we not imitate Time?

SEEING things of themſelves change to the

Con.

NEW Births are deformed Things.

ALL Novelty is injurious; for it deſtroys the preſent Things.

THOSE Things which have obtained by Uſe, if they are not good, at leaſt they are conformable and agree well together.

WHAT

Pro.

the worſe, if they be not by Counſel changed to the better, what will be the End of Evil?

A moroſe Retention of Cuſtoms, is as turbulent a thing as Innovation.

Con.

WHAT Innovator imitates Time; which inſinuates Innovations in ſuch manner, that they are not perceiv'd?

Delay. XLI.

Pro.

FORTUNE ſells many things to the Haſty, which ſhe gives to the Slow.

WHILST we are in haſte to embrace the Beginnings of things, we claſp Shadows.

THE Beginnings of Actions ſhould be com-

Con.

OCCASION offers the Handle of the Bottle firſt, then the Belly.

OCCASION, like *Sibylla*, diminiſhes the thing offered, and then encreaſes the Price.

Pro.

mitted to *Argus*, the Ends to *Briarcus*.

Preparation. XLII.

Pro.

WITH ſlender Proviſion we buy Wit, not Fortune.

Con.

LET no Man think to fetter Fortune by his Preparation.

GREAT Preparation is a Prodigal both of Time and Buſineſs.

To withſtand Beginnings. XLIII.

Pro.

IT is leſs Trouble to prevent a Danger, than to obſerve and watch the Progreſs of it.

A Danger is no more light, if it ſeem light.

Con.

HE teaches a Danger to advance, who buckles againſt it, and fixes it by a Remedy.

Violent

Violent Counſels. XLIV.

Pro.	*Con.*
THAT Neceſſity which reſolves upon violent Meaſures, commonly goes through with them.	EVERY violent Remedy is pregnant of a new Evil.
	NONE gives violent Counſels, but Anger and Fear.

Suſpicion. XLV.

Pro.	*Con.*
THAT Man's Integrity is juſtly ſuſpected, which Suſpicion weakens.	SUSPICION breaks the Bond of Faith.

The Words of Law. XLVI.

Pro.	*Con.*
IT is no Expoſition, but a Divination, which recedes from the Letter.	OUT of all the Words ſuch a Senſe is to be drawn out, as may expound the particular Words:
WHERE	

Pro.

WHERE there is a Departure from the Letter, the Judge of an Interpreter becomes a Law-giver.

For Witneſſes againſt Arguments. XLVII.

Pro.

HE that relies upon Arguments, pronounces according to the Pleader, not according to the Cauſe.

Con.

IF Witneſſes are to be believ'd againſt Proofs from Reaſon, it is ſufficient for the Judge only not to be Deaf.

ARGUMENTS are an Antidote againſt the Poyſon of Teſtimonies.

AND theſe *Antitheta* (which we have propounded) are perhaps not very valuable; however, as they were prepared and collected by us long ago, we were loth the Diligence of our Youth ſhould periſh; eſpecially ſince they are (if a Man conſider well) *Seeds*, not *Flowers*.

Flowers. But herein they plainly breath Youth, in that they abound in the *Moral*, or *Demonſtrative* Kind; and are ſo thin and ſparing in the *Deliberative* and *Judicial.*

Formulæ Minores.

A Third *Collection* which pertains to *Proviſion*, or *Preparatory Store*, is that which we think fit to call *Formulæ Minores*, *Leſſer Forms* or *Stiles of Speech.* And theſe are as it were the Porches, the Poſtern-Doors, the Ante-Rooms, the Back Rooms, the Paſſages, *&c.* of Speech; which may indifferently ſerve for all Subjects; As *Preface*, *Concluſion*, *Digreſſion*, *Tranſition*, *Excuſation*, &c. For as in Buildings there is great Pleaſure and Uſe in the well-caſting of the Frontiſpieces, Stair-Caſes, Doors, Windows, Entries, Paſſages, and the like; ſo in Speech, the Conveyances and Paſſages (if they be decently and skilfully contrived and placed) are of ſpecial Ornament and Effect to the whole Structure. Of theſe *Formulæ* we will propoſe an Example or two, and ſtay no longer upon them. For though they be Matters of no ſmall Uſe, yet becauſe we add nothing herein of our own, but tranſcribe the naked Forms only, out of *Demoſthenes*, or *Cicero*, or ſome other ſelect Author,

they ſeem too mean a Buſineſs to waſte Time upon.

Examples of Minor Forms.

A Concluſion of a deliberative Speech.

" SO we may both redeem the Faults " paſt, and with one and the ſame Trouble " prevent the Inconveniences future.

The Corollary of an accurate Partition.

" THAT all may ſee, that I intended " not to balk any thing by Silence, or to " cloud any thing by Words.

A Tranſition with a Caveat.

" BUT let us ſo paſs by theſe things, as " to leave them with a Retroſpect how- " ever.

A Preoccupation againſt an inveterate Opinion.

" I ſhall ſo order the Matter, as that you " may underſtand in the whole Cauſe, what " the Nature of the thing ſuggeſted, what " Miſtake hath added, and what Envy hath " raiſed.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Critical and Pedantical Knowledge.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 6. Cap. 4.

HERE remain two General Appendages touching the Tradition of Knowledge; The one *Critical*; The other *Pedantical*. For as the principal Part of Tradition of Knowledge consists in Writing of Books; so the Relative Part thereof consists in Reading of Books: Now Reading is governed and directed by Masters and Teachers, or perfected by every Man's particular Industry; And to this purpose serve the two Knowledges men-

mentioned, whereunto appertain incidently these Considerations.

TO the *Critical* Part appertain, First an exact Correction, and true Edition of approved Authors; whereby both the Honour of Authors themselves is vindicated, and a Light given to the Studious. Wherein, nevertheless, the rash Diligence of some Men hath done great Prejudice to Studies. For it is the Manner of many Criticks, when they meet with a Passage they do not understand, presently to presume it a Fault in the Copy; As the Priest, that, where he found it written of St. *Paul*, *Demissus est per Sportam*, mended his Book, and made it, *Demissus est per Portam*, because *Sporta* was an hard Word, and out of his Reading; and surely their Errors, tho' they are not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of the same Kind; as in that Passage of *Tacitus:* When a certain Colony claim'd *the Privilege of the Sanctuary* in the Senate, *Tacitus* reports, that what they alledg'd was not favourably receiv'd by the Emperor and the Senate: Upon which the Embassadors distrusting their Cause, gave *Titus Vinius* a round Sum of Money to maintain their Suit; and by this means the Thing was granted. *Then* (says *Tacitus*) *the Dignity and Antiquity of the Colony prevailed:* As if the Arguments, that seemed light before, receiv'd *then* a new Weight by the Addition of a Bribe. Here a

certain Critick, none of the meaneſt, expunges the Word *Tum*, and inſtead thereof reſtores *Tantúm*. And by this perverſe Cuſtom of Criticks, it hath come to paſs, (as one wiſely noted) *That the moſt Corrected Copies are commonly leaſt Correct.* And indeed, to ſpeak Truth, unleſs the Criticks be well skill'd in the Knowledges handled in the Books they put out, their Diligence is not without Danger.

SECONDLY, There belong to the *Critical Art*, the *Interpretation* and *Expoſition* of *Authors*, *Commentaries*, *Scholia's*, *Notes*, *Spicilegies*, and the like. And in Labours of this Kind, that ſcurvy (as I may call it) Diſeaſe of Criticks hath ſeiz'd many, of paſſing over moſt of the obſcurer Paſſages, and dwelling and expatiating even to Nauſeouſneſs upon things that are plain and perſpicuous. For the thing intended is not ſo much to illuſtrate the Author, as that the Critick himſelf upon every Occaſion may ſhew his manifold Learning, and various Reading. It were much to be wiſh'd, that the Writer that handles obſcure and noble Arguments, would annex his own Explications; that neither the Text it ſelf may be broken off by Digreſſions or Explanation; and that the Notes may not depart from the Mind and Intention of the Writer. Some ſuch thing we ſuſpect of *Theon* upon *Euclid*.

THE

THE Third is concerning the Times, which in many Cases give great Light to true Interpretations.

THE Fourth is concerning the Syntax and Disposition of Studies, that Men may know in what Order or Pursuit to Read.

FIFTHLY, It belongs to the Art *Critical* (from whence also it had its Name) to interpose some brief Censure and Judgment of the Authors they publish; and to compare them with other Writers that handle the same Subjects; to the end that by such a Censure Students may be both advertis'd of the Choice of Books, and come better provided to the Perusal of them. And this last Part is as it were the Chair of the *Criticks*, which certainly has been ennobled by some Great Men in our Age, Greater surely in my Judgment, than for the Model of *Criticks*.

FOR *Pedantical* Knowledge, it contains that Difference of *Tradition*, which is proper for Youth: In which Point it were soon said, *Consult the Schools of the Jesuits*; for nothing that has come into Use and Practice, can be better than they are. However, we will, according to our Fashion, suggest a few Things after the Manner of Gleaners. We do by all means approve a Collegiate Education of

Childhood and Youth; not in private Houses; not under Schoolmasters only. In Colleges there is a greater Emulation towards their Equals; besides, there's the Countenance and Aspect of Grave Men, which very thing contributes to Modesty, and fashions tender Minds even from the Beginning to a Pattern: In fine, there are Advantages in abundance of a Collegiate Education.

FOR the Order and Manner of Discipline, this I would principally advise; that they beware of Abridgments, and too great Forwarding in Learning, which renders Wits bold and confident; and makes rather a Shew of great Proficience, than effects it.

FURTHERMORE, some Indulgence should be given to the Liberty of Wits, so that if any one performs the Tasks which the Discipline of the Place requires, and yet steals Time for other things, to which he is inclined, he may not be restrain'd.

AGAIN, It may be worth while carefully to consider (which perchance hitherto hath not been noted) that there are two ways, and those as it were diametrically opposite, of training up, and exercising, and preparing Wits. The one begins with the easiest things, and by degrees leads to the more difficult; the other at first commands and presses the more

more difficult, that these being master'd, he may go through the easier with the more Delight. For it is one Method to learn to Swim with Bladders, which hold up, and another to learn to Dance with heavy Shooes, which press down. And it is not easy to express, how much a prudent Intermixture of these Methods conduces to the advancing the Faculties both of Mind and Body.

ANOTHER Consideration is the Application of Learning according to the Propriety of the Wits; for there is no Defect in the Faculties Intellectual, but seemeth to have a proper Cure contained in some Studies: As for Example, If a Child be Bird-witted, that is, hath not the Faculty of Attention, the Mathematiques give a Remedy thereunto; for in them, if the Wit be caught away but a Moment, one is to begin a-new. And as Sciences have a Propriety towards Faculties for Cure and Help; so Faculties or Powers have a Sympathy towards Sciences for Excellency or speedy Profiting: And therefore it is an Enquiry of great Wisdom, what Kinds of Wits and Natures are most apt and proper for what Sciences.

FURTHERMORE, in the Course of Teaching, *Exercises* have a mighty Stroke to Hurt or Help. But there is a Point here that hath been noted by few; which is, that there

there ought to be not only a wiſe Ordering of *Exerciſes*, but a wiſe Intermiſſion of them alſo. For *Cicero* hath an excellent Obſervation, *That in Exerciſes, it often happens that Men exerciſe their Faults as well as their Faculties*; ſo that an ill Habit is ſometimes got at the ſame Time, and inſinuates it ſelf together with a good one. Wherefore it is a ſafer Way to intermit Exerciſes, and to repeat them every foot, than inceſſantly to continue and purſue them.

IT were too long to particularize a Number of other Conſiderations of this Nature, Things but of mean Appearance, but of ſingular Efficacy. For as in Plants, the Wronging or Cheriſhing of them while they are young, is a Matter of the greateſt Importance towards their Thriving or Miſcarrying; and as the immenſe Greatneſs of the *Roman* Empire is by ſome deſervedly attributed to the Virtue and Wiſdom of thoſe Six Kings, that were as Tutors or Foſter-Fathers to it in its Infancy: So ſurely the Culture and Manuring of Minds in Youth hath ſuch a forcible (though unſeen) Operation, as hardly any Length of Time, or Contention of Labour can countervail afterwards. And it is not amiſs to obſerve alſo, that even ſmall and mean Faculties, if they fall into great Men or great Matters, do work great and important Effects. Of this we will ſet down a memorable Example;

Example; Which we bring the rather, becauſe the *Jeſuits* themſelves ſeem not to deſpiſe this Kind of Diſcipline; and upon ſound Judgment, (in my Opinion.) And it is a matter, which, if it be made a Trade, is diſreputable; if a Part of Diſcipline, excellent. We mean *Theatrical Action*; as that which Strengthens the Memory; Moderates the Tone and Emphaſis of the Voice and Pronunciation; Compoſes the Countenance and Carriage to a Decorum; Gives a good Aſſurance; And, in fine, inures Youth to the Faces of Men. The Example ſhall be from *Tacitus*, of one *Vibulenus*, formerly an Actor, but at that Time a Soldier in the *Pannonian* Legions. This Fellow, upon the Death of *Auguſtus*, had raiſed a Mutiny, ſo that *Blæſus*, the Lieutenant, committed ſome of the Mutineers. But the Soldiers by Violence broke open the Priſons and reſcued them: Whereupon *Vibulenus* got to be heard, and began his Harangue to the Soldiers in this Manner: *To theſe poor innocent Wretches you have reſtored indeed Light and Life: But who reſtores Life to my Brother; who, my Brother to me? That was ſent unto you in Meſſage from the* German *Army, to treat of the Common Cauſe, and he hath murder'd him this laſt Night by ſome of his Fencers and Ruffians, that he has about him ready arm'd for his Executioners upon Soldiers. Anſwer* Blæſus, *where have you thrown his Body? The mortalleſt Enemies*

mies do not grudge Burial. When I have glutted my Grief with Kissing, and Weeping over the Corpse, command me also to be murder'd; so that these our Fellow-Soldiers have Leave to bury us, slain for no Offence, but for our good Meaning, and our true Hearts to the Legions. With which Speech he put the Army into an infinite Fury and Uproar; to the Degree, that unless it had soon after appeared, that there was no Truth in this, and that he never had a Brother, the Soldiers would have gone near to have laid violent Hands upon the Lieutenant. But it was mere Acting in him, as if he had plaid a Part upon the Stage.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Moral Knowledge.

The Division of *Moral Knowledge* into the Doctrine of Exemplar, or Platform; and into the Georgicks or Culture of the Mind. The Division of the Platform (namely, of Good) into Good Simple; into Good Individual; and Good of Communion.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 7. Cap. 1.

E are now come to *Moral Knowledge*, which considers and handles the *Will* of Man. Right Reason governs the Will, Good Apparent seduces it; The Spurs of the Will are the Affections; Her Ministers, the Organs and Voluntary Motions. Of this Faculty

Faculty *Solomon* saith, *Above all Keepings, keep thy Heart; for out of it issue the Actions of Life*, Prov. iv. 23. In handling this Science, they that have written of it, seem to me to have done as if a Man that professed to teach to write, should only exhibit fair Copies of *Alphabets*, and Letters joined, without giving any Precepts or Directions for the Carriage of the Hand, and framing of the Letters. So have they propounded unto us goodly and fair Exemplars and Copies, and accurate Draughts or Portraitures of *Good*, *Virtue*, *Duty*, *Felicity*, as the true Objects and Scopes of Man's Will and Desires: But how to take a just Level at these *Marks* (excellent indeed, and by them well-placed) that is, by what Methods and Directions the Mind may be subdued and framed to become true and conformable to these Pursuits; this they either pass over altogether, or perform it slightly, and unprofitably. For it is not the Disputing, That Moral Virtues are in the Mind of Man by Habit, and not by Nature; or formally distinguishing, That generous Spirits are won by Doctrines and Persuasions, and the Vulgar Sort by Reward and Punishment; Or the witty Precept, that to rectify the Mind of Man, it must like a Staff be bowed the contrary way to its Inclination; and the like scattered Glances and Touches, that can excuse the Absence of this Part.

THE

THE Reaſon of this Omiſſion I ſuppoſe to be no other, than that hidden Rock, whereupon both this and many other Barks of Knowledge have been caſt away; which is, that Writers deſpiſe to be converſant in ordinary and common Matters; which are neither ſubtile enough for Diſputation, nor flouriſhing enough for Ornament. Verily it cannot eaſily be expreſs'd, what a Calamity this very Thing we ſpeak of hath brought upon Sciences; That Men, out of an inbred Pride and Vain-Glory, have made Choice of ſuch Subjects, and of ſuch a Method and Manner of handling them, as may ſet off their Wit rather, than conduce to the Reader's Profit. But here *Seneca* gives an excellent Check, *Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit, ſed ſui*; Doctrines ſhould be ſuch as ſhould make Men in Love with the Leſſon, and not with the Teacher, being directed to the Auditor's Benefit, and not to the Author's Commendation. Therefore they take a right Courſe, who can vouch that of their Counſels, which *Demoſthenes* did, and conclude them with this Clauſe; *Which Things if you put in Execution, you will not only commend your Orator at preſent, but your ſelves likewiſe, not long after, by Reaſon of a more proſperous Eſtate of your Affairs.*

FOR

FOR my own Part (to speak Truth of my self) both in the Works I now publish, and in those I think of hereafter, I have often wittingly and willingly thrown up the Glory of my own Wit and Name, (if any such there be) whilst I study to advance the Good and Profit of Mankind: And I that have merited to be an *Architect* perhaps in Philosophy and the Sciences, am made even a Labourer and a Drudge, and any Thing in short; whilst I sustain and execute my self many Things, which must of Necessity be done, but which others from an innate Pride shift off from themselves. But (to return to the matter in hand;) as I was saying, Philosophers in Moral Science have chosen to themselves a certain resplendent and illustrious Mass of Matter, to give Glory either to the Subtilty of their Wit, or to the Vigor of their Eloquence. But such Precepts as direct Practice chiefly, (and Life consists not in Novelties or Subtleties) they have for the most part omitted.

NEITHER needed Men of so excellent Parts to have despaired of a Fortune like unto that which the Poet *Virgil* promised himself, and indeed obtain'd; who got as much Glory of Eloquence, Wit, and Learning in the expressing his Observations of Husbandry, as in relating the Heroical Acts of *Æneas*.

Nec

Nec ſum animi dubius verbis ea vincere magnum
Quam ſit, & anguſtis hunc addere rebus honorem. *Georg.* 3. 289.

Nor can I doubt what Oyl I muſt beſtow
To raiſe my Subject from a Ground ſo low:
And the mean Matter which my Theme affords
To embelliſh with Magnificence of Words.
Dryden.

AND ſurely if Men meant in good earneſt, not to write at leiſure, that which Men may read at leiſure, but really to Inſtruct, and be Aſſiſting to Active Life; theſe *Georgicks*, that is, this Husbandry and Tillage of the Mind of Man, ought to be in as much Eſteem with Men, as thoſe Heroical Deſcriptions of *Virtue*, *Good*, and *Felicity*, whereon ſo much Labour and Coſt hath been beſtowed.

WE will therefore divide *Moral Philoſophy* into two main and principal Doctrines; The One concerning the *Exemplar* or *Image* of *Good*; The Other concerning the *Regiment* or *Culture* of the *Mind*, which Part we are wont to call *the Georgicks of the Mind: That* deſcribes the Nature of *Good: This* preſcribes Rules how to ſubdue, apply, and accommodate the Will of Man thereunto.

THE Doctrine touching the *Exemplar*, (which respects and describes the *Nature* of *Good*) considers *Good*, either *Simple*, or *Compared*; either (I say) the *Kinds* of *Good*, or the *Degrees* of *Good*. In the latter of these, those infinite Disputations, and Speculations touching the *Supreme Degree* of *Good*, which they term'd *Felicity*, *Beatitude*, or the *Highest Good*, (the Doctrines concerning which were as it were the Heathen Divinity) are by the Christian Faith taken away and discharg'd. For as *Aristotle* saith, *That Young Men may be Happy, but no otherwise than by Hope*; So must we all, being so taught by the Christian Faith, acknowledge our selves to be but Children and Minors, and think of no other Felicity, than that which is in Hope of the future World.

FREED therefore and delivered (by Happy Fate) from that Doctrine touching the Heathens Heaven as it were; (In which Particular doubtless they attributed to Man's Nature a higher Elevation than it was capable of; for we see in what a Height of Stile *Seneca* writes; *It is truly great to have the Frailty of a Man, and the Security of a God*;) we may certainly with less Loss of Sobriety and Truth receive the rest of their Enquiries and Labours concerning the Doctrine of the *Exemplar* or *Platform*. For as concerning *the Nature*

ture of Positive and Simple Good, they have drawn it admirably, in describing the Forms of *Virtue* and *Duty*, with their Situations and Postures, in distributing them into their Kinds, Parts, Provinces, Actions, and Administrations, and the like; Nay further, they have commended them to Man's Nature and Spirit with great Quickness of Argument, and Beauty of Persuasion; yea, and fortified and entrench'd them (as much as Discourse can do) against corrupt and popular Opinions. Again, *for the Degrees, and Comparative Nature of Good*, they have excellently handled this also in their Triplicity of Good; In the Comparisons between a Contemplative and Active Life; In the Distinction between Virtue with Reluctancy, and Virtue secured and confirm'd; In their Encounters between Honesty and Profit; In their Ballancing of Virtue with Virtue, to see which out-weighs the other; and the like. So that this Part touching the *Platform* I find excellently labour'd, and that the Antients herein have shewed themselves admirable Men: Yet so, that the Philosophers have been far out-gone by the pious and painful Diligence of Divines, in weighing and determining, Duties, and Moral Virtues, and Cases of Conscience, and the Bounds and Limits of Sin.

NOTWITHSTANDING, (to return to the Philoſophers) if before they had come to the popular and receiv'd Notions of *Virtue* and *Vice*, *Pleaſure*, and *Pain*, and the reſt, they had ſtaid a little longer upon the Enquiry concerning the Roots of Good and Evil, and the Strings of thoſe Roots, they had given, in my Opinion, a great Light to all that which might fall into Enquiry afterwards: Above all, if they had conſulted as well the Nature of Things, as the Axioms of Morality, they had made their Doctrines leſs prolix, and more profound; which being by them in part omitted, and in part handled with much Confuſion, we will briefly re-examin, and endeavour to open and clear the very Springs of Morality; before we come to the Doctrine of the *Culture of the Mind*, which we ſet down as *Deficient*. For this (in my Judgment) will give the Doctrine of the *Platform* a Kind of new Life and Spirit.

THERE is inbred, and imprinted upon every Thing an Appetite to a double *Nature of Good:* The One, as a Thing is a *Total in it ſelf*; the Other, as it is a *Part or Member of ſome greater Total.* And this Latter is worthier and more excellent than that Other, becauſe it tends to the Conſervation *of a more ample Body.* The Firſt may be called *Individual* or *Self-Good*; The Latter *the Good of Communion.* The Iron in particular Sympathy

thy moves to the Loadſtone: But yet if it exceed a certain Quantity, it forſakes the Affection to the *Loadſtone*, and like a good Citizen and true Patriot, moves to the *Earth*, the Region and Country of its Connaturals. To proceed a little further; *Water* and *Maſſie Bodies* move to the Center of the Earth, to the great Congregation of *cloſe-compacted Bodies*; yet rather than to ſuffer a Divulſion in the Continuance of Nature, and that there ſhould be (as they talk) a *Vácuum*; Theſe Bodies will move upwards from the Center of the Earth, forſaking their Duty to the Earth, that they may perform the general Duty they owe to the World: So is it ever ſeen that the Conſervation of the more general and publick *Form*, commands and governs the leſſer and more particular Appetites and Inclinations. But this Prerogative of the *Good of Communion*, is eſpecially engraven upon Man, if he degenerate not, according to that memorable Speech of *Pompey the Great*; who, being commiſſion'd for the Importation of Corn, when there was a Famine at *Rome*, and being diſſuaded with great Vehemence by his Friends, that he would not hazard himſelf to Sea, in Extremity of Weather, made this Anſwer only, *There is a Neceſſity for my Going, but no Neceſſity for my Living.* So that the Deſire of Life (which in every Individual is ſo predominant) did not out-ballance in him the Love and Allegiance to the Republick. But why do we

dwell upon this Point? There was never found in any Age of the World, either Philosophy, or Sect, or Religion, or Law, or Discipline, which did so highly exalt the Good of Communion, and depress Good Private and Particular, as the Holy Christian Faith: Whence it clearly appears that it was one and the same God that gave the Christian Law to Men, who gave those Laws of Nature to the Creatures. Wherefore we read that some of the Elect Saints have wish'd themselves anathematiz'd and raz'd out of the Book of Life, rather than their Brethren should not attain Salvation; in an Extasy of Charity, and an infinite Desire of the Good of Communion. *Rom.* ix.

THIS being laid down as an immoveable unshaken Position, puts an End to some of the weightiest Controversies in Moral Philosophy. For first it determines that Question concerning the Preference of the Contemplative to the Active Life; and that against the Opinion of *Aristotle*. For all the Reasons which he brings for the Contemplative Life, respect private Good, and the Pleasure and Dignity of a Man's self only; in which Respects, no question the Contemplative Life hath the Preheminence. For the Contemplative Life is not much unlike that Comparison which *Pythagoras* made for the Gracing and Magnifying of Philosophy and Contemplation; Who being ask'd by *Hiero*, what he was; Answered; *That* Hiero *knew well (if he*

he had ever been at the Olympian *Games) that the Manner there is, that some come to try their Fortunes for the Prizes; Others, as Merchants to vend their Commodities; and Some to meet their Friends, and to make good Chear, and be merry; and Others came to look on: And that he was one of them that came to look on.* But Men should know, that in this Theater of Human Life, it is fit only for God and Angels to be *Lookers on.* Neither surely could it have been, that any Doubt, touching this Point, should ever have been rais'd in the Church; (Howsoever that Saying has been frequent in many Men's Mouths, *Precious in the Eyes of the Lord is the Death of his Saints*; from which Passage, they are wont to exalt that Civil Death of theirs, and the Laws of a Monastick and Regular Course of Life;) but upon this Supposition, that the Monastick Life is not simply Contemplative; but is altogether conversant in Ecclesiastical Duties; as Incessant Prayer; Sacrifices of Vows offer'd to God; the Writing also (in so much Leisure) Theological Books, for the Propagating the Doctrine of the Divine Law; as *Moses* did, when he abode so many Days in his Retirement upon the Mount. And so *Henoch*, the Seventh from *Adam*, who seems to have been the first Founder of the Contemplative Life, (for he is said to *have walked with God*) yet endowed the Church with a Book of Prophesy, which

is alſo cited by St. *Jude*. But for mere Contemplation, terminated in it ſelf, and which caſteth no Beams of Heat or Light upon Human Society; aſſuredly Divinity knows it not.

IT decides alſo the Queſtion, controverted with ſuch Heat, between the Schools of *Zeno* and *Socrates*, on the one Side; who placed Felicity in Virtue, either Simple, or Adorn'd with other Goods (which Virtue has always had a principal Share in the Duties of Life:) and ſeveral other Sects and Schools, on the other ſide, as the Schools of the *Cyrenaicks* and *Epicureans*, who placed it in Pleaſure; and made Virtue (as it happens in ſome Comedies, where the Miſtreſs and the Maid change Cloaths) to be but as an Hand-maid; without which Pleaſure could not be well ſerv'd and waited upon; as alſo that other, as it were, *Reform'd* School of *Epicurus*, which aſſerted Felicity to be nothing elſe but a Tranquillity and Serenity of Mind, free and void of all Perturbations; as tho' they were minded to dethrone *Jupiter*, and reſtore *Saturn* with the Golden Age, when there was no Summer, nor Winter, nor Spring, nor Autumn, but all after one even Air and Seaſon; Laſtly, the exploded School alſo of *Pyrrho* and *Herillus*, who placed Felicity in an utter Extinction and Exemption of all Scruples and Diſputes of Mind, making no fix'd and conſtant

ſtant Nature of Good or Evil, but eſteeming Actions Good or Evil, according as they proceeded from the Mind, with a clear and undiſturbed Motion, or contrariwiſe, with Averſation and Reluctance; Which Opinion, notwithſtanding, hath revived in the Hereſy of the *Anabaptiſts*; who meaſured all Things according to the Motions and Inſtincts of the Spirit, and the Conſtancy or Wavering of Belief. But it is manifeſt, that all this that we have recited, tends to private Repoſe and Complacency of Mind, and no way to *Society*, and the *Good of Communion.*

AGAIN, it cenſures alſo the Philoſophy of *Epictetus*, who preſuppoſes this, That Felicity muſt be placed in thoſe Things, which are in our own Power; leaſt otherwiſe we ſhould be liable to Fortune and Accidents; as tho' it were not a Thing much more happy, to fail of Succeſs, and to be fruſtrated, in worthy and generous Intentions and Ends for a Publick Good, than always to have our Wiſh, in all Things relating to our own Private Fortune only. As *Conſalvo*, ſhewing his Soldiers *Naples*, bravely proteſted, *That he had much rather run himſelf upon certain Ruin, by ſetting one Foot forward, than prolong his Life for many Years, by retreating one Foot backward.* Whereunto the Wiſdom of that Heavenly Philoſopher alſo hath ſigned, who pronounced, *That a good Conſcience is a continual*

continual Feast; plainly signifying, That the Conscience of good Intentions, however unsuccessful, affords more solid and sincere Joy, and to Nature more agreeable; than all that Provision, wherewith Man can be furnish'd, either for the Fruition of his Desires, or the Rest and Repose of his Mind.

IT censures likewise that Abuse of Philosophy, which grew general about the Time of *Epictetus*: Which was, that Philosophy was converted into a Professory Kind of Life, and as it were into an Art; as if the Purpose of Philosophy was, not to repress and extinguish Perturbations; but to shun, and keep at a Distance, the Causes and Occasions of them; and therefore a particular Kind and Course of Life were to be shaped to that end: Introducing indeed such a Health of Mind, as was that of Body in *Herodicus*, which *Aristotle* speaks of; That he did nothing all his Life long, but intend his Health; and therefore abstain'd from an infinite Number of Things, being in the mean Time amerc'd as it were the Use of his Body: Whereas if the Duties of Society were the Delight of a Man's Soul, that Health of Body, when all is done, is pricipally to be desired, which is ableſt to bear and overcome all Alterations, and whatsoever Shocks: So likewise, that Mind only, is to be reckoned truly and properly sound and strong, that can break thro' the most and greatest Temptations

tations and Perturbations. So that *Diogenes* ſeems to have ſpoken excellently well; who commended ſuch Strength and Powers of Mind, as were able not warily to *Abſtain*, but bravely to *Suſtain:* And which can reſtrain and check the Sallies of the Soul, even in the greateſt Precipices; and can do what is commended in well-managed Horſes, that is, ſtop and turn in the narroweſt Compaſs.

LASTLY; It cenſures a certain Tenderneſs, and Want of Complaiſance, and obſequious Application, noted in ſome of the moſt Antient and Reverend Philoſophers; who withdrew too eaſily from Civil Buſineſs, for avoiding Indignities and Perturbations, and that they might live, in their Opinion, more unſtained, and as it were ſanctified Perſons: Whereas the Reſolution of a Man truly Moral ought to be ſuch, as the ſame *Conſalvo* required in a Military Man; *viz.* That his Honour ſhould be woven *è Tela craſſiore, of a Home-ſpun courſer Thread*; and not ſo fine, as that every Thing ſhould catch in it, and tear it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

The Diviſion of Particular, or Private Good, into Good Active, and Good Paſſive. The Diviſion of Good Paſſive into Conſervative Good, and Good Perfective. The Diviſion of the Good of Communion, into Duties General, and Reſpective.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 7. Cap. 2.

HEREFORE let us now reſume and proſecute, Firſt, *Private* and *Particular Good.* This we will divide into *Good Active*, and *Good Paſſive.* For this Difference of *Good* alſo (not unlike ſurely to thoſe Appellations, which were familiar amongſt the *Romans*

Romans in their Œconomicks of *(a) Promus* and *(b) Condus*) is found deeply engraved upon the Univerſal Nature of Things; and is beſt diſcloſed in the two ſeveral Appetites in Creatures; The One to *Preſerve* and *Fortify* themſelves; The Other to *Multiply* and *Dilate* themſelves; whereof the Latter, which is *Active*, and the *Promus* as it were, ſeems to be the ſtronger and worthier; and the Former, which is *Paſſive*, and the *Condus* as it were, may well be judg'd as the Inferior. For in Nature, the Heavens, which are the more worthy, are the *Agent*; and the Earth, which is the leſs worthy, is the *Patient*. In the Pleaſures of living Creatures, that of Generation is greater than that of Food. In Divine Doctrine, *It is more bleſſed to give than to receive*; Acts xx. 35. And in common Life too, there is no Man's Spirit ſo ſoft and effeminate, but he eſteems the effecting of ſomething that he hath fixed in his Deſire, more than any Senſuality or Pleaſure. And this Priority of *Active Good* is hugely exalted from the Conſideration of our Eſtate, being mortal and expoſed to the Stroke of Fortune. For if we might have a Perpetuity and Certainty in our Pleaſures, the Price of them would be ad-

(a) *One that deliver'd out Proviſions.*
(b) *One that ſtored up Proviſions.*

vanced

vanced upon the Account of their Security and Continuance. But when we ſee it is but *Magni æſtimamus, &c. we ſet a great Value upon dying a little later*; And, *Boaſt not of to Morrow: Thou knoweſt not what a Day may bring forth*; It makes us deſire to have ſomething ſecured and exempted from Time; which can be only our Deeds, as it is ſaid, *Their Works follow them*; *Apoc.* 14.

THE Preheminence likewiſe of this *Active Good* is upheld by the Affection which is natural in Man towards Variety and Proceeding; which Affection in the Pleaſures of the Senſe (which is the principal Part of *Paſſive Good*) can have no great Latitude. *Do but think* (ſays *Seneca*) *how often you have done the ſame Things*; *Meat, Sleep, Diverſion*; *We run round in this Circle*; *not only a Brave, or a Miſerable, or a Wiſe Man, but a nice faſtidious Perſon would wiſh to die.* But in the Enterprizes, Purſuits, and Purpoſes of Life, there is much Variety; whereof Men are ſenſible with great Pleaſure, in their Inceptions, Progreſſions, Recoils in order to renew their Forces, Approaches, Attainings of their Ends; and the like: So that it was well and truly ſaid; *A Life that propoſes no End to purſue, is a faint, ſickly, vagrant Thing.* Which indifferently befalls the Wiſe and Unwiſe, as *Solomon* ſaith; *A light-brain'd Man ſeeks to ſatisfy his Fancy, and intermixes himſelf with all*

all Things; *Prov.* xviii. 1. Nay, we see that the greatest Princes, that have have had at Command whatever could delight the Senses, have nevertheless made themselves Desires, and set their Hearts upon Toys: Sometimes upon a Building; Sometimes upon the advancing of a Person; Sometimes upon obtaining Excellency in some Art, or Feat of the Hand; As *Nero* for playing upon the Harp; *Domitian* for Certainty of the Hand with the Arrow; *Commodus* for Fencing; *Caracalla* for Driving Chariots, and the like: Which to them were more acceptable than all the Affluence of sensual Pleasures, from this Principle; *That the Mind of Man is more cheared and refreshed by profiting in small Things, than by standing at a stay in great.*

THIS in the mean Time should be well noted, That this *Active Good* hath no Identity with the *Good of Society*, though in some Cases it hath an Incidence into it. For although it does many Times bring forth Acts of *Beneficence*, yet it is with a Respect private to a Man's own Power, Glory, Amplification, Continuance; as appears plainly, when it lights upon a Subject, which is contrary to the *Good of Society*. For that Gigantick State of Mind, which possesses the Troublers of the World (such as was *Lucius Sylla*, and infinite others in smaller Model) who would have all Men Happy or Unhappy, as they are

are their Friends or Enemies, and would give Form to the World according to their own Humour, (which is the true *Theomachy*) pretends and aspires to *Active Good*, though it recedes fartheſt from *Good* of *Society*, which we have determined to be the greater.

TO resume *Passive Good*, we will subdivide it into *Good Conservative* and *Good Perfective*. For there is impressed upon every Thing a triple Desire or Appetite, in Respect of *Private* or *Particular Good*; *The First, Of Preserving or Continuing it self: The Second, Of Advancing and Perfecting it self: The Third, Of Multiplying or Extending it self.* But this last Appetite refers to *Active Good*, which we have handled already. There remain therefore only the two other *Goods* mentioned; whereof the *Perfective* excels. For to preserve a Thing in its natural State, is less than to advance the same to a higher Nature. For there are found through all Essences some nobler Natures to the Dignity and Excellency whereof inferior Natures do aspire, as to their Originals and Springs. So in Man,

Igneus est ollis vigor vigor & cælestis origo.
Æn. 6. 730.

Th' Ethereal Vigour is in all the same,
And ev'ry Soul is fill'd with equal Flame.
Dryden.

HIS

HIS Approach or Assumption to Divine or Angelical Nature is the Perfection of his Form; a depraved and preposterous Imitation of which *Perfective Good* is that which is the Tempest of Human Life, whilst Man upon the Instinct of an Advancement *Formal* and *Essential* is carried to seek an Advancement only *Local*. For as those who are sick and find no Remedy, tumble up and down and change Place, as if by a Remove Local, they could obtain a Remove Internal, and shift off their Disease: So is it in Ambition, that Men being possess'd and led away with a false Resemblance of exalting their *Nature*, purchase nothing else but an Eminence and Celsitude of *Place*. So then *Passive Good* is, as was said, either *Conservative* or *Perfective*.

TO resume the *Good* of *Conservation* or *Comfort*, which consists *in the Fruition of that which is agreeable to our Natures*, it seems to be the most pure and natural Good, yet is it the softest and lowest. And this also receiveth a Difference, which hath neither been well judged of, nor well enquired. For the *Good of Fruition* or *Delight*, is placed either in the *Sincereness of the Fruition*, or in the *Quickness and Vigor of it*; The One superinduced by the *Equality*: The Other by *Variety* and *Vicissitude*. The One having less Mixture of *Evil*: The Other, a more strong

and lively Impression of *Good.* Whether of these is the greater Good, is a Question controverted; But whether Man's Nature may not be capable of both, is a Question not enquired.

THE former Question being debated between *Socrates* and a *Sophist*, and *Socrates* placing Felicity in a constant *Peace and Tranquillity of Mind*; But the *Sophist* in this, *That a Man desire Much, and enjoy Much:* They fell from Arguments to ill Words; the *Sophist* saying, *That* Socrates's *Happiness was the Happiness of a Block, or a Stone*: *Socrates* on the other side, *That the* Sophist's *Happiness was the Happiness of one that had the Itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch.* And both these Opinions do not want their Supports. For to *Socrates* even the School of *Epicurus* it self assents, which denies not but Virtue contributes most to Happiness. And if so, most certain it is, That there is more Use of Virtue, in quieting Perturbations, than in compassing Desires. The *Sophist's* Opinion is favour'd something by this Assertion; *That the Compassing of Things desired, seems by Degrees to perfect Nature*; which tho' it should not in reality do, yet Motion, tho' in a Circle, has somewhat of a Shew of Progression.

BUT

BUT the second Question (that is, *Whether the Nature of Man may not at once retain both a Tranquillity of Mind, and the Vigor of Fruition*) decided the true Way, makes the former superfluous. For do we not often see that some Men are so framed and made by Nature, as to be extremely affected with Pleasures while they are present, and yet are not greatly troubled with the Loss or leaving of them? So that this same, *Not to use, that you may not desire*; *Not to desire, that you may not fear*; seems to be the Result of a poor diffident Spirit. And certainly most of the Doctrines of the Philosophers are more fearful and cautionary than the Nature of Things requireth. Thus have they encreased the Fear of Death, in offering to cure it. For when they would have a Man's whole Life to be but a Discipline or Preparation for Death, they must needs make Men think that it is a terrible Enemy, against which there is no End of preparing. Better saith the Poet,

Qui spatium vitæ extremum inter munera ponat
Naturæ.——

A Soul that can securely Death defy,
And count it Nature's Privilege to die.

Dryden.

SO have the Philoſophers ſought to make Men's Minds too uniform and harmonious, by not breaking and inuring them to contrary Motions and Extremes. The Reaſon whereof I ſuppoſe to be, becauſe they themſelves were Men dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied Courſe of Life. For, as we ſee, upon the Lute, or like Inſtrument, a *Ground*, tho' it be ſweet, and have Shew of many Changes, yet breaketh not the Hand to ſuch ſtrange and hard Stops and Paſſages, as a *Set Song*, or *Voluntary:* Much after the ſame manner was the Diverſity between a Philoſophical and a Civil Life. And therefore Men are to imitate the Wiſdom of Jewellers, who, if there be a Grain, or a Cloud, or an Ice which may be ground out, without taking too much of the Stone, they help it: But if it ſhould leſſen and abate the Stone too much, they will not meddle with it: So ought Men ſo to procure *Serenity*, as not to deſtroy *Magnanimity*. And thus much for *Particular* or *Self-Good*.

HAVING therefore ſpoken of *Self-good*, (which alſo we uſe to call *Good Particular*, *Private*, *Individual*) let us reſume the *Good of Communion*, which reſpecteth *Society*. This commonly goes by the Name of *Duty:* Becauſe the Term of *Duty* is more proper to a Mind well framed and compoſed towards others;

others; As the Term of *Virtue* is applied to a Mind well formed and compoſed within it ſelf; though neither can a Man underſtand *Virtue* without ſome Relation to Society, nor *Duty* without an Inward Diſpoſition. This Part may ſeem at firſt Sight to pertain to *Science Civil* and *Political*; but not, if it be well obſerv'd. For it concerneth the Regiment and Government of every Man, over himſelf, and not over others. And as in Architecture, it is one Thing to frame the Poſts, Beams, and other Parts of an Edifice, and to prepare them for the Uſe of Building; and another Thing to fit and join the ſame Parts together. And as in Mechanicks, the Direction how to frame an Inſtrument or Engine, is not the ſame with the Manner of Erecting, Moving, and ſetting it on Work; (and yet nevertheleſs in expreſſing of the one, you incidently expreſs the Aptneſs towards the other:) So the Doctrine of the Conjugation of Men in *Society* differs from that which makes them conformable, and well-affected to the Weal of ſuch a *Society*.

THIS *Part touching Duties* is ſubdivided alſo into two Parts: The *Common Duty* of every Man, as a Man or Member of a State: The Other, the *Reſpective* or *Special Duty* of every Man in his Profeſſion, Vocation, and Place. The Firſt of theſe is extant and well-labour'd, as hath been ſaid: The Second like-

wise we find dispersedly handled, tho' not digested into an entire Body of a *Science*: Which manner of dispersed Writing in this Kind of Argument, I acknowledge to be best. For who can take upon him to write of the proper Duty, Virtue, Challenge, and Right, of every several Vocation, Profession, and Place? For altho' sometimes a Looker on may see more than a Gamester; and there be a Proverb more arrogant than sound, touching the Censure of the Vulgar as to the Actions of Princes, *That the Vale best discovereth the Hill*; yet there is little Doubt but that Men can write best, and most really and materially, in their own Profession: And that the Writings of Speculative Men concerning Active Matter, seem to Men of Experience, little better than *Phormio*'s Discourses of the Wars seemed to *Hannibal*, who esteemed them Dreams and Dotage. Only there is one Vice which accompanies them that write in their own Profession, that they magnify them in Excess. But generally it were to be wished (as that which would make Learning indeed solid and fruitful) that Active Men would or could become Writers.

IN

IN which Kind I cannot but mention *Honoris Causa*, Your Majesty's excellent Book, touching the Duty of a King: A Work richly compounded of *Divinity*, *Morality*, and *Policy*, with great Aspersion of all other Arts: And being, in my Opinion, one of the most sound and healthful Writings that I have read; not distempered in the Heat of Invention, nor in the Coldness of Negligence; nor sick of Dizziness as those are who are confounded, or lose themselves in their Method; nor of Convulsions, as those who cramp in Matters impertinent: Nor savouring of Perfumes and Paintings, as those do who seek to please the Reader more than Nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the Spirits thereof, being agreeable to Truth, and apt for Use and Action; and far removed from that natural Infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in their own Professions, to be subject, which is, that they exalt them above Measure. For your Majesty hath truly described, not a King of *Assyria*, or *Persia*, in their external Glory: But a *Moses*, or a *David*, Pastors of their People. Neither can I ever forget, what I heard your Majesty, in the same sacred Spirit of Government, deliver, in a great Cause of Judicature, which was:

1 *King* James, *to whom the Advancement of Learning is Dedicated by the Author. He means the* Doron Basil.

That Kings ruled by their Laws, as God did by the Laws of Nature, and ought as rarely to put in Uſe their Supreme Prerogative, as God doth his Power of working Miracles. And yet notwithſtanding, in your Book of a *Free Monarchy*, you do well give Men to underſtand, that you know the Plenitude of the Power and Right of a King, as well as the Circle of his Office and Duty.

THUS have I preſumed to alledge this excellent Writing of your Majeſty, as a prime or eminent Example of *Tractates*, concerning Special and Reſpective Duties: Wherein I ſhould have ſaid as much, if it had been written a thouſand Years ſince: Neither am I moved with certain Courtly Decencies, which eſteem it Flattery to praiſe in Preſence. No, it is Flattery to praiſe in Abſence; that is, when either the Virtue is abſent, or the Occaſion is abſent: And ſo the Praiſe is not natural, but forced, either in Truth, or Time. But let *Cicero* be read in his Oration *pro Marcello*, which is nothing but an excellent Table of *Cæſar*'s Virtue, and made *to his Face*, beſides the Example of many other excellent Perſons, wiſer a great deal than ſuch Obſervers: And we will never doubt, upon a full Occaſion, to give juſt Praiſes to preſent or abſent.

BUT

BUT to return; There belongeth further to the handling of this Part touching the Duties of Profeſſions and Vocations, a *Relative* or *Oppoſite*, touching the Frauds, Proviſionary Cautions, Impoſtures and Vices of every Profeſſion; which hath been likewiſe handled in many Writings. But how? Rather by way of Satyr and Cynically (after the manner of *Lucian*) than ſeriouſly and wiſely. For Men have rather ſought by Wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in Profeſſions, than with Judgment to diſcover and ſever that which is corrupt. For as *Solomon* ſaith, He that cometh to ſeek after Knowledge, with a Mind to ſcorn and cenſure, ſhall be ſure to find Matter for his Humour, but no Matter for his Inſtruction. *Quærenti deriſori*, &c. *A Scorner ſeeketh Wiſdom, and findeth it not; but Knowledge is eaſy to him that underſtandeth*; Prov. xiv. 6. But the managing of this Argument with Integrity and Truth, which I note as *deficient*, ſeemeth to me to be one of the beſt Fortifications for Honeſty and Virtue that can be planted. For as the Fable goes of the *Baſilisk*, that if he ſee you firſt, you die for it; but if you ſee him firſt, he dies: So is it with Deceits and evil Arts; which if they be firſt eſpied, they loſe their Life, that is, their Power of doing hurt: But if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much beholden to *Machiavel*, and others, that

that write what Men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join *the Wisdom of the Serpent with the Innocence of the Dove*; except Men know exactly all the Conditions of the *Serpent:* His Baseness, and going upon his Belly, his Volubility and Lubricity, his Envy and Sting, and the rest, that is, all Forms and Natures of Evil. For without this Skill, Virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, a sincere and honest Man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, without the Help of the Knowledge of Evil. For Men of corrupt Minds and depraved Judgments presuppose, that Honesty grows out of Ignorance, and Simplicity of Manners, and believing of Preachers, Schoolmasters, and Men's exterior Language: So that, unless you can make them perceive, that you know the utmost Reaches of their own corrupt Opinions, they despise all Morality, according to that admirable Doctrine of *Solomon*; *A Fool will not receive the Words of the Wise*; *unless thou speakest the very Things that are in his Heart*; *Prov.* xvii. 2. (*i. e.*) Unless thou know all the Coverts and Depths of Wickedness. But this Part concerning *Frauds*, *Cautions*, and *Respective Vices*, we place in the Number of *Deficients*, and will call it by the Name of *Satyra seria*, or a Treatise *De Interioribus rerum: A serious Satyr*; or *Of the Mysteries of Professions.*

TO

TO this Part touching *Respective Duty*, do also appertain the *Mutual Duties* between Husband and Wife, Parent and Child, Master and Servant: So likewise, the Laws of Friendship and Gratitude: As also the Civil Bonds of Fraternities, Colleges, Politick Bodies, of Neighbourhood, and all other proportionate Duties: Not as they are Parts of Government and Society, (for that refers to Politicks) but as to the framing the Mind of particular Persons, to the maintaining of such Bonds of Society.

BUT the Doctrine concerning the *Good of Communion*, or *of Society*, (as that also of *Good Individual*) handles *Good*, not only *simply*, but *comparatively* also; whereunto belongeth the weighing of Duties, between Person and Person; between Case and Case; between Private and Publick; between Time present, and Time future: As we may see in the severe and cruel Proceeding of *L. Brutus* against his own Sons, which was so much extoll'd by the Generality of People: Yet, what says another?

Infelix,

Infelix, utcunq; ferent ea fata minores, &c.

His Sons, who ſeek the Tyrant to ſuſtain,
And long for Arbitrary Lords again,
With Ignominy ſcourg'd, in open Sight,
He dooms to Death deſerv'd, aſſerting Publick Right.
Unhappy Man, to break the pious Laws
Of Nature, pleading in his Childrens Cauſe!
Howe'er the doubtful Fact is underſtood,
'Tis Love of Honour, and his Country's Good:
The Conſul, not the Father, ſheds the Blood.
Dryd. Virg. Æn. 9. 820, &c.

AGAIN we ſee, when *M. Brutus* and *Caſſius* invited to Supper certain whoſe Opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their Aſſociates, and caſt forth the Queſtion touching the Lawfulneſs of *Killing a Tyrant*, being an Uſurper; They were divided in Opinion; Some holding, *That Servitude was the Extreme of Evils*; And others, *That Tyranny was better than a Civil War.* And a Number the like Caſes there are, of *Comparative Duty.* Amongſt which, that of all others, is the moſt frequent, where the Queſtion is of a great deal of Good, to enſue of a ſmall Injuſtice. Which *Jaſon* of *Theſſaly* determined againſt the Truth; *Aliqua ſunt injuſte facienda,* &c. *Some Things may be done unjuſtly,*

unjuſtly, that many Things may be done juſtly. But the Reply is good; *Authorem præſentis juſtitiæ habes; ſponſorem futuræ non habes.* Men muſt purſue Things, which are juſt in preſent, and leave the future to Divine Providence. And ſo we paſs on from this general Part touching the *Exemplar* and *Deſcription* of *Good.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

The Diviſion of the Doctrine of the Culture of the Mind, into the Doctrine of the Characters of Minds; Of the Affections; and of the Remedies or Cures. An Appendix *of the ſame Doctrine, touching the Congruity between the Good of the Mind, and the Good of the Body.*

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 7. Cap. 3.

NOW therefore that we have ſpoken of this *Fruit of Life*, it remains to ſpeak of the *Husbandry* belonging thereunto: Without which Part, the former ſeemeth to be no better than a fair Image or Statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but without Life and

and Motion; to which Opinion *Aristotle* himself subscribes in express Words; *It is necessary to speak of Virtue, both what it is, and how to procure it. For it would be to little Purpose, to know Virtue indeed, but to be ignorant of the Manner and Means how to compass it. For Enquiry must be made not only of the Form of Virtue, but also how she is to be come at: For we would have both these Things, the Knowledge of the Thing it self, and the Fruition thereof: Now this cannot succeed to our Desire, unless we know both of what Materials it is compounded, and how to procure it.* Mag. Mor. Lib. 1. In such full Words, and with such Iteration, doth he inculcate this Part; which notwithstanding himself pursues not. This likewise is the very Thing which *Cicero* attributes to *Cato* the Younger, as a great Commendation, that he had applyed himself to Philosophy, *Not for Disputation sake, but to live according to its Rules.* And although through the Neglect of our Times, wherein few Men hold any Consultation touching the Reformation of their Life, (as *Seneca* excellently says, *Of the Parts of Life every one deliberates; of the Sum of Life no body;*) this Part may seem superfluous, yet this moves us not to leave it untouched, but rather we conclude with that Aphorism of *Hippocrates*, *Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, iis mens ægra est; they who are sick of a dangerous Disease, and feel no Pain, are distem-*

pered

pered in their Understanding. Such Men need a Medicine not only to asswage the Disease, but to awake the Sense. And if it be said, that the Cure of Men's Minds belongs to sacred Divinity, it is most truly said; but yet what hinders, but Moral Philosophy may be accepted into the Train of Theology, as a wise Servant, and humble Hand-maid, ready at all Commands to do Her Service? For as it is in the *Psalm, That the Eyes of the Hand-maid look perpetually towards the Mistress*; *Psal.* cxxiii. And yet no doubt many Things are left to the Discretion and Care of the Hand-maid, to discern of the Mistress Will: So ought Moral Philosophy to give all due Observance to Divinity, and to be obsequious to Her Precepts; yet so as it may yield of it self (within due Limits) many sound and profitable Directions.

THIS Part therefore (when I seriously consider the Excellency thereof) I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not yet reduced into *a Body of Knowledge*; the rather because it consisteth of much Matter, wherein both Speech and Action is often conversant, and such wherein the common Talk of Men (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their Books. It is reasonable therefore that we propound it the more particularly, both for the Worthiness, and that we may acquit our selves for reporting

ing it *deficient*, which ſeemeth almoſt incredible, and ſo otherwiſe conceived and preſuppoſed by thoſe themſelves, that have written. We will therefore enumerate ſome Heads or Points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

The Georgicks of the Mind, or of the Culture of our Manners.

FIRST therefore in this, (as in all Things which are Practical) we ought to caſt up our Account, what is in our Power, and what not. For the one may be dealt with by *Alteration*, but the other by way of *Application* only. The Husbandman cannot command, neither the Nature of the Earth, nor the Seaſons of the Year: No more can the Phyſician the Conſtitution of the Patient, nor the Variety of Accidents. So in the Culture and Cure of the Mind of Man, two Things are without our Command: Points of Nature, and Points of Fortune. For to the *Baſis* of the one, and the Conditions of the other, our Work is limited and tied. In theſe Things therefore it is left unto us, to proceed by *Application*:

Superanda omnis fortuna ferendo:
Virg. Æn. 7.

By ſuff'ring well, our Fortune we ſubdue.
Dryden.

AND ſo likewiſe,

BY ſuff'ring well, our NATURE *we ſubdue.* But when we ſpeak of *Suffering*, we do not ſpeak of a dull and neglected *Suffering*, but of a wiſe and induſtrious *Suffering*, which draweth and continueth Uſe and Advantage out of that which ſeemeth adverſe and contrary; which is that Property which we call, *Accommodating*, or *Applying*. Now the Wiſdom of *Application* lieth principally in the exact and diſtinct Knowledge of the precedent State, or Diſpoſition, unto which we do *apply*: For we cannot fit a Garment, except we firſt take Meaſure of the Body.

SO then the firſt Article, touching *the Culture of the Mind*, is to ſet down ſound and true Diſtributions and Deſcriptions of the ſeveral Characters of Mens Natures and Diſpoſitions, ſpecially having Regard to thoſe Differences which are moſt radical, in being the Fountains and Cauſes of the reſt, or moſt frequent in Concurrence or Commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in

Paſſage

Paſſage, the better to deſcribe the Mediocrities of Virtues, that can ſatisfy this Intention: For if it deſerve to be conſidered, *That there are Minds which are proportioned to great Matters, and others to ſmall,* (which *Ariſtotle* handleth, or ought to have handled by the Name of *Magnanimity*) doth it not deſerve as well to be conſidered, *That there are Minds proportioned to intend many Matters, and others few?* So that ſome can divide themſelves, others can perchance do exactly well, but it muſt be but in few Things at once; And ſo there cometh to be a *Narrowneſs of Mind,* as well as a *Puſillanimity.* And again, *That ſome Minds are proportioned to that which may be diſpatched at once, or within a ſhort Return of Time: Others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of Purſuit.*

Hoc regnum Dea gentibus eſſe
Si qua fata ſinant, jam tum *tenditq;* *fovetq;*
Virg. Æn. 1. 21.

Here, if Heav'n were kind,
The Seat of awful Empire ſhe deſign'd.
Dryden.

SO that there may be fitly ſaid to be a *Longanimity* (which is commonly alſo aſcribed to God) as a *Magnanimity.* So further deſerved it to be conſidered by *Ariſtotle*; *That there is a Diſpoſition in Converſation (ſuppoſing*

it in Things which do in no ſort touch or concern a Man's ſelf) to Sooth and Pleaſe; and a Diſpoſition contrary, to Contradict and Croſs. And deſerveth it not much better to be conſidered, *That there is a Diſpoſition, not in Converſation or Talk, but in Matter of more ſerious Nature (and ſuppoſing it ſtill in Things merely indifferent) to take Pleaſure in the good of another; and a Diſpoſition contrariwiſe, to take Diſtaſte at the good of another?* Which is that Property, which we call *Good Nature*, or *Ill Nature*, *Benignity* or *Malignity*. And therefore I cannot ſufficiently marvel, that this Part of Knowledge touching the ſeveral Characters of Natures and Diſpoſitions, ſhould be omitted both in Morality and Policy, conſidering it would caſt ſuch reſplendent Beams of Light upon both thoſe Sciences.

A Man ſhall find in the Traditions of Aſtrology ſome pretty and apt Diviſions of Mens Natures, according to the Predominances of the Planets; *Lovers of Quiet*, *Lovers of Action*, *Lovers of Victory*, *Lovers of Honour*, *Lovers of Pleaſure*, *Lovers of Arts*, *Lovers of Change*; and ſo forth. So among the Poets, (Heroical, Satyrical, Tragical, Comical,) a Man ſhall find every where the Images of Wits, though commonly with Exceſs, and beyond the Proportion of Truth. But the beſt Proviſion, and nobleſt Matter of ſuch a Treatiſe may be fetcht from the wiſer ſort of Hiſtorians,

Hiſtorians, but yet not from the Elogies only, which they are wont to ſubjoin upon mentioning the Death of any illuſtrious Perſon; but much more from the entire Body of the Hiſtory, as often as ſuch a Perſon enters upon the Stage as it were. For this interwoven Image ſeems to be a better Deſcription, than any Judgment paſs'd upon a Man in an Elogy: As that in *T. Livius*, of *Africanus*, and of *Cato* the Elder; In *Tacitus*, of *Tiberius*, *Claudius*, and *Nero*; In *Herodian*, of *Septimius Severus*; In *Philip de Commines*, of *Lewis* the Eleventh of *France*; In *Francis Guicciardine*, of *Ferdinand* of *Spain*, *Maximilian* the Emperor, and of *Leo*, and *Clement*, Biſhops of *Rome*. For theſe Writers, having the Images of thoſe Perſons, whom they made choice of to decipher, conſtantly as it were in their Eye, hardly ever make mention of their Acts and Atchievements, without interſperſing at the ſame Time ſomething touching their Natures. So likewiſe, a Man ſhall find in the wiſeſt ſort of thoſe Relations, which the *Italians* make touching *Conclaves*, the Natures of the ſeveral Cardinals, handſomly and lively painted forth: As the Letters of Embaſſadors ſet forth the Natures and Manners of Counſellors to Princes. A Man ſhall meet with in every Day's Conference the Denomination of *ſenſitive*, *dry*, *formal*, *real*, *humourous*, *certain*, *Huomo di prima impreſſione*, *Huomo di ultima impreſſione*, and the like; and

yet nevertheleſs this Kind of Obſervations wandreth in Words, but is not fixed in Enquiry. For the Diſtinctions are found (many of them) but we conclude no Precepts upon them, becauſe (as was ſaid) both Hiſtory, Poeſy, and daily Experience are as goodly Fields where theſe Obſervations grow, whereof we make a few Poſies to hold in our Hands, but no Man bringeth them to the Confectionary, that Receipts may be made of them for the Uſe of Life. Wherefore let there be made out of this Matter (which certainly is fruitful and copious) a diligent and full Treatiſe. * But my Meaning is not, that theſe Characters ſhould in *Ethicks* (as in Hiſtories, and Poems, and in common Converſation) be drawn, as perfect, entire Civil Images; but rather as the Lines, and rude Strokes of the Images themſelves; (which being compounded and mix'd together, form and conſtitute all *Effigies* whatſoever;) How many, and of what Sort they are; and how connected together,

* Being in ſome doubt about the true Interpretation of two or three Lines here, I think it beſt to give the Reader the Original *Latin*. *Neq; vero volumus, ut Characteres iſti in Ethicis (ut ſit apud Hiſtoricos, & Poetas, & in Sermonibus Communibus,) excipiantur, tanquam imagines Civiles integræ; ſed potius ut Imaginum ipſarum Lineæ, & Ductus magis ſimplices; quæ inter ſe compoſitæ & commixtæ quaſcunq; effigies conſtituunt; Quot & quales eæ ſint; & quomodo inter ſe connexæ, & ſubordinatæ; ut fiat tanquam artificioſa*, &c.

and

and ſubordinate one to the other; to the end there may be made a Kind of artificial and accurate Diſſection of Tempers and Natures; and that a Diſcovery may be made of the Secrets of Diſpoſitions, in particular Perſons, and from the Knowledge thereof, Precepts and Rules more truly drawn for the Cures of the Mind.

AND not only the Characters of Diſpoſitions, impreſſed by Nature, ought to be taken into this Treatiſe; but thoſe alſo, which are impoſed upon the Mind, by *the Sex*, by the *Age*, by the *Country*, by *Health* and *Sickneſs*, by *Beauty* and *Deformity*, and the like, which are inherent, and not extern: And again thoſe which are cauſed by extern Fortune: As *Sovereignty*, *Nobility*, *obſcure Birth*, *Riches*, *Want*, *Magiſtracy*, *Privateneſs*, *Proſperity*, *Adverſity*, *Conſtant Fortune*, *Variable Fortune*, *Riſing* per ſaltum, per gradus, *(all at once, or gradually)* and the like: And therefore we ſee that *Plautus* maketh it a Wonder to ſee an Old Man beneficent, *Benignitas hujus ut adoleſcentuli eſt (he is as generous as a Young Fellow.)* St. *Paul* concludeth that Severity of Diſcipline was to be uſed to the *Cretans (Rebuke them ſharply)* upon the Diſpoſition of their Country, *(the Cretans are always Liars, evil Beaſts, ſlow Bellies,* Tit. 1.) *Salluſt* noteth that it is uſual with Kings to deſire Contradictories, *Sed plerumq; Regiæ*

voluntates, ut vehementes ſunt, ſic mobiles, ſæpeq; ipſæ ſibi adverſæ. Tacitus obſerveth how rarely Raiſing of the Fortune mendeth the Diſpoſition, *Solus Veſpaſianus mutatus in melius. Pindar* makes an Obſervation that great and ſudden Fortune looſens and diſſinews Men's Minds, *There are ſome that are not able to digeſt great Felicity.*. So the *Pſalm* ſheweth it is more eaſy to keep a Meaſure in the enjoying of Fortune, than in the Increaſe of Fortune; *If Riches increaſe, ſet not your Heart upon them.* Theſe Obſervations and the like, I deny not, but are touched a little by *Ariſtotle*, as in Paſſage, in his Rhetoricks, and are handled in ſome ſcattered Diſcourſes, but they were never incorporate into Moral Philoſophy, to which they do eſſentially belong; as the Knowledge of the Diverſity of Grounds doth to Agriculture, and the Knowledge of the Diverſity of Complexions and Conſtitutions doth to the Phyſician; except we mean to follow the Indiſcretion of Empiricks, who adminiſter the ſame Medicines to all Patients, of what Conſtitution ſoever.

ANOTHER Article of this Knowledge is the Inquiry touching the Affections: For as in Medicining of the Body, the firſt Thing in Order is, to know the divers Complexions and Conſtitutions; ſecondly, the Diſeaſes; and laſtly, the Cures: So in Medicining of the Mind, after Knowledge of the divers Characters

racters of Men's Natures, it followeth in Order to know the Diſeaſes and Infirmities of the Mind, which are no other than the Perturbations and Diſtempers of the Affections. For as the Antient Politiques in Popular States were wont to Compare the People to the Sea, and the Orators to the Winds; becauſe as the Sea would of it ſelf be calm and quiet, if the Winds did not move and trouble it; ſo the People would be peaceable and tractable, if the ſeditious Orators did not ſet them in Working and Agitation: So it may be fitly ſaid, that the Mind of Man in the Nature thereof, would be temperate and ſtayed, if the Affections, as Winds, did not put it into Tumult and Perturbation. And here again I find it ſtrange, as before, that *Ariſtotle* ſhould have written divers Volumes of Ethiques, and never handled the Affections, which is the principal Subject thereof, and yet in his Rhetoricks, where they are conſidered but Collaterally, and in a ſecond Degree (that is, ſo far as they may be rais'd and moved by Speech) he findeth Place for them, and handleth them well for the Quantity; but where their true Place is, he pretermitteth them. For it is not his Diſputations about Pleaſure and Pain, that can ſatisfy this Inquiry, no more than he that ſhould generally handle the Nature of Light, can be ſaid to handle the Nature of Colours: For Pleaſure and Pain are to the particular Affections, as Light is to particular Colours.

Colours. Better Travels, I ſuppoſe, had the *Stoicks* taken in this Argument, as far as I can gather by that which we have at ſecond hand: But yet it is like, it was after their manner, rather in Subtilty of Definitions, (which, in a Subject of this Nature, are but Curioſities) than in active and ample Deſcriptions and Obſervations. So likewiſe I find ſome particular Writings of an elegant Nature touching ſome of the Affections, as of *Anger*, of *Comfort upon adverſe Accidents*, of *Tenderneſs of Countenance*, and ſome few other. But to ſpeak Truth, the beſt Doctors of this Knowledge are the Poets and Writers of Hiſtories, where we may find painted forth with great Life, How Affections are kindled and incited; how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from Act, and further Degree; how they diſcloſe and betray themſelves, tho' checkt and hid; how they work; how they vary; how they gather, and fortify; how they are enwrapt one within another; and how they fight and encounter one with another, and other the like Particularities: Amongſt the which, this laſt is of ſpecial Uſe in Moral and Civil Matters; how I ſay to ſet Affection againſt Affection, and to maſter one by another; even as we uſe to hunt Beaſt with Beaſt, and fly Bird with Bird, which otherwiſe perchance we could not ſo eaſily recover: Upon which Foundation is erected that excellent Uſe of *Reward* and *Puniſhment*,

niſhment, whereby Civil States conſiſt, imploying the predominant Affections of *Fear* and *Hope*, for the ſuppreſſing and bridling the reſt. For as in the Government of States, it is neceſſary to bridle one Faction with another, ſo it is in the Government Within.

NOW come we to thoſe Points which are within our own Command, and have Force and Operation upon the Mind to affect the Will and Appetite, and to alter Manners: Wherein the Philoſophers ought to have made a diligent and painful Inquiry concerning the Force and Energy of *Cuſtom*, *Exerciſe*, *Habit*, *Education*, *Imitation*, *Emulation*, *Company*, *Friendſhip*, *Praiſe*, *Reproof*, *Exhortation*, *Fame*, *Laws*, *Books*, *Studies*, and the like. For theſe are the Points which have Dominion in *Morality*; From theſe Agents the Mind ſuffereth, and is turn'd about: Of theſe, as Ingredients, Receipts are compounded, which conduce to the Preſervation and Recovery of the Health and Good Eſtate of the Mind, as far as pertaineth to Human Medicine. Of which Number we will ſelect ſome one or two to inſiſt upon as an Example of the reſt, becauſe it were too long to proſecute all; and therefore we reſume *Cuſtom* and *Habit* to touch upon.

THAT Opinion of *Ariſtotle* ſeems to me to favour much of Negligence, and a narrow Contemplation, where he aſſerts, That over thoſe

thoſe Actions which are natural, *Cuſtom* hath no Power; uſing for Example; That if a Stone be thrown ten thouſand Times up, it will not learn to aſcend of it ſelf; And that by often Seeing or Hearing, we do not learn to See or Hear the better. For though this Principle be true in Things wherein Nature is *Peremptory* (the Reaſon whereof we cannot now ſtand to diſcuſs) yet it is otherwiſe in Things, wherein Nature, according to a Latitude, admitteth of *Intention* and *Remiſſion*. For he might ſee that a ſtreight Glove will come more eaſily on with Uſe, and that a Wand will by Uſe bend otherwiſe than it grew: And that by Uſe of the Voice, we ſpeak louder and ſtronger: And that by Uſe of enduring Heat and Cold, we endure it the better: Which two latter Examples have a nearer Reſemblance to the Subject he is handling, than thoſe Inſtances which he alledgeth. But allowing his Concluſion, *That Virtues and Vices conſiſt in Habit*, he ought ſo much the more to have taught the manner of ſuperinducing that Habit: For a great many Precepts may be given concerning the wiſe Ordering of the Mind, no leſs than thoſe of the Body. We will recite a few of them.

THE Firſt ſhall be, to beware, at the very Beginning, of harder, or ſmaller Taſks, than the Caſe requires: For if too great a Burden be laid on, in a diffident Nature, you'll

you'll blunt the Chearfulneſs of good Hopes: In a Nature full of Aſſurance, you'll raiſe an Opinion, whereby a Man will promiſe himſelf more than he is able to perform; which occaſions Sloth. And in both Tempers, it will come to paſs, that the Experiment will not ſatisfy the Expectation; which ever diſcourages and confounds the Mind. But if the Tasks are too eaſy, as to the Progreſs, in the main, there's great Loſs.

A Second ſhall be, that for the Exerciſing of any Faculty, whereby a Habit may be acquir'd, two Seaſons chiefly be obſerv'd: The One, when the Mind is beſt diſpoſed for the Thing; the Other, when it is worſt: That by the former, we may rid Ground amain; and by the latter, we may by a ſtrenuous Contention work out the Knots and Stops of the Mind: Whereby the middle Times will paſs eaſily and ſmoothly.

THE Third Precept ſhall be that which *Ariſtotle* mentions by the by; That we bear with all our Might (provided it be a Thing not vicious) towards the contrary of that, whereunto we are by Nature moſt inclin'd: Like as when we row againſt the Stream; or bend a crooked Wand, to make it ſtraight, the contrary Way.

THE

THE Fourth Precept depends upon a Principle that is moſt True; *viz.* That the Mind is more happily and ſweetly brought to any Thing, if that, at which we aim, be not principal in the Intention of the Doer, but be maſter'd as it were, *aliud agendo*; becauſe ſuch is the Inſtinct of Nature, that ſhe in a manner hates Neceſſity and ſevere Commands. Many other Rules there are which may profitably be preſcribed touching the Direction of Cuſtom: For Cuſtom, if it be wiſely and skilfully induced, really proves (as is commonly ſaid) a ſecond Nature: But if it be conducted unskilfully, and at hap-hazard, it will be only Nature's Ape; which imitates nothing to the Life, but only unhandſomly and uglily.

IN like manner, if we would ſpeak of Books and Studies, and of their Power and Influence upon Manners; are there not divers Precepts, and uſeful Directions appertaining thereunto? Hath not one of the Fathers, in great Indignation, called Poetry, the Wine of Devils; becauſe it really ſprings a World of Temptations, Deſires, and vain Opinions? Is it not a very wiſe Opinion of *Ariſtotle*'s, and worthy to be well-weigh'd; *That Young Men are not fit Auditors of Moral Philoſophy; becauſe the Boyling of their Paſſions is not yet ſettled, nor laid aſleep by Time and Experience?*

Experience? And to ſpeak Truth, is not this the Reaſon, that thoſe moſt excellent Books and Diſcourſes of Antient Writers (whereby Men are moſt powerfully invited to Virtue; as well by repreſenting Her Auguſt Majeſty to the Eyes of all; as by expoſing to Scorn, popular Opinions, attir'd as it were, to the Diſgrace of Virtue, in the Habit of Paraſites) are of ſo little Effect towards Honeſty of Life, and the Reformation of corrupt Manners; becauſe they uſe not to be read and revolv'd by Men mature in Years and Judgment, but are left only to Boys and Beginners? Is not this alſo true, that Young Men are much leſs fit Auditors of Policy than Morality, till they are throughly ſeaſon'd with Religion, and the Doctrine of Manners and Duties; leſt haply their Judgments being deprav'd and corrupted, they ſhould come to think, that there are no Moral Differences true and ſolid of Things; but that all is to be meaſur'd by Utility or Succeſs? As the Poet ſays:

Proſperum & felix ſcelus Virtus vocatur.

AND again:

Ille crucem pretium ſceleris tulit, hic diadema.

BUT the Poets, you'll ſay, ſpeak this Satyrically, and by way of Indignation: Yes, but ſome Books of Politicks ſuppoſe the ſame Thing

Thing seriously and positively. For so it pleases *Machiavel* to say: *That if* Cæsar *had happen'd to have been overthrown, he would have been more odious than even* Catiline. As tho' I warrant there was no Difference, but in Fortune only, between a Fury, composed of Lust and Blood, and an exalted Spirit, and of all Mortals (Ambition apart) most to be admired. We see by this very Thing also, how necessary it is for Men to drink deep of Pious and Moral Doctrines, before they taste of Politicks; for that they who are bred up in the Courts of Princes, and in Affairs of State, from their tender Years, hardly ever attain a sincere and inward Probity of Manners; how much less if there be added thereto the Discipline of Corrupt Books also? Again, even in Moral Instructions themselves, or at least some of them, is not Caution likewise to be used, lest Men become thereby Stiff, Arrogant, and Insociable, according to that of *Cicero*, touching *M. Cato? Hæc bona, quæ videmus divina & egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria: quæ nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a natura, sed a magistro: These Divine and Excellent Qualities which we see, are, assure your selves, his own proper Endowments. But the Things we sometimes think him deficient in, they are all deriv'd not from Nature, but from his Instructor*; (*Zeno.*) Many other Axioms and Advises there are touching those Properties and Effects, which Studies

Studies do infuſe and inſtill into Manners. For that is a true Saying, *Abeunt Studia in Mores:* Which may equally be affirm'd of thoſe other Points of *Company*, *Fame*, *Laws*, and the reſt, which we recited in the Beginning of the Doctrine of *Morality*.

BUT there is a *Culture* of the *Mind*, that ſeemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the reſt, and is built upon this Ground; *That the Minds of all Men are at ſome Times in a State more perfect, and at other Times in a State more depraved.* The Purpoſe therefore and Intention of this *Culture* is, to fix and cheriſh thoſe *Good Seaſons*, and to ſtrike out of the Calendar as it were, and expunge the *Evil*. The *Fixation* of the *good Times* is procured by two Means; *Vows*, or at leaſt moſt ſteady *Reſolutions*; and by *Obſervances* and *Exerciſes*; which are not to be regarded ſo much in themſelves, as becauſe they keep the Mind in continual Obedience. The *Obliteration* of the *Evil* may in like manner be brought about two ways; by ſome kind of *Redemption*, or *Expiation of that which is paſt*; and by a *Beginning*, or *an Account de novo for the Time to come.* But this Part ſeems wholly to belong to Divinity, and juſtly; ſince the true and genuine *Moral Philoſophy* (as was ſaid) is but an Handmaid to Religion.

WHEREFORE we will conclude this Part concerning the *Culture* of the *Mind* with that Remedy, which of all other is the most Compendious and Summary; And again the most noble and effectual to the forming of the Mind to Virtue, and placing it in a State next to Perfection. And it is this, *The electing and propounding unto a Man's self good and virtuous Ends of his Life and Actions; which yet must be such as may be in a reasonable sort within his Compass to attain.* For if these two Things be supposed, *That a Man set before him honest and good Ends; and again, that he be Resolute, Constant, and True unto them*; it will follow that he shall mould himself into all Virtue at once. And this is indeed like *the Work of Nature*; whereas the other Course is like the *Work of the Hand.* For as when a *Carver* cuts and carves an Image, he shapes only that part of the Figure which he is working upon, and none of the rest; (as if he be upon the Face, the rest of the Body remains a rude and formless Stone, till such Time as he comes to it:) But contrariwise when *Nature* makes a *Flower*, or *Living Creature*, she forms the Rudiments of all the Parts at one Time: After the same manner in obtaining Virtue by *Habit*, while a Man practises Temperance, he does not profit much as to Fortitude, nor the like: But when we dedicate and devote our selves wholly to *good and*

and honeſt Ends, look what Virtue ſoever the Purſuit and Paſſage towards thoſe *Ends* commend unto us, we ſhall find our ſelves inveſted with a precedent Diſpoſition to conform our ſelves thereunto. And this may be that State of Mind, which is excellently deſcribed by *Ariſtotle*, and which he ſays ought not to be called *Virtuous*, but *Divine*. His Words are theſe, *It may be reaſonable to oppoſe to Immanity that Ability which is above Humanity*, namely, *Heroical* or *Divine Virtue*. And a little after; *For as a Beaſt is not capable of Vice or Virtue, ſo neither is the Deity. But for this State, it is a certain Thing exalted above Virtue; That, a certain Thing different from Vice.* And therefore we may ſee what Celſitude of Honour *Plinius Secundus* attributes to *Trajan*, from an Exceſs of Heathen Magniloquence, when he ſaid, *That Men needed to make no other Prayers to the Gods, than that they would continue to be as Good and Propitious Lords to them, as* Trajan *had been*; as if he had not been only an Imitation of Divine Nature, but a Pattern of it. But theſe are Heathen and Prophane Boaſtings, having but a Shadow of that Divine State of Mind, which Religion and the Holy Faith doth conduct Men unto, by imprinting upon their Souls *Charity*, which is excellently called *the Bond of Perfection*, becauſe it comprehends and faſtens all Virtues together. And it is elegantly ſaid by *Menander* of Senſual

Love, which is but a false Imitation of Divine Love; *Amor, melior Sophista lævo, ad humanam vitam,* That Love teaches a Man to carry himself better, than the *Sophist* or *Præceptor,* whom he calls *Left-handed,* because with all his Rules and Precepts he cannot form a Man so *dextrously,* nor with that Facility to value himself, and govern himself, as Love can do: So certainly if a Man's Mind be truly inflamed with *Charity,* it doth work him suddenly into greater Perfection, than all the Doctrine of Morality can do, which is but a *Sophist* in Comparison of the other. Nay, farther, as *Zenophon* observ'd truly, that all other Affections, though they raise the Mind, yet they do it by Distorting, and Uncomelinesses of Extasies or Excesses; but only Love exalts the Mind, and nevertheless at the same Instant settles and composes it: So all other Human Excellencies, which we admire, tho' they advance Nature, yet they are subject to Excess; only Charity admits no Excess. For so we see, aspiring to be like God in Power, the Angels transgress'd and fell; *I will ascend, and be like the Highest:* By aspiring to be like God in Knowledge, Man transgress'd and fell; *Ye shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evil:* But by aspiring to a Similitude of God in Goodness or Love, neither Man nor Angel ever transgress'd, or shall transgress. Nay, unto this Imitation we are even called, *Love your Enemies, do Good to them that hate you,*

and

and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you; that you may be the Children of your Father which is in Heaven, who makes his Sun to rise on the Evil, and on the Good, and sends Rain upon the Just, and upon the Unjust. So in the first Platform of the Divine Nature, the Heathen Religion speaketh thus (*Best, Greatest;*) And the Sacred Scriptures thus; *His Mercy is above all his Works.*

AND thus we conclude this Part of *Moral Knowledge* concerning the *Culture and Regiment of the Mind.* Wherein, if a Man, considering the Parts thereof, which I have touched upon, do judge, that I have taken Pains only to collect into an *Art* or *Science*, that which hath been pretermitted by other Writers, as common and obvious, and plain and clear enough of it self; he judgeth well. In the mean Time, let him remember that which I hinted at the Beginning, that my Design was, not to pursue the Flourish and Beauty of Things, but their Use and Truth. And as *Philocrates* sported with *Demosthenes*; You must not wonder, (*Athenians*) *that* Demosthenes *and I differ, for he drinks Water, and I drink Wine:* And like as we read of an antient Parable of *the two Gates of Sleep*;

Sunt geminæ Somni portæ: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, quâ veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera, candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,
Sed falſa ad Cælum mittunt inſomnia manes.

Virg. Æn. 6. 893.

Two Gates the ſilent Houſe of Sleep adorn;
Of Poliſh'd Iv'ry This; That, of tranſparent Horn:
True Viſions through tranſparent Horn ariſe;
Thro' poliſh'd Iv'ry paſs deluding Lies.

Dryden.

SO if we put on Sobriety and Attention, we ſhall find it a ſure Maxim in Knowledge, that the more pleaſant Liquor of *Wine* is the more vaporous; and the ſtatelier Gate of *Ivory* ſendeth forth the falſer Dreams.

AND thus we have concluded *that general Part of Human Philoſophy, which contemplateth Man, as he conſiſts of Body and Spirit.* By way of Supplement, that Obſervation

ſervation about *Moral Knowledge* may be ſet down, which is, *That there is a Kind of Relation and Conformity between the Good of the Mind, and the Good of the Body.* For as *the Good of the Body* conſiſts, as hath been ſaid, of *Health*, *Beauty*, *Strength*, and *Pleaſure*; So the *Good of the Mind*, if we conſider it according to the Axioms of *Moral Knowledge*, we ſhall perceive to tend to this Point; "To "make the Mind ſound, and free from "Perturbation; Beautiful, and graced with "the Ornaments of true Decency; Strong, "and Agil to all the Duties of Life; "*Laſtly*, Not Stupid, but retaining a quick "and lively Senſe of Pleaſure, and Ho-"neſt Recreation." But theſe Four, as in the Body, ſo in the Mind, ſeldom meet all together. For it is eaſy to obſerve, that many have Strength of Wit and Courage, but have neither Health from Perturbations, nor any Beauty, or Decency in their Actions: Some again have an Elegancy and Fineneſs of Carriage, who have neither Soundneſs of Honeſty, nor Subſtance of Sufficiency: And ſome again have honeſt and reform'd Minds, who are neither an Ornament to themſelves, nor uſeful to the Publick: Others, who perhaps are Maſters of three of them, but yet being poſſeſs'd with a certain Stoical

Sadneſs, and Stupidity, practiſe indeed the Actions of Virtue, but have none of the Pleaſures of it. And if it chance, that of theſe *Four*, *Two* or *Three* meet, yet (as was ſaid) a Concurrence of all Four very rarely happens.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Civil Converſation.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.

Lib. 8. Cap. 1.

CONVERSATION certainly ought not to be affected, but much leſs neglected; ſince a prudent Government of it, both carries in it ſelf a certain Gracefulneſs of Manners; and is of huge Service towards a clever Management of Buſineſs, as well Publick as Private. For as Action in an Orator is ſo much regarded (tho' it be but an outward Quality) that it is preferr'd even before thoſe other Parts, which ſeem more grave and intrinſick; in the

the ſame manner almoſt, in a Man of a Civil Practick Life, Converſation, and the Regimen thereof, (tho' it be converſant about Exteriors) finds, tho' not the chiefeſt, yet certainly an eminent Place. For of how great Importance is the very Countenance, and the Compoſure thereof? The Poet ſays well:

——— *Nec vultu deſtrue verba tuo.*

FOR a Man may undermine, and utterly betray the Force of his Words, with his Countenance. Nay our Actions, as well as Words, may likewiſe be deſtroy'd by the Countenance, if we may believe *Cicero:* Who recommending to his Brother Affability towards the Provincials; ſaid it did not principally conſiſt in this, the giving eaſy Acceſs to his Perſon, unleſs likewiſe he receiv'd them Courteouſly with his very Countenance: *Nil intereſt habere oſtium apertum, vultum clauſum: To admit Men with an open Door, and to receive them with a ſhut and reſerved Countenance:* We ſee likewiſe *Atticus*, upon the firſt Interview between *Cicero* and *Cæſar*, the War as yet at the Height, did diligently and ſeriouſly adviſe *Cicero*, by a Letter touching the Compoſing of his Countenance and Geſture to Dignity and Gravity. Now if the Management of the Face and Countenance alone, be of ſuch effect, how much more, Familiar

miliar Speech, and other Carriage, appertaining to Converſation? And indeed the Summ and Abridgment of the Grace, and Elegancy of Behaviour, is compriz'd moſtly in this; *the Meaſuring in a juſt Ballance, as it were, and maintaining, both our own Dignity, and that of Others.* Which thing is well expreſs'd alſo by *T. Livius* (tho' intended do ſomething elſe) in that Character of a Perſon; *Leſt* (ſays he) *I ſhould ſeem either Arrogant, or Obnoxious: Whereof the one is the Humour of a Man, that is forgetful of another's Liberty: the other, of a Man, that forgets his own.*

BUT on the other ſide, if we ſtudy Urbanity, and outward Elegancy of Behaviour, too much, they paſs into a deformed, adulterate Affectation: *Quid enim deformius, quam Scenam in vitam transferre? What can be a more deform'd Spectacle, than to transfer the Scene into our common Courſe of Life?* Further, tho' they fall not by any means into that vicious Extreme; yet too much Time is conſumed in thoſe ſmall Matters, and the Mind is depreſs'd and bow'd to the Study of them, more than is fit. And therefore, as in the Univerſities, Young Students, too much addicted to keep Company, uſe to be put in Mind by their Tutors, *Amicos eſſe fures temporis, That Friends are the Thieves of Time:* So certainly this ſame continual Intention of Mind,

Mind, upon the Grace of Converſation, is a great Pilferer of more ſerious Meditations. Again, ſuch as are ſo exactly accompliſh'd in Urbanity, and ſeem, as it were, form'd by Nature for this Thing alone, have commonly this Quality to pleaſe themſelves in that only, and ſcarce ever to aſpire after more ſolid and higher Virtues: Whereas on the contrary, thoſe that are conſcious to themſelves of a Defect this way, ſeek Comelineſs from a good Reputation; For where a good Reputation is, almoſt all Things are Becoming; but where that fails, in ſuch Caſe, a Supply muſt be fetcht from Exactneſs of Behaviour, and Urbanity. Again, there is ſcarce a greater or more frequent Impediment of Action, than an over-curious Obſervance of this ſame outward *Decorum:* And that other Attendant of it; namely, A ſcrupulous Election of Time and Opportunities. For *Solomon* ſaith excellently, *Qui reſpicit ad*, &c. *He that regards the Winds ſhall not ſow: And he that regards the Clouds, ſhall not reap.* For we muſt make Opportunity, oftner than wait it. To conclude in a Word, This Graceful Compoſition of Behaviour, is as it were the Garment of the Mind: And therefore ought to reſemble the good Conditions of a Garment. For firſt, it ought to be ſuch as is in Faſhion: Next, not to be too curious or coſtly: Then, to be ſo contriv'd, as to ſet forth any good Shape of the

the Mind, moſt to View; and to ſupply and hide any Deformity: Laſtly, and above all, it ought not to be too ſtrait, nor ſo to reſtrain the Spirit, as to check and hinder the Motions thereof in Buſineſs.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The Architect of his Fortune.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 8. Cap. 1.

HERE is a certain Wisdom of giving Counsel to others; and there is another Wisdom also of Forecasting for a Man's own Fortune: And those sometimes meet; but they are oftner sever'd. For many are exceeding Wise in ordering their own Affairs; who are notwithstanding very weak as to the Administration of Civil Affairs, or giving Counsel: Like the Ant, which is a wise Creature for it self, but very hurtful in a Garden. This Virtue *of being Wise for ones self*, was not unknown to the *Romans* themselves, tho' excellent Patriots: Whence the Comick Poet; *Certainly the Mould of a Wise Man's Fortune is in his own Hands.* Nay, it grew into an Adagy with them, *Every Man is the Architect of*

of his own Fortune. And *Livy* attributes the same to *Cato the Elder*; *In this Man there was such a Strength of Understanding, and Natural Endowments, that wheresoever his Nativity had cast him, he seem'd able to have made his own Fortune.*

THIS Kind of Prudence, if a Man professes it, and openly boasts of it, hath ever been thought not only Impolitick, but an unlucky and ominous thing: As was observ'd in *Timotheus* the *Athenian*; who, after he had done many excellent Services to the Honour and Benefit of his Country, and was giving an Account (as the Manner then was) of his Administration to the People; concluded every Particular with this Clause; *And in this thing Fortune had no Share.* But it fell out, that he never prosper'd in any thing he took in Hand afterwards. This is in truth too high and arrogant; savouring of that of *Ezekiel* concerning *Pharaoh*; *Thou sayest the River is mine own, and I have made my self.* Ezek. 29. 3. Or that of *Habacuc* the Prophet; *They exalt and Sacrifice to their own Net.* Or that of the Poet, concerning *Mezentius* the Despiser of the Gods;

Dextra

Dextra mihi Dens, & telum quod miſſile libro,
Nunc adſint. ——

My ſtrong right Hand, and Sword, aſſiſt my Stroke;
There only Gods Mezentius will Invoke.
Dryden.

Finally, *Julius Cæſar*, never (to my Remembrance) betrayed the Impotence of his hidden Thoughts but by an Expreſſion of like Nature: For when the Soothſayer inform'd him, *That the Entrails were not proſperous*, he murmur'd in a low Voice to himſelf; *They ſhall be more lucky when I pleaſe.* Which very ſaying did not long precede the Misfortune of his Death. But this ſame exceſs of Confidence (as we have ſaid) as it is an unhallowed thing, ſo it is unbleſt. Wherefore Great Men, and truly Wiſe, have thought good to aſcribe all their Succeſſes to their Felicity, not to their Virtue or Induſtry: For both *Sylla* Sirnamed himſelf *Felix* not *Magnus*; and *Cæſar* (more adviſedly than before) ſays to the Pilot; *Thou carrieſt Cæſar, and his Fortune.*

NEVERTHELESS, ſuch Poſitions as theſe; *Every Man is the Architect of his own Fortune. A Wiſe Man will command the Stars. No way is impaſſible to Virtue*, and the like; if they be underſtood and applied rather as Spurs to Induſtry, than as Stirrops to Inſolence; and more

more to beget in Men Constancy and Strength of Resolution, than Arrogance and Boasting; have been deservedly accounted sound and healthful, and, no question, have found Place in Great Minds; to that Degree, that sometimes they can scarce dissemble such Thoughts. For we see *Augustus Cæsar* (who compared with his Uncle, was rather different, than inferior; but certainly a Person somewhat mord staid and better govern'd) at the End of his Life, desired of his Friends that stood about his Bed, that when he had Expired, they would give him a *Plaudite*; as if he were conscious to himself; *That he had play'd his Part well upon the Stage of Life.* This Part of Knowledge also may be reckoned among the *Deficients:* Not but that it is used and frequented in Practice, abundantly more than is fitting; but because Books concerning this Argument are silent. Wherefore we will recite some Heads of it; and call it, *The Architect of Fortune*; or, *A Doctrine concerning the Course of Life for Advancement.*

AND at the first View, I shall seem to handle a new and unusual Argument; in teaching Men how they may be Contrivers of their own Fortune; a Doctrine, no doubt, to which every Man will willingly yield himself up a Disciple, till he throughly sees the Difficulty of it. For the Requisites to the Purchase of a Fortune, are neither lighter,

nor fewer, nor leſs difficult, than to the Purchaſe of Virtue; And it is as hard, and ſevere a Thing, to be a true Politique, as to be truly Moral. But the Handling of this Doctrine concerns greatly the Honour of Learning. For it is of ſpecial Importance to the Credit of Learning, that *Pragmatick* Men may know, that Learning is no way like ſome ſmall Bird, as the Lark, that is wont to mount, and ſing, and pleaſe her ſelf, and nothing elſe: But further, that ſhe is a Kind of Hawk rather, that can both ſoar aloft, and every now and then, when ſhe ſees her Time, ſtoop, and ſeize her Prey. Again, this Kind of Wiſdom relates to the *Perfection* of Learning, becauſe it is the true Rule of a perfect Inquiry after Truth, *That nothing be found in the Globe of Matter, that hath not a Parallel in the Chriſtalline Globe, or the Intellect:* That is, that there be not any Thing in Being and Action, that ſhould not be drawn and collected into Contemplation and Doctrine. And yet Learning does not admire or eſteem of this Architecture of Fortune, otherwiſe than as a Work of an inferior Kind. For no Man's particular Fortune can be an End any way worthy of his Being. Nay it often happens, that Men of excellent Virtues abandon their Fortune of their own Accord, that they may have Leiſure for more ſublime Reſpects.

NEVER-

NEVERTHELESS, Fortune, as ſhe is an Inſtrument of Virtue, and of doing Good, deſerves to be conſidered in her Place, and to have ſome Inſtructions given about her.

UNTO this Doctrine appertain Precepts, ſome Summary and Principal; Others Scatter'd and Various. Precepts Summary are converſant about the true Knowledge both of Others, and of a Man's ſelf. The firſt Precept therefore, wherein the principal Point of the Knowledge of Others conſiſts, may be determin'd this; That we procure to our ſelves (as far as may be) that Window, which *Momus* once required. He, when he ſaw in the Frame of Man's Heart, ſo many Angles and Receſſes, found fault that there was not a Window, through which a Man might look into thoſe obſcure and crooked Windings. This Window we ſhall obtain, if with all Diligence we purchaſe and procure to our ſelves Information touching the particular Perſons, with whom we negotiate and have to do; as alſo of their Natures, their Deſires, their Ends, their Cuſtoms and Faſhions, their Helps and Props whereby they are chiefly ſupported, and are ſtrong and powerful; ſo again, of their Defects and Weakneſſes, and in what Part they lie moſt open, and obnoxious; of their Friends, Factions, Patrons, Dependencies; and again of their Enemies, En-

viers, Competitors; as alſo their Times, and Seaſons of Acceſs:

Sola viri molles aditus & tempora noras:
Virg. Æn. 4.

——*You only know what Time is beſt,*
To move the haughty Foe with my Requeſt.
Lauderdale.

LASTLY, The Principles and Rules which they have ſet down to themſelves, and the like. Furthermore, Information is to be taken not only of Perſons, but of particular Actions alſo, which from Time to Time are on Foot, and as it were upon the Anvil; how they are conducted and ſucceed; by whoſe Endeavours they are further'd; by whom they are oppoſed; and of what Weight and Moment they are; and what may be their Conſequence, and the like. For the Knowledge of preſent Actions, is both very material in it ſelf, and carries in it this alſo, that without it, the Knowledge of Perſons too is like to be very deceitful and erroneous. For Men change with the Actions: And are one thing, while they are engaged and environed with Buſineſs; and another, when they return to their Nature.

AND that ſuch Knowledge may be compaſſed, *Solomon* is our Surety, who ſaith; *Counſel in the Heart of Man is like a deep Water*;

Water; *but a wise Man will draw it out.* And although the Knowledge it self fall not under Precept, because it is of Individuals, yet Instructions for the fetching it out, may with Profit be given.

THE Knowledge of Men may be gathered and drawn out six Ways: By their Faces and Countenances: By their Words: By their Deeds: By their Tempers: By their Ends: Lastly, By the Relations of others.

AS for the Countenance, let not the antient Adagy move us, *Fronti nulla fides*; *there's no Trust to be given to the Countenance*; for although this Saying may not be amiss, touching the outward and general Composure of the Countenance and Gesture; yet there are certain secret and more subtil Motions and Labours of the Eyes, Face, Looks, and Behaviour, by which (as *Q. Cicero* elegantly saith) the *Gate of the Mind* is as it were unlock'd and open'd.

AS for Men's Words, they are (as Physicians say of People's Water) full of Flattery and Deceit; yet these counterfeit meretricious Varnishes are two Ways excellently discovered; Namely, when Words are uttered, either upon a Surprize; or in a Passion. So *Tiberius* being suddenly mov'd, and carried away a little, by a stinging Speech of *Agrip-*

pina, came a Step out of his innate Simulation; *Theſe Words* (ſaith *Tacitus*) *being heard by him, drew from his dark Breaſt ſuch Words as he uſed ſeldom to let fall; and taking her up ſharply, he told her her own in a Verſe; That ſhe was therefore hurt, becauſe ſhe did not reign.* Wherefore the Poet does not improperly call ſuch Paſſions, *Tortures*, becauſe they urge Men to confeſs their Secrets;

Vino tortus & ira;

Rack'd by Wine and Anger.

INDEED Experience it ſelf ſhews that there are very few Men ſo true to themſelves, and ſo ſettled in their Reſolutions, but that ſometimes upon Heat of Paſſion; ſometimes upon Bravado; ſometimes upon entire Good Will to a Friend; ſometimes upon Weakneſs of Mind, that can no longer hold out under the Weight of Thought; ſometimes, laſtly, upon ſome other Affection and Paſſion, they will reveal and communicate their inmoſt Thoughts. But above all, it ſounds the Mind to the Bottom, and ſearches all its Folds, when Simulation is attack'd by a Counter-Simulation; according to the *Spaniſh* Proverb, *Tell a Lye, and find a Truth.*

NEI-

NEITHER are Deeds themſelves, tho' they be the ſureſt Pledges of Men's Minds, altogether to be truſted, without a diligent and judicious Conſideration, both of their Size and Nature. For the Saying is moſt true; *Fraud erects it ſelf Credit in ſmaller Matters, that it may cheat with better Advantage afterwards.* And the *Italian* thinks himſelf *upon the Croſs with the Cryer*, and upon the Point to be bought and ſold, when he is better uſed than he is wont to be, without manifeſt Cauſe. For thoſe *minor* Favours render Men careleſs, and lull them to Sleep as it were, both as to Caution, and as to Induſtry: And are rightly call'd by *Demoſthenes*, *The Baits of Sloth.* Again, we may plainly ſee the crafty and doubtful Nature of ſome Deeds, even of ſuch as paſs for Benefits, from that Particular, which *Mucianus* practis'd upon *Antonius Primus*; who after that hollow and unfaithful Reconcilement made with him, advanc'd abundance of *Antonius*'s Friends, beſtowing upon them Lieutenancies and Tribuneſhips. But by this Craft, he did not ſtrengthen, but altogether diſarm and deſolate *Antonius*, by bringing over his Friendſhips to himſelf.

BUT the ſureſt Key, to unlock the Minds of Men, turns in ſearching and getting throughly acquainted, either with their Diſ-

poſitions and Natures, or their Ends and Intentions. And certainly the weaker and more ſimple Sort of Men are beſt interpreted by their Natures; but the Wiſer and more Reſerv'd are beſt expounded by their Ends. For it was wiſely and pleaſantly ſaid (tho' in my Judgment not very truly) by a *Nuntio* of the Pope's, upon his Return from an Embaſſy in a certain Nation, where he had reſided as Ambaſſador in Ordinary. Being ask'd about the Choice of a Succeſſor, he gave Counſel, That they would by no means ſend one remarkably wiſe, but rather moderately ſo: *Becauſe* (ſays he) *no one wiſer than ordinary, will ever imagine, what they in that Country are like to do.* Certainly it is a frequent Error, and very familiar with wiſe Men, to meaſure other Men by the Model of their own Abilities; and ſo many Times to over-ſhoot the Mark, by ſuppoſing Men to project and deſign to themſelves deeper Ends, and to practiſe more ſubtle Arts, than ever came into their Heads. Which the *Italian* Proverb elegantly notes, ſaying; *That there is commonly leſs Money, leſs Wiſdom, leſs Honeſty, than Men reckon upon.* Wherefore if we are to deal with Men of a mean and ſhallow Capacity, the Conjecture muſt be taken from the Propenſions of their Nature, rather than from the Ends they may aim at. Furthermore, Princes alſo (but upon a far other Reaſon) are beſt judged of by their Natures; and private Perſons by their Ends.

For

For Princes being at the top of Human Desires, have commonly no particular Ends propounded to themselves, whereto they aspire, especially with Vehemence and Perseverance; by the Site and Distance of which Ends, a Direction and Scale of the rest of their Actions may be taken and made; which is one of the chief Causes, *that their Hearts* (as the Scripture pronounces) *are inscrutable.* But private Persons are like Travellers, who intently go on aiming at some End of their Journey, where they may stay and rest; from whence a Man may make a good Conjecture, what they will, or will not do. For if any Thing conduce to their End, it is probable they will put the same in Execution; if it cross their End, not. Neither is the Information touching the Diversity of Men's Ends and Natures, to be taken only *simply*, but *comparatively* also: As namely, What has the Predominancy and Command over the rest. So we see, *Tigellinus*, when he saw himself out-stripped by *Petronius Turpilianus* in administring and suggesting Pleasures to *Nero*, *search'd into* Nero's *Fears*, (as *Tacitus* says) and by this Means broke the Neck of his Rival.

AS for the knowing of Men's Minds, at second Hand; namely, by the Relations of others; it shall suffice to say this in short. Defects and Faults are best learn'd from Ene-

mies;

mies; Virtues and Abilities, from Friends; Customs and Times, from Servants; Notions and Studies, from intimate Confidents, with whom they most commonly discourse. Popular Fame is light; and the Judgments of Superiors uncertain. *The truest Reports come from Domesticks:* CIC. But the most compendious Way to this whole Inquiry consists in three Things: The First, To have a general Acquaintance and Intimacy with such Men as have look'd most into the World, and have a general Knowledge of Things, and Persons: But especially to endeavour to have Privacy and Conversation with some particular Friends, who, according to the Diversity of Business and Persons, are able to give us solid Information, and good Intelligence in every several Kind. The Second is, To keep a good Mediocrity both in Liberty of Speech, and Taciturnity: In most Things Liberty: Taciturnity, where there's Occasion. For Liberty of Speech invites and provokes Liberty to be used again; and so brings much to a Man's Knowledge: And Secrecy, on the other side, induces Trust and Intimacy, and makes Men love to lay up their Secrets with us, as in a Closet. The Last is the reducing of a Man's self to such a watchful and serene Habit, as in all Conferences, and Actions, both to carry on the Matter in hand, and at the same Time, to observe other Things that fall in by the By. For as *Epictetus* would have a

Phi-

Philosopher in every particular Action to say to himself, *I will do this, and yet go on in my Course*; So a Politician in every particular Business should say to himself; *I both intend to do this, and to learn somewhat into the Bargain also, which may be of Use for the future.* And therefore those Men that over-do the Thing in hand, and are entirely taken up with the present Business, without so much as thinking of Matters that intervene, (a Weakness that *Montaigue* confesses in himself) such indeed are the best Ministers of Princes, but fail in Point of their own Fortune. I have dwelt the longer upon this Precept of obtaining good Information, because it is a main Part of it self, and answereth to all the rest. But above all Things, Caution must be taken, that Men have a good Stay, and Hold of themselves, and that this Much Knowing do not draw on Much Meddling: For nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash Intermeddling in many Matters: So that this various Knowledge of Things and Persons, which we advise to be procured, tends in Conclusion but to this: To make a more judicious Choice both of those Actions we undertake, and of those Persons, whose Assistance we use; that so we may know how to conduct all Things with more Dexterity, and less Error.

AFTER

AFTER the Knowledge of Others, follows the Knowledge of our ſelves. For no leſs Diligence, but rather more, is to be uſed, in taking a true and exact Information of our ſelves, than of others. For that Oracle, *Know your ſelf*, is not only a Rule of univerſal Prudence, but has a ſpecial Place in Politicks too. For St. *James* excellently puts us in Mind; *That he that hath view'd his Face in a Glaſs, yet inſtantly forgets what Manner of Man he was*; ſo that there is great need of a frequent Inſpection. And the ſame holds alſo in Politicks: But the Glaſſes indeed are different: For the Divine Glaſs, in which we ought to behold our ſelves, is the Word of God; but the Politick Glaſs is nothing elſe but the State of Things and Times wherein we live.

THEREFORE a Man ought to take an impartial View, (and not ſuch as uſes to be taken by one too much in Love with himſelf,) of his own Abilities, Virtues and Supports; as likewiſe of his Defects, Inabilities, and Impediments; caſting up his Accounts in ſuch Manner, that he ever eſtimate *Theſe* with the moſt, *Thoſe* rather with the leaſt. And from ſuch a View and Diſquiſition, the following Points may come into Conſideration.

THE

THE first Consideration should be, how a Man's Constitution and Temper sorts with the Times; which if they be found agreeable and fit, then in all Things he may give himself more Scope and Liberty, and indulge his own Temper; but if there be any Antipathy and Dissonancy, then, in the whole Course of his Life, he must carry himself more cautiously and reservedly; and appear less in Publick. So did *Tiberius*, who being conscious to himself that his Temper did not sort very well with his Times, was never seen at Publick Plays; nay, for the last twelve Years successively he came not into the Senate: Whereas on the other Side, *Augustus* lived in Men's Eyes; which *Tacitus* also observes; *Alia Tiberio morum via*; *But* Tiberius *was of another Humour.* The same Method he took also to secure himself from Dangers.

LET the second Consideration be, how a Man's Nature sorts with the Professions and Courses of Life, which are in Use and Esteem, and out of which he is to make his Choice; that so if he be not resolv'd upon any way of Life, he may chuse that which is most fit and agreeable to his natural Disposition; but if he be already engaged in a Condition of Life, to which he is not so well fitted by Nature, let him draw off upon the first Occasion, and take another Profession; as we see was done

done by Duke *Valentine*, that was bred by his Father to a Sacerdotal Profeſſion, which nevertheleſs afterwards, in Compliance with the Bent of his Nature, he renounc'd, and applied himſelf to a Military Life; though equally unworthy the Dignity both of Prince and Prieſt, ſince the peſtilent Man was a Diſgrace to both.

LET the third Conſideration be, How a Man ſtands, in Compariſon with his Equals and Rivals, who are like to be his Competitors in his Fortune; and let him run that Courſe of Life, wherein there is the greateſt Solitude; and in which himſelf is like to be moſt Eminent: As *Julius Cæſar* did, who at firſt was an Orator, and Pleader, and was chiefly converſant in the Arts of Peace: But when he ſaw *Cicero*, *Hortenſius*, and *Catulus*, to excel in the Glory of Eloquence, and no Man very famous for Military Affairs but *Pompey*; he forſook his Courſe begun, and bidding a Farewell to Civil and Popular Greatneſs, he went over to the Military, and Imperatorian Arts; by which he aſcended to the Top of Sovereignty.

THE fourth Conſideration may be, That in the Choice of Friends and Dependants, a Man conſult his own Nature and Diſpoſition: For a different Kind of Friends ſuits different Perſons: The ſolemn and ſecret Kind, Some; The

The bold and boasting, Others. Certainly it is worth the observing, what Kind of Friends *Julius Cæsar*'s were; (*Antony*, *Hirtius*, *Pansa*, *Oppius*, *Balbus*, *Dolobella*, *Pollio*, and the rest) These Men had this Form of Swearing, *So may I dye whilst* Cæsar *lives*; shewing an infinite Affection to *Cæsar*; towards all others Arrogant and Contemptuous: And they were Men, in Business, strenuous; in Fame and Reputation, nothing extraordinary.

THE fifth Consideration may be, That a Man take heed how he guide himself by Examples; and that he do not fondly affect the Imitation of others; as if that which others can go through, must needs be as open to him; never considering with himself, what Difference, perhaps, there is betwixt his and their Natures, whom he hath chosen for his Pattern. This was manifestly *Pompey*'s Error, who, as *Cicero* records, was wont to say, Sylla *could do this, and can't I?* Wherein he deceiv'd himself hugely, the Natures and Proceedings of *Sylla* and Himself, being the unlikest in the World: The one being fierce, violent, and ever pressing the Fact; the other solemn, regardful of the Laws, directing all to Majesty and Fame; and therefore the less effectual and powerful to go through with his Designs. There are more Precepts of this Nature; but these shall suffice for Example to the rest.

NOR

NOR is the *Knowing of a Man's ſelf* ſufficient, but he muſt alſo conſult with himſelf upon a Way how he may cleverly and prudently ſet forth and reveal himſelf, and, in fine, turn, and wind, and faſhion himſelf to all Occaſions. As for the ſetting himſelf forth, we ſee nothing more uſual, than for the leſs able Man to make the greater Shew. Wherefore it is no ſmall Gift of Prudence, for a Man to be able to ſet himſelf forth with a Kind of Art and Gracefulneſs; by aptly diſplaying his Virtues, Merits, and Fortune alſo, (as far as may be done without Arrogance or Nauſeouſneſs;) and again, in the artificial Covering of his Weakneſſes, Defects, Misfortunes and Diſgraces; dwelling upon *thoſe*, and as it were turning them to the Light; ſeeking Excuſes for *theſe*, or waſhing them away by an apt Interpretation, and the like. Therefore *Tacitus* ſays of *Mucianus*, who was the greateſt Politick of his Time, and the moſt indefatigable in Buſineſs; *Omnium quæ diceret atq; ageret, Arte quadam Oſtentator. He was one that had the Art to make the moſt Shew of whatſoever he ſpake or did.* This Affair requires indeed ſome Art, that it may not occaſion Nauſeouſneſs and Contempt: Yet ſo, that ſome Kind of Oſtentation (tho' to the firſt Degree of Vanity) ſeems rather a Vice in Morals, than in Politicks. For as it is uſually ſaid of Slander; *Slander boldly, ſomewhat*

ſomewhat ever ſticks: So may it be ſaid of Oſtentation, (unleſs it be in a ridiculous Degree of Deformity) *Boaſt ſtoutly, ſomewhat always ſticks.* It will ſtick certainly with the People, though the more Wiſe ſmile at it. Therefore Reputation won with the Moſt, will eaſily countervail the Diſdain of a Few. Now if this Oſtentation of a Man's ſelf, of which we are ſpeaking, be managed with Decency and Diſcretion; For Example, If it carry the Appearance of a native Candor and Ingenuity; or if it be uſed at Times either of Danger, (as by Military Perſons in Time of War) or when others are much envied; or if the Words, which reſpect a Man's own Praiſe, ſeem to fall from a Man, as a Thing not principally intended, and without either inſiſting ſeriouſly, or dwelling too long upon them; or if a Man ſo praiſe himſelf, as at the ſame Time not to forbear even Taxing, and Jeſting upon himſelf; or, finally, if he do it, not of himſelf, but as it were urg'd, and provok'd to it by the Inſolencies and Contumelies of others: It certainly makes a great Addition to a Man's Reputation. And ſurely there are not a Few, who being more ſolid by Nature, and no Way windy; and conſequently wanting this Art of hoiſting Sails to their Honour; ſuffer for their Modeſty, by ſome Loſs of Reputation.

BUT for theſe Flouriſhes and Enhanſements of Virtue, howſoever ſome of weaker Judgment, and perhaps too Moral, may diſallow them; no Man will deny, but we ſhould endeavour, at leaſt, that Virtue may not through Neglect be undervalued, and debaſed below its juſt Price. This Diminution of Value, in the rating of Virtue, is wont to happen three Ways: Firſt, when a Man offers and obtrudes himſelf and Service in Matters of Buſineſs, uncall'd, unſent for: For ſuch Offices are thought rewarded, if accepted. Secondly, when a Man in the Beginning and firſt Onſet of a Buſineſs, exerts himſelf immoderately, and by doing too much, will not give that which is well done leave to ſettle; which wins an early Commendation, but in the End induces Satiety. Thirdly, when a Man is too quickly, and too lightly ſenſible of the Fruit of his Virtue, in Praiſe, Applauſe, Honour, Favour yielded him, and is too much affected and delighted therewith; concerning which Point there is a good Piece of Advice; *Beware leſt you ſeem unacquainted with great Matters, that are thus pleas'd with a ſmall Matter, as if it were great.*

BUT in Truth, a diligent Covering of Defects is of no leſs Importance, than a diſcreet and dextrous Oſtentation of Virtues. Now Defects are concealed and hid chiefly by

by a threefold Industry, and as it were under three Covers; *Caution*, *Colour*, and *Confidence*. *Caution* is, when we prudently keep off from those Things, to which we are not equal: Whereas on the other hand, bold and unquiet Spirits will be thrusting themselves, without Judgment, into Matters that they are not used to; and so publish and as it were proclaim their own Defects. *Colour* is when we sagaciously and wisely prepare and make Way, to have a favourable and commodious Construction made of our Faults and Defects, as proceeding from another Cause, or tending to some other Purpose, than is generally conceiv'd. For as to the Covers of Faults, the Poet says well; *Many Times a Vice lies hid by its Nearness to a Virtue.* Wherefore if we perceive a Defect in our selves, our Endeavour must be to borrow the *Person* and *Colour* of the next bordering Virtue, under whose Shadow it may be conceal'd. For Instance; He that is *Dull*, must pretend *Gravity*; He that is a *Coward*, *Mildness*; and so for the rest. This also is of Use, to pretend and give out some plausible Cause, that induced us to forbear doing our best, and exerting our utmost Strength; that so what is not in our Power, may seem not to be in our Will to do. As for *Confidence*, it is indeed an impudent, but yet the surest and most effectual Remedy; Namely, For a Man to profess to despise utterly, and to set at nought, what in Truth he

is not able to attain; according to the Principle of wiſe Merchants, with whom it is familiar to raiſe the Price of their own Commodities, and to beat down that of others. But there is yet another Kind of Confidence, even more impudent than this; which is, to face out a Man's own Defects, to boaſt them and obtrude them upon Opinion, as if he conceiv'd that he was beſt in thoſe Things, wherein he moſt fails; and in Order to put this Cheat upon others the more eaſily, to pretend a Diffidence of himſelf in thoſe Things, wherein, in Truth, he is beſt: Like as we ſee it in Poets; For a Poet reciting his Verſes, if you except againſt any particular Verſe, he'll preſently ſay; *And yet this Line coſt me more Labour than any of the reſt.* And then he'll bring ye ſome other Line, as tho' he ſuſpected that himſelf, and aſk your Judgment of it, which yet he knows well enough to be the beſt in the Number, and liable to no Exception at all. But above all, as to the preſent Buſineſs, *viz.* Of ſetting the faireſt Gloſs upon himſelf before others, and maintaining his Right in all Points, nothing, in my Judgment, avails more, than for a Man not to diſarm, and expoſe himſelf to Injuries and Contumelies, by an exceſſive Goodneſs and Sweetneſs of Nature; but rather in all Things, to ſhoot out now and then ſome Sparks of a Spirit free and generous, and carrying with it as much Sting as Honey.

Which

Which Kind of fortified Carriage, together with a prompt and prepared Resolution to vindicate himself from Affronts, is imposed upon some Men by Accident, and a kind of Inevitable Necessity, by reason of somewhat inherent in their Person or Fortune; as it happens in deform'd Persons, and Bastards, and in Persons any way disgrac'd; upon which account, such Men, if they don't want Virtue, are commonly Successful.

AS for the declaring of a Man's self, that is a far different Thing from *the Ostentation of a Man's self*, whereof we spake just now. For it refers not to Men's *Virtues*, or *Defects*, but to the *particular Actions of Life*. In which Point, nothing is more Politick, than to observe a wise and discreet Mean in disclosing or concealing our Thoughts touching particular Actions. For altho' Profound Secrecy, and Concealing of Counsels, and that Manner of managing Business, which works all in the Dark, and (as the *French* speak) by *Sourd, menees (qualis est via navis in mari*, when Men set Things a work without opening themselves at all) be a Thing, sometimes most Prosperous, and to be admired; yet many times it comes to pass, That *Dissimulation* (as the saying is) *begets Errors, and insnares the Dissembler himself.* For we see the greatest Politicians that ever were, have made no scruple of professing freely and with-

out Diſſimulation the Ends they aimed at. Thus *L. Sylla* openly declared, *That he wiſh'd all Men Happy or Unhappy, as they were his Friends or Enemies.* So *Cæſar*, when he went firſt into *Gaul*, boldly profeſt, *That he had rather be Firſt in an obſcure Village, than Second at Rome.* The ſame *Cæſar*, when the War was now begun, did not play the Diſſembler, if we hearken to what *Cicero* reports of him. *The other* (meaning *Cæſar*) *refuſes not, nay in a manner requires to be called (what he is) a Tyrant.* In like manner we ſee in a Letter of *Cicero*'s to *Atticus*, how far from a Diſſembler *Auguſtus Cæſar* was; who in his very Entrance upon Affairs, when he was the Darling of the Senate, nevertheleſs was wont, in his Harangues to the People, to ſwear in this Form; *ſo may I attain the Honours of my Father.* And this was no leſs than Tyranny it ſelf. It is true, to abate the Envy of the Thing a little, he uſed at the ſame Time to ſtretch forth his Hand to a Statue of *Julius Cæſar's*, which was erected in the *Roſtra.* And Men laugh'd and wonder'd and ſaid, *Is it poſſible? Or did you ever hear the like?* And yet thought he meant no hurt, he did it ſo handſomly and ingenuouſly. And thoſe that we have named were proſperous in all their Doings; *Pompey* on the other ſide, who tended to the ſame Ends, by Ways more ſhaded and obſcure (as *Tacitus* ſays of him; *more Secret, but nothing better:* And

Salluſt

Salluſt concurs in the ſame Charge; *Of a modeſt Countenance, but an immodeſt Mind:*) Made it his entire Buſineſs, and endeavour'd by infinite Stratagems, hiding his Deſires and Ambition deep, to reduce the Republick in the mean time to Anarchy and Confuſion; to the End, ſhe might of Neceſſity caſt her ſelf into his Arms; And ſo the Sovereign Power be devolv'd upon him, againſt his Will as it were, and Endeavours to the contrary. And when he thought he had gain'd his Point, being made *Conſul* alone (which no one had ever been before) he was never the nearer yet; for this Reaſon, becauſe thoſe, that without Queſtion would have co-operated with him, underſtood him not. So that he was forc'd in the End to go the beaten and common Track, *viz.* of getting Arms and an Army into his Hands, under Colour of oppoſing *Cæſar*. So ſlow, caſual, hazardous, and commonly unfortunate are thoſe Counſels, which are covered with profound Diſſimulation! And *Tacitus* ſeems to have been of the ſame Sentiment in this Matter, when he determines the Artifices of *Simulation* to be a Wiſdom of an inferior Form, in Compariſon of *Political Arts*; attributing Thoſe to *Tiberius*, Theſe to *Auguſtus Cæſar*. For ſpeaking of *Livia*, he ſaith thus; *That ſhe was a good Compoſition of the Arts of her Husband, and the Simulation of her Son.* For ſurely the Continual Habit of Diſſimulation is but a

weak and ſluggiſh Cunning, and not greatly Politique.

AS to the bending and faſhioning of the Mind; we muſt indeed endeavour with all our Might, that the Mind be made pliant and obedient to Occaſions, and Opportunities, and that it be not any way ſtiff, or Refractory towards them. For nothing is a greater Hindrance to Buſineſs, or to the eſtabliſhing of Men's Fortunes, than This: *Idem manebat, neque idem decebat*; That is, when Men continue the ſame, and follow their own Bent, tho' Occaſions are chang'd. Therefore *Livy*, when he brings in *Cato Major*, as the expert-eſt Architect of his Fortune, does well to annex this, that he had *Verſatile ingenium*, a Wit that he could command, and turn any way. And hence it comes to paſs, that grave and ſolemn Wits, and ſuch as cannot Change, have generally more Dignity than Felicity. But this Weakneſs, is implanted in ſome Men by Nature, being of themſelves diſpoſed to be Viſcous, and Knotty, and unapt to Turn. In others it has obtain'd by Cuſtom (which is a ſecond Nature) and from a Conceit, (which eaſily ſteals into Men's Minds) that they ought by no means to change a Courſe of Acting, which they have found good and proſperous by former Experience. For *Macchiavel* notes wiſely in *Fabius Maximus*, that he was for keeping Tooth and Nail to his old inveterate

veterate Custom of Delaying, and Protracting the War, when the Nature of the War was altered, and required brisker Measures. Again, in others the same Weakness proceeds from Want of Judgment; when Men do not discern in time the Periods of Things and Actions; but turn too late, when the Opportunity is slipt. Some such Thing as this *Demosthenes* reprehends in his *Athenians*, saying, *That they are like Country-Fellows, playing in a Fencing-School, who after they have receiv'd a Blow, turn their Shield to the Guard of that Part, where they were struck, and not before.* In others again this comes to pass, because they are loth to lose the Labour, taken in that way, they have once enter'd into, nor do they know how to sound a Retreat; but rather trust to get the better of Occasions, by their Perseverance; and yet in the End, when they see no other Remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage, as *Tarquin* that gave for the third Part of *Sibylla*'s Books the treble Price, when he might at first have had all three for the simple. But this Viscocity and Restiveness of Mind, from whatever Root it proceed, is most prejudicial to Business, and to Men's Fortunes: And nothing is more Politick than to make the Wheels of the Mind Concentrick and Voluble with the Wheels of Fortune. Thus much of the two Summary Precepts touching the *Architecture* of *Fortune*. *Precepts Scattered* are many; but we will only

ly ſelect a few, to ſerve as Examples to the reſt.

THE Firſt *Precept* is, that this *Architect of his Fortune* uſe his Line and Rule skilfully, and apply it rightly; That is, that he accuſtom his Mind to eſtimate and rate the Price and Value of Things, in Proportion as they conduce, more or leſs, to his particular Fortune and Ends; and that he do this ſubſtantially, and not ſuperficially. For we ſhall find *the Logical Part* (as I may term it) of ſome Men's Minds Good, but *the Mathematical Part* erroneous: That is, they can well judge of Conſequences, but not of Proportions and Compariſon, preferring Things of Shew and Senſe before Things of Subſtance and Effect. So ſome fall in Love with acceſs to Princes, others with popular Fame and Applauſe, ſuppoſing they are Things of great Purchaſe, when in many Caſes they are but Matters of Envy, Peril, and Impediment. So ſome meaſure Things according to the Labour and Difficulty, or Aſſiduity, which are ſpent about them; and think if they are ever moving, that they muſt needs advance and proceed: As *Cæſar* ſaid, contemptuouſly of *Cato Uticenſis*, deſcribing how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpoſe: *Hæc omnia magno ſtudio agebat*; *All theſe Things he drove on with huge earneſtneſs.* Hence likewiſe it comes to paſs, that Men many times abuſe them-

themſelves in thinking, if they have the Favour and Furtherance of ſome Great and Honourable Perſon, all Things muſt ſucceed to their Deſire; whereas the Truth is, that not the *Greateſt*, but the *Fitteſt* Inſtruments, ſooneſt, and moſt happily accompliſh a Work.

AND for the true Direction of the *Mathematical Part of the Mind*, (that is, for the due marſhalling of Men's Purſuits towards their Fortune, as they are more or leſs material) I hold the Order to be this. Firſt, *the Amendment of their own Minds.* For the Remove of the Impediments of the Mind, will ſooner clear the Paſſages of Fortune, than the Obtaining Fortune will remove the Impediments of the Mind. In the ſecond Place, I ſet down *Wealth* and *Means*; which perchance moſt Men would have placed firſt, becauſe of the general uſe it bears towards all Variety of Occaſions. But that Opinion I may condemn for the like Reaſon, that *Machiavel* doth in that other; *That Money is the Sinews of War*; whereas (ſaith he) the true *Sinews of War* are no other, than the *Sinews of Men's Arms*, that is, a Valiant, Populous, and Military Nation; and he voucheth aptly the Authority of *Solon*, who when *Cræſus* ſhewed him his Treaſure of Gold, ſaid to him, that if another came that had better Iron, he would be Maſter of his Gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it

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is not *Money* that is the *Sinews of Fortune*, but it is *the Sinews and Steel* of Men's Minds, Wit, Courage, Boldneſs, Reſolution, Temper, Induſtry, and the like. In the third Place I ſet down *Reputation*, becauſe of the peremptory Tides and Currents it hath, which if they be not taken in their due Time, are ſeldom recovered; it being extreme hard to play an After-Game of Reputation. And in the laſt place I ſet down *Honour*, which is more eaſily won by any of the other three, much more by all in Conjunction, than any of them can be purchaſed by *Honour*. To conclude this Precept, as there is Order and Priority in Matter, ſo is there in Time; the prepoſterous placing whereof is one of the commoneſt Errors; while Men fly to their Ends when they ſhould intend their Beginnings: And do not take Things in Order of Time as they come on, but marſhal them according to *Greatneſs*, and not according to *Inſtance*, not obſerving the good Precept,

Quod nunc inſtat, agamus.

Virg. Paſt. 9. 66.

Let us mind our Way,
Another Song requires another Day.

Dryd.

THE ſecond Precept is, that we beware, how upon a ſort of Greatneſs and Preſumption of Mind, we engage in Matters too difficult; and that we do not Row againſt the Stream. For touching Men's Fortune, the Counſel is excellent, *Fatis*

Fatis accede Deisq;

LET us look about us on every side, and observe where Things are open, where shut and obstructed, where easie, where difficult, and let us not misimploy our Strength, where the way is not passable. By doing thus, we shall both preserve our selves from being Foiled; we shall win the Opinion of Moderation; offend the fewer; and finally acquire an Opinion of Felicity; whilst those Things which perchance would of their own accord have come to pass, shall be attributed to our Industry.

THE third Precept may seem to clash a little with that immediately foregoing; though if well understood, not at all. It is this; That we do not always expect Occasions, but sometimes provoke them, and lead them the way. Which is also what *Demosthenes* intimates in high Terms. *And as it is a receiv'd Principle, that a General should lead his Army; so by Wise and Understanding Men Things themselves ought to be Led, so as that such Things be done, as they see fit to be done, and not themselves forc'd to follow Events only.* For, if we carefully attend it, we shall observe two differing Kinds of Sufficiency in managing Affairs, and handling Business. For some know how to make a dextrous use of Occasions, but

plot

plot and invent nothing of themſelves; others are all for Plots, but can't lay hold of Occaſions, that fall in opportunely. Either of theſe Abilities, is very lame and imperfect, without the other.

A Fourth Precept is, to undertake Nothing, that muſt neceſſarily take up a great deal of Time; but to have that Verſe ever ſounding in our Ears;

Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparable tempus:
But time is loſt, which never will renew.
Dryden.

And the Reaſon, why thoſe who have addicted themſelves to laborious Profeſſions, as Lawyers, Orators, Learned Divines, Writers of Books, and the like; are leſs Politick in building and promoting their own Fortunes; is no other than this; that they want time (which is otherwiſe employ'd) to inform themſelves of Particulars; to wait upon Occaſions, and to deviſe and project Deſigns tending to the making of their Fortune. Furthermore, in the Courts of Princes, and States, you will find thoſe moſt expert in advancing their own Fortune, and invading that of Others, that are in no Publick Office; but are perpetually taken up in this ſame *Advancement of Life*, that we are ſpeaking of.

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A Fifth Precept of this Knowledge, is *to Imitate Nature which doth nothing in vain*; Which surely a Man may do, if he does well Interlace his Business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally intendeth. For a Man ought in every particular Action, so to carry the motions of his Mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best Degree, yet to have it in a second, or even in a third: And if he can get no Footing at all in the thing he purposes, then to turn the Pains he has taken upon some other End, than that whereto it was design'd: and if he cannot make any thing of it for the present, yet to make it as a Seeed of somewhat in time to come: And if he can derive no solid Effect or Substance from it, neither for the present nor for the future, yet to win some good Opinion and Reputation by it, and the like: So that he should exact an Account of himself of every particular Action, to reap somewhat from it, and not to stand amaz'd and confused, if he fail in the principal Scope of his Intentions: For nothing is more Impolitique than to be wholly and solely taken up with one thing. For he that is so, loses infinite Occasions which intervene, and are many times more proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore

fore Men must be perfect in that Rule: *Hæc opertet facere, & illa non omittere.*

A Sixth Precept of this Knowledge is, not to engage a Man's self peremptorily in any thing, though it may seem at first sight not very liable to Accident, but ever to have a Window to fly out at, or a way to Retire; following the Wisdom in the antient Fable of the two Frogs which consulted when their Plash was dry, whither they should go: And the one moved to go down into a Pit, because it was not likely the Water would dry there; but the other answer'd, *True, but if it do, how shall we get out again?*

A Seventh Precept of this Knowledge, is that antient Precept of *Bias*, construed not to any Point of Perfidiousness, but only to Caution and Moderation: *Both Love as tho' you were to Hate, and Hate, as tho' you were to Love:* For it utterly betrays all Utility, for Men to imbarque themselves too far into unfortunate Friendships, troublesome Spleens, and humorous Envies or Emulations.

BUT I continue this beyond the Measure of an Example, induc'd thereto, for that I would not have such Knowledges which I note as *Deficient*, to be thought Things Imaginative, or in the Air; or an Observation or two much made of; but Things of Bulk and Mass, whereof

whereof an End is hardlier made, than a Beginning. It must be likewise remembred, that these Sketches which we have made of *Deficients*, are far from compleat Treatises, but only as small Pieces for Patterns. And lastly, no Man I suppose will think, that I mean Fortunes are not obtain'd without all this ado; For I know they come tumbling into some Men's Laps, and a Number obtain good Fortunes by Diligence, in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross Errors.

BUT as *Cicero*, when he setteth down an *Idea* of a perfect Orator, doth not mean that every Pleader should be such; And so likewise, when a Prince or a Courtier hath been described by such as have handled those Subjects, the Mould hath used to be made according to the Perfection of the Art, and not according to common Practice: So I understand it, that it ought to be done in the Description of a *Politique* Man; I mean Politique for his own Fortune.

BUT it must be remembred all this while, that the Precepts which we have set down, are all of that Kind, which may be counted and called *Good Arts*. For as to *Evil Arts*, if a Man yield himself a Disciple to *Machiavel*, who gives it in Precept; *That a Man need*

not much trouble himself about Virtue it self, but only the Appearance of it in the Eye of the World: Because the Fame and Credit of Virtue is a Furtherance to a Man, but Virtue it self a Cumber; and who in another Place gives this Rule; *That a Politician lay down this as a Foundation of his Practick Wisdom; that he presuppose, that Men can't rightly and safely be bent and brought to our Will, otherwise than by Fear; and therefore that he use his utmost Endeavours, to have all Men Obnoxious, and in Dangers, and Streights*; So that his Politician seems to be what the *Italians* call *ill seminatore delle spine*, a *Thorn-Sower:* Or if a Man would embrace that Principle, Cited by *Cicero*; *Let our Friends fall, provided our Enemies perish*; as the *Triumviri* did, who Sold the Lives of their Friends, for the Deaths of their Enemies: Or if a Man would be an Imitator of *L. Catiline*, to become an Incendiary and Disturber of States, to the End, he may fish better in troubled Waters, and clear his Fortunes; *I* (says he) *if a Fire be rais'd in my Fortunes, will extinguish it not with Water, but Ruin:* Or if any one would convert to his use that of *Lysander*, who was wont to say; *That Children are to be deceiv'd with Comfits, and Men with Oaths*; and the like corrupt and pernicious Positions; whereof (as in all other Things) there are more in Number, than of the

the good and ſound; if any Man (I ſay) be delighted with ſuch polluted Wiſdom; I deny not but ſuch an one, diſpenſing with all the Laws of Charity and Virtue, and being wholly enſlaved to the preſſing his Fortune, may with more compendiouſneſs and ſpeed advance it. But it is in Life, as it is in Ways, the ſhorteſt Way is commonly the fouleſt and dirtieſt; nor indeed is the faireſt Way much about.

BUT Men ſhould be ſo far from applying themſelves to ſuch corrupt and crooked Arts, that rather indeed they ought to ſet before their Eyes, not only that general Map of the World, *That all Things are Vanity and Vexation of Spirit*; but alſo many other more particular Directions, *viz. That Being it ſelf, without well-Being is a Curſe*; *and the Greater the Being, the Greater the Curſe*; And, *That the higheſt Reward of Virtue, is Virtue her ſelf*; *as alſo the ſevereſt Puniſhment of Vice, is Vice it ſelf*; according to what the Poet ſays excellently;

Quæ vobis, quæ digna Viri, pro talibus auſis
Præmia poſſe rear ſolvi? Pulcherrima primum
Dii Moreſq; dabunt veſtri.

Virg. Æn. 9. 217, &c.

Ye brave Young Men, what equal Gifts can we,
In recompence of ſuch Deſert, decree?
The greateſt, ſure, and beſt you can receive,
The Gods, and your own Conſcious Worth will give. Dryden.

NAY further, whilſt Men are turning and toſſing their Thoughts every Way, how they may beſt conſult their Advancement in the World, they ought, in the midſt of theſe Workings of Thought, to look up to the divine Judgments, and eternal Providence, which very often ſubverts and brings to nought the Machinations, and evil Counſels (tho' never ſo profound) of the Wicked; according to that of Scripture; *He hath conceived Iniquity, and ſhall bring forth a vain Thing.* Nay, tho' Men ſhould refrain from Injury and Evil Arts, yet this reſtleſs, inceſſant, and as it were Sabbathleſs Aſpiring to the Heights of Fortune, pays not the Tribute of our Time due unto God: Who (as we may ſee) demands and ſets apart for himſelf a Tenth of our Subſtance, and a Seventh of our Time. For to what purpoſe were it, to have an erected Face towards Heaven, and a Spirit groveling upon Earth, and eating Duſt like the Serpent? An Obſervation which even the Heathen could make;

Atq; affligit humo Divinæ particulam Auræ.

AND

AND if any Man should herein flatter himself; that he resolves to employ his Fortune well, tho' he should obtain it ill; as was wont to be said of *Augustus Cæsar*, and *Septimius Severus*; *That either they should never have been Born, or never have dyed:* They did so much Mischief in the Pursuit of their Fortune; and so much Good, when they were at the Top of it; let him take this with him, that such Compensation of Evil by Good, may be allowed after the Fact; but is deservedly condemn'd in the Purpose. Lastly, it would not be amiss for us, in that swift and hot Race towards our Fortune, to cool our selves a little, with that Elegant Conceit of the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth, in his Instructions to his Son; *That Fortune has something of the Nature of Women, that for the most Part scornfully turn off humble Servants that are too eager in their Courtship.* But this last Remedy is for those, whose Taste, from some Distemper of Mind, is corrupted. Let Men rather Build upon that Foundation, which is as the Corner-Stone of Divinity and Philosophy, which assert the same Thing in a manner touching that which ought *to be first sought*; for Divinity saith, *First seek ye the Kingdom of God, and all these Things shall be added unto you*; and Philosophy commands somewhat like this; *Seek first the Goods of the*

Mind, and the reſt ſhall be ſupplied, or their Abſence ſhall not be Prejudicial. And altho' the Human Foundation is ſomewhat Sandy, as we ſee in *M. Brutus*, who brake forth into that Speech;

I reverenc'd Thee, O Virtue, as a Thing, but Thou art an Empty Name: Yet the Divine Foundation is ſettled upon a Rock. And here we conclude the Doctrine of *the Courſe of Life for Advancement in the World.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Inſpired Divinity.

De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Lib. 9. Cap. 1.

THE Prerogative of God comprehends the whole Man; and extends as well to the *Reaſon*, as to the *Will of Man*; To the End, that Man may renounce himſelf wholly, and draw near unto God. Wherefore, as we are to obey the Divine Law, tho' we find a Reluctancy in our *Will*; So are we to believe the Word of God, tho' we find a Reluctancy in our *Reaſon*. For if we believe only that which is agreeable to our *Reaſon*, we give Aſſent to the *Matter*, not to the *Author*; Which is no more than we would do towards a ſuſpected and diſcredited Witneſs. But *that Faith which was accounted to* Abraham *for Righteouſneſs*, was of ſuch a Point, as was Gen. 18.

that, at which *Sarah* laugh'd; Who therein was an Image of Natural Reason. By how much therefore any Divine Mystery is more discordant, and incredible, so much the more Honour is given to God in Believing it, and the *Victory of our Faith* becomes the more Noble. Nay even Sinners, the more they are oppressed in Conscience, yet if they repose a Trust in the Mercy of God for their Salvation, do by this so much the greater Honour to God; for all Despair is a Reproach of the Deity.

FURTHERMORE (if we consider the Thing aright) more worthy it is to *Believe* than to *Know*; As we now *Know*. For in *Knowledge* Man's Mind suffers from Sense, which results from Things Material; but in *Belief* the Spirit suffers from Spirit, and such an one as it holdeth far more authorised than it self, and so suffers from the worthier Agent.

The Case is otherwise in the *State of* 1 Cor. 13. *Glory*; for then *Faith shall cease, and we shall Know, as we are Known.*

WHEREFORE we may conclude, that Sacred Theology must be drawn from the Word and Oracles of God, not from the Light of Nature, or the Dictates of Reason. For it is written, *The Heavens declare the* Psal. 19. *Glory of God:* But we find it no where written; *The Heavens declare*

clare the Will of God. Of this it is pronounc'd, *Ad legem & teſtimonia*; *ſi non fecerint ſecundum verbum illud*, &c. Nor does this hold only in thoſe Great Myſteries of the Deity, of the Creation, of the Redemption, but appertains alſo to the Law Moral truly Interpreted. *Love your Enemies*; *Do good to them that hate you*, &c. *That you may be the Children of your Heavenly Father, who ſendeth his Rain upon the Juſt and Unjuſt.* Mat. 5. Which Words certainly deſerve that Applauſe, *Nec vox hominem ſonat:* For it is a Voice beyond the Light of Nature. So we ſee the Heathen Poets, eſpecially when they ſpeak Pathetically, ſtill Expoſtulate with Laws and Moral Doctrines (which are yet far more free and indulgent than Divine Laws) as if in a kind of malignity they oppoſed Nature;

——*Et quod Natura remittit*
Invida Jura negant.——

SO *Dendamis* the Indian to *Alexander*'s Meſſengers; *That he had heard indeed ſomewhat of the Name of* Pythagoras, *and ſome other of the wiſe Men of* Greece; *And that he believed them Great Men*; *but that they had one Fault, which was, that they had in too great Reverence and Veneration, a certain Imaginary Thing which they called Law and Manners.* So it muſt be confeſſed, that a great part of the Law Moral is of that Perfection, where-

whereunto the Light of Nature cannot aſpire: Notwithſtanding, what is ſaid, That Men have, even from the Light and Law of Nature, ſome Notions of Virtue, Vice, Juſtice, Wrong, Good, Evil; that is very true. For it is to be noted, that the Light of Nature is taken in two Senſes. *Firſt*, As it ſprings from Senſe, Induction, Reaſon, Argument, according to the Laws of Heaven and Earth: *Secondly*, As it is imprinted and ſhines upon the Spirit of Man by an inward Inſtinct, according to the Law of Conſcience; which is a kind of Spark, and the Relicks as it were, of his former and primitive Purity. In which latter Senſe chiefly, the Soul participates of ſome Light to behold and diſcern the Perfection of the Moral Law; which Light however is not altogether clear, but of ſuch ſort, as to check the Vice rather, than fully to inform the Duty. So then the Doctrine of Religion, as well Moral as Myſtical, depends upon Divine Revelation.

THE Uſe notwithſtanding of Human Reaſon in Spiritual Things, and the Latitude thereof is very great and general. For it is not for nothing, that the Apoſtle calls Religion, *our reaſonable Service of God.* Nay, the very Ceremonies and Figures of the Old Law were full of Reaſon and Signification, much more than the Ceremonies of Idolatry, and Magick, which were Surd and Mute, teaching

teaching nothing, no not ſo much as inſinuating any thing. But the Chriſtian Faith, as in all Things, ſo particularly in this, deſerves to be highly magnified, that it holds and preſerves the Golden-mediocrity, as to the Uſe of Reaſon, and Diſputation (which is the Offſpring of Reaſon) between the Law of the *Heathen* and the Law of *Mahomet*, which have embraced the two Extremes. For the Religion of the *Heathen* had no conſtant Belief or Confeſſion, but left all to the Liberty of Argument: And the Religion of *Mahomet* on the other ſide, interdicteth Argument altogether; the one having the very Face of Errour; the other of Impoſture; whereas the Chriſtian Faith doth both admit and reject Diſputation, but according to due Bounds.

THE Uſe of Human Reaſon in Matters pertaining to Religion is of two Sorts; The one, in the Conception and Apprehenſion of the Myſteries of God to us revealed; The other, in the Inferring and Deriving of Doctrine and Direction thereupon. As to the Conception of the Myſteries, we ſee God vouchſafes to deſcend to the Weakneſs of our Capacity, ſo expreſſing and unfolding his Myſteries, as they may beſt be comprehended by us; and grafting as it were his Revelations, and Holy Doctrine, upon the Conceptions and Notions of our Reaſon; and ſo applying his Inſpirations to open our Underſtanding, as the Form

Form of the Key is fitted to the Ward of the Lock. In which reſpect notwithſtanding, we ought not to be wanting to our ſelves: For ſince God himſelf makes uſe of the Means of our Reaſon in his Illuminations, we ought alſo to exerciſe and turn the ſame every way, whereby we may become more capable to receive and imbibe the Holy Myſteries; with this Caution, that the Mind be dilated, according to its Model, to the Amplitude of the Myſteries; and not the Myſteries ſtreightened and contracted to the narrowneſs of the Mind.

AS for Inferences, we ought to know, that there is allowed us a Uſe of Reaſon, and Argumentation (as to Myſteries) Secondary and Reſpective, tho' not Original and Abſolute. For after the Articles and Principles of Religion are once placed, and wholly exempted from the Examination of Reaſon; it is then permitted unto us to make Deductions and Inferences from them, and according to the Analogy of them, for our better Direction. In Things Natural indeed this holds not. For both the Principles themſelves are examinable, by Induction, tho' not by Syllogiſm: And beſides, thoſe Principles or firſt Poſitions have no Repugnancy with that Reaſon, which draws down and deduces the Inferior Poſitions. The Caſe is otherwiſe in Religion; Where both the firſt Propoſitions are their own

own Supporters, and ſubſiſt by themſelves; And again, they are not regulated by that Reaſon, which deduces the conſequent Propoſitions. Nor does this hold in Religion alone, but in other Sciences alſo, both of greater and ſmaller Nature; namely wherein there are not only *Poſita* but *Placita*; for in ſuch alſo there can be no uſe of abſolute Reaſon. We ſee it familiarly in Games of Wit, as Chefs, or the like; The Draughts or firſt Laws of the Game are Poſitive: but How? Merely *ad placitum*, and not examinable by Reaſon; But then how to direct our Play thereupon with beſt Advantage to win the Game, is Artificial and Rational. So in Human Laws, there are many Grounds and Maxims, which are *Placita Juris*, Poſitive upon Authority and not upon Reaſon, and therefore not to be diſputed: But what is moſt juſt, not abſolutely, but relatively, and according to the Analogy of thoſe Maxims, That affordeth a large Field of Diſputation. Such therefore is that Secondary Reaſon, which hath place in Divinity, which is grounded upon the *Placits* of God.

AND as there is a double Uſe of Human Reaſon in Matters Divine, ſo in the ſame Uſe alſo, there is a double Exceſs. The One, when too curious an Inquiry is made into the Manner of the Myſtery; The Other, when as great Authority is attributed to Inferences,

as

as to Principles. For both He may seem to be a Disciple of *Nicodemus*, who per-
Joan 3. 4. tinaciously inquires, *How can a Man be Born when he is old?* And he can in no wise be accounted a Disciple of St. *Paul*, that does not sometimes insert in his Doctrines; *I, not the Lord*; Or That;
1 Cor. 7. *According to my Judgment.* For that Stile suits well most Inferences. But Men are now too ready to usurp the Stile, *Non ego, sed Dominus*, and not only so, but to bind it with the Thunder and Denunciation of *Curses*, and *Anathema's*, to the terror of those who have not sufficiently learnt out of *Solomon*, that *the causeless Curse shall not come.* Wherefore to my Understanding it would be a wholesom and very useful Course, if there were a sober and diligent Treatise compiled, which is a Kind of Divine Dialectick, might give Directions concerning *The true Limits and Use of Reason in Spiritual Things*; Which would be a Kind of Opiate Medicine, not only to quiet and lay asleep the Vanity of Curious Speculations, wherewith the Schools labour, but likewise to calm and mitigate the Fury of Controversies, wherewith the Church labours. For it cannot but open Men's Eyes to see that many Controversies do merely pertain to that which is either not Revealed, or Positive, and that many others do grow upon weak and obscure Inferences or Deductions. A Treatise of this Nature we set down as Deficient,

ficient, and Term it *Sophron*, or, *The Right Uſe of Human Reaſon in Matters Divine.*

2. IT Imports exceedingly the Peace of the Church, that the League of Chriſtians, preſcribed by our Saviour, in thoſe two Clauſes, which ſeem a little Contradictory, be well and clearly expounded: whereof the One defines thus; *He that is not with us, is againſt us:* The Other thus; *He that is not againſt us, is with us.* Mat. 12. 30. Mar. 9. 40. From hence it plainly appears, That there are ſome Articles, wherein whoſoever diſſents, is to be eſteemed as out of the League: And others, wherein a Man may diſſent, without breaking the League. For the Bonds of Chriſtian Communion are ſet down; *One Faith, One Baptiſm*, &c. and not, *One Rite, One Opinion.* Thus we ſee the Coat of our Saviour was *entire without ſeam*, and ſo is the Doctrine of the Scriptures in it ſelf: But the Garment of the Church was of *divers Colours*, and yet not divided. The Chaff may and ought to be ſevered from the Corn in the Ear; But the Tares muſt not be pulled from the Corn in the Field. When *Moſes* ſaw the *Iſraelite* and *Egyptian* fighting, he did not ſay, *Why ſtrive you?* but drew his Sword, and ſlew the *Egyptian:* But when he ſaw the two *Iſraelites* Ephes. 4. 5. Joan. 19. 23. Exod. 2.

fight,

fight, he ſaid, *You are Brethren, why ſtrive you?* So that it is a Thing of great moment and uſe well to define, what, and of what Latitude thoſe Points are, which diſcorporate Men from the Body of the Church, and caſt them out, and quite caſhire them from the Communion and Fellowſhip of the Faithful. Now if any one think this has been done long ago, let him well conſider, with what Sincerity and Moderation. In the mean time it is likely, that he that makes mention of *Peace* will receive *Jehu*'s Anſwer to the Meſſenger (*Is it Peace Jehu?*) *What haſt thou to do with Peace? Turn and follow me.* Peace is not the Thing that moſt People love, but Party. Notwithſtanding I thought good to ſet down amongſt *Deficients*, as a wholeſom and profitable Work, a Treatiſe *of the Degrees of Unity in the City of God.*

3. SEEING the Parts of Holy Scripture, as to the Information of Theology, are ſo great, we ought eſpecially to conſider their Interpretation. Nor do we here ſpeak of the *Authority* of Interpreting them, which is eſtabliſht in the Conſent of the Church, but of the *Manner* of Interpreting them. This is of two Sorts; *Methodical*, and *Solute*, or at large. For theſe divine Waters, which infinitely excel thoſe of *Jacob*'s Well, are drawn forth much in the ſame manner, as Natural Waters uſe to be out of Wells; which are either forced

for ced up into a Ciſtern, and ſo convey'd and derived by Pipes for Publick and Private Uſe; or elſe are drawn and received in Buckets and Veſſels immediately where they ſpring, to be uſed out of hand, as Occaſion requires. The former ſort whereof, tho' it ſeem to be the more ready, yet in my Judgment is more ſubject to Corrupt. This is that Method which hath exhibited unto us the Scholaſtical Divinity, whereby Divinity hath been reduc'd into an Art, as into a Ciſtern; and the Streams of Axioms and Poſitions, derived and diſtributed from thence into all Parts.

IN this, Men have ſought three Things, a Summary *Brevity*, a compacted *Strength*, and a compleat *Perfection:* The two firſt of which they fail to find, and the laſt they ought not to ſeek. For as to *Brevity*, we ſee in all Summary Methods, while Men purpoſe to abridge, they give cauſe to dilate. For the Sum or Abridgment by Contraction becomes Obſcure, the Obſcurity requires Expoſition, and the Expoſition is deduced into large Commentaries, or into Common Places, and Titles, which grow to be more vaſt than the Original Writings, whence the Sum was at firſt extracted. So we ſee the Volumes of the School-Men are greater much than the firſt Writings of the Fathers, whence the Maſter of the Sentences made his Sum or Collectino. So in like manner the Volumes of the

Modern Doctors of the Civil Law exceed thoſe of the antient Juriſconſults, of which *Tribonian* compiled the Digeſt. So that this Courſe of Sums and Commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the Body of Sciences more immenſe in Quality, and more baſe in Subſtance.

AND for *Strength*, it is true, that Knowledges reduced into exact Methods have a ſhew of Strength, in that each Part ſeems to ſupport and ſuſtain the other: But this is more Satisfactory than Subſtantial, like unto Buildings, which ſtand by Architecture, and Compaction, which are more ſubject to Ruin, than thoſe that are Built more ſtrong in their ſeveral Parts, tho' leſs Compacted. But it is plain, that the more you recede from your Grounds, the weaker do you conclude; and as in Nature, the more you remove your ſelf from Particulars, the greater Peril of Error you do incur: So, much more in Divinity, the more you recede from the Scriptures by Inferences and Conſequences, the more weak and dilute are your Poſitions.

AND as for *Perfection*, or *Compleatneſs* in Divinity, it is not to be ſought, which makes this Courſe of Artificial Divinity the more ſuſpect. For he that will reduce a Knowledge into an Art, will make it round and uniform: But in Divinity many Things muſt

muſt be left abrupt, and concluded with this: *O the Depth of the Wiſdom and Knowledge of God, how unſathomable are his Judgments, and his Ways untraceable!* So again the Apoſtle ſaith, *We know in Part*; and to have the Form of a Total, where there is but Matter for a Part, cannot be without Supplies by Suppoſition and Preſumption. And therefore I conclude, that the true Uſe of theſe Sums and Methods hath place in Inſtitutions or Introductions, preparatory unto Knowledge: but in them, or by Deducement from them, to handle the main Body and Subſtance of a Knowledge, is in all Sciences prejudicial, and in Divinity dangerous.

AS to the Interpretation of the Scriptures *Solute* and at large, there have been divers Kinds introduced and deviſed, ſome of them rather curious and unſafe, than ſober and warranted. Notwithſtanding thus much muſt be confeſſed, that the Scriptures being given by Inſpiration, and not by Human Reaſon, do differ from all other Books in the Author: which by Conſequence doth draw on ſome Difference to be uſed by the Expoſitor. For the Inditer of them did know four Things, which no Man attains to know; which are the Myſteries of the Kingdom of Glory; the Perfection of the Laws of Nature; the Secrets of the Heart of Man; and the future Succeſſion of all Ages. For as to the firſt, it

is ſaid, *He that preſſeth into the Light, ſhall be oppreſſed of the Glory.* And again, *No Man ſhall ſee my Face and live.* To the Second, *When he prepared the Heavens I was preſent, when by Law and Compaſs he encloſed the Deep.* To the Third, *Neither was it needful that any ſhould bear witneſs to him of Man, for he knew well what was in Man.* And to the laſt, *From the Beginning are known to the Lord all his Works.*

FROM the former two of theſe have been drawn certain Senſes and Expoſitions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the Bounds of Sobriety; The one *Anagogical*, and the other *Philoſophical.* But as to the former, Man is not to prevent his Time; *Videmus nunc per ſpeculum in Ænigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem*; wherein nevertheleſs there ſeemeth to be a Liberty granted, as far as to the poliſhing of this Glaſs, or ſome moderate Explication of this *Ænigma.* But to preſs too far into it, cannot but cauſe a Diſſolution and Overthrow of the Spirit of Man. For in the Body there are three Degrees of that we receive into it; *Aliment*, *Medicine*, and *Poyſon*; whereof *Aliment* is that, which the Nature of Man can perfectly alter and overcome; *Medicine* is that, which is partly converted by Nature, and partly converteth Nature; and *Poyſon* is that which worketh wholly upon Nature, ſo as that Nature cannot

not in any part work upon that. So in the Mind, whatſoever Knowledge Reaſon cannot at all work upon and convert, is a mere Intoxication, and indangers a Diſſolution of the Mind and Underſtanding. But for the Latter, it hath been extremely ſet on Foot of late Time by the School of *Paracelſus*, and ſome others, that have pretended to find the Truth of all Natural Philoſophy in the Scriptures; ſcandalizing and traducing all other Philoſophy, as Heatheniſh and Profane. But there is no ſuch Enmity between God's Word, and his Works. Neither do they give Honour to the Scriptures, as they ſuppoſe, but embaſe them. For to ſeek Heaven and Earth in the Word of God, (whereof it is ſaid, *Heaven and Earth ſhall paſs, but my Word ſhall not paſs*) is to ſeek Temporal Things amongſt Eternal; And as to ſeek Divinity in Philoſophy, is *to ſeek the Living amongſt the Dead*; So to ſeek Philoſophy in Divinity, is to ſeek the Dead amongſt the Living. Neither are the *Pots* or *Lavers*, whoſe Place was in the outward part of the Temple, to be ſought in the Holieſt Place of all, where the Ark of the Teſtimony was Seated. And again, the Scope or Purpoſe of God, is not to expreſs Matters of Nature in the Scriptures, otherwiſe than in Paſſage, and for application to Man's Capacity, and to Matters Moral or Divine. And it is a true Rule, *Authoris aliud*

agentis parva authoritas. For it were a ſtrange Concluſion, if a Man ſhould uſe a Similitude for Ornament or Illuſtration ſake, borrowed from Nature or Hiſtory, according to vulgar Conceit, as of a *Baſilisk*, an *Unicorn*, a *Centaur*, a *Eriareus*, an *Hydra*, or the like, that therefore he muſt needs be thought to affirm the Matter thereof poſitively to be true. To conclude therefore, theſe two Interpretations, the one by Reduction or Ænigmatical, the other Philoſophical or Phyſical, which have been received and purſued in imitation of the *Rabbins* and *Cabaliſts*, are to be confined with a *Noli altum ſapere, ſed time.*

BUT the two latter Points known to God, and unknown to Man; *Touching the Secrets of the Heart, and the Succeſſions of Time*; do make a juſt and ſound difference between the manner of the Expoſition of the Scriptures, and all other Books. For it is an excellent Obſervation, which hath been made upon the Anſwers of our Saviour Chriſt, to many of the Queſtions which were propounded to him, how that they are impertinent to the State of the Queſtion demanded; the Reaſon whereof is, becauſe not being like Man, who knows Man's Thoughts by his Words, but knowing Man's Thoughts immediately, he never anſwer'd their Words, but their Thoughts. Much in the like manner it is with

with the Scriptures, which being written to the Thoughts of Men, and to the Succeſſion of all Ages, with a foreſight of all Hereſies, Contradictions, differing Eſtates of the Church, yea, and particularly of the Elect, are not to be interpreted only according to the Latitude of the proper Senſe of the Place, and reſpectively towards that preſent Occaſion, whereupon the Words were uttered; or in preciſe Congruity or Contexture with the Words before or after, or in Contemplation of the principal Scope of the Place, but have in themſelves not only totally, or collectively, but diſtributively in Clauſes and Words, infinite Springs and Streams of Doctrine to water the Church in every part, and therefore as the Literal Senſe is, as it were the main Stream or River: So the Moral Senſe chiefly, and ſometimes the *Allegorical* or *Typical* are they whereof the Church hath moſt uſe: Not that I wiſh Men to be bold in *Allegories*, or *Indulgent*, or light in Alluſions; but that I do much condemn that Interpretation of the Scripture, which is only after the manner as Men uſe to interpret a Profane Book.

IN this Part touching the Expoſition of the Scriptures, I can report no Deficience; but by way of remembrance this I will add; In peruſing Books of Divinity, I find many Books of Controverſies, and many of Common Places

and Treatises, a Mass of positive Divinity, as it is made an Art: a Number of Sermons and Lectures, and many prolix Commentaries upon the Scriptures with Harmonies and Concordances. But that Form of Writing in Divinity, which in my Judgment is of all others most rich and pretious, is positive Divinity collected upon particular Texts of Scripture in brief Observations, not dilated into Common Places, not chasing after Controversies, not reduced into Method of Art; a Thing abounding in Sermons, which will vanish, but defective in Books which will remain, and a Thing wherein this Age excelleth. For I am perswaded, and I may speak it with an *Absit invidia verbo*, and no ways in derogation of Antiquity, but as in a good Emulation between the Vine and the Olive; That if the Choice, and best of those Observations upon Texts of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in Sermons, in the space of these Forty Years and more (leaving out the Largeness of Exhortations and Applications thereupon) had been set down in a Continuance, it had been the best Work of Divinity, which had been written since the Apostles Times. And certainly as Wines, which at the first Treading run gently, are pleasanter, than those forc'd by the Wine-Press; (for these Tast of the Stone and Skin of the Grape;) So those Doctrines are exceeding wholesom and

and sweet, which flow from Scriptures gently pres'd, and are not wrested to Controversies, or Common Places. Such a Treatise we will term *the Emanations of Scripture into Positive Doctrines.*

Of the Matter of Divinity.

4. THE Matter informed or revealed by Divinity is of two Kinds, Matter of Belief, and Truth of Opinion: And Matter of Service and Adoration; which is also judged and directed by the former; The One being as the internal Soul of Religion, and the Other as the external Body thereof. And therefore the Heathen Religion was not only a Worship of Idols, but the whole Religion was an Idol in it self, for it had no Soul, that is, no Certainty of Belief or Confession, as a Man may well think, considering the chief Doctors of the Church were the Poets, and the Reason was, because the Heathen Gods were not jealous Gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as they had Reason. Neither did they respect Purity of Heart, so they might have external Honour and Rites.

BUT out of these two do result and issue four main Branches of Divinity; *Faith*, *Manners*, *Liturgy*, and *Government*. *Faith* contains

tains the Doctrine of the Nature of God, of the Attributes of God, and of the Works of God. The Nature of God conſiſteth of three Perſons in Unity of Godhead. The Attributes of God are common to the Deity, or reſpective to the Perſons. The Works of God Summary are two, that of the *Creation*, and that of the *Redemption*. And both theſe Works, as in Total they appertain to the Unity of the Godhead; So in their Parts they refer to the three Perſons: That of the Creation in the Maſs of the Matter, to the Father; in the Diſpoſition of the Form, to the Son; and in the Continuance and Conſervation of the Being, to the Holy Spirit: So That of the Redemption, in the Election and Counſel, to the Father; in the whole Act and Conſummation, to the Son; and in the Application, to the Holy Spirit: For by the Holy Ghoſt was Chriſt conceived in Fleſh, and by the Holy Ghoſt are the Elect regenerate in Spirit. This Work likewiſe we conſider either effectually in the Elect, or privately in the Reprobate, or according to the Appearance in the Viſible Church.

FOR *Manners*, the Doctrine thereof is contained in the Law, which diſcloſeth Sin. The Law it ſelf is divided according to the Edition of thereof, into the Law of Nature, the Law Moral, and the Law Poſitive; and accord-

according to the Stile, into Negative and Affirmative, Prohibitions and Commandments. Sin in the Matter and Subject thereof, is divided according to the Commandments; in the Form thereof, it referreth to the three Persons in Deity; Sins of Infirmity against the Father, whose more special Attribute is Power: Sins of Ignorance against the Son, whose Attribute is Wisdom: And Sins of Malice against the Holy Ghost, whose Attribute is Grace or Love. In the Motions of it, it either moveth to the Right Hand, or to the Left; either to blind Devotion, or to profane and libertine Transgression, either in imposing Restraint, where God granteth Liberty, or in taking Liberty, where God imposeth Restraint. In the Degrees and Progress of it, it divideth it self into Thought, Word, or Act. And in this Part I commend much the diducing of the Law of God to Cases of Conscience, for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting whole, of the Bread of Life. But that which quickneth both these Doctrines of *Faith* and *Manners* is, the Elevation and Consent of the Heart, whereunto appertain Books of Exhortation, Holy Meditation, Christian Resolution, and the like.

FOR the Liturgy or Service, it consisteth of the Reciprocal Acts between God and Man, which on the Part of God, are the Preaching of the Word, and the Sacraments, which are Seals

Seals to the Covenant, or as the Viſible Word: And on the Part of Man, Invocation of the Name of God, and under the Law, Sacrifices, which were as Viſible Prayers or Confeſſions, but now the Adoration being *in Spirit and Truth*, there remain only *the Calves of the Lips*, altho' the uſe of Holy Vows of Thankfulneſs and Retribution, may be accounted alſo as ſealed Petitions.

AND for the Government of the Church, it conſiſteth of the Patrimony of the Church, the Franchiſes of the Church, and the Offices, and the Juriſdictions of the Church, and the Laws of the Church directing the Whole. All which have two Conſiderations; the One in themſelves; the Other, how they ſtand compatible and agreeable to the Civil State. This *Matter* of Divinity is handled either in Form of Inſtruction of Truth: or in Form of Confutation of Falſehood. The Declinations from Religion, beſides the Primitive, which is Atheiſm and the Branches thereof, are three, *Hereſies*, *Idolatrie*, and *Witch-craft: Hereſies*, when we ſerve the true God with a falſe Worſhip: *Idolatrie*, when we Worſhip falſe Gods, ſuppoſing them to be true: And *Witch-craft*, when we adore falſe Gods, knowing them to be wicked and falſe. For *Witch-craft* is the height of *Idolatrie*. And yet we ſee tho' thoſe be true Degrees, *Samuel* teacheth us that they are all of a Nature, when there is once a receding from the

the Word of God, for he saith, *Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, & quasi sceleus Idolatriæ nolle acquiescere.*

THESE Things I have passed over so briefly, because I can report no Deficience concerning them: For I can find no Space or Ground that lieth vacant and unsown in the *Matter* of Divinity; so diligent have Men been, either in sowing of good Seed, or in sowing Tares.

THUS have I made it as it were a small Globe of the Intellectual World, as faithfully as I could; together with a Designation and Description of those Parts, which I find, either not constantly occupied, or not sufficiently improved, by the Industry and Labour of Man. In which Work, if I have in any Point receded from the Opinion of the Antients, I would have it interpreted as done with a Design of Proceeding in *Melius*, not in *Aliud*; with Purpose of Amendment and Proficience; and not of Change and Innovation. For I could not be true to my self, nor to the Argument I handle, if I were not willing to go beyond others; But yet not more willing, than to have others go beyond me again. Which may the better appear by this, that I have propounded my Opinions naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupy the Liberty of Men's Judgments by disputatious Confuta-

tions

tions. For in any thing that is well ſet down, I am in good Hope, that if the firſt Reading move an Objection, the ſecond Reading will make an Anſwer. And in thoſe Things wherein I have chanced to err, I am ſure I have offered no Violence to Truth by litigious Arguments; which certainly have this contrary Effect and Operation, that they add Authority to Error, and deſtroy the Authority of that which is well Invented. For Controverſie is an Honour to Falſehood, as on the other ſide it is a Repulſe to Truth. In the mean time, I call to mind an Anſwer *Themiſtocles* made, who, when a Deputy from an inconſiderable Village, had boaſted great Matters of it in a ſet Harangue, takes him up thus, *Friend*, ſays He, *Your Words require a State.* Certainly it may very well be objected to me, That *my Words ask an Age.* A *whole Age* perhaps to Prove them; And *ſeveral Ages*, to Perfect them. Nevertheleſs, ſeeing even the greateſt Things are owing to their Beginnings, it will be enough for me *to have Sown unto Poſterity, and the Immortal God:* Whoſe Divine Majeſty I humbly Implore, thro' his Son, and our Saviour, that He would Vouchſafe graciouſly to Accept theſe, and ſuch like *Sacrifices of Human Underſtanding*, ſeaſoned with *Religion*, as with *Salt*, and *Offered* firſt to His Glory, and next to the Honour of your Majeſty, to whom on Earth I am moſt bounden.

Deo Gloria.

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